Abstract
How does the international system work is a fundamental question that still continues to confound international relations scholars and practitioners. There is no singular conception about this. The debate between the realists and the idealists emphasise competitive theories of state behaviour in international politics. It is a debate between the role of national interests and the influence of ideas, values and principles. The behaviour of states is either governed by power relations or it is mainly the result of perceptions, preferences and decisions of elites. The tradition of power relations has largely overwhelmed the influence of ideational factors in international relations scholarship.
However, the historical reality is that both power and ideas together have influenced international relations. The conception of world order which determines the nature of interaction of states in the international system is based on some beliefs and interests and accepted norms of behaviour and it is not simply about the role of power in establishing order. The dominance of Western ideas and values in the shaping of the world order since the spread of colonialism in the seventeenth century marginalised alternative conceptions of world order. Rather, the universalisation of a Western-centric knowledge system has been instrumental in spreading their values, experiences and perspectives globally. The Western value system has been acceptable to many cultures and geographical regions, even though there is little doubt that this has spread through the projection of power. To understand the contemporary shifts in power in the international system, it is imperative to develop a greater understanding of values in international relations.
Therefore, one cannot have much of a disagreement with the assertion that the making of foreign policy and international interactions requires an understanding of the values of states in the international system. In this regard, this edited volume focuses our attention on this important theme and raises the question in what ways values guide the conduct of foreign policy of states. This volume examines the values professed by some major countries in three continents—America, Asia and Europe. It is ambitious in its scope. Seventeen contributions to the volume attempt to answer two questions—whether there are any discrete set of values that can be identified as Asian and whether those clash with values that originated and evolved in the West and are represented as a universal consensus.
But, first what are values? Can we have a clear definition of values? Values can be considered as principles that influence political beliefs that guide the behaviour of states. They refer to ethical principles or standards of behaviour by which good and bad, and right and wrong may be assessed. In a cultural context, they are widely shared beliefs. But values vary, and across cultures they may not necessarily be shared. This dissonance of values across different cultures has also led to a disharmony, particularly between the West and Asia.
A Western value system underpins the contemporary world order. A belief in democracy, the rule of law, the protection of individual human rights and in the economic realm the free play of market forces have become standards to which all countries should aspire. Multilateral institutions were created by the West after the Second World War with the purpose of promoting liberal ideas of world politics and economics. The Europeans believe that their values are secular and universal. US foreign policy has been underpinned by a set of values that have dominated since Second World War, emphasising engagement, multilateralism, integration, rules-based arrangements, trade liberalisation and intervention to protect those values and interests. The USA also sees a major responsibility for freedom across the world as consistent with American security and economic interests. However, morality of these values, at least in their policies abroad, has been questioned.
Western values have been regarded with cynicism in Asia due to its past colonial history. Asians have also been critical of Western claims of universality of their value systems, much of which has spread through the instruments of power. There has been a resistance to the imposition of this Western value system. By no means, it was a concerted unified reaction against the West. But elements of that in Asia have been conceptualised as ‘Asian values’. The discussion on Asian values which spreads across three chapters stands out in the volume. There is a recognition that Asian societies are unlike Western societies but there is clearly no definable Asian values except in very broad terms. Asia is characterised more by political, religious, economic, cultural and ethnic diversity than homogeneity. Given the differences between West Asia, India, China, Japan and Southeast Asia, it is difficult to conceptualise an Asian way.
The modernisation process in post-colonial Asian societies has quite often resulted in the emergence of patrimonial political systems where communitarian values have been culturally ingrained. Unlike the West, the community was placed above the individual. Thus, Asian values can be characterised as a political culture that emphasised the community over the individual and a collective acceptance of the curtailment of individual and democratic freedoms in the desire for progress. The idea of Asian values justified soft authoritarianism. Asians welcomed Western values of free market but were resistant to the commitment of the West to democracy, rule of law and human rights. Respect for Westphalian values of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other were regarded as critical to maintaining regional harmony by the ASEAN countries and many others.
The five principles of China about peaceful coexistence heavily emphasised this and became a basic norm in developing state-to-state relations. But given the maritime disputes with its neighbours and its actions in the South China Sea beginning 1974, it appears that the five principles have been observed more in breach. China has played by international norms where it suits it and ignored them when it does not. Values are professed ideals or goals. Uncritically, one can make an observation that based on traditional cultural values of harmony, ‘China has chosen the road of peaceful development, internal harmonious society and an external harmonious world’ (p. 204). But these have to be tested against the practices that states have followed.
In the world of realpolitik and a dynamic security environment, values give way to the protection of interests. The chapters on India and Japan bring this out very clearly. The chapter by Krishnan Srinivasan on Indian foreign policy shows the shift from a Nehruvian foreign policy based on moral principles to a contemporary foreign policy bereft of any ‘… philosophical values other than Hindutva’ (pp. 148–149). Nehru recognised morality as a pillar of strength of foreign policy. The policy of non-alignment was also framed in morality and idealism. Nehruvian foreign policy objectives were to reduce great power involvement in Asia and prevent global domination by any power. He hoped for a security system that guaranteed national sovereignty and territorial integrity and allowed India maximum manoeuvrability. The China war socialised India into the international order when Indian leaders realised the limits to their self-professed exceptional status. The core value of Nehruvian foreign policy has long since been abandoned.
There is a rightward shift in Indian foreign policy now. A new assertiveness is reflected in symbols of patriotism and respect for the military. Srinivasan writes, ‘In foreign affairs, Hindutva hankers for the Chanakya concept of Akhand Bharat or the imprecise frontiers of Chandragupta Maurya’s third-century BC empire, or of the British Raj whose strategic vision was based on logical territorial limits for defence and the exercise of sovereignty’ (p. 148). There was an exceptionalism to Indian foreign policy in respect of the pursuit of peace and a conviction that India was a natural leader of the Afro-Asian world. Indian exceptionalism in its belief in leading the world in its search for peace continues. It still believes that it has an important role to play as a responsible power in the international system. But its domestic record leaves much to be desired for it to be looked up as a global leader. Srinivasan points out that a ‘… tradition has been established wherein any need to be accountable abroad on matters pertaining to its internal jurisdiction is stoutly rejected’ (p. 149). What Srinivasan observes in the context of India is probably true of most other Asian states.
In the case of Japan, the dominant value of its foreign policy can be identified with pacifism—a product of its defeat and a negation of its pre-War Japanese history. There is a growing revisionism in Japan today. It is rearranging its values under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The author argues that Japan can find creative solutions to bypass its values, where strategic interests collide with its values of post-War pacifism.
A chapter on ‘Islamic Values in Foreign Policy’ makes an argument about how interests are cloaked under professed values. Quite a few countries claim that their foreign policies are being motivated by Islamic values. But it is not clear whether this is purely strategic for the purposes of gaining legitimacy. The chapter suggests that realpolitik is the main influence on both Turkey and Iran. Geostrategic, economic and political factors exclusively make any Islamic considerations in foreign policy virtually impossible. Turkey and Iran, despite their professedly Islamic orientation, are predominantly motivated by realpolitik but the narrative is dressed in the language of political Islam.
A great deal of scholarship is evident in some of the individual chapters in the volume. However, the diversity among the countries and the lack of a uniform framework have brought out the limitations in this ambitious study. It is hard to find a common template between the Confucian values in Chinese foreign policy, the early idealism in Indian foreign policy, the post-War pacifism in Japanese foreign policy, peace activism in Indonesian foreign policy, South Korea’s lack of values but a search for partners among the major powers, the importance of the domestic ethnic conflicts in Myanmar and its continuation of a non-aligned foreign policy, and the veneer of the Islamic values over the realpolitik practised by Turkey and Iran. This is an amazing range of diversity to make sense within a conceptual framework.
All the individual chapters are educative and insightful, but some chapters have not really contributed to the overall theme. One of the questions that the editors had raised in the introduction about a clash of values—between what underpins the present world order and what is professed by the emerging powers in Asia—remains unanswered. One can concede to the point that it will be difficult for the West and Asia to arrive at a value consensus, but far more difficult to accept that authoritarian China along with Russia will ‘shape a world antithetical to US values and interests’ (p. 92). China is being viewed as a challenger to the status quo, but we are a long way off from the universalisation of Chinese values to underwrite a new world order.
The post-COVID19 world order is also most likely to lead to a rethink on the nature of power in the international system. The vulnerabilities of even the major powers to a global pandemic might bring in changes in normative concerns about security. Some of the lessons learnt from dealing with the global pandemic of 2020 calls for an introspection on the importance of values in the interaction of states in the international system. This volume, even though it precedes the pandemic, is a timely contribution to further that debate. The editors and authors have to be complimented for having delved into a terrain that is at the margins of mainstream international relations. Needless to say that the volume should be useful reading for not only scholars but also policymakers.