Namibia’s Foreign Policy and Its Impact on Peace and Security in the Southern Africa Region: A Framework of Liberalism as a Theory of International Relations Studies

Introduction

Namibia attained her independence on 21 March 1990, having been under the successive colonial rules of Germany from 1884 to 1915 and South Africa, from 1915 to 1990. The first article of the Namibian Constitution proclaims that the Namibia state is founded on the principles of democracy, rule of law and justice for all (Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990, art 1). The Namibian Constitution further state that Namibia’s foreign policy will strive for international cooperation, peace and security and upholds international law. Independence marked the beginning of foreign policymaking in Namibia, as during the pre-independence period foreign affairs business was conducted by the colonial power from Pretoria.

This article discusses aspects of Namibia’s foreign policy principles and how they impact on the values of democracy, and issue of peace and security in the region. The article will focus on the attainment of peace in Angola, democratisation of South Africa, and security situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar and Lesotho. The main question of this article is: To what extent has Namibia realised the objectives encapsulated in her foreign policy principles of striving for international peace and security and promote the values of democracy in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region? The assumption is that though relatively a newly established state, Namibia has made her contribution towards democracy, peace and security in the Southern Africa region and the world at large.

Two major theories of international relations (IR) studies, Realism and Liberalism stand on the opposite edges of IR debate’s continuum. Realism supposes that states seek to maximise their power and influence through waging war and exhibiting aggressive foreign policy. Liberalism supposes that states endeavour to strive for peace, democracy and civil rights (Doyle, 2015, pp. 113–114; Morgenthau, 2015, p. 30). This article discusses Namibia’s foreign policy in respect of promoting peace in the Southern Africa region within the context of Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. It should be understood that Namibia’s independence came during the end of the Cold War, a period then characterised by realpolitik in which the East and West blocs pursued Realism-inclined foreign policy. Further, typically of small state, Namibia’s foreign posture avoids conflicts pursuance. The post-Cold War IR coupled with the smallness of Namibia as a state presented Namibia with an opportunity to pursue a Liberalism-oriented foreign policy.

Promoting Peace and Democracy in the Region

At independence, Namibia joined the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which had been in existence since 1980. SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Windhoek 1992. At the time when Namibia joined SADCC, the region was preoccupied with the democratisation of South Africa and suddenly became beleaguered with internal conflict in Angola.

Striving for Peace and Democracy in South Africa

Citing Lively (1975, p. 30), Garner et al. (2012, pp. 69–70) lists seven principles of democracy, which advocate that

All people should govern.

By the time Namibia became independent, South Africa was still governed by an undemocratic regime and did not meet the aforementioned Lively’s principles of democracy. Black South Africans had no right to vote and were subjected to discriminatory laws. Universal suffrage is fundamental to democracy and participatory democracy is fundamental to peace and security. Central to the doctrine of democracy is also the value of equality. In a democratic state, people are not discriminated as they are equal before law and institutions, and individuals abide by the rule of law. It is these virtues that the Namibian Constitution is founded on (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990).

The plight of the South African people was among the priorities of the Namibian foreign policy soon after independence. This is illustrated, among others, by the fact that President Nujoma addressed the issue of the democratisation of South Africa when he attended the SADCC Summit, one week after Namibia’s independence. He further expressed Namibia’s support for the dialogue between President Frederic Willem De Klerk and the African National Congress (ANC), at the opening of Parliament in 1990 (Office of the President, 1999a).

President Nujoma has been persistent in advocating for the democratisation of South Africa. He assertively and relentlessly talked about this issue at almost all official talks he held when he travelled abroad or while receiving foreign dignitaries in Namibia. He elevated the issue to a foreign policy priority during his foreign relations engagements. Further, he was firm in criticising President De Klerk for the violence that was prevalent in South Africa (Office of the President, 1999a).

Motivating the Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990, Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab informed parliament that Namibia looks forward to the democratisation of South Africa and only after apartheid is done away with Namibia will embrace South Africa as a good neighbour (National Assembly, 1990). Gurirab did not mince his words that Namibia will have no cordial relations with an apartheid and undemocratic South African regime. Namibia further made a contribution of N$ 2 million to the ANC and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1993 during their negotiations with the South African government on the road map towards democratisation of the country (Office of the President, 1999a). This support illustrates that Namibia supported the consolidation of revolutionary forces with a view to drive out the apartheid regime from government seat in the elections that were taking place the next year.

Within one year of attaining her independence, Namibia hosted two international conferences in 1991 to discuss the situation in South Africa, namely the Conference of the Association of West-European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPAA), now the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), and the African Leadership Forum Conference. The two conferences discussed the place of post-apartheid South Africa in IR of the Southern Africa region in particular and the African region in general (Office of the President, 1999a; The Namibian, 1991). At the African Leadership Forum Conference, President Nujoma stated that the Southern Africa region should focus on the most effective utilisation of the political and economic institutions (Office of the President, 1999a). Arguably, political institutions were to be used to forge regional peace and security in Angola and South Africa.

President Nujoma invited Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), to visit Namibia from 21 to 22 July 1993, to engage him in the peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa. Buthelezi was welcomed at the Eros airport by Minister Gurirab and taken to State House for official talks with President Nujoma. The Namibian government wanted the IFP to return to the negotiation table in order to achieve completion of the democratisation and peace process in South Africa in particular and the Southern Africa region in general. The IFP was considered to be the main rival party to the ANC in South Africa, given a series of conflicts between the supporters of the two parties, especially in the KwaZululu Natal area. Buthelezi was, therefore regarded as crucial to the end of violence, promoting peace and paving the way for democratic elections to be held in South Africa. During this period, Inkatha had walked out of multiparty democracy talks convened by the apartheid South African government, demanding that they be granted the right to veto decisions taken at the talks (Minney, 1993, pp. 1–2).

It is significant that after her independence, Namibia which was colonised by South Africa had hosted two international conferences, fighting against South Africa’s apartheid policy and the future of post-apartheid South Africa. It is further significant that a small state reached out to engage stakeholders in South African politics to broker peace in that country. By the time when the conferences were held, there was no peace in South Africa. Although the ANC’s military wing, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) had suspended its military operations, and there were reports of violence in South Africa due to demonstrations against the government and protests by members of the liberation movements. The hosting of these conferences is in accordance with one of the five foreign policy objectives set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Namibia will enhance peace in the Southern Africa region, including the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial and democratic state (National Assembly, 1990). The hosting of the two conferences in South Africa and the SADC Summit further manifest Namibia as a key player in multilateral diplomacy in the region.

In advocating for a democratic South Africa, Namibia pursued a Liberalist foreign policy agenda. It is a contention of Liberalism that citizens should enjoy basic tenets of democracy, civil liberties, equality and freedom of association, among others. These were not applicable to the majority of South Africa’s population as Blacks were excluded from the mainstream of the political spectrum. Liberalism theory further advocates that when a state does not comply with international norms of human rights and democracy, it should bear the consequence (Meiser, 2017, p. 24). These consequences can be direct and immediate or indirect and delayed. The price that apartheid South Africa paid for non-democratisation was direct and immediate response in the form of cold diplomacy from Namibia and constant condemnation at international platforms.

Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict and Its Impact: Domestic Disagreement on Foreign Policy in Namibia

Following the overthrow of the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire—as the DRC was previously known—President Laurent Kabila’s guerrilla troops, in 1997, Namibia has been at the forefront of campaigning for the DRC to join SADC. Foreign Minister Gurirab and his Zimbabwean counterpart, Nathan Shamuyarira, were assigned to engage the DRC government inviting the country to join SADC. Their diplomatic efforts culminated in the DRC joining SADC in 1997. President Nujoma stated then that Namibia was looking forward to work with the DRC in maintaining peace and ensuring economic development in the region (Mushelenga, 2008; Office of the President, 1999a). As a large country that borders the central, eastern and Southern Africa regions, DRC’s membership of SADC was important to link the region to other regions like the International Conference on the Great Lake Region (IGLRC), to whose meetings Namibia had been invited as an observer.

At the beginning of August 1998, there was military insurgence by some rebel groups in the DRC, which were supported by the governments of the neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda governments. Subsequent to that, President Kabila sought support from his colleagues in the Southern Africa region. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe responded positively, sending their troops to come to the defence of President Kabila’s government. A meeting of the Heads of State of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was convened by the Organ’s Chairman, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, where it was resolved to consider military intervention should the conflict escalate. South Africa did not attend the meeting and became opposed to the idea of military intervention, rather advocating for a diplomatic negotiation to resolve the conflict. Consequently, South Africa convened an emergency meeting of the SADC Heads of State where she proposed a 10-point peace plan. The presidents of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe did not attend the meeting (Europa Publications, 2004, p. 332).

President Nujoma explained that DRC had approached SADC, through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security chaired by President Mugabe, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Office of the President, 1999b, p. 415). The Charter provides that UN member states may embrace self-defence measures, individually or collectively, when there is an attack against a member state and report to the Security Council. SADC was divided on the issue, with South Arica as the Chair of SADC, and Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania maintaining that the DRC conflict was internal and did not warrant SADC intervention (Kapinga, 2015, p. 114). The SADC Inter-Defence and Security Committee (1998) ministerial meeting met in Zimbabwe from 17 to 18 August, attended by the defence ministers of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, resolved to deploy SADC troops to the DRC to fight the rebels.

Notwithstanding the explanation by President Nujoma, the manner in which the decision was taken did not comply with the SADC procedures for intervening in conflicts. Further, the manner in which the decision was communicated in Namibia raised more questions, as some key policymakers appear not to have been in the know. The implementation of the intervention taken at a ministerial meeting lacks legitimacy as it violates the framework of intervention by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which was in operation at that time, which requires that such a decision should be taken by a summit. Heads of State only approved retrospectively after the three countries had already deployed their armed forces, when a consultation of Heads of States took place during the Non-Alignment Summit held in South Africa in September 1998. President Mandela announced at that meeting that Heads of State agreed to support the actions of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in order to maintain unity in the regional body (Hwang, 2006, pp. 174, 176–177).

The deployment of Namibia’s defence forces to the DRC conflict prompted domestic disagreement on foreign policy. When news surfaced that Namibia has deployed troops to the DRC, Minister Gurirab vehemently denied, seemingly unbeknown to him, that the troops were already sent. Then in a surprising turn of events, President Nujoma confirmed that Namibia sent troops to the DRC at a public meeting. Opposition parliamentarian Moses Katjiuongua of the Democratic Coalition of Namibia (DCN) cautioned in parliament that such state of affairs puts the credibility of the minister at stake. He averred

President Nujoma did not take his institutions and his people into confidence. We first had to hear from foreign news agencies. President Nujoma made Foreign Minister Gurirab a liar. (Katjiuongua, 1998)

At the height of domestic disagreement, President Nujoma remained adamant that it was justifiable to send troops to the DRC conflict as a matter of urgency, because time was running out to effectively respond to a request from a sister republic that was confronted aggression from foreign states. President Nujoma undertook to sensitise the public, arguing that the situation was of emergency nature and required a timeously and decisive action (Office of the President, 1999b, p. 416).

Domestic disagreement on Namibia’s involvement in the DRC conflict continued to manifest in public domain. During the parliamentary debate on the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Management in 2004, Elizabeth Amukugo, Member of Parliament for the Congress of Democrats (CoD) questioned the covert approach in which Namibia’s involvement in the DRC conflict unfolded. She bemoaned the exclusion of parliament from the process. She stated

Since the fighting in the DRC was not a secret war, it was beyond our comprehension that the decision was taken to get involved secretly without informing Parliament or even informing the public whose tax money had to be spent without their authorization. (National Assembly, 2004b)

There was, however, a grey area in terms of Namibian laws regarding consultation with parliament, at the time when Namibian government sent its contingent to engage in the DRC conflict. The Namibian Constitution only provides for parliament’s approval of martial laws and state of emergency, and the deployment of Namibia’s troops to the DRC do not fall under this. Article 27 of the Namibian Constitution states, inter alia, that

At a time of national disaster or during a state of national defence or public emergency threatening the life of the nation or the constitutional order, the President may by Proclamation in the Gazette declare that a state of emergency exists in Namibia or in any part thereof.

The constitutional provision on martial laws is concerned with the state of national defence for Namibia, that is, when Namibia is under attack. The constitution is silent regarding the deployment of the Namibian armed forces to defend another state from aggression. Accordingly, the president did not act contrary to any provision of law. The grey area gap was resolved when the parliament passed the Defence Act, No. 1 of 2002. Article 32 (2) of the Defence Act states, inter alia, that

The President may, with the concurrence the Cabinet, deploy members of the Defence Force outside Namibia –

in compliance with a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations or the African Union or the Southern Africa Development Community.

If the act was in existence during the time when Namibia deployed armed forces to the DRC, the deployment would have been contrary to law, not only because the Cabinet was not consulted, but also because the procedures in SADC were not properly adhered to, when a ministerial meeting, rather than a summit, decided on the matter.

Kapinga (2015, p. 114) states that while Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe argued that their intervention in the DRC conflict was legitimate and done within the framework of SADC treaty and objectives of the Organs on Politics, Defence and Security and provisions of the UN Charter, their action was not pre-authorised by the UN Security Council. This renders it akin to actions of NATO in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, as well as in Afghanistan where NATO justified the need for expediency to fight terrorism. However, Kapinga’s assertion is mitigated by the fact that Article 51 of the UN Charter, that Namibia relied on, states that nothing removes the inherent right of states to adopt self-defence measures in the event of aggression faced by any of the UN member states, after which they shall immediately report the measures that they have taken to the UN Security Council. President Nujoma repeatedly argued that the action to send Namibian troops was consistent with the UN Charter because troops were sent at the invitation of the DRC government, which was not only faced with internal rebellion, but also with foreign aggression by Rwanda and Uganda who were backing the rebels. This, arguably, means that it was then for the DRC to report to the UN Security Council the measures that it has taken to invite friendly countries to come to her rescue.

It should, however, be noted that the objectives of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security were, inter alia, to safeguard the region from instability arising from within or outside the region, and to adopt preventive diplomacy measures in the rise of conflict and pursue punitive measures as a last resort (Cilliers, 1999, pp. 3–4). Further, Hwang (2006, p. 176) asserts that:

[T]he DRC was a SADC member and thus had a right to expect SADC to help in times of crisis. Moreover, SADC members have pledged to ‘act in accordance with the following principles: … [such as] solidarity, peace and security’

The intention of Namibia was to affirm peace in the region. The aggression in the DRC would cause instability in the region and make the DRC state fragile. Accordingly, Namibia set to realise her foreign policy principle of prompting international peace and security. Namibia’s involvement in the DRC conflict included the deployment of 3,000 soldiers and the supply of military equipment to the DRC government, even before the deployment of Namibian troops (Likoti, 2006, pp. 149, 151; Mushelenga, 2008, p. 220)

In 2001, former leader of the rebel group Rally for Congolese Democracy Professor Wamba dia Wamba paid a courtesy call to President Nujoma to consult him on the peace process in the DRC (The Namibian, 2001). During that period, President Nujoma was the chairperson of SADC and Dia Wamba regarded him a key stakeholder in the DRC peace process. Dia Wamba informed the media that a consultation with President Nujoma was necessary because Nujoma is among the leaders in the region who are committed to the return of peace to the DRC. In a meeting reported on NBC TV, President Nujoma cautioned Professor dia Wamba not to allow himself to fuel fighting between himself and his fellow countrymen and women.

Namibia further continued to play a role in the DRC peace process in the subsequent years. When the DRC internal conflict continued as illustrated fighting between the DRC governments and the rebel movements mainly the M23, SADC held numerous meetings where it devised measures to put an end to the conflict, and Namibia continued to play a role. In 2013, SADC resolved to deploy a mission to the DRC, and Namibia pledged support to the mission by way of training military officers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

The intervention in the DRC can be contextualised in terms of Liberalism as a theory of IR studies. The theory supposes that countries form pacts and alliances against aggressors in order to restrain their aggression. Democratic peace theory which is a component of Liberalism maintains that violent states are to be restrained in furtherance of liberal world order. Accordingly, when foreign states invaded a sovereign state, it deemed it necessary to seek assistance from other states, resulting in three states collectively, in line with Meiser’s (2017, p. 24) Liberalist contention that says

[A]n aggressor knows that when breaking this law it risks considerable international backlash. For example, states – either individually or as part of a collective body…can … intervene militarily against the offending state.

From the explanation of President Nujoma cited earlier, it is apparent that Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe’s position was that their action was in response to the breaking of international law by some states. Moreover, Cosmopolitan Liberalism, as a school of Liberalism, advocates that when there is a violation of human rights law, there is a moral duty on the part of states to adopt military intervention to restore human rights, provided that it is done proportionally to violation. While these scholars were focusing on a state in relation to its own citizens, there is logic to argue that the same principle is applicable when there is an aggression by one state that interferes with peace and stability of another state. It is justifiable to respond to such aggression by military intervention (Recchia, 2011, p. 1438). It is further a perspective of defensive Liberalism that a rival’s offense should be countered by multilateral use of hard and soft power (Miller, 2018, p. 566), an approach which the DRC government, supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, took.

Leadership Role in Southern Africa Development Community’s Efforts on Conflict Resolution

During Namibia’s tenure as chairperson of SADC, from August 2013 to August 2014, the region was inundated with problems in Madagascar and Lesotho. As chairperson, Namibia had a duty to steer the agenda of the regional body towards restoring the situations in the two countries to normalcy, not only to realise SADC’s objectives of maintaining regional peace and stability, but also in keeping with the letter and spirit of Namibia’s foreign policy principle of striving for international peace and security.

Namibia and Theories of Small States’ Foreign Policy

Small states are perceived to have challenges in pursuing foreign policy, because they have limited capacity of financial and human capital. Generally, they do not take on large states, but as inherently weak entities, they rely on aligning themselves to large states in order to participate in world politics. Given their small defence budgets, small states do not engage in military interventions and they would rather form military alliances for the purpose of collective security to stand them in good stead, in case when they are faced with aggression McCraw (1994, pp. 7–8). But Namibia’s role in regional peace-making surpasses perceptions on small states’ limited abilities. She is not a passive actor on regional politics but made her presence felt in the region.

Namibia’s role as a small state in regional diplomacy is comparable to the role that other small states play; for example, Qatar as small state in the Arab region mediated in regional conflicts in Yemen, from 2008 to 2010, Lebanon in 2008 and Darfur, from 2008 to 2010. She was further involved in conflict resolution between Sudan and Chad in 2009 and between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010. This is in realisation of Qatar’s constitutional provision on her foreign policy goal of strengthening international peace and security, employing the mechanisms of peaceful resolution to international disputes. All these efforts were undertaken, despite Qatar’s less number of diplomatic personnel, just like Namibia’s (Ulrichsen, 2014). However, Qatar with a GDP of US$191.4 million in 2018 has more resources than Namibia with a GDP of US$14.5 million (World Bank, 2018).

Regional conflicts can take place infinitely, like in the Great Lakes region, Horn of Africa and north of Africa (Sudan) depite high-profile negotiations. In the Middle-East, the Oslo Accords concluded in 1993 and 1995 did not result in the end of the Isaraeli–Palesitine conflict (Norheim, 2009). Namibia’s peculiar success in mediations is, arguably, attributable to the personalities of foreign policy actors, who epitomise persistence and perserverance, a trait that they developed during the protracted negotiations for Namibia’s independence. During the period of the struggle for Namibia’s independence, Namibian foreign policy actors were involved in negotiations, which provided them with an opportunity to acquire negotiation and conlict mediation skills that came to stand them in good stead when they became involved in regional conlict negotiations as foreign policy actors in a post-independent Namibia.

As a small state, Namibia’s role in pace and security in the Southern Africa region could be thematised as follows: (a) peace and security enforcement under collective security organisation, (b) promotion of peace and democracy and (c) conflict resolution and mediation. Collective security is defined as a response to an attack against an established international order. Under collective security, states belonging to an organisation form a strong military force to restrain the uncooperative behaviour of a fellow member-state (Ebegbulem, 2011, p. 23). Namibia’s particiption in the DRC conflict signifes this theme. Small state theories postulate that small states are disposed towards promoting democracy than large states (Corbett & Veneendaal, 2019, p. 5). It is, thus, not surprising that Namibia’s foreign policy theme include the promotion of peace and democracy in South Africa and Madagascar. Conflict resoution and mediation is carried out through facilitating peaceful talks and dialogue. In Lesotho, Namibia participated in conflict resolution to bring stability to the mountain Kingdom, facilitating the dialogue between warring parties. In the South African conflict, Namibia encouraged peaceful diaologue, illustraed by, among others, engaging the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Similarly, Namibia endeavoured to adopt this mechanism to the Angolan conflict, but the UNITA leader did not come on board. It should be noted that as a small state, Namibia favours engagement and the use of military force, like in the DRC, as a last option and excercised in an emergency situation, in her drive to promote peace and security in the region.

Although Namibia was relatively a new small state, her neighbours were receptive towards her active role in peace-making efforts in the region. This is illustrated by the constitution of a team of foreign ministers of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to address the Security Council on the question of Angola. Similarly, her participation in the DRC confict alongside angola and Zimbabwe speaks to the confidence in which Namibia is held by these allies. Although a middle power and neighbour, South Africa initially opposed the deployment of troops in the DRC, she was confronted by the moral ground dillemma, having deployed her troops in Lesotho, which too attracted criticism (Nethling, 1999).

Though a smal state, Namibia’s role in promoting peace and security goes beyond the Southern Africa region. She has participated in other UN and AU peace-keeping misions in Africa and Asia (Mushelenga, 2008, pp. 99–100).

Conclusion

Namibia made her contribution to the Southern Africa region, maintaining her foreign policy that embodies the constitutional values of democracy, peace and security. With limited resources at her disposal, Namibia contributed to peace-keeping missions and led regional programmes and activities aimed at restoring peace and democracy in the region. At the formative years of her foreign policymaking, Namibia actively engaged the international community, striving for peace and democracy to return to her northern and southern neighbours, Angola and South Africa, respectively. It is significant in IR studies that a small state sandwiched between middle powers, will play an important role to shape the course of events in those countries.

Contrary to perspectives that small states have a narrow scope of foreign policy, Namibia has further been involved in the DRC conflict, alongside Angola and Zimbabwe, in response to a request from the DRC government to fight aggression, and as part of SADC missions, was involved in peace-making efforts in Madagascar and Lesotho. Namibia’s participation in regional peace-making activities illustrates a realisation of her foreign policy principle of striving to promote international peace and security. Within the context of theories of IR, Namibia’s foreign policy in the region is pursued within the framework of Liberalism as a theory of IR studies.