Abstract
This article evaluates the impact of natural resource conflicts on Africa’s security. This study is qualitative and based on secondary data that were analysed textually. Hinged on the greed and grievance theory, the study argues that the mismanagement of resources, greed and grievance have had immeasurable negative implications on national security, national growth and development. The issues that have come to the fore in resource management in some selected African countries include rancorous intergroup relations, militancy, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, leadership ineptitude, corruption, warlordism and money laundering. The article recommends that effective resource management strategies in Africa are key in curbing the plaguing security challenges and conflicts ensuing from resource ownership in the continent.
Introduction
Averting, managing and solving natural-resource conflicts are indisputably amongst the key peace and security challenges of the twenty-first century (Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017). The increasing demands for natural resources across the world have intensified the pressure and competition between countries, communities and faction groups over the access to, as well as the use of, natural resources. Today, the geopolitical stakes for the survival of states and multinationals depend on securing access to key natural resources.
The importance of resource ownership cannot be overemphasised. The endowment of abundant resources has huge developmental advantages to the host country. Ghana, Botswana and Namibia have used their resources for the socio-economic development of their people in the past few decades. Contrarily, poor management of resources has had detrimental effects on Africa and African people. Scholars of the resource curse argument are of the view that poverty, underdevelopment, social violence, state fragility, weak governance and regime illegitimacy have been intensified and sustained by the mismanagement of the abundant-resource ownership (Omenma & Onyango, 2020).
In addition to the multidimensional manifestations of resource curse in Africa, natural resource has had a key role in both eliciting and intensifying conflicts both within and between states. This is as a result of clashes of interest amongst the various stakeholders, mostly foreign governments, national government/key political figures, armed sub-state groups and multinationals. Somalia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Senegal, Congo Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Libya, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Burundi, Nigeria, Rwanda and Mauritania are some natural resources conflict–ridden countries.
The politicisation of natural resources has made resource wars take complex forms, making them dominant scholarly discourse from the late 1990s. Alao (2007, p. 5) avers that natural resources–fuelled conflicts have remained one of the very controversial and topical issues of the post–Cold War era, especially with the protracted nature of the conflict, the rise of armed groups exploiting natural resources for their self-determination and the survival of illicit armed groups and criminal networks, in addition to the role natural resources play for the state in regime and authority consolidation. According to Enor et al. (2014, p. 58), all of these multidimensional complexities of Africa’s resources gave rise to a critical concern in respect of security and conflict risks. While a lot of studies have linked the abundance of resources in Africa to mainly economic curses, this article seeks to argue that the implications of natural resources’ richness poses multifaceted security dynamics, such as trans-nationalisation of crimes, militancy, rancorous intergroup relations, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and struggles between internal and external forces. This is why this article explores the insecurity dimension of Africa’s resource wars and their implications on both national and regional stability.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Defining natural resources, Worthington (1964, p. 2) opines that it includes:
everything that is derivable for the use of man from any part of the universe. In the physical sphere, they include energy from the sunshine, gravity as well as mineral deposit and the rain. In the biological sphere, they include domesticated as well as wildlife plants and animals; and they include human resources too.
To Oyinlola et al. (2015), natural resources are gifts of nature. They, however, disagree with UNESCO (1964, p. 2), suggesting that natural resources do not include physical, human, social and institutional capital. The World Trade Organization defines natural resources as ‘the stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing’ (World Trade Organization, 2010). Thus, natural resources are the scarce gift of nature with huge economic and livelihood benefits to man. They are pillars and platforms on which countries generate export revenues, provide employment, build the local livelihood system and catalyse transformative changes in all ramifications.
Natural resource conflicts are disputes that arise concerning the use, access and management of natural resources such as trees, land and solid resources. They also include situations where the allocation, management or use of natural resources causes human rights abuses, violence, death or even reduction in human welfare. A pungent feature of most resource conflicts is the existence of several stakeholders, such as community-based organisations, multinational and domestic businesses and governments, who sometimes could have diverse and incompatible interests over resource ownership and control.
The greed and grievance theory by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is the theoretical framework suitable for this study. The theory offers combined explanations for how political and economic paradigms utilise in-group hostilities and marginalisation to generate conflicts within nations. The theory gives prominence to economic variables as the major cause of conflicts. Collier (2000) argues that conflict can ensue when there is a combination of both grievance and greed in the mobilisation of resources. Greed and grievance result from social determinants, specifically inequality and deprivation. The grievance theory is well explained by Gurr (1970). Gurr argues that there is bound to be a conflict when a contrast exists between groups’ expectation and actual access to prosperity and power. Grievance theory is rooted in behavioural paradigms that reflect social inequalities and divisions along political, ethnic and even religious exclusions. The feeling of grievance that is induced by deprivation begins as an individual concern that latter expresses itself collectively in group members which leads to a social movement bent on violent political change. In other words, structural inequity in the distribution of resources is mostly underpinned by the greed of resource managers which brings about deprivation of the majority or some groups, which will, in the short or long run, generate discontent and then a rebellion. There are arguments that grievance and deprivation alone are insufficient in explaining conflict. Thus, they propose adding the greed dimension to the analysis.
The greed thesis focuses on the loot-seeking opportunities of actors. Its argument espouses that rebels fight against the government for control of resources and resource revenues. Lootable resources such as solid mineral and timbers have been linked to insurgencies in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, for instance. A critical limitation of Collier’s greed argument is its rebel-centric nature and pro-state biases. The theory provides a one-sided and incomplete analysis of rebellion. Collier proposes that, rebels, not state actors, cause conflict, thus neglecting the role of the state and international actors in fuelling conflicts. The article argues that, contrary to the argument of Collier’s (2000) economic model of rebellion, resource conflicts are most times fuelled by the interplay of the greed and grievances of both rebel groups and other actors in the conflicts and not motivated by the greed instigated by self-interested behaviours of the actors alone.
Natural Resources: Curses or Blessings?
A wide range of issues relating to natural resource conflicts have been studied. Much of the discussions border around the copiousness of natural resources in relation to economic underperformance, low level of democracy and mismanagement of the resources causing resource curses, such as negative social, environmental, economic, cultural and political effects. There are discrepancies in the indicators used to measure natural resource abundance and scrutinise the causative mechanisms underpinning resource curse, as well as in the state-centric emphasis of most literature. Inadequate efforts have also been made to examine the costs of the resource curse for the various groups of persons within conflict-affected populations.
The African continent contains widespread reserves of natural resources that have great potential for human benefits (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2017). It is generously gifted with valuable natural resources, such as productive land, forestry, water and fisheries, which are classified as renewable resources, and non-renewable resources such as oil, coal, gas and minerals. These resources have been sources of subsistence and income for large groups of Africa’s population and are a major source of national wealth and public revenue. Natural resources do not only serve as a product in the global and local economic structure, but they also play important communal identity and cultural roles for many local communities and, in some cases, are points of pride for the nation as a whole.
In Africa, natural resources have brought curses to some countries and blessings to others. Most literature has critically explored the adverse impacts of natural resource endowment on Africa under the theme of ‘resource curse’. Resource curse denotes a situation where possession of natural resources does not necessarily translate to economic prosperity. It seems strange that an abundance of natural resources can make countries worse off than those without natural resources. This is because focusing on the booming natural resources for tradable exports can lead to jettisoning other non-natural resources sectors, with an adverse effect on the economic diversification required for increased employment and long-term economic growth.
Many African states have underutilised their resources for practical developmental gains, such that they have become reasons for their fragility. Thus, rather than a positive effect of resource ownership, there is a paradox of lack and underdevelopment (IDEA, 2017). For instance, African countries such as Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Sudan, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe are resource-rich, with oil, gas, and minerals being their main exports; yet, they are fragile and lack developmental proofs of socio-economic gains. More pungently, in Sierra Leone, for instance, the connection between environmental degradation and resource availability is alarming, particularly at Kono, which has very large diamond deposits. More than 75 years of intensive mining of diamond has left a large expanse of land degraded, top soil eroded and thousands of pits abandoned, making it impossible for Sierra Leoneans that depended on land-based livelihoods, including fishing, farming, hunting and forestry, to meet their needs (Mabey et al., 2020). Disturbingly, these narratives of Sierra Leone are similar to those of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, where there have been worrisome concerns over the hazardous offshore oil and gas activities of oil corporations. Gas flares and oil spills have perpetually contaminated the waters, air and crops that the locals depend on with hydrocarbons. Health wise, respiratory problems such as bronchitis and asthma, lung disease, miscarriage, heart attack and skin disease are very prevalent as a result of the exposure of the residents in the oil communities to heat and air from oil exploration–related activities.
Some factors that can lead to natural resource–related conflict have made the ownership of natural resources more of a curse and instrument of vulnerability than a blessing in Africa. They include poor resource governance, trans-boundary dynamics and competition over scarce resources. Frequent conflicts, weak administrative capacity, poverty and systemic corruption related to the management of resources have also been characteristics of such resource-rich states (Henri, 2019). Thus, Alao (2007) contends that the importance of the management or governance of natural resources is vital to understanding the prevalence or absence of resource conflict in Africa. Several fragile states in the African subcontinent are rich in extractive resources yet lack effective institutions that are vital to promoting the reinforcement of resource flows and the transformation of natural resources to sustainable social, national economic and inclusive development.
One of the effects of natural resources is that they have taken a toll on the democratic consolidation of African resource-endowed countries. Human rights have been massively violated, which has led to the rise of autocratic regimes, deaths, wars, loss of properties and displacement within and beyond recognised states borders. Garrett and Piccinni (2012, p. 5) add that the rent-seeking behaviour of several African states rich in natural resources adversely affects the quality of governance of the resources. The reason for this is that, there is the tendency for an easy translation of the governance weakness to grievance-based violence hinged on the absence of equitable socio-economic development and development. Nigeria’s Niger Delta decades of struggle is a relevant example.
Natural Resources–Conflict Nexus
The relationship between natural resources and conflict is complex and multidimensional. Natural resources play a significant part in initiating and sustaining conflicts (Maphosa, 2012). Similarly, Alao (2007) avers that the link between conflicts and natural resources centres on the processes, structures and actors connected with the management, as well as the control, of the resources. The presence of resources, resource degradation, resource scarcity, over-exploitation of resources and contamination of existing ones (e.g., water) have instigated wars over resources. Such conflicts have manifested locally, regionally, nationally and even across boundaries. Hanson (2017) notes that rarely do natural resources spur conflict; nevertheless, they could encourage it. When there is a mix of grievances over the control and use of natural resources with factors such as ethnic polarisation, critical inequality, poor resource management, weak institution, high demands and other forms of injustices, violent resource conflict is bound to occur. Thus, the control of resources, combined with these issues, has been the reason for the protracted conflicts in Africa’s resource struggles. No wonder, the twenty-first century has witnessed a tenacious upsurge of resources-based struggles in African states such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and CAR.
In understanding the conflict–natural resources nexus, an appraisal of the competition over the increasingly scarce resources is also imperative. Resource scarcity refers to the depletion of the supply of resources, such as land, solid minerals, oil, etc., such that the available quantity is insufficient to meet the demands of all users. The increasing competition over natural resources has over the years been influenced and intercepted by other factors like technological innovation, migration, cooperation, religious and ethnic cleavages, socio-economic manifestations such as corruption, unequal distribution of resources, political exclusion and globalisation (Joshua, 2017).
Maphosa (2012) argues that there are two dimensions to resource conflicts, which are the intent to loot and seeking to control the state for the sake of encouraging stability and growth. Hackenesch (2018) avows that both the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which were both rebel groups, extracted offshore oil and alluvial diamonds for the protraction of conflict. Leaders of various factions too enjoyed wealth from the resources at the expense of the unarmed masses. MPLA, the ruling party, was regarded as a rebel group then because it behaved like a rebel, as it was also involved in indiscriminate violence that pervaded the land during the civil war, as detailed by Mophosa.
All natural resource conflicts do not take the same form. Variances in natural resources generate distinct kinds of conflicts between the different stakeholders. The risk generated from each resource is tantamount to the magnitude of the benefits it can generate. According to Bayramov (2018), the natural resources that cause conflicts are those that have high market values. They are mostly oil and rock minerals, that is, hard minerals such as gold, diamonds and coltan. At times, other resources such as timber, land and water bodies also play key roles in triggering conflict. Maphosa (2012) avows that in places where oil has been discovered in a large quantity, there have been high incidences of secessionist movements. Examples include Cabinda (Angola), Biafra (Nigeria), Katanga/Shaba (DRC), Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), the Polisario Front (Morrocco), South Sudan (Abyei) and Darfur (Sudan). In most of these instances, ethnic attachments have been a cause of rebellion, as the ethnic groups living on lands where these resources were present were found to assert their right to secede. In the same vein, Alao (2007) opines that most of the resource-driven conflicts that have gained international attention are those that are of international significance and interest, particularly those involving oil, gold and diamonds. Envisaging an end to resource-based conflict remains a delusion, because conflict over resources will not cease as long as there remains a huge dependence on the resources, resource scarcity and increased demand for the resources, as well as an unequal benefit from the resources’ trade and ownership.
A Cross-regional Analysis of Natural Resource Struggles in Africa
The study engaged in a cross-regional analysis of natural resource struggles in Africa. The yardsticks for the selection of case studies in this study were the nature of the resource, duration of the conflict, international dynamics of the conflict and the intensity of the conflict.
Nigeria
The Niger Delta’s strategic importance lies in its endowment of natural gas. Ninety per cent of Nigeria’s oil is extracted from this region. This has been the major cause of the crisis in the region. Since Nigeria began its exploration of oil on a large scale in 1970, numerous corrupt politicians, military dictators and government officials have profited from the explorations through dubious means and collaborations with multinational firms. The Niger Delta resource crisis has been multidimensional (Olusola, 2019). The protagonists have held various perspectives on it. Like the province of Cabinda in Angola and Kono in Sierra Leone, the Niger Delta is undeveloped, most people are poor, and their sources of livelihood have been damaged by gas flaring. Rivers and water bodies have been contaminated by oil spillages from oil companies, making it difficult and almost impossible for fishermen to fish and earn a living and for farmers to farm. Thus, the resentment of the Niger Delta people has been against the inequitable and negligent fiscal policies of the government, activities of the oil companies, scarcity and high cost of food, damage and devaluation of natural resources and disruption of agriculture activities. The protests, which initially started peacefully, were met with human rights violations and repression by the government. A significant instance was the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and other Ogoni activists in 1995 by General Sani Abacha. It brought about an international uproar against the violation of human rights and the internationalisation of the negative human and environmental effects of oil politics in Nigeria. Apart from eliciting international condemnation, the execution of the Ogoni activists changed the nature of resistance against the state from peaceful protests to violent protests (Oluyemi, 2020).
Unfavourable government policies and repression of the people have made the region a zone of violence for decades. Groups of disenchanted men and women have arisen to form militant groups such as Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), fighting against the government and multinational companies to defend their human rights and oil revenue entitlements through the use of violence. Over the years, the militias operating in the Niger Delta have advanced, acquiring a new level of lethality and tactical sophistication through possessing AK-47s and remote detonation and anti-aircraft missiles. They have engaged in the abduction of oil workers of Shell, Agip and Chevron, amongst others, and blown up oil pipes. The protests have, however, yielded some positive results, such as better state policies towards the region, better distribution of oil revenue and intensified efforts towards corporate social responsibility by the oil firms towards host communities.
Democratic Republic of Congo
DRC was formally called Zaire. The country is one of the most blessed African countries, with natural resources such as gold, diamond, copper, uranium, cobalt, coltan and cassiterite. It also has large oil and natural gas reserves. The struggle for the right to the exploration of the resources has been a central issue in the resource violence in DRC. The DRC conflict was fuelled by solid materials such as diamonds, coltan, gold and timber. In 1997, Laurent Kabila overthrew President Mobutu Sese Seko and ended his 30 years of rule. A year after, the second Congolese war ensued.
The first civil war was a spillover of the Cold War and occurred immediately after the independence of Zaire. It reflected the interests of the Cold War rivals, the Soviet Union and the Western forces. On the other hand, the second war, also called the African civil war, saw a conflict of interests amongst African states. African states such as Uganda, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Namibia were directly involved in the war (Halleson, 2009, pp. 55–56). Each country supported various factions of the warring parties in the war. The rebels were supported by the anti-government rebels’ force UNITA from Angola. Furthermore, the rebel groups in eastern DRC that fought against the government were able to secure the support of the African governments of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The government had the support of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudanese soldiers, Angola, Rwandan Hutu extremists and Chad. The armed forces desired to control the large reserves of diamonds, gold and copper, amongst other minerals. Thus, the rebels and the government controlled considerable zones that had natural resources.
In addition to the African dimension of the war, there was a broader international dimension to the Congolese resource conflict. Resource struggle made the belligerents vulnerable to outside economic pressures (Halle, 2009). The presence of multinational corporations engaging in the extraction of resources also had significant influence on the war. Some of the corporations were linked with the rebel groups in the DRC. Kuuya (2008) avers that about 33 companies located in Germany, Rwanda, Belgium, Tanzania, Malaysia, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Pakistan and the Netherlands were parties in the importation of Congo minerals through Rwanda. Apart from the illicit trade of minerals, some companies directly supported the rebel groups. The mismanagement of resources by the government of Congo and the lack of accountability of the government with regard to the allocation of mining licences to some companies from Zimbabwe also provided funding avenue for the government against the rebel groups. The international dimension the Congolese conflict took was a result of the natural resources in the country. For instance, Uganda violated Congo’s territorial integrity, forcing gold miners to mine gold for their benefit and also taking direct control of gold-rich areas. Between 1998 and 2003, about $9 million worth of gold had been looted. The accession to power of Joseph Kabila after the death of Laurent Kabila in 2001 paved the way for the breach of peace.
Sudan
In 1955, a year before Sudan was pronounced an independent sovereign state, civil war broke out and continued until 1971. It occasioned the death of approximately 500,000 people. The first civil war was a reaction to the unequal power distribution in the run-up to independence. North Sudan was bestowed with more power, which made the South feel neglected and separated from the national decision-making processes. The formerly dualistic administrative pattern was turned into a unitary system, led by the North, which started to implement policies of Islamisation and Arabisation of the South. This disfranchisement of the South by the policies of the North was met with resistance and also the adoption of a separatist colonial policy and the 17 years of civil war.
The second civil war broke out with the violation of some of the points of the Addis Ababa Accord that granted autonomy to the southern region made up of three provinces: Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal. The Accord signed on 27 February 1972 commenced the 11-year ceasefire period. With the discovery of oil, Sudan leader General Ja’afar Mohamed Numeir sought to redefine the boundaries of independent South Sudan and gain access to the oil deposits in the Bentiu region, South Kordofan, upper Nile, Unity, Adar and Heglig. In the actual sense, the redrawing of the boundaries was going to deny the South of its culturally, historically, religiously and ethnically owned allegiance to those regions. With the system being already tensed, the eviction of Christian missionaries in 1962, the pronouncement of Khartoum Government’s Declaration that declared Sudan an Islamist state and the termination of the autonomy of the Christian South caused an outbreak of tension. Rebel forces intensified their guerrilla warfare against the government. The southern insurgency from 1983 to 2005 was by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) led by Lieutenant Colonel John Garang. Between 1983 and 2005, approximately 500,000 people had died. According to the United Nations (UN), it is the highest record of civilian casualty since World War II (Varma, 2011, pp. 5–6).
Sudan is the sixth major oil producer in Africa. In 2009, revenue from oil accounted for 93 per cent of Sudan’s exports and 50 per cent of domestic revenue. The reliance on oil revenue is higher for South Sudan, which generates 93 per cent of its revenue from oil. The oil dependence of both the North and the South led to a sharing framework of oil revenue, which led to relative peace between 2005 and 2010. Since January 2011, the Abyei region located along the South–North border has been engulfed in violent clashes that worsened as time progressed. The region’s strategic importance made the crisis assume broader political dimensions. For instance, in May 2011, some allied civil militias and Sudanese Armed Forces from the North invaded Abyei, committed massive human rights violations, burnt down homes, looted properties and forced people to flee their homes. The disagreement over Abyei was one of the most obstinate conflicts in Sudan. Approximately 100,000 people were displaced (UN News Centre, 2011).
The United States imposed sanctions on Sudan in 1997 on allegations of state-sponsored terrorism. Al-Bashir’s government barred Western countries from Sudanese oil and attracted investors from Asia. Malaysia’s Petroliam Nasional Berhad, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh and the Chinese China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) are the major external stakeholders in Sudan’s oil (Jiali, 2010). These countries have been collaborating in Sudan’s energy sector. Before 2004, China and India had been rivals over border issues but chose to cooperate rather than compete over Sudan’s oil industry since 2004. Shared economic benefits in terms of energy supply led both countries to inaugurate joint ventures to explore oil reserves in Sudan, amongst other places. For instance, India and China, since 2004, bought shares and became partners in the Greater Nile Oil Project. Furthermore, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, India and China became important economic and political partners of the National Congress Party in Khartoum. In addition to this, they both have established quasi-diplomatic relations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–run Government of Southern Sudan in Juba. China is Sudan’s major export partner of oil. CNPC, one of China’s state-owned enterprises, plays an important role in Sudan’s oil sector. Sudan supplies 5 per cent of China’s oil demands. Being the major export partner, China provided indirect support for Sudan’s human rights violations and encouraged CNPC to illegally export oil out of Sudan. In 2003, ONGC Videsh got a 25 per cent stake in the Greater Nile Oil Project, which comprised three blocks (1, 2 and 4) and produced about 50,000 barrels of oil per day. The arrangement was affected by the outbreak of conflict in Sudan and the subsequent split and creation of South Sudan in 2011 following years of civil strife, as all the blocks were split between the two countries (Choudhary, 2019). In 2016, Sudan presented to ONGC Videsh three more oil and gas blocks for production and exploration and invited Indian companies to set up a coastal refinery to increase oil revenue and boost fuel supplies to the African continent.
Sierra Leone Civil War (‘Blood or Conflict Diamond’)
Between 1991 and 2002, the diamonds of Sierra Leone became famous—not necessarily because of their quality, rather because they were classified as ‘blood or conflict diamond’. That is, the gems were smuggled and traded to support a protracted and brutal civil war. It suffices to say that the civil war was indeed funded and prolonged as a result of the plenty of diamonds in the country. This was made possible because most of the diamonds extracted in the country required secondary mining. Since they were readily obtained, their control became difficult (Ross, 2004), hence the need to introduce management of the country diamond industry to build peace. Three measures were introduced: (a) the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF)—this was done to assuage the complaints of local communities by using a portion of state taxes on diamond revenue for local communities; (b) the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), intended for abolishing the tie between violent diamond and rough diamond; and(c) deep-shaft kimberlite mining to boost the development of the national economy.
The Underpinning Characteristics of Natural Resource–induced Conflicts in Africa
Economic motive and greed are the overriding causes of resource-induced conflicts. Many studies posit that the cause of resource conflict is economic opportunities, rather than grievances (Collier, 2000). Political theorists such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Gurr (1970) have argued that grievance is the motive for conflict over natural resources, especially when a particular party feels unfairly/unequally treated in terms of their expected entitlements. On the other hand, greed is rooted in the search for power and economic emancipation/profit maximisation. Although governments have the responsibility to have oversight of resource development and management, standardised trade and also the issuance of licence, the mismanagement of resources, lack of accountability, weak state institutions and limited transparency on the part of the governments have provided grounds for the governments, institutions and powerful groups to access resources for their profit (Oyinlola et al., 2015).
Culliver et al. (2013, p. 9) argue that economic and political misrule, endemic corruption, poor functioning of governance structures and unstable environment that characterise most of the resource-rich African states encourage the illicit trade and exploitation of natural resources, which are often managed by transnational networks composed of army officers, warlords, state officials, brokers, private companies, economic and political elites and entrepreneurs. In addition to the above, Keen (1998, cited in Garrett & Piccinni, 2012, p. 5) argues that the post-Cold War decline of the superpowers’ external support for armed movements led to the emergence of armed movements and exploitation of and trade in natural resources for the financing of conflicts in the late 1990s. The looted resources were for their gains, for the purchase of weapons and the mobilisation of fighters against their respective governments. Transnational terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, use illegal sales of diamond, for instance, from Ivory Coast, to finance terrorist operations around the world. In 1998, during the conflict in DRC, national militias, armies and foreign forces from Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Uganda used the loot of resources such as gold, coltan, diamond and timber to finance the conflict. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and UNITA’s loot of diamond during the Sierra Leonean civil war from the mid-1990s to the late 1990s was worth billions of dollars.
There are some cases when foreign governments sponsor the looting of resources. For example, the UNITA was alleged to have been sponsored by South Africa and the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Also, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is said to have sponsored a private militia during the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 from funds raised from the sales of future exploitation rights of Congo’s considerable oil reserves. Sassou-Nguesso also got assistance from Elf-Aquitaine, now Total-Finealelf, a French oil company, for the purchase of arms, which empowered him to defeat Pascal Lissouba, the then incumbent president, after 4 months of the war that led to much destruction of Brazzaville (Ross, 2004).
Resource conflicts have arisen from the desire of marginalised groups to demand and assert claims for redress of inequality injustice in resource distribution. Civil wars have broken out in Angola between 1975 and 2002 over oil and diamonds, the Congo Republic in 1997 over oil, the Congo Democratic Republic between 1996 and 1998 over copper, diamonds, gold and coltan, Sudan in 1983 over oil, Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002 over diamonds, Papua New Guinea in 1988 over copper, Morrocco in 1975 over phosphates and oil, DRC and Liberia between 1989 and 1996 over diamonds, Uganda over timber, palm oil, iron, cocoa, marijuana, coffee, gold and rubber, etc. (Ross, 2004). The power struggle is also an intricate aspect of the struggles for resources in Africa. All minerals provided power and revenue for rebel groups, governments, landowners and other actors that had the ability to, whether legally or illegally, extract them.
Analysis of the Effects of Resource Struggle on Africa’s Security
One of the effects of natural resource struggle is the failed state paradigm it creates. Internal violence, which is one of the proof of a failed state is fueled by the government’s lack of legitimacy, lack/limited dividend of democracy by the people, lack of adequate health care, education, social welfare facilities, lawlessness, perceived illegitimacy of the government as viewed by the people, the weakening of state institutions, the rise of insurgency and armed groups, insecurity and struggle for state power amongst various ethnic groups, are common characteristics of state fragility in these resource endowed African states (Rotberg, 2003).
Another implication of Africa’s resource struggles is political instability. Access to natural resources has been a fuel for instability in Africa. The growing global competition for access to natural resources (especially in the minerals sector) by most, especially the economic rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as the BRICS’ challenge of and competition with multinational corporations (MNCs) domiciled in the industrialised countries, has given rise to interstate and intrastate tensions within Africa. Also, conflicts have ensued between and amongst the industrialised countries, between the industrialised and rising economies and between natural resource-importing countries and resource-exporting countries, predominantly over conditionalities of trade.
Conflicts over natural resources can contribute to violence and instability when they intersect with other factors such as inequality, poor governance and polarisation along ethnic lines. One of the manifesting effects of conflicts over natural resources is the further/deepened fractionation of countries along ethnic divides. The civil wars in Uganda, Sudan, DRC, Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia by rebel movements, which were organised across ethnic lines, illustrate this scenario. In some cases, rather than resulting in ethnic division or ethnic cleavages, conflicts culminate in resource struggles, especially when the affected groups live on the natural resources, such as Nigeria’s Niger Delta and Sudan’s Abyei region.
In addition to the tensed bilateral and multilateral relationships between natural resource-exporting and natural resource-importing countries, as well as amongst resource-importing countries over supply, resource conflicts have also bred grounds for interferences in African affairs via diplomatic engagement on multilateral platforms. Sometimes, they have even led to military interventions to secure control over resources, for example, in Libya in 2011. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Libya in 2011 was to secure long-term energy supplies.
During conflicts, there is an opening up of resources governance and institutional vacuum that is, systematically exploited by warring parties. Resource thefts are often used to perpetuate and sustain conflicts. Enor et al. (2014, p. 59) posit that:
Resource dependence [has become] associated with the security risk of violent conflicts…In Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone for instance…diamonds were mined or smuggled across national borders and became associated with corruption, violence and warfare. Being easy to transport, diamonds were increasingly used to purchase weapons…The effect of this is that money associated with diamonds mining and rubber theft has funded an increase in number and magnitude of arms proliferation on every side of the conflict in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, including the purchase of landmines that have maimed thousands of innocent civilians.
Krumova (2011) observes that while natural resources have attracted investments in Africa, they have also brought about criticisms of the ties between BRICS, MNCs and national governments. In Kenya and Ethiopia, land acquisitions by South Korea, India and the Gulf states, in exchange for cash-crop production and biofuel, drew the anger of civil society groups and domestic farmers, who were infuriated by their governments’ sales of land to foreigners without proportionate gains for indigenous communities.
Also, these criticisms of exploitation have led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), for instance, in Congo, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Maphosa, 2012). Africa’s security has been critically threatened by the proliferation of arms amongst sub-state groups and individuals. During resource conflicts, arms traffickers exchange arms for access to natural materials. Citing the examples of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 1990s struggles for power between opposing power groups within Sierra Leone and Liberia were fuelled by capital and arms gotten from the sale of ‘blood diamonds’ and rubber. Armed groups exploited natural resources found within their terrains to sponsor wars against their respective governments in DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone (Alao, 2007, p. 5). The presence of SALW empowers criminals to commit crimes against humanity, violate human rights and make peace fragile and sometimes deteriorates efforts for peace or peace processes, as well as weakening the opportunities for the consolidation of human security in already fragile societies.
Also, the war economies have become breeding grounds and fertile business grounds for insurgency and international criminal networks such as terrorist groups. In Nigeria, the many decades of abandonment and minority exclusion has created restiveness amongst various groups (Joshua, 2017). Conflicts have manifested through clashes between government and militia groups, such as MEND, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and other significant actors contending for control and ownership of the resources. Also, the internal political challenges in Sudan amongst the factions of the SPLA/M bred the emergence of insurgent groups that were fighting the southern forces instead of enforcing a unified front against the North (Varma, 2011, p. 19).
Alao (2007, p. 7), making a regional analysis of the effects of natural resource struggle, explains that in all cases, all countries involved in important conflicts relating to natural resources have spread the effects of the conflicts to their neighbours. In the West African sub-region, conflicts led to the emergence of mobile dissident groups that operated in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front, an insurgent group, crossed over from Liberia to Sierra Leone, and the Sierra Leonean government was not able to repel it, despite the risks the group posed to the stability of Sierra Leone. Maphosa (2012) avers that migrating groups sometimes activate cleavages in the host regions because of several factors related to religious, linguistic and ethnic lines which engender multifaceted violent conflict. An instance is a crisis in Zimbabwe that had spillover effects on secondary forms of violence that engulfed the entire Southern Africa region, specifically South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia.
Conclusion
The interrelationship between conflict and natural resources poses critical security challenges for regional and global stability. Due to the germane importance of this matter, issues bordering on natural resource conflict and security challenges remain germane on global, national and regional agendas. It is therefore recommended that African states should institute resources governance frameworks and corresponding institutional structures that would effectively manage resource extractions, end the cycle of rentiers and resource conflicts in Africa and ensure equitable sharing of resource revenues between or amongst stakeholders, as well as guarantee transparency and accountability amongst stakeholders in managing resources and revenue from resources’ trade.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
