The Tamil Issue in India–Sri Lanka Relationships: Priorities and Interests

Introduction

During the last phase of civil war (2006–2009), which ended more than 25 years of ethnic war in Sri Lanka, serious war crimes were committed by the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil rebels. Between the two, allegations against the Sri Lankan state for perpetrating war crimes are more serious than those against Tamil rebels. Hence, since the end of the civil war, the Sri Lankan state has been subject to global criticism for carrying out indiscriminate killing, sexual abuse, and enforced disappearance in the Tamil dominated northern and eastern regions of the country. Some forms of violence continue even after the end of the war (See Subramanian, 2014). Expressing ‘serious concerns’ on ‘deteriorating situation of human rights’ in post-civil war Sri Lanka, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has adopted resolutions (United Nations General Assembly 2021). The eighth resolution on Sri Lanka was adopted by the UNHRC on 23 March 2021 (Subramanian, 2021). The core group on Sri Lanka—UK, Canada, Germany, Malawi, Montenegro and North Macedonia—introduced the 2021 resolution. The 23 March 2021 UNHRC’s resolution number 46/1 called upon (United Nations General Assembly, 2021, p. 1)

The Government of Sri Lanka to fulfil its commitments on the devolution of political authority, which is integral to reconciliation and the full enjoyment of human rights by all members of its population, and encouraging the Government to respect local governance, including through the holding of elections for provincial councils, and to ensure that all provincial councils, including the northern and eastern provincial councils, are able to operate effectively, in accordance with the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka.

The March 2021 resolution reaffirmed (United Nations General Assembly, 2021, p. 2) ‘that all individuals in Sri Lanka are entitled to the full enjoyment of their human rights without distinction of any kind such as religion, belief or ethnic origin, and the importance of a peaceful and unified land to the enjoyment of human rights’. The resolution expressed serious concerns over the deteriorating situation of human rights in the country. It also called upon the Sri Lankan government to ensure impartial investigation of all alleged crimes relating to human rights violations, ensure the effective and independent functioning of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, protect civil society actors, and enable a political ‘environment in which civil society can operate free from hindrance, surveillance, insecurity and threat of reprisals’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2021, p. 3). 22 countries voted in favour of the resolution, 11 against it and 14, including India, abstained. The Indian statement before the resolution on Sri Lanka was put to vote at the 46th session of the Human Rights Council, held in March 2021, said:

India’s approach to the question of human rights in Sri Lanka is guided by two fundamental considerations. One is our support to the Tamils of Sri Lanka for equality, justice, dignity and peace. The other is in ensuring unity, stability and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka … India supports the call by the international community for the Government of Sri Lanka to fulfil its commitments on the devolution of political authority, including through the early holding of elections for Provincial Councils and to ensure that all Provincial Councils are able to operate effectively, in accordance with the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution.… We would urge that the Government of Sri Lanka carry forward the process of reconciliation, address the aspirations of the Tamil community and continue to engage constructively with the international community to ensure that the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all its citizens are fully protected. (India at UN, Geneva, 2021)

India’s vote at the UNHRC in the past depended on political relations between New Delhi and Colombo, the pressures from coalition partners in India, the influence of politics and parties in Tamil Nadu, and regional and international geopolitics (Subramanian, 2021). The first resolution was moved in 2009 by Sri Lanka urging the international community to help the country to rebuild and support the government’s efforts to politically settle the ethnic issue. The preamble to resolution mentioned the implementation of the 13th amendment to bring ‘lasting peace and reconciliation’ (Subramanian, 2021). India voted in favour of that resolution. In 2012, a critical resolution sponsored by the US was moved at the UNHRC. India voted in its favour but moved an amendment to the resolution to make it more balanced and respectful of Sri Lankan sovereignty (Pant, 2016, p. 115). Again, in 2013, India voted with 24 other countries in favour of the UNHRC resolution. It even pushed for seven written amendments to six paragraphs of the resolution. India’s vote in 2012 and 2013 contravened its traditional policy to abstain from country-specific UNHRC resolutions (Pant, 2016, p. 116). The 2015, 2017 and 2019 resolutions were adopted without a vote (The Wire, 2021).

There are several studies on the domestic origin of the civil war in Sri Lanka and the conditions of the Tamil after 2009. De Votta (2011) shows that the discriminatory ethnic policies followed by the successive Sri Lankan governments since the country’s independence in 1948 resulted in ethnic tensions and conflicts. After the end of the civil war in 2009, there have been talks about the reconstruction of the Tamil-dominated regions. Gerharz (2014) presents a comprehensive insight into the politics of reconstruction and development in post-civil war northern Sri Lanka. She observes that an interplay of cooperation and conflict shapes such development. In the post-civil war years, the Sri Lankan government is accused of damaging signs and symbols of Tamil in the northern areas. Subramanian (2014) examines how the Sinhala-dominated state reshapes memory and buries histories in the Tamil populated northern province. Mohan (2015) analyses the effect of ethnic conflict on the Sri Lankan Tamils torn between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). Parera (2016) looks at how Sri Lankan state narratives of the civil war and political violence have erased the acts of individual or group suffering and loss. In the war, sexual assault is invariably used as a means to show the patriarchal power of the state. In a collection of articles, Pinto-Jayawardena and Kumari Jayawardena (2016) demonstrate that many women and men were sexually assaulted, tortured, abducted, and disappeared during the two decades long Sri Lankan civil war. On India’s involvement on Tamil issues in Sri Lanka, Sahadevan (1995) illuminates bilateral efforts made by the two countries to resolve the issue of stateless people between 1940 and 1964. He also discusses the diplomatic efforts made by India and Sri Lanka during 1965–1981 to address the citizenship issues. Looking at the India–Sri Lanka relations in post-civil war years, Manoharan (2014), and Manoharan and Chakravarty (2016) discuss the downs between the two countries and identify some factors that have pulled their bilateral relationship back on track. Senevirathna (2015) examines the domestic and external factors which have a varied influence on India–Sri Lanka bilateral relations and determine the contours of the diplomatic and other responses required to maintain the relationship in a positive equilibrium. Padmakumara and Senanayake (2019) show that China’s influence in Sri Lanka has generated uncertainty in India. Jain (2021) analyses the impact of enormous Chinese investments in Sri Lanka on Indo–Lanka relationships.

Elaborating on the arguments made in the literature mentioned above, this article attempts to answer two questions: First, why, initially, did India to ethnic Tamil issues in Sri Lanka? Second, have changes in Indian policy after 2009 on Tamil issues proved effective in containing outside forces in the region? In this article, the authors argue that besides certain compulsions in its domestic politics, India ‘intervened’ in Sri Lankan matters in the 1980s mainly to keep other countries away from South Asian affairs. Likewise, India’s position on Sri Lankan Tamil issues has shifted in post-civil war years due to its geostrategic considerations.

India and the Tamil Issue in Sri Lanka, 1980s to 2006

Historically, the majority of the Tamils in Sri Lanka came from India as labourers and worked on plantations for generations and were known as ‘Indian Tamils’ (Pillai, 2012). The Sri Lankan Government passed the Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was called until 1972) Citizenship Act of 1948, depriving about 700,000 Indian origin Tamils (Menon, 2016, p. 84) of their citizenship rights and franchise. Their position worsened when Sinhala was made the only official language of the country in 1956 (Pillai, 2012).

To address the ‘Indian Tamil’ issues, in 1964, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement under which it was decided that all persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka who were not recognised either as citizens of India or Sri Lanka would become citizens of either of the two countries. The approximate number of such people was 975,000. Of that, 300,000 were to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship, while India agreed to accept repatriation of 525,000. The two countries agreed that the status and future of the remaining 150,000 would be decided in the future (Ministry of External Affairs, 1964).

However, the problem remained unsolved. The Sri Lankan government’s discriminatory policies favouring Sinhala created ethnic tensions and caused riots that helped the militant Tamil become stronger. For instance, the anti-Tamil riots of 1977 and 1981 made the Tamil opposition, which was earlier dominated by the educated middle class, ‘grew increasingly militant’ (Chacko, 2012, p. 139). The worst happened in 1983.

In July 1983, 14 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed by the LTTE. As the news of the killing spread, at many places, Sinhalese mobs went berserk attacking the Tamils (Chattoraj, 2017). The Sinhala dominated police and military soldiers even supported the mob. Even the then President of Sri Lanka, Junius Richard Jayewardene, in his 27 July speech emphasised on Sinhala’s grievances. In that anti-Tamil pogrom, popularly referred to as Black July, between 400 and 3,000 Sri Lankan Tamils were killed (BBC News, 2013a). Besides, further damaging the ethnic relationships in Sri Lanka, the July 1983 riots raised Indian ‘concerns’ about Sri Lankan Tamils (see Dixit, 2002). India’s ‘concerns’, followed by ‘intervention’ and support to the issues raised by the Tamil groups were largely seen by the Sri Lankan leadership and Sinhalese groups as an attempt to destabilise Sri Lanka’s political climate (DeVotta, 1998, p. 462).

Under Rajiv Gandhi’s political leadership (1984–1989), India was directly involved in Sri Lankan affairs. The Indian involvement was mainly seen because of ‘concerns’ over the Tamil population; however, it was strategic thinking that pushed India into Sri Lanka’s ethnic matters. For instance, while sending troops to Sri Lanka in 1987 to execute a peace deal between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, India also served its own larger interests in the region. The Sri Lankan government agreed then that (Burgess, 2009; Seevaratnam, 1989, p. 213):

military bases would not be offered to any other country;

During the long years of militancy in Sri Lanka, India’s strategy had shifted from a strategy of diffusion to a strategy of mediation and then, finally, a strategy of suppression (Sengupta & Ganguly, 2013). India’s involvement during the mid-1970s to early 1980s was covert, as its secret intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) provided most of the insight (Sengupta & Ganguly, 2013). As a result of the assistance supplied by the RAW, the LTTE emerged as the most effective fighting force for the Tamil cause (Sengupta & Ganguly, 2013). From the early 1980s until the mid-1980s, India pursued a strategy of mediation, which eventually resulted in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement and the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) into Sri Lanka in 1987.

India believed that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 largely convinced the Sri Lankan Tamils that ‘their security and future well-being could only be ensured by direct Indian guarantees’ (Dixit, 2002, p. 84). At that time, India also ‘realised that her mediation would have to go beyond political persuasion to make the Sri Lankan government responsive to the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils’ (Dixit, 2002, p. 84). On the contrary, the 1987 accord precipitated a serious political crisis in the Sinhalese dominated areas of the country, which saw several anti-government riots (De Silva, 2001). There were also differences within the Tamil groups over the 1987 Accord. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and other Tamil groups endorsed the 1987 Accord but LTTE ‘clung to its misgivings’ mainly because of three reasons, as J. N. Dixit, the then Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka mentions (Dixit, 2002, pp. 152–53):

Revival of the democratic process in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka would deprive the LTTE of its dominant political and military role.

The Political Committee of the LTTE enumerated reasons for its reservations on the Indo-Lanka Accord (Seevaratnam,1989, pp. 203–213):

The Accord attempted to impose a settlement within the framework of the ‘military constitution’ of Sri Lanka which is nothing but a legalised embodiment of the Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinism. It would subjugate the Tamils under the dictatorship of the majority.

As the LTTE was not happy with the Agreement, the sabotage began soon after it was signed in 1987 (see Dixit, 2012). Both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government blamed each other for sabotage. The LTTE even accused India of withdrawing from commitments and pledges it made earlier to resolve the ethnic problems (Seevaratnam, 1989, p. 218). Amidst such an environment, ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka intensified and conflict escalated.

As fighting began in Sri Lanka, many Sri Lankan Tamils took refuge in India (mainly in Tamil Nadu). Since their arrival in the mid-1980s, the Tamil refugees were initially considered ‘guests’ and received a warm reception by the locals (Chattoraj, 2022). However, resentment developed and ‘warmth’ towards the refugees faded after the LTTE suicide bombers assassinated Rajiv Gandhi during a campaign for parliamentary elections in Perambaddur, Tamil Nadu in 1991. Additionally, the attitude of the Indian government towards the LTTE changed significantly (Chattoraj, 2017, 2021). Nevertheless, many war-affected Tamils remained in India. According to an estimate, in 2021 around 58,843 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees live in about 108 government-administered refugee camps in Tamil Nadu and nearly 34,135 are outside the camps (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021). Besides, 54 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are staying in the refugee camp at Malkangiri, Odisha (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021).

India and the Tamil Issue in Sri Lanka, 2006 Onwards

Ahead of the restart of the final phase of the civil war in 2006, efforts were made to mediate a solution between the Tamil militant group(s) and the Sri Lankan government. Norway, for instance, had offered its services to bring the parties together (Moolakkattu, 2005). The International Committee of the Red Cross, which was admitted in Sri Lanka in 1989 after considerable campaigning by countries like Norway, acted as a channel of communication between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government during 1994–1995, and between the war zone and the outer world in general. The UN wanted to be involve in the mediation but opposition by the Sinhala nationalists barred its involvement (Perera & MacSwiney, 2002; Orjuela, 2003). However, such mediation efforts failed, leading to a return to full-scale war (Goodhand et al., 2014).

After the civil war resumed in 2006, India conveyed its deep concerns at the plight of the mostly Tamil civilian population, emphasising that their rights and welfare should not get enmeshed in hostilities against the LTTE (Aliff, 2015). During the last days of the war, the Indian government was constantly in touch with Sri Lanka under the ‘troika’ arrangement consisting of India’s then-National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayanan, then Defence Secretary Vijay Singh, and then Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon. From the Sri Lankan side, it was then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, then Secretary to the President Lalith Weeratunga, and member of Parliament Basil Rajapaksa (Menon, 2016, p. 94). In the talks, Indian officials asked to provide safe passage to the civilians, to which Sri Lanka agreed (Menon, 2016, p. 94). The Sri Lankan officials were, however, not ready to agree on keeping the LTTE leaders alive and taking them as prisoners or trying them in court. They were also not willing for international mediation or a ceasefire that, they believed, would enable top LTTE leaders to survive (Menon, 2016, pp. 94–95). Norway and the USA attempted to negotiate exile for LTTE founder and leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran and a ceasefire. However, in New Delhi and Chennai, almost all political leaders had different stances. Many Indian Tamil leaders were not supportive of Prabhakaran. They believed that the only way Prabhakaran could restart the conflict was by eliminating the Sri Lankan Tamil leaders living in India, as he had done in Sri Lanka earlier (Menon, 2016, p. 95). The more than 25 years long Sri Lankan civil war caused loss of about 100,000 lives (Hyndman & Amarasingam, 2014), and more than a million experienced displacement within and across the island and beyond its borders from the North-East (Chattoraj, 2022). There was also destruction of physical infrastructures (Chattoraj, 2019).

Soon after the end of the civil war in 2009, India urged the then Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa to reach out to Sri Lankan Tamils through devolution of political power and democratic means, restoring human rights, and a sense of dignity to victor and vanquished alike (Menon, 2016, p. 100). During his visit to India in June 2009, Mahinda held talks with the then Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh. India extended support to reconstruct the war-affected areas and rehabilitation programmes (Thalpawila, 2014). Financial and technical assistance, along with a housing scheme of US$270m to build 50,000 houses in the war-affected areas were announced by the Government of India in 2010 (Chattoraj, 2017). Indian government provided emergency supplies of medicine, temporary housing and cement and undertook demining programmes in war zones with an investment of US$110m (Thalpawila, 2014). India contributed US$416.4m to Sri Lanka for the construction of the Northern railway line (Thalpawila, 2014).

However, India was worried about Civil-Military balance in post-war Sri Lanka (Menon, 2016, p. 100). It is estimated that even in 1995, Sri Lanka had more security personnel per million of the population than other South Asian countries, including India and Pakistan. Further increase in the number of security forces between 2005 and 2009 had increasingly militarised the society (De Silva, 2012, p. 211). The militarisation of Sri Lanka had been an issue post-2009, but the government was reluctant to reduce the number of security forces. The civil-military balance is justified as a way to prevent any prospect of a revival of the LTTE in Sri Lanka (De Silva, 2012, p. 211).

As the civil war raged global public turned against the Sri Lankan government, the United Nations took the human rights issue into cognizance. The UNHRC in Geneva adopted a resolution in 2012 and again in 2013 calling on Sri Lanka to take reasonable steps to ensure accountability for alleged war crimes and human rights violations during the final steps of the war with the LTTE. The United States sponsored a resolution in the 47 member UNHRC. Twenty-four countries voted for the resolution and 15 against it in 2012. India voted for the resolution. The UNHRC passed the second resolution against Sri Lanka in its 22nd session in March 2013. Twenty-five countries voted for the resolution, and 13 against it. India was among voters for the resolution again (Chattoraj, 2017).

Earlier, in 2010, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government set up a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) which absolved the military and solely accused the separatist Tamil Tigers of human rights violations (LLRC, 2011). The Sri Lankan government maintained that the Tamil situation was its internal affair, which it would handle itself. Russia, China and all developing nations supported it, but not India (Menon, 2016, p. 100).

Sri Lanka’s previous government under Maithripala Sirisena (2015–2019) sought to forestall similar attempts by co-sponsoring the UN Resolution 30/1 in 2015 (DeVotta & Ganguly, 2021). This measure called on the country to promote ethnic reconciliation and accountability by installing an office of missing persons, an office for reparations, a truth and reconciliation commission, and war crimes court that included international and local judges, prosecutors, and investigators (DeVotta & Ganguly, 2021). While the Tamil separatists perpetrated multiple acts of terrorism and human rights abuses (DeVotta & Ganguly, 2021), so had Sri Lanka’s military personnel, who had been given leeway to do so and abetted by leading politicians.

After winning the Presidential elections in November 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa has shown a cavalier attitude in his disregard for human rights. Not only did the government withdraw from co-sponsorship of Resolution 30/1 in February 2020, but a soldier convicted of slitting the throats of eight Tamil civilians was also pardoned by the president (DeVotta & Ganguly, 2021). In December 2020, Rajapaksa promoted Lt Gen Shavendra Silva as the army chief and the defence secretary, who was accused of committing war crimes (PTI, 2019).

Gotabaya Rajapaksa has remilitarised the island. At present, at least 28 retired or serving military and intelligence personnel play leading roles in the affairs of the Tamil dominated region which were earlier administered by civilian authorities. There are more than 30 government establishments from the region which have been placed under the Defence Ministry (DeVotta & Ganguly, 2021).

In such a political environment, India has shown concerns towards the Tamil issues but given more weightage to its geostrategic interests. The following section discusses the change in India’s policy towards Sri Lanka.

Changes in India’s Policies Towards Post-civil War Sri Lanka

Although India has expressed concerns on Tamil issues, as discussed above, it is geostrategy which largely has guided India’s policy towards Sri Lanka (Menon, 2016, p. 87; Thalpawila, 2014). In the past the Tamil groups could not find support from New Delhi and Madras (now Chennai). For instance, in 1972 the TULF was unsuccessful in getting support for the Sri Lankan Tamils from the Indian government. Also, on several occasions, the Tamil Nadu government had arrested and deported Sri Lankan Tamil militants to Sri Lanka (Chacko, 2012, p. 140).

The Sri Lankan Tamil cause became strong in Tamil Nadu politics only after 1977 when the regional political parties such as Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) became electorally strong. Between 1989 and 2014, the DMK and AIADMK have played important roles in national politics by supporting coalition governments at the centre. After the last phase of the Sri Lankan civil war, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Jayaram Jayalalitha (AIADMK) proposed a resolution against Sri Lanka in 2013 urging New Delhi to slap an economic embargo on Colombo till the suppression of Tamils was stopped and those who were responsible for ‘genocide and war crimes’ face an international investigation (Thalpawila, 2014). Jayalalitha’s government also wanted New Delhi to move amendments to the US-backed resolution on Sri Lanka over war crimes against Tamils in Northern Sri Lanka (Thalpawila, 2014). The AIADMK government banned Sri Lankan cricketers playing in Tamil Nadu for Chennai Super King, a Tamil Nadu based Indian Premier League cricket franchise (BBC News, 2013b). The DMK, which was a part of the Manmohan Singh led coalition government at the centre influenced India’s 2012 and 2013 voting at the UNHRC. Not satisfied with the central government’s position in March 2013, DMK withdrew its support from the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. Political calculations in Tamil Nadu also prevented Manmohan Singh from attending the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of the Government Meeting at Colombo in November 2013. Further, in 2019, after the Indian parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the DMK and AIADMK opposed it. Under CAA, non-Muslim minorities from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh could become Indian citizens if they fulfilled other eligibility criteria given in the Act (Government of India, 2019). The CAA does not talk about Sri Lanka and ethnic Sri Lankan Tamils living in India.

Several Sri Lankan Tamils in the camps desire Indian citizenship and therefore, have requested the state government of Tamil Nadu to grant them citizenship as they have been living in India for over several decades. The AIADMK led Tamil Nadu government on 8 January 2020 took up this issue in the state assembly. It talked about providing dual citizenship to the refugees, which needs to be facilitated by the Union government with (Chattoraj, 2022). In the 2021 Tamil Nadu assembly elections, MK Stalin-led DMK came back to power (Times Now, 2021). Earlier, in March 2021, Stalin stated that he and his party would urge the union government to scrap the contentious CAA and confer Indian citizenship on Sri Lankan Tamils living in refugee camps in India (The Hindu, 2021a). Recently, in early September 2021, the Tamil Nadu State Assembly adopted a resolution urging the Union government to repeal the CAA.

Unlike the regional political parties from Tamil Nadu for whom Tamil ethnic issue is more important, the Union government of India gives more weightage to geostrategy, though Tamil issues are not entirely discarded. In the post-civil war years, in 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the former war zone in the northern areas to show solidarity with ethnic Tamils (Parameswaran, 2015). Modi launched the construction of a US$9m cultural centre in Jaffna and handed over houses built with Indian aid to war-displaced Tamils (Parameswaran, 2015). In 2018, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement to have Indian assistance of US$45.27m to upgrade the Kankesanturai (KKS) harbour, located on the northern tip of the Jaffna peninsula (Srinivasan, 2018).

As Coronavirus or the COVID-19 pandemic infected millions in Sri Lanka in 2020, India had come forward to assist the island country. India’s assistance to Sri Lanka during the pandemic has been varied and need-based (The Economic Times, 2021).Close to 26 tonnes of essential medical supplies were also gifted by India to Sri Lanka in April–May 2020. In January 2021, India provided 500,000 doses of the Covishield vaccine (Press Trust of India, 2021). Additionally, since August 2021, India has been sending urgent supplies of oxygen to Sri Lanka following a personal request for assistance by Gotabaya Rajapaksa, to help the island nation combat the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (The Economic Times, 2021).

Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visited Sri Lanka in October 2021 to review the status of bilateral ties, including an assessment of the bilateral projects between the two countries (Rajagopalan, 2021). The visit was considered an effort to smooth out recent ‘wrinkles’ in their bilateral relationship, reflected in the rescheduling or cancellation of some India-led projects in Sri Lanka (Rajagopalan, 2021).

In recent years, India’s Sri Lanka policy has been largely shaped and affected by Colombo’s growing relations with China and Pakistan. To keep the Chinese and Pakistani influences away from the island nation, before the civil war, India had provided military and economic help to Sri Lanka. For instance, India provided radars to track the LTTE aircraft and provided personnel to manage and operate them. Along with the US, India helped the Sri Lankan navy to neutralise the LTTE in the high seas. The Indian Army trained around 800 Sri Lankan officers annually without any cost (Deyshappriya, 2019). On the economic side, India and Sri Lanka signed a Free Trade Agreement in 1999. India signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Sri Lanka in 2008. Indian companies such as Tata, Apollo Hospitals, Ashok Leyland, and Indian oil had a conspicuous presence in Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2010, p. 52). However, during the civil war, when India decided not to send offensive weapons to Sri Lanka and Western countries decided to suspend the military aid to it, China came to Colombo’s rescue. Sri Lanka signed a US$37.6m deal in 2007 to buy Chinese weapons. China supplied fighter jets to Sri Lanka to counter the LTTE (Pant, 2016, p. 114). Notably, China is Sri Lanka’s largest arms supplier. Colombo has traded military equipment worth US$749m since 1959 (Attanayake, 2021). Also, worth noting is China’s arms trade with Sri Lanka between 2000 and 2008 was US$271m (Attanayake, 2021). In post-civil war times, despite changes in policies, India has not been able to fully check China’s growing bonding with Sri Lanka (Deyshappriya, 2019).

After the civil war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa reassured the Indian troika about the nature of Sri Lanka’s defence relationship with China and help for Indian companies to re-enter the reconstruction works in Colombo (Menon, 2016, p. 101). Mahinda was more compliant with the Chinese demands. However, India was assured by the Rajapaksa brothers that there would be no permanent Chinese military presence in Sri Lanka and that the country would look to India to meet most of its military training and intelligence needs. They were respected in practice till May 2014 (Menon, 2016, p. 101). Despite such assurances and reassurances, in 2016, China’s military supplies to Sri Lanka was estimated to be around US$100m per year. China has encouraged Colombo to participate in multilateral military activities, and Sri Lanka became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2009 (Pant, 2016, p. 114). In the post-civil war years, there is a gradual increase in the number of Sri Lankan officers trained at the Chinese National Defence University (see Attanayake, 2021).

China emerged as the largest foreign finance partner of Sri Lanka in 2010, overtaking India and Japan. In 2012 China became the third trading partner of Colombo (Pant, 2016, p. 114). China has been involved in constructing the Hambantota port and Hambantota international airport (Roy-Chaudhury, 2019). China and Sri Lanka signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for cooperation on the BRI in Beijing on 9 December 2014. In 2017, the Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Sri Lanka amounted to 35% of the total foreign investments (Singh, 2018). Furthermore, on 20 May 2021, the Sri Lankan parliament passed the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill. The bill lays out the country’s legal framework governing the China-financed project built on land reclaimed from the Sri Lankan capital’s seafront, adjoining ‘Colombo’s port’. The bill effectively turns 660 acres into Chinese sovereign territory (Deb, 2021).

After the pandemic hit Sri Lanka in early 2020, China has provided masks and other medical aid to Sri Lanka. In April 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted a third virtual meeting with the South Asian countries to deal with the COVID-19 situation during which he proposed flexible methods for ‘diversified and stable’ vaccine supplies (PTI, 2021).

Bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and Pakistan developed rapidly during the civil war period in Sri Lanka. Pakistan has been one of the major sellers of arms and ammunition to Sri Lanka since 1999 (Abeyagoonasekera, 2021). In the post-civil war period, to firm bilateral relations with Sri Lanka, the then President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, and a high-powered delegation visited Sri Lanka in November 2010. Then, Mahinda Rajapaksa visited Pakistan in February 2012. Both visits confirmed the development of economic cooperation between the two countries. Pakistan agreed to train police and intelligence officers in Sri Lanka involved with the country’s security issues (Abeyagoonasekera, 2021). During his visit to Sri Lanka in February 2021, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan offered Sri Lanka a US$50m credit line to help with military equipment purchases and strengthen bilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism and drugs trafficking. The two countries also agreed to share intelligence gathering (Abeyagoonasekera, 2021). However, the visit was overshadowed by Colombo’s challenges at the UNHRC where the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet submitted a resolution by which the UN assembles, consolidates, analyses, and preserves information and evidence. Also, the resolution helps to devise strategies for future accountability processes in Sri Lanka that address gross violations of human rights or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, it is expected to advocate for victims and survivors and to support judicial and other proceedings (Abeyagoonasekera, 2021).

To counter the outside power’s influence in Sri Lanka, India has taken several measures. After the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Colombo in 2014, Narendra Modi visited the country in 2015. Modi went to Sri Lanka again in 2017. The gap between the two visits is the smallest in the last three decades which underpins the importance of Sri Lanka in its strategic calculations (Singh, 2018). Defining India–Sri Lanka relations, former Sri Lankan finance minister Ravi Karunanayake said in The Hindu as saying, ‘We want to be to India what Hong Kong is to China’ (Singh, 2018).

However, India’s relation with Sri Lanka is not as smooth as Colombo has with Beijing. For instance, in early 2021, the Sri Lankan government cancelled a deal with India and Japan to develop the East Container Terminal at Colombo port with the Adani group. The Rajapaksa government was facing threats of countrywide protests against port privatisation. The port is now wholly owned and operated by the state-run Sri Lanka Port Authority. Strongly reacting to it, India asked Sri Lanka to adhere to its ‘international commitments’ (International News, 2021). Some in India accused China of pressuring Sri Lanka to cancel the port deal that the Sri Lankan foreign minister, Dinesh Gunawardena, refuted (International News, 2021).

Conclusion

As discussed in this article, even in the 1980s, India’s policy towards Sri Lanka was primarily to secure its geostrategic interests in the region. The LTTE’s issues initially found support in India, but post-India–Sri Lanka accord of 1987, serious differences cropped between the government of India and the LTTE. The accord became a reason for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, after which India strongly shifted its stance. During the final phase of the Sri Lankan civil war, India tacitly supported action against the LTTE. However, in post-civil war times, India has kept shifting its position over human rights violations in Sri Lanka. Despite such shifts, India has reiterated its demand for the full implementation of the 13th amendment. Welcoming the election results of the 2013 council elections in northern province, in which the Tamil National Alliance secured comprehensive victory, the Government of India statement stated that

The Government of Sri Lanka has honoured its commitment to the international community to hold elections to the Northern Provincial Council. We look forward to the implementation by the Government of Sri Lanka of other important commitments made to the international community, including the full implementation of the 13th Amendment and going beyond it. (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013)

With Gotabaya in power and the strong political position of the Rajapaksa brothers, it is less likely that the Sri Lanka government will implement the 13th amendment and give more power to the provincial council.

India has always been wary of external interference in its southern island neighbour. In the 1980s, the presence of the Americans disturbed India, and in post-Cold War (1948–1991) days, it is China. To counter the Chinese presence, India has taken several measures but they have not been very effective. China has grown strong bonding with Sri Lanka. In recent times, more than any other, the COVID-19 pandemic has been proved as a serious blow to the Indian influence in Sri Lanka. The Chinese have provided medicines, ventilators, vaccines and other forms of assistance to Sri Lanka to fight against the pandemic. India initially provided assistance to Sri Lanka, but after the country was severely affected by the second wave of COVID-19 in late March 2021, it paused the export of vaccines and medical goods. India’s COVID-19 crisis provided opportunity for China to further accelerate aid and pandemic diplomacy in Sri Lanka. As of now, it is difficult to say how much India has gained or lost in Sri Lanka but Beijing has undoubtedly become closer to Colombo.