Emerging Contours of Contemporary Asian Maritime Connectivity: Economic and Strategic Objectives

Introduction

The twenty-first century has been widely regarded as the Asian century, especially in light of the recent developments in Asian politics concerning the rise of China and India as well as the relocation of the pivot of the global financial system to Asia (Khanna, 2019, p. 148). As such, there has been considerable change in how global politics has been perceived over the years. At the end of the Second World War, the discourse on global politics and international relations was mostly dominated by securitisation and formation of organisations responsible for collective security, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. However, today the narrative has shifted from past concerns centred on security toward a new direction of development hinged on connectivity, infrastructure and influence. The conventional notions of ‘balance of power’ are now assessed in terms of the influence a country enjoys, which in turn depends on nodes of influence and outreach through connectivity linkages. Furthermore, that may often be sufficient to maintain a position of hegemony and unchallenged dominance (Walt, 1987). The rise of connectivity and infrastructure as a parameter of development is particularly evident in Asia. In light of the USA’s increasing reluctance to participate in a collective global politics, Asian players such as China, India and Japan are trying to establish connectivity networks to leverage their position in Asia individually as well as along with other partners. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his ambitious foreign policy agenda, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to leverage China’s strategic advantage in geopolitics through a network of connectivity linkages and development projects spanning across Asia, Eurasia and even mainland Europe. The USD8 trillion-dollar investment project comprises a reprised version of the ancient Silk Road that formed the primary conduit of trade and exchange until the middle of the fifteenth century. Interestingly, the BRI has been designed to rejuvenate China’s erstwhile connectivity and trading linkages which were instrumental in shaping its past glory, articulated in Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’. The Chinese BRI has two components in the continental Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road. This has already enabled China to spread its roots beyond Asia, to Africa and even parts of Europe (Cai, 2017). This upsurge in countries resorting to building their own network of connectivity linkages is, however, not devoid of strategic planning and geopolitical implications. In the same vein, India has also initiated its own network of connectivity linkages which insinuates a nuanced counterapproach to the BRI-dominated regional order in Asia, based on India’s historical networks of connectivity. Therefore, a resurgent tendency of Asian countries to position themselves as leaders of the past global order is notably visible. In this context, it is imperative to take stock of the strategic initiatives of China and India to understand how they have attempted to revive their historical legacies to realise their current geopolitical ambitions.

Connectivity linkages, especially those which have surfaced in Asia currently involve critical strategic hedging, with stakeholders leaning cautiously on either side of regional power spectrum. Chinese President Xi is particularly keen on exploring the opportunities available at hand which involve not just building strategic networks with countries but also extending financial loans to countries.

The fundamental constituents of power have shifted across Asia. The power determinants in Asian geopolitics are now moving toward a direction where connectivity linkages are vital in strengthening relations and establishing gateways for the assertion of dominance. India’s calculated move in not joining the BRI has drawn the criticism of perceptive loss in keeping out of the massive infrastructure and connectivity labyrinth. Even though China has become the biggest power dominating Asia and India on a mission to resist any domination of South Asia by an external power, it would not be strategically advantageous for India to become a part of China’s mega plan which also challenges India’s sovereignty (Kwatra, 2018). These complications surrounding the BRI have further underscored the need for ‘balance of influence’ in the Asian maritime domain. Much of China’s influence is through networks, infrastructural projects that are being built as well as the loans doled out now shape its influence. As such, we have seen increasing efforts by larger countries to influence smaller countries. Countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, Nepal and Bangladesh are all cases in point. China’s overbearing influence on smaller Asian countries has proven to be a real challenge for India in South Asia. The fact that China’s BRI enjoys participation from over 60 countries, including most of South Asia but barring India and Bhutan, does give China a strategic leverage over India (Zheping, 2017). Various countries including India which are stakeholders in this changing order are now participating in their own connectivity linkages, leading to a labyrinth of crisscrossing connectivity initiatives spanning throughout Asia.

Contemporary Asian Connectivity Linkages

Contemporary Asian connectivity has seen rapid growth over the years, especially in the twenty-first century. In the Asian context, the theoretical understanding of the traditional ‘balance of power’ theory of international relations has marked a shift to accommodate elements of soft power such as influence assertion through culture, trade and increasing people-to-people interaction. Culture has increasingly become an important point of convergence, especially in the Asian context. The aspect of shared cultural values has gained centrality in the recent efforts by China and India to leverage their strategic ambit of influence by invoking their central role in shaping the global order in the past. For larger Asian states, cultural reminiscence plays an important role in helping these major civilisational states to reflect on their historical past to revive the past.

However, besides the element of culture and history, China’s BRI has attained high symbolism in Asian connectivity. The multi-trillion-dollar pet globalisation project conceptualised by Xi Jinping envisages connecting Asia with parts of Africa and Europe through roads, railways, ports and industrial parks. The BRI has been widely regarded as the biggest project undertaken by any country yet, in terms of its magnitude, budget, involvement and participation. BRI is an apt Asian example of how China is leveraging the balance of power constituents to develop a new model of influence. China’s soft power strategy centres on harmony with the promotion of peaceful development in a harmonious world (Hazarika & Mishra, 2016). This is particularly important in the increasingly normalised view of China as a dependable partner and a harbinger of economic growth and prosperity, drawn from a similar perception of China as a civilisation state in the past.

President Xi Jinping has blended his foreign policy initiatives with his international objectives through the BRI in such a way that it now provides China with formidable expanse extending from South Asia to Europe and Latin America. However, despite claims of this being a benign expanse, there are clear signs of underlying contestation. The BRI consists of several bilateral and multilateral projects and institutions at the inter-regional level. The main projects are New Eurasian Land Bridge, China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor, China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor, China–Indo-China Peninsula Corridor, Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road. The BRI project is funded by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Asian Development Bank, New Development Bank and some other institutions. China’s engagement involves not just network development and infrastructural collaborations but also extending financial loans and multilateral engagements with countries across the span of BRI. The project is a comprehensive initiative designed to cater to economic, cultural as well as security aspects through connectivity.

South Asia, in particular, has grown to be the epicentre of China’s emerging influence with new fronts and collaborations. China’s increasing dominance in this region along with India’s resistance to prevent loss of regional influence have emerged as nuanced counterstrategies in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the larger Indo-Pacific which has increasingly gained new momentum in the strategic maritime discourse (Khurana, 2019). Similarly, India’s approach to South Asia has been guided by a sense of cohesion and region building which are in turn governed by economic concerns, security aspects and cultural discourse (Chakma, 2018). Especially, the aspect of cultural discourse has increasingly dominated India’s strategic vision in light of China’s increasing economic and strategic footprints in the region. Therefore, India’s turn toward cultural similarities and historical ties can be understood as a tactical alternative chosen to carve out its strategic space in its imagined sphere of influence. For instance, India’s Mausam initiative has been invoked to trace India’s historical economic and aesthetic connections with the Indian Ocean littoral.

The BRI mechanism involves collaboration with one or many countries for projects involving loans to needy countries and infrastructure development inside other countries. The financial condition of the countries taking loans from China often becomes an irreversible situation for them, given their inability to repay the loan. In many instances, China has used these countries’ inability to pay back the loan as ‘debt-trap’ and has capitalised on them to do territorial swap and own or manage ports, bases and other nodes of influence on their territory. Sri Lanka is one of the countries which has fallen in debt-trap against the loan it had received from China. In South Asia, China is using its partner countries to strategically build a chain of present through bases and ports in the IOR. The ‘String of Pearls’, first used in the Western discourse, has emerged as a contextual geopolitical theory to explain the network of Chinese strategic nodes in IOR. By definition, each Pearl represents some form of permanent Chinese military installation in a series of locations along a ‘String’ stretching from southern China, through the Indian Ocean, to the areas from where China imports much of its natural resources, such as Africa and the Middle East (Sarkar, 2016).

Consequentially, China is now using territories across Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, Pakistan, Djibouti and so on to build naval, airbases and assisting these countries in building coastal and maritime infrastructure along the rim of the IOR. This string of bases is not just a boost for Chinese presence in the region, reflecting its extent of influence but also poses a threat to India, specifically in light of a countervailing power centre being created in the IOR. The naval and air bases constructed by China across the region bolster the larger BRI strategically designed to exert Chinese dominance in distant territories and has created substantial scope for external balancing for the latest global power to emerge. The extensive focus on the maritime space as a site of contestation makes it imperative to examine the role of China and India in asserting their historical legacies in propagating strategic ties.

Although the seemingly underlying principles of BRI are trade and connectivity, there are larger strategic goals that have come to the fore in the case of recipient countries connected by the BRI. India, in particular, has raised questions regarding Chinese intentions behind its growing presence and the pattern in which it has impinged on India’s sovereignty and gradually its traditional dominance in the IOR. India has declined to participate in the BRI due to concerns about sovereignty as well as security.

China’s connectivity linkages have also incentivised India to undertake its own initiatives. India, along with China, is part of a new matrix of trans-Asian connectivities. Strategic moves by powers on either side of the imagined power axis in the region not only symbolises a more confrontational regional front in the domain of economics and security but also signifies a new kind of geopolitics in the Asian maritime domain. In much of the Euro-Atlantic strategic culture history, collective activities were primarily undertaken on the basis of either securitisation (like NATO) or economic concerns (like World Trade Organization). However, in the Sino-centric Asian order, there has been a shift toward a security orientated geo-economics and heightened emphasis on cultural ties which are carried out both by collective action and unilateralism. The stark distinction present in the Euro-Atlantic order between security and economics proved effective through their demarcated conceptualisation even in their collective action. In the Sino-centric Asian order, there has been a role reversal of security and economics when compared to the past. In this order, geo-economics lead security dynamics and both impinge on each other equally strongly. However, the latter dilutes stark demarcation between blocs of countries as trade leads the agenda of countries, and trade dependence is indispensable for smaller nations around their larger nations. The bigger and more influential countries are in a relatively stronger position to influence and hedge against smaller countries which are at a disadvantage mainly due to their weaker economy or need for security. Additionally, the cultural aspect of the imagination of shared interest has gained momentum. The construction of the blocs of power and the idea of the region are based on cultural similarities.

With the coming of new Asian geopolitics and regionalism, the Chinese assertion on smaller nations is growing subtly, and the strategic arrangements emerging in Asia are not devoid of bullying at the underlying level. This happens primarily because the motive and purpose of building connectivity play out at the complex level of entanglements involving regional development and strategic interests of the stakeholders. From the Chinese perspective, this would mean that smaller countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles and so on would look to extract at least some benefit out of aligning with China which is spearheading Asian connectivity discourse.

These concerns that accompany China’s game-changing BRI have further pushed India to build its connectivity in Asia, independent of China. There are however conflicting opinions pertaining to India’s role in the overall connectivity situation in Asia. With respect to China’s BRI, scholars are polarised on whether India should join the project. The ones who align with the idea that India should join BRI often highlight the economic potential of the project. India is a founding member of AIIB with second-highest capital share after China (Chhibber, 2015). Therefore, it is not as if India is completely out of the loop of China’s globalisation project. However, India has principally stood against the BRI. India’s stand against the BRI was most pronounced when India did not send an official representation to the BRI summit held in China in May 2017. The debate whether India should join the BRI or not remains to be one of the leading questions that is likely to shape Asian geopolitics. Giving it a miss would mean isolating itself from a vast trade network of over 70 countries and a trillion-dollar conglomerate. Although, India is a part of the AIIB which is the principal funding body of BRI. The opponents of India’s inclusion in the BRI often argue that India’s over 7,000-km coastline does have the potential to generate connectivity linkages that would compensate for the lack of continental connectivity which has been anticipated primarily through the BRI. In fact, India is looking to strengthen its case in developing an alternative model of connectivity linkages by establishing extensive cooperation with a host of countries which have shared strategic interests with India. For that to be effectively realised, a robust inland, coastal, territorial waters and high sea continuum must be developed. To this end, the SagarMala, Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and Mausam initiatives could prove useful. The primary reason for India to not join BRI is concerns regarding security and clear disregard for its sovereignty, especially with regards to the CPEC passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Dahiya & Panda, 2015). These concerns have further heightened with India and China’s growing animosity particularly on the Himalayan border, as also with the rising tension in the maritime domain in South Asia. However, the possibilities of cooperation between India and China cannot be completely ruled out. India and China are engaged in quite a few important multilateral institutions such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, and recent events like the informal meet between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping at Wuhan and later in Chennai keep the flag of optimism in the Sino-Indian relations waving (Zhaoui, 2018). In light of increasing assertiveness from China, India has undertaken various initiatives to build on the connectivity front tapping on the growing potential of geopolitical engagements in the IOR.

In this regard, it becomes imperative to highlight a few relevant characteristics of India’s emerging foreign policy trends to understand its regional strategy in a better way. India has a long extended coastline in the southern Indian Ocean which is strategically pivotal in bringing its southern peninsula closer to South East Asia. This connection furthers India’s momentum in establishing regional connectivity webs between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Along with strategic leverage, India’s emerging connectivity is also estimated to boost its bourgeoning economy which is the biggest in South Asia and also emerging as one of the biggest economies globally. As such, India’s quest in establishing connectivity through geopolitical initiatives in the region has sought to transcend South Asia into South East Asia, based on shared cultural vision and common strategic interests.

Historically, India’s approach to regionalism has changed over the years under different governments. India vision of South Asia as its backyard of strategic influence by virtue of being the most influencing player in the region is further expected to strengthen with regional connectivity initiatives. India has dominated the narrative of South Asian politics but currently faces a strategic threat from China. This seems further compounded by India’s perennially bumpy relations with its western neighbour and China’s ‘all-weather’ friend Pakistan. China, in its bid to establish connectivity and push its model of infrastructure development through Asia, has consistently focused on regional organisations as platforms for mitigating perceived threats emerging from such networks. China is a part of almost all its neighbouring regional initiatives apart from those in South Asia. China has made a strong move to co-opt South Asian countries in its connectivity initiatives thereby posing a formidable threat to India’s long-standing perceived hegemony in South Asia. Even in institutional approach to South Asia, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not been able to churn up the narrative of regional integration and development (Chakma, 2018). This has been mainly due to India and Pakistan’s hostile relations which surfaced in inadequate cooperation within the organisation and hindrances in smooth functioning, like India boycotting SAARC summit in 2016 as a retaliatory action to the Uri attacks along with the hostile dispute between the two countries regarding Kashmir (Falak, 2017). India has now turned to a host of counter initiatives such as BIMSTEC and Project Mausam to rebuild its own network of South Asian solidarity against growing Chinese influence in its immediate neighbourhood. This is expected to bring the important Gulf of Thailand into India’s strategic calculus. India’s approach to connectivity through its geopolitical and strategic initiatives, according to many scholars, has been a mirror effect of China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific as well as Asian contours at large. Here it is important to take stock of India’s attempts to ‘rejuvenate’ its position the Indian Ocean World through Project Mausam. This initiative is at the forefront of India’s heightened focus on the maritime space, especially on the IOR. A cursory glance of India’s signalling through Project Mausam would reflect that it is largely inspired by India’s historical role as the centre for trade and cultural exchanges in the Indian Ocean.

It is also important to briefly shed light on the prospects of India’s strategic convergence with Japan to build an Asian solidarity network poised to contain the China factor in the Indo-Pacific region at large but with specific purpose of cooperation in the IOR. Japan’s efforts in connectivity in Asia inherently ties with emerging counterstrategies that could be conceptually placed against Chinese advent in the Indo-Pacific. The factoring of Japan further highlights that the Asian giants have embraced the game of one-upmanship in their efforts to establish connectivity linkages. China’s enthralling success so far in its approach to build a solid network of geostrategic initiatives stands testimony to the challenge that both India and Japan face in countering or providing alternatives to the former’s growth model. India and Japan are both huge economies and, naturally, have aspiration to shape their own regional narratives. India and Japan as new re-emerging Asian powers have pushed their connectivity linkages to form a new matrix of trans-Asian connectivity, even as Tokyo and New Delhi have displayed enhanced bonhomie under their current leaders across a broad spectrum of issues concerning bilateral relationship. Japan has emerged as an integral part of not just the emerging Asian connectivity but also has a player that has a key role to play in India’s pursuit to bring connectivity alternatives in the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s role in boosting connectivity with India goes beyond just the inter-country linkages and involves investments for intra-country development in India. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Indian counterpart Prime Minister Modi have shared an amiable relationship and a positive vision. In understanding connectivity, it is important to look at the strategic positioning of Japan and India in the Asian strategic paradigm. India and Japan, along with China, are a part of the ASEAN+6 grouping. India is only the third country after China and Japan to initiate a dedicated meeting with the ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee (ACCC; Desai, 2017). This development also supports the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, subsequently connecting India and ASEAN physically. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2017 between India and Japan to set up the India–Japan Act East Forum with the aim to marry India’s Act East Policy with Japan’s Free and Open Asia-Pacific strategy in tandem with their joint vision of solidarity and cooperation in the Asian connectivity discourse with emphasis on the Indo-Pacific front. As per reports, published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, the Act East Forum has also been designed to catalyse the development of Northeast India (Statesman News Service, 2018). This is also a step toward India’s concerted effort to make progress on the South East Asian front. India is currently working on various connectivity projects with ASEAN through land, water and air. Along with subregional cooperation and connectivity, these engagements also take India to the same pedestal with China and Japan who have been spearheading Asian discourse of geopolitics. However, it must be noted that India and Japan’s converging interests have not been perceived without their anti-China and anti-BRI intentions, which makes it inevitable that connectivity bids in Asia like the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) intersect with Chinese BRI.

India and Japan’s bolstering relations have surfaced not just through mutual assistance and exchange of financial aid at a global level but also in developments at the internal connectivity initiatives. The connectivity discourse, in general, has developed between India and Japan in a unique way where the heads of the two states, Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe have consistently contemplated the idea of connectivity linkages, fuelled by their common ground of anti-China agenda, especially, in Asia. Extensive deliberations between the two Asian countries have materialised in the form of Japan International Cooperation Agency extending a loan of approximately ₹4,000 Cr to India for ‘North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project’ to improve the National Highway 40 and construct a bypass on National Highway-54 in the Northeast. Besides, Japan has also committed to boosting India’s internal connectivity through its high-speed railway systems in the Mumbai–Ahmedabad route which has garnered much attention in India, especially due to the leap in technological advancements it promises to bring within the connectivity framework of India.

The AAGC is the flagship project backed by India-Japan solidarity where both the countries are cooperating toward building ties with Africa. Initiation of the AAGC has also led to creation of several ancillary institutions like African Development Bank which has been designed to fund the mega project in Africa. The complex milieu of connectivity projects backed by India along with Japan and China reflect the intensity of enmeshing geo-strategy with connectivity plans. Africa is the next ground of geopolitical competition where both China and India are looking to establish their connectivity influence. China has an upper hand over India by virtue of its ability to assert cheque-book diplomacy with nations that are economically weaker. India and Japan, however, have managed to ensure participation from all the African countries toward creating strategic space in that continent. India’s efforts in Africa have also been seen as a countervailing strategy to the Chinese moves in developing connectivity linkages. The India-Japan AAGC aims to develop quality infrastructure in Africa, complemented by digital connectivity which seeks to undertake the successful realisation of the idea of creating free and open Indo-Pacific region, crucial to their bilateral aspirations in Asian connectivity and its subsequent implications in the geopolitical reality of the continent (Brinza, 2018).

India has ambitions to channelise its regionally strategic potential and scope in a way that would lead to its emergence as a net security provider and a player that ensures maximum connectivity. One of the flagship projects facilitating land connectivity between India and ASEAN is the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. To develop connectivity through water, ASEAN and India are working on the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project which seeks an alternative route through Myanmar for the transportation of goods to Northeast India (Halliday, 2014). The Mekong–Ganga Cooperation is an initiative that was started in 2000 by six countries—India and five ASEAN countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam—for cooperation in the sectors of tourism, culture, education as well as transport and communications. Within Mekong–Ganga Cooperation the Mekong–India Economic Corridor promises to connect Ho Chi Minh City, Dawei, Bangkok and Phnom Penh with Chennai. This is particularly relevant in light of scarce connectivity between India and important nations in ASEAN. Developing a Buddhist trail is also a part of this project, which is crucial in looking at the emergent aspect of cultural unity in South and wider South East Asia. India’s connectivity outlook has been further bolstered by other subregional initiatives such as the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative, Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, BIMSTEC, South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) in the South Asian region specifically. It is interesting to note India’s historical trajectory of its understanding of subregionalism, and how it has emerged over the years with the shift in global politics, and India’s varying positions in it. The discourse around India’s subregional efforts has also been shaped by South Asia’s growing strategic and geopolitical relevance. On the western side of the Indian peninsula, recent agreements to mutually use the ports of Duqm in Oman and Reunion Island near Madagascar—besides negotiations on Assumption Island in the Seychelles have given new vigour to India’s maritime connectivity. In addition to this, India’s engagement with Oman to rebuild the ancient Spice Route adds to India’s strengthened focus toward West and Central Asian Region. Another example of India’s enmeshed geostrategic and geopolitical objectives for India is its extensive cooperation with Iran in the Chabahar Port which not only gives India access to Central Asia and the wider Inner Asian region but also poses a formidable opposition to CPEC (Mahajan, 2017). However, in coming times, India’s western connectivity bid is likely to be shaped by how it acts on the International North–South Transport Corridor, which has a clear objective of improving trade connectivity through a multimode network of ship, rail and road route for moving freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. It may be noted therefore, that, India has emerged as a key player in the connectivity network discourse in Asia with ambitions to proceed beyond just South Asia into the larger Indo-Pacific. However, the IOR sits at the centre of India’s focus on building connectivity networks. The centrality of the IOR looms large on New Delhi’s vision of emerging as a regional power in South Asia, coupled with its maritime ambitions of leveraging its strategic potential for better outreach with extra-regional powers in South East Asia, East Asia, Australia and Japan.

India has shifted its growth perspectives from the point of individual countries to the vantage point of zones and subregions, purely due to the increasing importance of connectivity on lines of geopolitical, strategic and cultural convergence order requiring multilateralism. This outlook has strengthened the concept of regionalism in the IOR as well as the Indo-Pacific, allowing India to partner with its immediate as well as extra-regional partners in the extended neighbourhood. For India, its immediate neighbourhood, Africa and South East Asia are crucial areas to build connectivity, especially in the face of the Chinese interests and pursuits in the same region. This view of global politics ties the fundamental concept of connectivity to the indispensable element of growth and prosperity. This is in line with the view that a connectivity initiative is the future of the new emerging global order in Asia. These sentiment manifests in both China’s emerging BRI and the plethora of connectivity initiatives that are taking shape in the region, including India’s counter strategies. India’s renewed interest in regional organisations has also pushed a potential debate on institutional connectivity. India’s engagement with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS and growing bonhomie with ASEAN proves its renewed interest in such organisations despite a historically uninspiring experience with regional organisation like SAARC.

In its quest to build a solid connectivity front for itself while still developing a robust regional strategy, India has quite a task to accomplish. Toward that goal, India has identified several strategies. Regarding physical connectivity initiatives, India has extensively focused on infrastructure development programmes including pipelines, highways and sea routes. A few flagship projects initiated by India include SagarMala, Project Mausam, Spice Route, BBIN, BIMSTEC have been designed on the fundamental idea of a shared cultural worldview. All these projects have been strategically planned keeping in mind the need for connectivity, especially pandering to the regional geopolitical needs of India in the coming future. Currently, India has shown a comprehensive and holistic approach to deal with the developments in the continent as well as its subregional domain.

The project Mausam sits prominently at the centre of India’s maritime vision to re-establish its ties with its ancient trading partners reinvigorating its strategic potential in the IOR and revamping its idea of the Indian Ocean World. However, it is also important to note that Project Mausam should be not only seen as an initiative operating in the IOR but also viewed as a building block for India’s South East and East Asia outreach. Here, Indo-Pacific as a maritime terrain gains importance in India’s strategic vision. India’s Project Mausam plan includes several key players from the Indo-Pacific region such as Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Myanmar and so on. Therefore, Project Mausam should be viewed as a holistic measure for New Delhi to establish itself as a regional power in light of China’s growing strategic footprint in the region.

The connectivity bids by Asia’s major powers have already had several potential geostrategic implications for other powers of Asia. The sudden rise in importance of negotiations carried out by the Asian players has focused on the discourse of connectivity in Asia. The different blocks within the continent, namely South Asia, South East Asia, Inner Asia, East Asia, Middle East and West Asia have been caught in the race of connectivity developments of various measure and extent. The Eurasian landmass, too, is likely to emerge as a site of contestation for the Asian players in the future, particularly China and India. China enjoys geographic advantage in the region by virtue of sharing its border with several Central Asian countries. China has also made significant development to strengthen its bonhomie with the Central Asian Region through initiatives like the Five Nations Railway Corridor running from China to Afghanistan (Jahanmal, 2018). It is also strategically crucial for China because it is a gateway to Europe and falls in the line of its Silk Road Economic Belt of Belt, the continental component of its Belt and Road Initiative. India has also identified Central Asian Region and the larger Eurasian landmass as a potential site of geostrategic contestation; give the region’s vast potential in energy resources. India is trying to reach out to the heartland of Asia through multiple initiatives, mainly the Connect Central Asia policy, its strategic engagements in Chabahar Port, renewed strategic interests with Oman in pursuing the historic Spice Route. The Indo-Pacific has gained centrality primarily due to a renewed understanding of maritime discourse. The Indo-Pacific conceives the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean as an interconnected, geopolitical and economic space (Khurana, 2019). It has assumed key importance in the emerging geopolitics of twenty-first-century Asia. One of the driving factors behind the region’s growing importance is the great dependence of international trade on the Indo-Pacific sea-lanes of communications (Ghosh, 2017). It has occupied a position of high priority due to a variety of reasons which include its strategic positioning, the kind of resources it houses and the kind of access it gives to countries to meet their strategic interests. The Asia-Pacific and IOR have further gained significance due to extensive priority given to securitisation. The IOR is particularly important as it is the breeding ground of major transnational co-operations and multilateral regional initiatives such as BIMSTEC, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Japan–US–Australia trilateral cooperation, which is seen as the USA’s counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Project Mausam.

A New Maritime Discourse

The emergence of a new maritime discourse has played a catalyser to the extensive muscle flexing done by the major players. Maritime connectivity has been the fundamental reason for the aspects of trade, cultural ties and securitisation to come to the fore as major factors influencing the rapid development in the area. The substantial weight gained by the concept of connectivity and the immense stress put by nation-states to the idea of connectivity, especially in Asia, has led to the inevitability of economic interests being tied to connectivity linkages. The way major players within Asia, such as China, India, Japan and even the USA are emphasising on connectivity initiatives has a pattern to it. They are trying to counter each other by initiatives and participation in transnational cooperation. However, whether these transnational and multilateral collaborations are actually fetching any tangible benefit needs to be seen in light of SAARC’s failure to uphold the subregional model in South Asia, China’s engagements with smaller countries of the IOR, and the latter countries’ subsequent situation of debt-trap and India’s growing apprehensions about China in the region due to String of Pearls among other contexts. These overriding developments seem to highlight a pattern in India’s neighbourhood and the larger context of Asia, which attempt to broaden the concept of ‘balance of power’ and understand it as ‘balance of influence’. This idea is premised on the ways in which these major players are carrying out initiatives and drafting foreign policy as a reaction to what their strategic opponents are doing, except lessening prospects for a full-fledged war.

There have also been a few nascent attempts made at bridging the gap between India and China, which started from the Wuhan informal summit between Xi Jinping and Modi. However, whether the issues discussed at the meeting see the light of the day needs to be carefully observed. The Wuhan meeting has indicated an urge among the major players of Asia to build regional solidarity and minimise conflicting strategic interests. Even the vision documents published by India have outlined its view of growth and development from the perspective of zones rather than individual countries. This is evident is India’s shifting focus on regions integral to its scope of strategic interest. India has made a significantly important shift toward focusing on Africa, South East Asia and even by propounding its ‘neighbourhood first policy’. It has found common strategic interest with Japan in Africa which has largely shaped the AAGC. The AAGC is a substantial effort with the potential to counter the might of China’s cheque-book diplomacy in Africa. India’s tilt toward ASEAN through an alleviated Act East policy has also been at the centre of a reimagined Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) 2.0 which only serves as the base to India’s extensive foreign policy activities in South Asia and IOR, mainly through connectivity. This view ties connectivity as an inevitable and indispensable part of growth and prosperity. China’s successful attempt at roping in over 70 countries to the Belt and Road Initiative is one such example, with the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road forming the skeleton of the entire initiative.

India’s outlook toward connectivity discourse should be perceived through a comprehensive catalogue of various components of connectivity links. This primarily includes physical connectivity through infrastructure development, which accommodates pipelines, highways and sea routes, which India has emphasised as one of its crucial ambitions in the connectivity sector. The inevitable presence of connectivity linkages of India accounts for over 40 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which comes from international trade. This is directly linked to connectivity initiatives. Improving its connectivity linkages would not just require a more regionally connected India but should also reflect in its policies that affect its trans-regional course.

Whether there is any real progress in the way it is acting on it needs to be reassessed. The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Pipeline has been in the pipeline but whether it makes any substantial improvement for India needs to be looked at carefully and expedited. In institutional connectivity, India is engaged in facilitation of customs procedures including foreign trade agreements (FTA) and customs union. However, previous attempts with SAFTA have left a bitter taste for India, although it has been trying to develop a shared strategic front with ASEAN and regional initiatives. The concept of soft power has also penetrated the connectivity discourse in South Asia, particularly. People-to-people connections through human resource networks and exchanges have also boosted track-two diplomacy. Opponents of this kind of connectivity-based order, question the basis of its impact on international relations. However, India has been pushing for soft power diplomacy in its connectivity ideas, extensively. Digital connectivity is also on the rise which has manifested in ASEAN–India Connectivity Summit held in New Delhi in 2017.

Project Mausam

Narendra Modi’s government has gained significant traction from foreign policy analysts because of its general intention to depart from Nehruvian foreign policy outlook. Modi’s foreign policy has largely emphasised India’s role in history and has been shaped by regaining the political and economic clout at the global level. Hall (2019) writes that Modi has harped on the role on the India civilisation in his attempt to rebuild India’s image as the Vishwaguru. Toward this end, Project Mausam has been instrumental in shaping New Delhi’s vision of rejuvenating India’s historical role of catalysing regional trade in the IOR. This can be seen as a larger attempt by India to reclaim its glorious presence in the India Ocean Community. India’s maritime policies in the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific has been envisioned as a free, fair and open with optimum emphasis on SAGAR. This substantiates India’s perception of itself as the harbinger of economic and peaceful security engagement in the region. The historical account of India’s engagement in the region has provided a strong framework in shaping New Delhi’s foreign policy in the region especially in light of China’s attempt to invoke its historical trade links through the Silk Road. Project Mausam has gained significant momentum with the rise of the maritime domain as the hotbed of geopolitical and geostrategic contestation. India considers the IOR as its strategic backyard, which has seen China’s looming presence in the larger context of the Maritime Silk Route Initiative as a part of the BRI. Project Mausam is therefore understood as one of the most crucial initiatives churned out by New Delhi which is seen as a strategic and tactical response to China’s advances in the region. The role of culture and soft power in forming the bedrock of trade and economic engagement drawn from India’s glorious historical presence in the region can be considered as an important initiative in the neighbourhood. At a time when the discourse on Asianism is steadily gaining momentum with the rise of Asian giants, the idea of integration based on historical regional linkages holds promise. However, there appears to be a paradox in India’s strategy for regional integration. The idea of building strategic consensus among regional actors based purely on geographic determinants seems to have taken a backseat in India’s foreign policy. It is often argued that the growing acrimonious relations with Pakistan, especially under the Modi government, has deterred continental geographic integration for India, which has paved way for extensive focus on the maritime domain along with new attempts to bring back other subregional groupings to the fold which harps on technical expertise and economic engagement. In this light, institutions such as BIMSTEC and BBIN have increasingly gained steam especially after 2014 despite being in place since the late 1990s (Roy, 2018, August 31). Therefore, India’s imagination of its neighbourhood or its ‘region’ needs to be contextualised in the larger imperatives of its foreign policy outlook. Irritants such as Pakistan and China have vastly figured in shaping New Delhi’s outreach to its neighbourhood. India has crafted a cautious approach to keep Pakistan out of its regional grid and simultaneously build networks of regional integration to check Chinese presence. This has prominently manifested in India’s initiatives to build a strong network of regional solidarity through Project Mausam, Act East, Neighborhood First, BIMSTEC, BBIN and so on. The attempt to rekindle past networks of trade harping on the aspect of soft power can be seen as a cornerstone of contemporary Indian foreign policy, forging new avenues of cooperation in the Indian Ocean littoral. Project Mausam is expected to enable a significant step in recording and commemorating this important phase of world history from the African, Arab and Asian world perspective (Mukherjee, 2014). This can be seen as tactical move by India to move beyond its perceived area of influence. In the interest of India’s strategy to develop a trade and connectivity network based on its historical presence, it is important to take a holistic approach and reconfigure the region. It must also be noted that the maritime initiatives of the IOR have a strategic impact on the wider Indo-Pacific domain. According to Pardesi (2020), the contemporary subregions in Asia, namely South, South East and North East Asia along with the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean have constituted a single strategic system in the past for close to two centuries with the exception of the last three decades of the Cold War. Therefore, an attempt to craft an initiative based on historical ties needs to necessarily look at the whole of the Asian system as entwined into a single strategic imperative. Correspondingly, one can argue that India’s vision of a new Asian order is a significant development toward that end. This was manifest in Prime Minister Modi’s heightened interest in the Indo-Pacific as he reiterated his vision of a ‘free, fair and open Indo-Pacific’ at the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2018 reasserting his commitment to push back on the unilateral advances of China. Prime Minister Modi has placed considerable emphasis to ‘blue economy’ during his tours to IOR littoral states. Toward this end, Prime Minister Modi has propounded the SAGAR—security and growth for all in the region initiative in 2015 during his visit of Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka, which is a geo-economic construct that retains a balance between maritime security and economic development and cooperation, which is essential to India’s vision in the IOR (Baru, 2019). This initiative involves India to maintain and protect its own sovereignty apart from ensuring safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean for the benefit of all in the region (Padmaja, 2015, p. 27). Therefore this can be seen as an effort by India to design its own initiative of collective mechanism that will deepen mutual understanding on maritime challenges and the collective ability to address them. This reflects the keen willingness of New Delhi to play the role of a Net Security Provider formally endorsing India’s active role in regional security and stability (Khurana, 2017).

Conclusion

Contemporary political discourse in Asia has seen monumental growth with the rise of China and India, especially in the maritime domain. India has shown a reinvigorated approach in projecting itself as a maritime power. A cursory analysis would reflect that India’s enhanced initiative has been mainly designed as a counterstrategy to China’s looming presence in the region. India’s maritime vision has seen an enhanced effort by Prime Minister Modi. His key foreign policy initiatives have been designed on the maritime space which includes Project Mausam, SAGAR, Act East Policy, BIMSTEC and so on. According to Gurpreet S. Khurana, India needs to keep shouldering the onerous costs to ensure maritime security. To do that there needs to be prudent development of appropriate capacities and partnership with major powers as well as addressing the lack of maritime consciousness and the awareness of the nuances of the international law (Khurana, 2017). According to Sanjaya Baru, Modi has been able to bridge India’s security concerns and the region’s shared developmental priorities through the formulation of security and growth through SAGAR (Baru, 2019). Hence, there has been a distinctive shift in India’s maritime policy in light of the changing discourse of global politics where blue economy and maritime security have gained centrality. Toward this end, Project Mausam and SAGAR have been the two flagship initiatives undertaken by Prime Minister Modi. It is evident that the maritime policy of India is broadly guided by the historical role of India in the region reflecting on India as a civilisation facilitating trade and economic engagement between relevant stakeholders, apart from prioritising regional development and maritime security which have been elaborated on through the SAGAR initiative. India’s foreign policy at large has seen a steady shift toward asserting the willingness to play the role of a leader and not a mere balancer (Pant, 2019). However, most of India’s initiatives in the broader context of its reinvigorated foreign policy approach have been guided by the China factor. China’s growing influence in India’s perceived strategic backyard has been largely instrumental in shaping India’s aggressive countermeasures. There has been a growing tendency by both China and India to draw for their respective historical-cultural-economic roles in their respective regions. However, it is important to note that when two neighbouring Asian giants attempt to rejuvenate and reclaim their status at the global stage, there is an inevitable situation of geostrategic competition. According to Ranjan (2017), the competition will be healthy as long as they do not treat it like a zero-sum game. However, there have been instances of mutual mistrust which have manifested on multiple occasions. India will have to shed some of the security concerns and policy apprehensions. India has a mammoth presence in South Asia and greater emphasis on connectivity will only boost its strategic presence and geopolitical influence in the region.

Hall (2019) points out that there has been a shift in India’s foreign policy under Modi in its vision and willingness to premise its ambition on its historical and cultural linkages. Modi’s ambition to reclaim India’s status of a Vishwaguru is a part of the larger idea of falling back on the historical legacy of India. However, Hall points out that there has been little difference in India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Modi in the policy framework where it has been more of continuity than change. Even if there has been a shift in vision or posturing, they have not yielded any significant tangible outcome as such. Prime Minister Modi’s maritime vision can therefore be seen as an effort to consolidate India’s position as a credible economic force by underlining its historical and cultural linkages through Project Mausam and by emphasising on the aspect of security provider through SAGAR. As such, the utmost task for India is to start converting the rhetorical ambitions into reality.