Abstract
A considerable amount of literature in international relations (IR) is concerned with understanding the mechanism and origins of alliance formation. There is a rich array of theoretical literature that unpacks the origins of alliances among states in regional and global orders. In the neo-realist tradition, the structure is deemed as the main driver of alliances. Some realists argue that alliances are an outcome of the balance of power (Waltz, 1979), whereas others consider balancing against the perceived threat to ensure security as the main trigger of alliance formation (Walt, 1987, p. 263). Neo-classical realists argue that alliances are related to the varied political goals of different states. Some states prioritise self-preservation (status quo states) while others are willing to take risks for improving their material conditions (revisionist states) (Schweller, 1994). States ally in ways that maximise their political goals showcasing the balance of interest bargains rather than a balance of power calculation. This is where Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India makes a fresh intervention. The book argues that alliances are the product of both power and interest (p. 11). Alliances are not merely formed on the calculations related to balance of power or balance of threats, but on the principle of the balance of interests.
Biberman starts off by asking a very important question related to the behaviour of many modern states: what drives the alliances between state and non-state actors? She proposes the ‘balance of interests’ theory to deepen our understanding of the nature and cause of alliances between state and non-state actors during and after civil wars. This helps explain why and how states outsource violence to local non-state actors despite the risks of surrendering the state’s monopoly over the use of violence.
Biberman explores state and non-state alliances in counterinsurgencies in India, Pakistan, Turkey and Russia. Taking a qualitative methodological approach, Biberman argues that state–non-state alliance occurs because of two causal factors: first, the militarily superior states are not always capable of tackling insurgents on their own. They need the help of non-state actors at the local level where the reach of the state is severely limited (p. 2). Non-state actors can help the strong military states in providing vital tactical benefits that may be otherwise impossible.
Second, the relationship between the state and non-state actors rests on the balance of interest bargains. Non-state actors are not mere puppets at the hands of their principals but have the agency and interests of their own (p. 2). Based on this balance of interest bargaining, Biberman divides non-state actors into the two categories: opportunists and activists. The opportunists are largely interested in transactional alliances that are likely to serve as balance tippers in a conflict characterised by pragmatic quid pro quo agreements (p. 26), whereas the activists are more farsighted and play a ‘longer game in the overall shadow of an ideology’ (p. 12).
The book is divided into three main sections. The first section sketches out the theoretical framework that situates the book within the broader contours of current scholarship on alliances and civil wars. This section defines key conceptual terms and explores the theoretical basis on which this whole research rests. The book uses the ‘balance of interests’ framework that stems from the incorporation of ideas borrowed from neo-classic realism and neo-realism. Biberman connects neo-realism’s focus ‘on the structuring role of relative power distribution in an anarchic system with classical realism’s appreciation of the actor’s divergent interests and agency’ (p. 29). Thus, the ‘balance of interests’ framework takes care of both the structure that constrains and shapes the behaviours of actors and the agency and interests of those actors in that structure (Wendt, 1987).
The second section provides a detailed analysis about the four case studies. She begins by exploring Pakistan’s need to reach out to non-state actors in 1971 for fighting against the escalating insurgency in East Pakistan. Pakistan Army allied with Islamist volunteers who joined willingly due to religious belief and material benefits, while the rest of allies were coerced into joining. The alliance that ensued between the army and the non-state actors remained weak. This turned the tables against the interests of the Pakistani state, shifting the local balance of power in favour of rebel groups (p. 63).
In Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan’s army allied with the anti-Taliban tribe known as lashkar for halting ‘bad Taliban’ from spreading its tentacles. This alliance transpired in 2008 because both the army and the local tribesmen were on the same page willing to drive out the ‘bad Taliban’ from FATA as it was threatening both the national security of Pakistan and the local authority of tribal heads (p. 100). This mutual interest in weakening Taliban ensured a successful alliance between the state and its non-state allies.
India was able to create a far more successful alliance with Ikhwan ‘opportunists’ for ending insurgency in Kashmir (p. 73). Ikhwan comprised of surrendered militants who were thoroughly informed about various militant outfits operating in Kashmir. The counterinsurgency operation continued from 1988 to 2003, with local allies bringing more success after the balance of power in the conflict tipped in government’s favour.
India’s counterinsurgency operations against the Naxalites in Chhattisgarh effectively began in May 2005 by huge deployment of military forces that tilted the local balance of power in state’s favour (p. 118). This shift had not decisively turned in the state’s favour and was rather more like a ‘stalemate’. Therefore, the state formed a robust alliance with Salwa Judum, who altered the balance of power decisively in state’s favour (p. 112).
Beyond South Asia, Biberman attempts to understand Turkey’s counterinsurgency against the Kurds and Russia’s counterinsurgency effort in Chechnya. In the mid-1970s, the waves of Kurd nationalism engulfed the major cities of Turkey with a goal to liberate ‘Kurdistan’ from Turkish rule (p. 133). With heavy local logistic support, the local balance of power gradually tilted in favour of Kurd nationalists. The Turkish army then allied with the pro-Turkish clan who were nationalists and ideologically at odds with the Kurds (p. 130). This tipped the balance of power towards the state facilitating other opportunists to join the counterinsurgency operations (p. 130).
In the 1990s, the Russian military was in utter disarray because of the dissolution of USSR. This led Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev to declare independence from Russia. Russia responded by sending troops to Chechnya but failed to gain major successes. This compelled the state to ally with the proxies and join hands with Gantamirov and Kadyrov, the famous warlords, who tilted the local balance of power in Russia’s favour (pp. 153–156). This enabled Russia to gain control over the restive region with immense support from warlords.
The concluding section lays out some policy recommendations and propositions for future work on ‘outsourcing violence’. Biberman demonstrates that ‘when territory is at stake, states take the gamble with violence by empowering nonstate actors to fight insurgency on their behalf’ (p. 158). This is in line with core war studies literature that looks at territory as the most prized resource that can drive states to ally with even core ideological opponents (Vasquez, 2009, pp. 135–166). Biberman recommends military leadership to behave ‘professionally’ and warns that non-state actors themselves do not lead to victory. Arming and aiding proxies poses security risks and ‘degrades the state by corrupting the social contract with its citizens’ (p. 128).
Though the book is theoretically rigorous, there are a few issues that have not been addressed. The case studies that elucidate the balance of interest theory are treated as a monolith with no consideration given to the nature of insurgency and varying goals of the government; for instance, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operation goals in FATA were not the same as India’s goals in Chhattisgarh. Pakistan wanted to keep the militants in check and not eliminate them, whereas India wanted to control the whole state of Chhattisgarh and mainstream the insurgents. Moreover, the book does not take into account the external security implications of certain insurgencies. States choosing of a particular response to insurgency is contingent upon the external security implications of a secessionist movement (Butt, 2017). The relative military strength of states may also be a factor in determining the degrees of state response to peace overtures from various actors both inside and outside the state (Hussain, 2018). This guides the overall state strategy and explains states’ use of different policies and varying degrees of coercive apparatus for resolving different conflicts within its territorial boundaries; for example, India’s policy response to Kashmir insurgency has been much harsher and decisive than Naxalite insurgency because of the direct involvement of Pakistan in the former.
Nonetheless, Gambling with Violence is a compelling book that has knitted together a rich array of case studies, adding new theoretical insights to the scholarship of IR theory and alliance formation. Overall, this book has made a substantial contribution in the field of political violence, civil wars and terrorism in the world.