Vietnam’s Responses to India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiatives and Opportunities for Vietnam–India Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea

Introduction

China has unprecedented resurgence moves with sheer scale and ambition in history. China’s territorial claims in the East Sea of Vietnam which is known internationally as the South China Sea (SCS), its aggressiveness and its rapid entry into the Indian Ocean through ambitious economic and strategic initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have challenged the international legal system that respects the oceans. Big countries like Japan, the United States, Australia, India and France started to introduce the concept of the Indo-Pacific. Although there are some differences in the definition, this is a way to make a balance against the growing challenges from China.

The Indo-Pacific, for India, is the region that encompasses the entire Indian and Western Pacific, as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised in his keynote address at the 2018 Shangrila Dialogue. ASEAN including Vietnam is central to India’s Indo-Pacific concept, and Vietnam is also in need of strong support from other countries such as India to achieve her foreign policy that is to keep balance among countries.

It can be seen that in recent years India has shown strong involvement in all aspects from politics, legal, bilateral diplomacy to multilateral, military activities in the region. India’s proactive engagement has impacted Vietnam actively, and Vietnam has, in response, taken good advantage of India’s rising role to promote Vietnam–India bilateral relations comprehensively in many fields, bringing practical benefits and strategic interests to both sides.

The SCS closely connects with the entire Indo-Pacific. The situation in the SCS is always tense because of China’s aggression. The SCS serves as a base for China to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean. For India, China’s activities are of a serious nature. Beijing’s aggression has now extended from the SCS to the Indian Ocean. This goes against the Indo-Pacific vision that India, the United States, France and Japan are aiming for.

The SCS is directly related to India’s strategic calculations, since it is located in the middle of a maritime route stretching from the eastern Indian Ocean to the western Pacific, giving India access to big markets in the world. India has tremendous interests in protecting freedom of navigation; political security stability in the region and promote respect for the rules-based global order. India has deployed many activities in the SCS such as maintaining India’s military presence in the region through exercises, visiting seaports and oil and gas exploration activities.

The question is how India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) affects Vietnam and the SCS, how Vietnam has responded to maximise the strategic interests and benefits of cooperation between the two countries? Within the scope of this article, the question will be clarified by highlighting the impact of India’s IPOI on Vietnam, how Vietnam has responded and what cooperation opportunities Vietnam and India may grasp in the SCS.

India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative

Having special political, economic and strategic importance, the Indo-Pacific has been becoming the policy focus of many major powers such as the United States, Japan, Australia, India and other regional institutions like ASEAN, including Vietnam. In fact, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is not new. Rory Medcalf in his book Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future traces the history of the use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, he says that ‘… the idea of the Indo-Pacific has a long line of antecedents… It has been an enduring way of understanding the geography, the geopolitics and the geo-economics of Asia’ (Medcalf, 2020a). Medcalf claims that the term Indo-Pacific is used in the era of competition and contest which has followed from the emergence post-2012 of a more assertive and ambitious China. In another book Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region, Rory Medcalf also describes the gradual formation of the Quads on the world geopolitical map. As he points out, the Quad consists of India, Japan, Australia and the United States, but there will be the participation of many other littoral countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. This geopolitical bloc is considered to be more flexible and multi-polar than any other blocs in the past and will likely come together to counter China in the region. He also concludes that ‘the Indo-Pacific is both a region and an idea: a metaphor for collective action, self-help combined with mutual help’ (Medcalf, 2020b).

Meanwhile, according to authors Felix Heiduk and Gudrun Wacker in From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges, there is no uniform Indo-Pacific concept to date. The term is used by the United States, Japan, Australia, India and ASEAN to refer to very different concepts, which are based on different ideas on regional order. The divergences involve the extension of the Indo-Pacific as a geographical area, the objectives associated with each respective concept, the focus on or weighting of different policy fields within each respective concept, the question of China’s inclusion or exclusion, and the significance of bi-, mini- and multilateral approaches to trade and security policy (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020, p. 6).

Nevertheless, Indian Navy Captain Gurpreet Khurana claims the first use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in his article published in the ‘Strategic analysis’ titled, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ (Khurana, 2007). Khurana said the Indo-Pacific as a geographic concept to describe the growing importance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The main reason for developing a militarised concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is largely to counter growing Chinese influence in this region.

It can be seen that the term Indo-Pacific is one of the developments clearly shown in recent years as an opposition to the challenges caused by China. In the context of China’s rise to become the world’s largest economy, and its expanding economic, political and military engagements, from Europe and Africa to Asia and the Pacific, which has changed the regional balance of power in political and military terms, Beijing developed its own ideas and concepts of regional order and subsequently launched its own initiatives. Beijing has claimed to shape or reshape the regional (and international) order in accordance with its own interests. The Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI) is a direct expression of this claim. In response to this, in recent years a number of states have developed alternative concepts under the label ‘Indo-Pacific’.

Competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasing and China is challenging India’s historical dominance in the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines have been spotted in the Indian Ocean and recently, a Chinese research vessel had to be expelled from India’s exclusive economic zone. As India began to face these challenges in the Indian Ocean and South Asia, Prime Minister Modi launched an Indo-Pacific strategy to manage a rising China in the region while strengthening partnerships to address a new security environment (Baruah, 2020). In fact, Japan supported the Indo-Pacific concept very early when the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his speech to parliament on the ‘confluence of the two seas’ in August 2007 (Bhatt, 2018). In December 2015, he visited India and signed a Joint Declaration with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on India’s and Japan’s vision for 2025, the ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World’ (MEA, GOI, 2015). Later, Abe visited India in September 2017, followed by a second Joint Declaration entitled ‘Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017). Meanwhile, Australia also mentioned this concept in its official statements. Australia released its Defense White Paper identifying the Indo-Pacific as the new theatre and highlighted the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Rim in May 2013 (Department of Defense, 2013). In the same trend, in May 2018, the United States renamed the U.S. Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command (Idrees, 2018). All of these countries continuously highlighted New Delhi’s role in the Indo-Pacific. On 1 June 2019, on the eve of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the U.S. Department of Defense officially announced its first Indo-Pacific strategic report, clearly stating that the main purpose was to curb the rise and influence of China (US Department of Defense, 2019).

India officially acknowledged IPOI in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue on 1 June 2018 (MEA, GOI, 2018). Here, Prime Minister Modi stated that the Indo-Pacific stretches from the Western Pacific to the East Coast of Africa, while emphasising ideas of ‘pluralism, co-existence, openness and dialogue’. Being a multi-stakeholder and cooperative initiative, the IPOI focuses not only on ASEAN centrality, but also on Indo-Pacific connectivity, sustainable infrastructure and economic cooperation leading to regional integration (Panda, 2020, p. 1). India’s External Affairs Minister also talked about the reason why India should stitch new partnerships based on common interests (MEA, GOI, 2019a, 2019b). Besides emphasis on key stakeholder groups such as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), and Western Indian Ocean, India has emphasised the centrality of ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific framework and India’s involved in the regional ASEAN-centred organisations (EAS, ADMM-Plus) (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020, p. 25).

Although ASEAN is concerned that the concept will reduce the ‘centrality’ of the organisation, as a decisive voice in the regional economic and security structures. Recently, however, ASEAN has made certain changes in this respect. ASEAN no longer opposes the concept of the Indo-Pacific, but has made its own definition of the region, ‘not merely a geographical space, but also an integrated region and closely connected, with ASEAN taking a central and strategic role’ (Hong Phuc, 2019). It can be said that the way ASEAN defines the Indo-Pacific is to avoid pushing this organisation into an aggressive United States–China confrontation.

On 13–14 December 2019, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted two important conferences on foreign affairs in New Delhi: the sixth Indian Ocean Dialogue and the 11th Delhi Dialogue (MEA, GOI, 2019b). At the events, Indian Foreign Minister, S. Jaishankar elaborated on the country’s own Indo-Pacific strategy, which is different from the Indo-Pacific strategy announced by Washington. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy will of course serve the interests of India. One feature that is highlighted in New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy is the wide geographic reach. The scope of application of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy stretches from the west coast of India to the west coast of the United States, excluding Gulf States in the Arabian and African Sea (on the western coast of the Indian Ocean). This exclusion shows that the United States needs India, not the entire Indian Ocean region, with the primary goal of deterring China for the sake of the United States. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, on the other hand, would cover the western Indian Ocean region, Gulf countries, island countries in the Arabian Sea and Africa. This allows India to cooperate with both East Asia and the Gulf and Africa, thereby making India the centre of the Indo-Pacific region. Along with the other Indo-Pacific countries, India will be able to balance a rising China and also play a leading role in the region (Paul, 2018).

Obviously, India has placed the IPOI at the heart of her engagement with the countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia to counterbalance China. India has embarked on a period of radical change in economic and foreign policy. Along with the Act East Policy (AEP), India is sharing its Indo-Pacific vision as an open, stable, safe, prosperous, and orderly, rules-based region. India emphasises the element of ‘inclusion’ as a somewhat different approach. Accordingly, Prime Minister Modi noted that this initiative should not be seen as an implication of ‘a group of countries seeking domination in the region’ nor ‘directly against any country’. Now is the ripen time for India to establish strong economic partnerships with Southeast and East Asia and other Indo-Pacific countries. This approach will reinforce India’s AEP (De, 2020).

This clearly shows a new landmark in India’s foreign policy mindset since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. India’s global footprint has increased from a country struggling to find a way to development to a driving force of global resurgence; from a balanced state to a leading state, from a rules-abiding country to a rules-making state and setting agendas on the international stage (Ganguly et al., 2018, p. 4). These are very apparent changes.

Vietnam’s Responses to India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative

The IPOI combining two continents Asia and Africa and two oceans, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean; in which, India considers ASEAN to have a geostrategic position connecting Asia and Africa (Chaudhury, 2018); and vice versa, as Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs said, ‘all the ASEAN countries appreciated India’s growing role (in the Indo-Pacific) region and that India’s growing role is a factor of peace and stability in the region. That is the broad approach of the ASEAN’ (PTI, 2019a, 2019b).

In Vietnam’s perspective, the vast Indo-Pacific region is of vital importance to Vietnam as most of Vietnam’s largest strategic and economic partners are located in this region. Hence, challenges to peace, security and development in this region are also challenges for Vietnam. Vietnam’s view of the Indo-Pacific converges on many aspects with India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific when both India and Vietnam emphasise participation of all countries in these two oceans and on land.

Up to now, on the regional and international level, Vietnam has consistently supported India since India started implementing the Look East policy and AEP. Vietnam has backed India to build a rising role and position in the region and in the world. Therefore, Vietnam also welcomes Modi’s IPOI. The two countries share common interests in maintaining peace, stability, cooperation and development in the Indo-Pacific region, on the basis of respect for international law (PTI, 2019b). India’s Indo-Pacific will immensely affect Vietnam in many ways.

Politically, Vietnam has a long-standing cooperative relationship with India, so the rise of India in the region will bring more benefits to Vietnam. The two countries inherently have very high political reliability and are willing to share each other on most bilateral and multilateral issues, including hot and intense issues such as the SCS issue. The high-level visits of the Party, State, National Assembly, and Government of the two countries not only lay the foundation and motivate the implementation of the signed cooperation agreements but also further tighten the political credibility between two countries. Therefore, Vietnam would not refuse any opportunities of cooperation offered by India, and Vietnam would be willing to support India in long-term strategies if these strategies would not adversely affect the national interests of Vietnam. Vietnam also finds it easy to accept the initiatives that India launched if these provide immediate benefits to the country.

In addition, India’s implementation of IPOI creates conditions for Vietnam to have important advantages in the implementation of its foreign policy, multilateralisation and diversification to develop the country, helping Vietnam strategically balance with major countries, increasing resistance in the protection of sovereignty over borders and islands, political and economic security, developing multifaceted relations with countries in the region, especially with regional and world powers.

Moreover, together with India, Vietnam can also seek to further strengthen its security partnerships with major powers by closely linking with the Quad-like-minded countries with Indo-Pacific visions, these countries could assist Hanoi in suppressing China’s growing assertiveness in the region.

Economically, one of the pillars of the India-Vietnam partnership is economic cooperation. Deepening economic integration with the dynamic ASEAN region (including Vietnam) is an important aspect of the IPOI. For India, the development of economic-trade relations with ASEAN countries helps India promote economic integration with the Indo-Pacific region, thereby maintaining high and stable growth.

Currently, the economic cooperation between Vietnam and India is developing very well, despite complicated developments in international relations and the economic stagnation in the world. Bilateral import–export turnover grew strongly from U.S. $5.6 billion in 2014 to U.S. $11.5 billion in 2019 (Nguyen, 2020). The trade and investment relationship between Vietnam and India has improved and achieved many important results in recent years. Besides, Vietnam has set target for the development milestones in the next three decades as followed: first, Vietnam will become an industrial country with a high average income by 2030 when Vietnam celebrates the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and second, Vietnam will become a socialist oriented-developed country by 2045 when Vietnam celebrates 100 years of the independence of Vietnam (1945–2045). With this target, Vietnam finds it extremely important to strengthen economic cooperation with India. Through IPOI, India is the gateway for Vietnam to exchange with Central Asia which is an area crucial with an international strategic location and rich in oil. IPOI will facilitate connecting Vietnam’s economy with coastal countries in this region, increasing the presence of Vietnam’s economy in the region. Moreover, enhancing economic connectivity with India as well as other countries in the region also strengthens Vietnam’s capability of control of foreign investment from China. The fact that China is the largest foreign investor in Vietnam, accounting for 27.5% of total registered capital (Xinhua, 2019) makes Vietnam worry. Therefore, Vietnam should seek to prevent long-term investment from China, especially in the fields of infrastructure development.

Strategically, India is looking for a strong cooperation partner to expand its presence in the Indo-Pacific, thereby demonstrating its role in ensuring peace and stability in the region while at the same time dealing with common challenges. Additionally, India is more likely to deepen its involvement in the SCS through IPOI. Vietnam and India have convergences of strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, including dealing with threats from major countries. Therefore, Vietnam’s national security in general and maritime security in particular, would be protected. Until now, defence and security cooperation are one of the most important pillars of the comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and India. Good implementation of defence and security cooperation will contribute to promoting the relationship between the two countries, giving the two countries the opportunity to strengthen strength, create a balance in Asia, and adapt to the security cooperation mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific. Especially, it would change the military balance in the SCS.

Deepening strategic cooperation in defence and security between Vietnam and India will bring more benefits to both sides. In addition to economic benefits from sales contracts for weapons, equipment, military technology and services to Vietnam, India has received support from Vietnam to create the basis for India to play a larger role in East Asia, especially in the maritime sector. Conversely, India helps Vietnam to strengthen its capacity to modernise its armed forces, enhance defence and security strength, and strengthen defence capacity to protect its national independence and national sovereignty.

Opportunities for Vietnam–India Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea

The major focus of the Indo-Pacific is based on oceans, which is the common thread that connects all (Huma, 2019). The basic components of the Indo-Pacific include maritime security, that is, securing sea lanes of communication, freedom of navigation, maintaining an open and transparent rules-based order, abiding by international law, open dialogue and discussions, and fostering regional development by engaging in infrastructure and connectivity projects (Nidhi, 2018, p. 125). As mentioned, the birth of the term Indo-Pacific has coincided with the remarkable rise of China which has attached its territorial claims in the SCS together with not only reclamation and construction of artificial islands but also militarisation through the installation of equipment and weapons capable of controlling the SCS. These activities are threatening not only the sovereignty of Southeast Asian countries but also the freedom of navigation, overflight and trading activities of other countries outside the region.

Modi’s speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Security Conference emphasised that equal access to sea and airspace on the basis of international law was essential (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). Therefore, it can be said that in India’s vision when India launched the Indo-Pacific strategy, the SCS and freedom of navigation in the SCS have always been of a crucial importance. India’s attention to the SCS shows the increasing Indian engagement in East Asia and Southeast Asia. India’s Indo-Pacific initiative seems to set a dual strategic goal that is to make India both become a prominent power in Indian Ocean, and assume a larger strategic role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

The SCS has long been directly related to India’s strategic calculations. About 97% of India’s trade is conducted by maritime shipping, with 55% of the total transiting the Malacca Straits and the SCS. Trade with the ASEAN states stands at approximately $80 billion, and as of 2018 comprised over 10% of India’s total exports (MEA, GOI, 2018). Besides economic perspective, the SCS is vital for India not only as a gateway for shipping in East Asia but also as a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. It profoundly affects India’s strategic vision as a growing power, in terms of its expanding security role in the integrated maritime theatre spanning the two oceans. On many occasions, India has committed itself to protect its commercial interests in the SCS.

With this fact, India’s strategic interest clearly lies in maintaining peace and maritime order in the region (Panda, 2020), and the main goal of Indian policy in the Indo-Pacific is to prevent China from dominating the region (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). India’s decision to engage in a complicated security environment in the SCS, even at the risk of provoking its giant neighbour, demonstrates the important New Delhi places in the region as well as its sea routes. In this difficult-to-control environment, India has been expanding its influence through the implementation of the AEC, and initiating the Indo-Pacific strategy, in which India has been trying to enhance its defence partnerships with its ASEAN partners as well (Saurabh, 2019).

From Vietnam’s perspective, the SCS is of utmost importance in terms of specific position and role in the development and existence of Vietnam. In 2007, Vietnam was one of the first countries in Asia to adopt Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy 2020. In the SCS, Vietnam has sovereignty not only over the Paracel and Spratly Islands but also with 3,000 other large and small islands. With a coastline of 3,260 km stretching from north to south, Vietnam has more than 1 million km² of exclusive economic zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The SCS is of vital importance to the Vietnamese economy as this area becomes the main gateway for Vietnam to go to the world and if this region is monopolised, not only Vietnam’s security is threatened but also Vietnam’s economy will also be severely affected.

During the times, Vietnam has noticed that India’s increased engagement in the SCS is evident through her political determination and behaviours. First, India always asserts her principle stance on freedom of navigation, maritime security and settlement of disputes in the SCS in accordance with the provisions of international law (United Nations Convention on Law Sea 1982), and dispute resolution through dialogue and peaceful measures. Second, India remains steadfast, continuing her oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities in the SCS, despite threats, disputes and encroachment, making the situation in this sea increasingly tense. The movement is surely not only to protect India’s interests in the SCS but also to contribute to helping Vietnam consolidate its national sovereignty in this sea area. Third, India opposed China’s intention to establish an air defence identification area (ADIZ) in the SCS, because it not only affects India’s commercial and strategic interests, but also violates international principles of freedom of navigation and over flight. Fourth, India supports the decision of the International Court of Arbitration on the SCS (MEA, GOI, 2016). Fifth, India has always considered Southeast Asia as the centre, in which Vietnam has always been an important factor in this region.

With regard to policies related to the SCS, Vietnamese leaders are determined to act responsibly to preserve peace and stability, by trying to resolve the ongoing confrontation only by peaceful means. In fact, that is the chosen path as the basis for Vietnam’s foreign policy. Another important aspect of Hanoi’s foreign policy is its willingness to take advantage of partners from far away to confront a closer enemy. Vietnam’s policies in the SCS are in many ways aimed at internationalising the conflict and resolving it through cooperation with regional and global powers, as well as international organisations. Therefore, Vietnam has been taking advantage of Indian role and her IPOI to promote the relations and involve New Delhi more deeply in the SCS. As in 2017s Delhi Dialogue IX, an annual event to promote economic and politico-military discussion between India and ASEAN, Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh said that ‘ASEAN supports India to play a greater role in the political and security domain… We hope India will continue to partner our efforts for strategic security and freedom of navigation in [the] SCS’ (Bhattacherjee, 2017).

As like-minded nations with convergences of interests, in order to fulfil both sides’ goals, Vietnam and India need to make more efforts to seize cooperation opportunities. India’s naval presence and expression of views on the SCS should be continued. In such a context, the two sides may find a number of important cooperation opportunities.

In political term, India has repeatedly opposed Chinese activities like China’s construction and militarisation of islands or India supported the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling and opposed China’s unilateral activities in sea dispute settlement. On account of current Indian policies and activities, it can be predicted that India will continue to have a strong voice on the SCS issues on bilateral and multilateral forums in the coming time. India’s coordination with other major countries such as the United States, Australia, and Japan to speak up about the SCS issues will benefit Vietnam in preventing China’s unilateral activities that do not comply with international law. Vietnam and India need to strengthen delegation exchanges at all levels, especially at high levels, in order to enhance mutual understanding and views on the SCS. In particular, both of the countries need to attach importance to improving the effectiveness of defence policy dialogue mechanisms, especially at high levels, in order to refer and coordinate defence strategies and policies of each other. Through meetings and exchanges, the leaders of the two countries may get more strategic agreements directing the strategic bilateral relationship in the medium and long term while they can both promptly remove difficulties and firmly reinforce mutual understanding and trust.

In security term, India has steadily shifted towards becoming a ‘net security provider’ in the region, strengthening its naval capabilities, supporting maritime capacity-building efforts in Southeast Asia (Kim et al., 2020). In that light, India needs to maintain a strong regional presence through military visits by naval vessels to Vietnam, combined with joint capacity-building exercises. India and Vietnam have an immense opportunity to promote cooperation in maritime training to meet the needs and strengths of each country. In training cooperation, if India focuses more on skill training for Vietnam’s maritime law enforcement personnel, Vietnam will be able to improve her maritime law enforcement capacity.

Also, India and Vietnam can promote cooperation and development of defence industry. Vietnam is focusing on strengthening material and technical foundations, building a ‘step by step modernised’ armed force, in which there are a number of forces going straight to modernisation. The promotion of defence industry cooperation, especially maritime defence with India, is an important and practical issue. In the meantime, Vietnam needs to exploit and use new and modern weapons and technical equipment. Therefore, India can transfer to Vietnam modern technology to improve, upgrade and digitise old aircrafts, radars, warships and electronic equipment to prolong the service life and increase combat capabilities and efficiency. Vietnam will likely involve the deployment of Kilo-class submarines and Su-30MMK fighter jets to demonstrate her determination though Vietnam may get risks of broader conflicts with China in doing so.

The two countries also need to strengthen coordinated patrols. Vietnam can deploy the Coast Guard and Marine Militia (newly built) to patrol regularly in disputed areas just like Beijing has been doing for years. The need to improve Coast Guard capacity has increased due to the need to develop a marine economy and manage marine operations in Vietnam. The number of foreign fishing vessels operating illegally fishing in Vietnam’s waters is increasing. China continues to impose a number of unilateral fishing bans in the SCS, including Vietnam’s waters. The situations of disputes at the sea will have many unpredictable complications.

In term of economy, Vietnam summarised 10 years of implementing ‘the Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy 2020’, on that basis, the Resolution on the Strategy for the Sustainable Development of Viet Nam’s Marine Economy by 2030, with a Vision to 2045 (Resolution No. 36-NQ/TW) was passed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam on 22 October 2018. This new strategy has the general objective of ‘turning Viet Nam into a strong marine country; in principle, achieving the criteria for sustainable development of marine economy’ (Online Newspaper of the Government, 2019). To achieve that objective, Vietnam has come up with a number of key solutions like ‘Strengthening relations with strategic partners, comprehensive partners, traditional friends, countries with potential power in the sea, countries with common interests on the principle of respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit and compliance with international law’, and ‘Promoting international cooperation activities on sustainable management, use and conservation of seas and oceans’ (Online Newspaper of the Government, 2019). Meanwhile, India’s IPOI stresses on seeking ‘partnerships’ that promote free trade and sustainable use of marine resources. Therefore, Vietnam and India have a similarity in seeking a deeper cooperation relationship at sea.

In the Resolution No. 26/NQ-CP promulgating the 5-year plan for implementation of the Maritime Strategy, Vietnam has a need to ‘continue searching and exploring minerals, oil and gas, non-traditional hydrocarbon forms in deep-shore sedimentary basins to increase mineral and oil and gas reserves’ (The Prime Minister, 2020). This is an opportunity basis for Vietnam and India to continue shaking hands to cooperate on this sector. Though China has continuously sent ships to invade Vietnam’s waters, approaching the location of the oil and gas lot under exploration of India’s ONGC, India also has stated in certain terms that it would deploy the Indian Navy to the SCS to defend its energy interests. During a telephone call on 13 April 2020, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc affirmed to Indian Prime Minister N. Modi that oil and gas cooperation is a strategic area in the bilateral relationship in the coming time (Nhandan Online, 2020). Therefore, Vietnam and India need to further promote oil and gas exploration in the SCS.

Moreover, Vietnam wishes to develop successfully and breakthrough marine economic sectors by 2030 in order of priority as follows: (a) marine tourism and services; (b) maritime economics; (c) exploration of oil and gas and other marine mineral resources; (d) aquaculture and fishing; (e) coastal industry; (f) renewable energy and new marine economic sectors (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2018). India is a country with advanced technologies to exploit and protect resources from the sea, so India’s cooperation in this area will be very useful for Vietnam’s marine economic development, especially in exploiting, cultivating and processing marine products as well as establishing marine conservation zones. These activities will certainly help Vietnam to exploit the sea sustainably in the SCS, contributing to the achievement of Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy’s goal.

Thus, India’s comprehensive participation, as well as the close cooperation between Vietnam and India on the political, security and economic aspects in the SCS today can certainly promote the balance and positively affects to reduction of tensions, contributing to the promotion of peace and stability in the SCS.

Conclusion

In the context of strategic changes, ensuring a greater role for India in the Indo-Pacific in general and the SCS in particular is not an exception. This policy framework validates India’s growing concerns and activities in the region and the SCS amid growing challenges from China. Accordingly, the strategic relationship between India and Vietnam plays an extremely important role in the India’s IPOI in the region. Vietnam’s consistent policy always attaches importance to developing a traditional friendship and a comprehensive strategic partnership with India. India’s IPOI is also clear and consistent with its direct interests in the region. India and Vietnam have convergent strategic interests in the SCS. The more aggressive China is, the more it will promote India–Vietnam strategic cooperation, helping to improve Vietnam’s maritime capacity, consistent with the regional security mechanism and the Indo-Pacific vision. Vietnam takes full advantage of Indian support which is essential to the protection of Vietnam’s sovereignty and interests in the region.