A Response to Allauddin,Hongsong Liu and Raja Qaiser Ahmed

The article titled ‘Changing dynamics and new developments of China-Pak relations’ that appeared in India Quarterly (76.1) and was authored by three scholars—two of the Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) and one assistant professor at Islamabad’s School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University—provides an interesting view of the development of China–Pakistan relations. Noticeable are that the article presents a substantially Pakistani perspective of the relationship, though the Chinese author has possibly added emphasis to the extent of Chinese assistance, and the questionable observation that the bilateral relationship was propelled by the shared perspective of a ‘hostile neighbourhood’. It does, however, candidly acknowledge that ‘Pakistan’s political and military elite’ promoted the relationship.

Among the factors cited as contributing to development of the China–Pakistan relationship, which it said had been steady and uninterrupted, were that Pakistan was ‘the first Muslim state’ to recognise the People’s Republic of China, settlement of the Pakistan–China boundary in December 1962, Chinese aid to Pakistan and the strains in Pakistan–US relations. It did not dwell on these. The last is particularly significant since China’s influence on Pakistan’s military establishment was at the same time growing steadily. Illustrative was the number of Pakistan military personnel going for training to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) establishments. Their number, at least since 2010, already exceeded those going to the US, which for many years was the traditional source for training of Pakistan military officers.

However, India has been an important factor in ensuring the development of Sino-Pakistan relations. After the India–China border war in 1962, where deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations were also a factor, India looked towards the Soviet Union while China accelerated the strengthening of its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan, which has viewed India as a threat and ‘enemy’ and traditionally sought to preserve a solid relationship with the US, now assiduously began building relations with China. In turn, China, with an eye to enforcing its territorial claims and perceiving shared interests, helped Pakistan enhance its military and nuclear capabilities. A major step in China–Pakistan relations was taken in 1963, when the two countries signed a border agreement transferring 2,000 square miles (5,180 km²) of territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China. This agreement effectively paved the way for China’s claims of sovereignty over hundreds of square kilometres of land in northern Kashmir and Ladakh. The transfer facilitated building of the high altitude 1,280 km Karakoram Highway, which traverses the 19,000 feet high Khunjerab Pass north of the Siachin Glacier, and connects China’s Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan’s northern areas (NA).

The article describes China, Pakistan and India as making a strategic triangle in Asian geopolitics, suggesting thereby that each of them will play a major role in South Asian politics for the foreseeable future. Its explanation of their attributes sought to gloss over China’s ambitions by saying only that ‘China is the most powerful communist state in world politics with its own objectives’. It papered over Pakistan’s economic frailties with the observation that ‘Pakistan is considered as a state with significant military power in the world’ and that all three countries possess nuclear arsenals and nuclear launching missiles. It does hint, though, that Pakistan’s economy doesn’t compare with that of the others by describing China and India as among the fastest growing economies and, rather candidly, that ‘Pakistan is different as it is much backwards and politically unstable and religious in political nature’. The article anticipates long-term problems between each of the three states since they share ‘a troubled and uneasy mutual border which are disputed, and the areas are so big that they are usually considered as territorial disputes’.

The priorities listed as guiding the development of China–Pakistan relations suggest greater importance to Beijing’s interests. Of the four listed, it mentions access to the Straits of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan for regional interconnectivity and against militancy and extremism in Xinjiang, and China wanting a peaceful South Asian region aimed at developing a Pakistan–India economic relationship. All three reflect primarily Chinese interests. The second priority listed is the China–Pakistan relationship as a ‘bulwark against India’s regional hegemonic ambitions’, which is intriguing. This would certainly have been a part of Islamabad’s narrative and, consequently, a concern for the Pakistan military establishment. But for China, which made it part of its oft-repeated propaganda, this would have been more a factor seen as a future impediment to its own ambition to dominate Asia and accordingly portrayed as indicative of Indian ambitions.

Pointing to the long-term nature of this relationship was the mention of the importance of the military component in the relationship. It acknowledged the enormous Chinese assistance in military supplies and added that China had helped Pakistan strengthen its indigenous military capability. Cooperation in the joint manufacture of missiles, aircraft and frigates was mentioned, as was China’s assistance in the creation of Pakistan’s nuclear capacity. The article omitted details such as Pakistan having become the largest purchaser of Chinese weaponry by 2013.

Similarly, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar did figure, with the CPEC described as bringing immense promise to Pakistan’s economic development. It disclosed that a large part of the potential US$ 55 billion investment in the CPEC was earmarked for the Gwadar Port. It also noticed the importance accorded by the CPEC to the development of energy generation. But there was no mention of the difficulties being faced by the CPEC or problems between China and Pakistan in its development because of domestic opposition in Pakistan centring on issues like the high pricing per unit cost of energy and high interest rates charged by China for CPEC projects. The persistent doubts about the CPEC’s economic viability and potential indebtedness of Pakistan, raised also by Imran Khan before becoming prime minister, as well as the governor of the Bank of Pakistan, journalists and opposition MPs, have been ignored.

Inadequate attention has been paid to Gwadar Port and its development. Illustrative of the seeming ‘permanence’ with which China views its relationship with Pakistan is the construction of Gwadar Port, which is a major initiative intended to help China project its strategic presence and military power across the subcontinent and diversify and secure its crude oil import routes and gain access to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Viewed by China also as an energy hub, it is strategically located just 250 miles from the Straits of Hormuz and through which nearly 40 per cent of the world’s oil supplies flow. The port is well placed to serve as a key shipping point in the region. China agreed to fund the port after Pakistan agreed to give it ‘sovereign guarantees to the port facilities’ in March 2007.

Chinese officials have stated that they will use Gwadar as part of the ‘Maritime Silk Route’ to enhance trade and commerce. It has the potential to facilitate the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s operations in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Chinese military literature has been describing Gwadar as a ‘logistics base’ for PLAN and Karachi as a Navy base. Reports of China setting up electronic eaves dropping posts at Gwadar to monitor US and Indian naval activity and shipping traffic through the Straits of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea lend credence to this. It also augments the Pakistan Navy’s capabilities and enhances Pakistan’s importance in the region as a commercial and trade-transit point.

China’s huge plans for the development of Gwadar suggest long-term, if not permanent, involvement. The CPEC envisages construction of a 2,870 mile road connecting Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region with Gwadar at an estimated cost of US$ 18 billion. An international airport is under construction at Gwadar as are six coal-fired power plants. Plans provide for a railway line, stretching from Xinjiang through Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to Gwadar, alongside the extended Karakoram Highway. The support infrastructure built around the port will help integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech basic production and manufacturing jobs. For China this is an important strategic venture as it will be the only rail link affording land-locked Afghanistan access to a warm water port and will offer Kyrgyzstan an alternate to the existing solitary transport route controlled by Russia. China has already acquired on long-term 43-year lease the land surrounding Gwadar Port including 500 acres for a gated Chinese-only housing colony.

Revealing are the comments on terrorism where the article acknowledges that China and Pakistan have no common policy on terrorism. This despite, as the article acknowledges, the most significant and immediate threat of the menace of terrorism because of the deteriorating law and order situation inside Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan that pose immediate threats to the economic objectives and regional prosperity of the region. It noted that there had been a series of terrorist attacks on Chinese workers killing 12 from 2004 to 2010 but said China and Pakistan will cooperate on terrorism due to compelling reasons. These are that both confront separatism and both value the emerging new economic and strategic dynamics being brought by the CPEC which will consolidate their relations and prepare the path for long-term relations as China develops deep economic stakes.

The article did not, however, for obvious reasons, even touch upon the fact that following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Beijing did not condemn the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or criticise the alleged responsibility of Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). On the contrary, there was an intrusion by Chinese troops in the Ladakh sector during this period. China has also exhibited partiality in the matter of international terrorism by declining to support placing Masood Azhar and other Pakistan-based terrorists on the UN blacklist.

Mentioning, in conclusion, the challenges and threats, it listed the internal problems of Pakistan, growing provincialism, the constitutional ambiguity by Pakistan over the status of Gilgit Baltistan, militancy, etc., which could prevent full exploitation of the potential of the CPEC; Indo-Pak rivalry can slow down the pace of development of the CPEC; Indian quest to check the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region as supported by the US and its Indo-Pacific policy; and the Indo-US strategic partnership aimed at containing China’s economic growth has the potential to cast its shadow over the economic ambitions of both China and Pakistan.

In conclusion, the article asserted Beijing’s formulation that China’s foremost priority should be to resolve the long-standing issues between India and Pakistan and create ‘a win-win situation for India so that India does not play in the US hands against China’.