The Indo-Pacific Consensus: The Past,Present and Future of India’s Vision for the Region

Introduction

At the Raisina Dialogue in 2021, when the Indian Foreign Minister Dr S. Jaishankar made the case for the logic of the Indo-Pacific and India’s vision, he defended it as a return to history:

I think Indo-Pacific historically existed. It refers to a seamless world and this was historically there, because if you look at Indian or Arab, economic trading, cultural influence, all the way from ASEAN, into Vietnam up to even the East coast of China, historically. Or if you look the other way around, which is Indonesians actually going all the way to the east coast of Africa. So what actually broke up this seamlessness, some of it was the empires of that Imperial period, but a lot of it was post Second World War politics and the fact that, we separated it as Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean. (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2021a)

The view that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is not new nor an aberration has anchored New Delhi’s embrace of this geopolitical reality and the articulation of its central role and vision for this dynamic theatre. This has happened, in New Delhi’s understanding, because of drivers such as globalisation, multipolarity and a recognition by the United States that it needs to work with others to manage the disruptive rise of China and other global challenges (The Economics Times, 2021).

Tracing India’s Ideational Engagement with the Indo-Pacific

The traction for the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ has thrown up a vast amount of literature devoted to investigating the origins of this concept and re-iteration that the idea is not a new one. Many strategists have argued that the Indo-Pacific conceptualisation existed in the past, but within differing contexts and Indian thinking was always part of this conversation.

Even before India’s independence, its political leaders and strategic thinkers were cognisant of geopolitical salience of country’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific littorals. Jawaharlal Nehru, in his book The Discovery of India (1945), had observed:

The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as a nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in South East Asia and right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world that is going to develop rapidly in the future. (Nehru, 2008)

K. M. Panikkar, an eminent Indian historian and former Ambassador, in his book The Strategic Problem of Indian Ocean Defence (1944), had similarly highlighted the need for entrenched strategic engagement with wider Indo-Pacific littorals in order to ensure the security of India’s maritime frontiers and her seaborne trade.

Later in his landmark essay India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History, Panikkar (1945) enunciated the importance of the Indian Ocean and the relevance of India’s geographic location in the region, saying it is ‘the subcontinent of India’ which makes the Indian Ocean important. ‘For the most part, its area is walled off on three sides by land, with the southern side of Asia forming a roof over it. The continent of Africa constitutes the western wall, while Burma, Malaya and the insular continuations protect the eastern side’. He had surmised, ‘It is the geographical position of India that changes the character of the Indian ocean’.

Pannikar’s writing also seems prescient when contextualised with the resurgence of the ‘Indo-Pacific Debate’, where Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea or the strategic competition in the India Ocean Region is seen as primary geopolitical drivers. He wrote in the same essay:

[T]he Indian Ocean will be one of the major problems of the future.… With major powers developing so near the area, the old conception of that ocean as a preserve has to be given up. America, China and perhaps Russia will have access to the sea, in a manner totally different from what the European nations had in the centuries that followed Vasco da Gama’s arrival.… An exclusively land policy of defence for India will in future be nothing short of blindness. (Panikkar, 1945)

India’s efforts for building a Pan-Asiatic community can be traced back to PM Nehru’s enthusiasm to convene the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March and April 1947 (Borah, 2015). This was significant because it led to the creation of an Asian Relations Organization in New Delhi and which anointed PM Nehru as its president. At this forum, PM Nehru also recognised that Asia had a certain responsibility for the people of Africa as well and Afro-Asian cooperation would lay the foundation of a peaceful international order (Borah, 2015). This belief anchored and lead Nehru’s approach to the Bandung Conference of 1955. It has been established that ideationally, ‘India was at the forefront of the conference’ and it was PM Nehru who ‘took the initiative to introduce China to the world, inviting Premier Zhou Enlai to the conference, despite resistance from other founding members of the conference (Borah, 2015)’.

In the backdrop of the cold war, India’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis Pakistan and China, an inward looking economy further restrained it from developing its relationship with the region (Pandalai, 2022).

India as an Indo-Pacific Nation: The Evolution of the Concept in India’s Official Discourse

India has always considered itself an Indo-Pacific actor for the following reasons: (a) its geographical location, (b) its interests and stakes primarily in the Indian Ocean and secondary in the pacific which are also reflected in its naval deployments and exercises undertaken, (c) its bilateral partnerships which then see a shared interest in the region converging in various plurilateral fora with diverse partners, (d) its presence in de facto Indo-Pacific bodies that include members from the Indian and Pacific Oceans and (e) its growing role as a provider of net security and emergency as first responder and preferred maritime security partner for many countries in the region.

The ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ speech by the then Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, to the Indian parliament in 2007 was credited with reinvigorating New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific policy discussions. However, it is worthwhile to note here that Indian usage of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ arose in naval circles when the Naval Doctrine spoke of ‘the shift in global maritime focus from the Atlantic–Pacific combine to the Pacific–Indian Ocean region’ in 2004. ² The first ‘Indo-Pacific’ reference in India came in 2006 from Premvir Das, the former Chief of Eastern Naval Command. This was quickly followed by Gurpreet Khurana, former Commander in the Indian Navy and subsequent Executive Director of the National Maritime Foundation. He used the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ in 2007 in connection with maritime cooperation with Japan and in 2008 in connection with competition with China. By 2009, Arun Prakash, the Chief of Naval Staff 2004–2006 and subsequent Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation, was arguing that it was ‘time for our diplomats to take a stand and suggest through regional and international forums that the Indian Ocean is now significant enough to be hyphenated with the Pacific, in order to create a new term, “Indo-Pacific”’. By 2015, India’s official Maritime strategy document ‘Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy’ (Ministry of Defense (Navy), 2015) had identified officially ‘the shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways’. It highlighted ‘India’s maritime security environment has become even more complex and unpredictable’ and ‘demanded a re-evaluation of our security perceptions’ and called for ‘a reorientation of our organisation, operating philosophy and force development plans’. It also recognised that the national outlook towards the seas had become vital and, India’s interaction ‘with littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region and maritime security engagement had become a cornerstone of her regional foreign policy initiatives’.

The first appearance of Indo-Pacific in Indian official terminology has been recorded in December 2011, when Nirupama Rao, India’s ambassador to the United States, argued that ‘continuance of economic growth and prosperity […] is in many ways linked to the Indo-Pacific region’ (Scott, 2012). Within the Ministry for External Affairs, in February 2012, the then Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai noted that Asia Pacific was now being replaced with ‘as some here have begun to call it, the Indo-Pacific’, and in which ‘while our Look East Policy began with a strong economic emphasis and content, we now have growing strategic and security engagement in the region’ (Scott, 2012). In February 2012 itself, the then Defence Minister A. K. Antony reiterated ‘the relevance of the Indian Ocean-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific combine’ in great power relationships that India was involved in. Later Salman Khurshid, the Minister of External Affairs, articulated in July 2012, that ‘beyond ASEAN, we (India) are actually looking at the Indo-Pacific now’ (Scott, 2012). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh consequently, used the term for the first time in December 2012 at the India–ASEAN Commemorative Summit declaring: ‘our future is inter-linked and a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is crucial for our own progress and prosperity’ (MEA, 2012). For even then in Indian conception, ASEAN Centrality was going to be a cornerstone for India’s vision for the region.

In 2013, the usage of the term picked up in India’s diplomatic lexicon when Ambassador Rao argued that the term ‘“Indo-Pacific” which is increasingly defining the cultural, economic, political and security continuum that straddles the Indian and the Pacific Ocean regions [is] fast becoming a geo-strategic construct to comprehend the common opportunities, the intersecting maritime and security interests, and challenges’ (Centre for Contemporary South Asia, 2013). The then Secretary (East) Sanjay Singh in an interaction at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) 2013 Conference, ‘Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region’, noted how ‘since the last couple of years, the term “Indo-Pacific” is being used increasingly during discussions among policymakers, strategic thinkers and think tanks’ because quite simply the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has come to reflect contemporary realities (Scott, 2012). At that ICWA venue, the then Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid also made the case for the ‘IndiaPacific’ as a natural corollary of the country’s modern version of ‘Look East Policy’, adding that it was ‘an exciting era in this region where the Indian and Pacific Oceans meet’. By June 2013, Foreign Minister Khurshid was talking of ‘a common future that has to be secured not just within the new security and economic future of Asia Pacific but also the Indo-Pacific’ and with the need for India to ‘build partnerships across the Indo-Pacific’. This was a hat tip to Japan. Khurshid invoked Shinzo Abe, who ‘had eloquently spoken of the confluence of the two seas which gave rise to the term “Indo-Pacific” that is commonly used by strategic thinkers today’. This was followed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trip to Japan where he praised ‘Abe’s inspiring and visionary address to the Indian Parliament in August 2007, when he spoke of “the confluence of the two seas”—the Pacific and the Indian Oceans—which has defined the new framework for our bilateral relationship [in] the Indo-Pacific region’ (Scott, 2012).

Under PM Modi, starting in 2014, India had taken to fine tuning its conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific framework and brought a renewed push into the Indian Ocean and India’s pre-eminence in the region, reframed its Look East policy to an Act East policy and worked towards establishing a presence in the South Pacific. PM Modi, who has identified India as an Asian nation with an interest in a multipolar Asia, has consistently reinforced this message, that from a maritime perspective, ‘with a 7,500-kilometre-long coastline, India has a natural and immediate interest in the developments in the Indo-Pacific region’. The economic rise of India was rendering the previous reference point of the Asia-Pacific obsolete, ‘people now speak of the Indo-Pacific. It is now the focus of the world economic dynamism’. Consequently, Modi noted in his speech at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2015: ‘Since my government entered office 18 months ago, no region has seen greater engagement from India than the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. This reflects a long-standing national consensus in India on the importance of this region for India’ (MEA, 2015).

Indian diplomats and practitioners often submit that the Indo-Pacific articulation by India is not new nor an aberration, but ‘a natural evolution of our “Look/Act Policy”. Despite obvious linkages to “Asia Pacific”, the concept of the Indo-Pacific strongly evokes a maritime perspective’ (Raghavan, 2018). They argue that when India’s Look East Policy became its Act East Policy in November 2014 it helped broaden the nation’s geographical orientation: ‘an essentially ASEAN-centric strategy was expanded to focus on the larger Indo-Pacific region without diluting ties with ASEAN’ (Bhatia, 2018). The thrust was to build relations with bigger powers while giving due importance to ASEAN member-states. ASEAN centrality, as a core of India’s Indo-Pacific policy, saw its biggest projection when the India–ASEAN Commemorative Summit was held in Delhi on 25 January 2018 and the presence of 10 ASEAN heads of state at India’s Republic Day celebrations.

Conceptually, practitioners have explained this expansion of India’s Look East Policy in terms of three concentric circles (MEA, 2015). In its first avatar in the 1990s, under PM Narasimha Rao, it was a trade and economic relationship, driven at both the bilateral and multilateral levels for greater engagement with the ASEAN. However, over the next three decades, the security and strategic dimensions steadily expanded, with the rise of China affecting the region’s strategic calculus.

The second circle, geographically closer to India, emerged between 1997 and 2004, with the coming together of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand and consequently Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan under the rubric of the BIMSTEC. With the addition of the last two countries, the acronym has been expanded to mean ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’. Connectivity was the driving force behind this grouping, with a focus on linking India’s Northeast and Myanmar to connect the dots between South Asia and South East Asia. Much like the India–ASEAN in interaction, the BIMSTEC too was driven by key bilateral relationships, apart from the regional focus given by a multilateral organisation. Establishment of the grouping also reflected the Indian desire for substantively associating the SAARC countries with the ASEAN.

The third concentric circle is seen as the Indo-Pacific and is always imagined as ‘most straightforwardly strategic in its orientation (MEA, 2015)’. Foreign Minister, Dr S Jaishankar, when still serving as India’s top diplomat in 2018, argued (Bagchi, 2018) that for India, ‘the outer Indo-Pacific circle add(s) to the security and stability of the inner Indian Ocean one. For the lynchpin of the Indian Ocean, Indo-Pacific represents a conceptualisation of the peaceful periphery on the seas’. India’s understanding of Indo-Pacific as ‘rooted in a reclamation of its traditional strategic space in the Indian Ocean, gravitating outwards’. He described six broad interlocking layers to India’s Indo-Pacific policy, reflecting both India’s aspirations and capabilities. These were development of a blue economy that integrates and builds mutual prosperity; enhancing naval capabilities and building interoperable defence relationships; building infrastructure and connectivity linkages; informal partnerships and groupings on security and humanitarian platforms; all while bolstering the centrality of ASEAN. Lastly, the focus is on reinvigorating Indian cultural and religious links through the region, which have been bound for centuries (Bagchi, 2018). All of these goals have now anchored India’s vision for the region in Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR) concept, including in multilateral platforms led by India like the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), which was tabled by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2019.

The clearest articulation from India on its vision of the Indo-Pacific came at the Prime Minister’s address at the annual Shangri La Dialogue (SLD) in June of 2018.

PM Modi called it a ‘natural region’ and envisioned India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific in both a geographical and civilisational sense, underlining India’s centrality to this geopolitical space. Modi outlined various elements of India’s Indo-Pacific philosophy under the following broad themes:

Not a containment strategy: For India, the Indo-Pacific was neither a strategy nor an exclusive club, a free, open and inclusive vision, open to all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. This enunciation reiterated India’s position of its Indo-Pacific vision not being a containment strategy of China.

PM Modi’s address was viewed by many as a re-emphasis of India’s principled commitment to multilateralism and regionalism. Traction for this vision, especially in the SE Asian nations was high in terms of evolving architecture for the Indo-Pacific. Emphasising India’s position on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, PM Modi explained:

India will be an enabling power, seeking to establish a loose concert of common principles and best practices in the region’s international relations such that power is exercised in a spirit of self-restraint by its dominant entities.

Interestingly, right after the SLD, PM Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit where he emphasised that India’s Indo-Pacific strategy would not limit its linkages with Eurasia. (Scholars around the world have now come to accept ‘Eurasia’ as a broad description of the region comprising Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia.). Commentators in India saw this as a delicate act of balancing, arguing that

Like the two ideas—Indo-Pacific and Eurasia—the SLD and SCO are quite different. The SLD is a forum that brings together the Asian defence establishments and the strategic community. It is increasingly preoccupied with the sharpening maritime conflicts in the Indo-Pacific. The SCO is an effort by China and Russia to consolidate a continental coalition in the heart of Asia. India is one of the few powers straddling the maritime and continental coalitions. (Mohan, 2018)

India’s association with the BRICS, RIC and burgeoning central Asian formats including what is now termed the Western Quad (with India, Israel, UAE and US), can be understood as an attempt by India to develop a cohesive and balanced policy for its Indo-Pacific vision.

Operationalising India’s Vision for the Indo-Pacific: Act East to SAGAR to Post-pandemic Recovery

Today, India’s approach to ‘Acting East’ is focused on three main components: increased economic integration, building strategic partnerships and deepening defence cooperation with a special emphasis on maritime security with the countries in the region, including with extra-regional powers. It wants a say in both shaping the regional architecture as well as acting as a provider for net security in the region. India has also made it clear that while it is concerned about China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, India’s motivation for engaging with the region exists independently of its relationship with China, and underlines its larger interest in seeing a multipolar order in Asia where India plays a leading role. All of these ambitions find echo in the articulation of India’s vision for an inclusive Indo-Pacific. For any of these ideas to fructify a rule-based order is essential, and India’s articulation across platforms and through many of its representatives has driven home the same message.

As Sino-US relations plummet and become more about the power to prevail, the choice for nations of aligning with one or the other, some would say, has become indiscernible. Realms of trade, technology, territory, competitiveness in the military domain and now also the larger debate on governance systems—political, social and economic realms which are being contested. The current jostling in the Indo-Pacific makes it the primary theatre. Looming unilateralism and rising nationalism within countries afford little incentive to back down. Within this global churning, India’s position as a reliable partner in the region is being recognised by nations such as Australia, Japan and the United States who have identified India as a key actor in their respective policies and official doctrines for the Indo-Pacific theatre.

Indo-Pacific as an Arena of Opportunity

For India, therefore, the Indo-Pacific presents a geo-strategic and geo-economic opportunity. While India has mainstreamed the Indo-Pacific, it has maintained that the concept is evolving and remains a work in progress. It has neither, as yet, a top-down structure nor a clearly defined building block approach that would draw in all its sub-regions under an acceptable framework. The understanding is also tempered by contemporary realities of the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness. Clearly, 2020 was an inflection point for China’s relations with the world, but also the India–China relationship and the Galwan valley clash which saw blood spilt for the first time in over 40 years have impacted strategic choices. From New Delhi’s perspective, the long view of these tectonic shifts in the Indo-Pacific is sobering. China looms large on India’s land and maritime borders not to mention its West Asian neighbourhood with the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan.

When India launched its priority paper in 2020 for its elected seat on the UN Security Council, it titled it NORMS (MEA, 2020), calling for a comprehensive approach to international peace and security, one that is ‘guided by dialogue, mutual respect, commitment to international law’—its guiding principles its Indo-Pacific Regional (IPR) strategy. The Foreign Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar outlined India’s prioritisation of ‘5S’ strategies—samvad [dialogue], samman [respect], sahyog [cooperation] shanti [peace] samridhi [prosperity]. New Delhi’s vision is also predicated on the understanding that the evolving concept has varied interpretations among countries in the region. So as like-minded countries work together to narrow differences, they could work together to build preparedness, partnerships and the promotion of a networked region.

India’s vision of ‘SAGAR’ had included a five-pronged approach which included: deepening economic and security cooperation; strengthening maritime security capacities; advancing peace and security; responding to emergencies; and calling for respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries. India’s own schemes for the Indian Ocean such as Mausam and the Cotton Route and Indian support for an Africa–Asia Growth Corridor (AAGC) are all parts of this ongoing effort that have had limited success. New Delhi has also worked on the ‘Sagarmala’ project which involves building new ports and modernising old ones, developing inland waterways and hinterlands aimed at transforming the maritime logistics infrastructure. India is looking to ‘target energy and digital connectivity’ and ‘also reflect the ambition to leapfrog in terms of connectivity and access’. Under the Sagarmala project, India has been taking steps to augment infrastructure and capacity at all major ports, particularly on the eastern seaboard. Partnership with ports located in Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam can make Indian ports important gateways to ASEAN countries and vice versa and that has been prioritised.

India has enthusiastically participated in mechanisms such as the EAS, Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers Meeting Plus tabling ideas that help framing a collaborative approach to the challenges of the region.

Under the aegis of the MEA, India also set up the Indo-Pacific wing and the Oceania division to focus on implementing its vision for the region and integrating work related to the IORA, ASEAN and the Quad.

New Delhi has created the office of a National Maritime Security Coordinator working under the National Security Advisor, tasked to coordinate among the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard and security agencies involved in coastal and maritime security.

The Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), an initiative of the Indian Navy and supported by the Government of India was launched in December 2018 and has been working with 21 countries, including Australia, France, Italy, Japan, the Maldives, the United States, New Zealand, Mauritius, Myanmar and Bangladesh, as well as 22 multinational agencies for quick sharing of information in the IOR. Many countries, including France, Japan, the United States and the UK, have sent their liaison officers to the centre for better coordination and real-time sharing of sea activities, while many more countries are expected to deploy their liaison officers once COVID-19 protocols are lifted. India is also enhancing its Coastal Surveillance Network which is a string of radars that present extensive live monitoring of ship movements in the IOR and connect Indian radars to related systems in Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Seychelles.

Defence cooperation has been broadened via logistic sharing agreements, plethora of joint exercises to improve interoperability, proliferation of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral strategic, and defence dialogues and institutionalisation with 2+2 formats, maritime surveillance, capacity-building and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADR) operations.

India has made some calculated choices politically, breaking new ground in strategic cooperation with partners of the Quad Dialogue—the United States, Japan and Australia—and deepening partnerships with countries such as France, the UK, Singapore and South Korea. It has also enhanced its engagement with the EU, West Asia and Africa with a focused cultivation of Pacific Island states as well as Indian Ocean states, reflecting its strategic priorities.

COVID-19 and the India Way in the Indo-Pacific

It really is in the post-COVID-19 era that India’s mainstreaming of the Indo-Pacific concept truly became visible (Pandalai, 2020).

Top diplomats from South block have spoken to this ‘weaving of a narrative’, which proves to partners and friends that India came through when it mattered the most. It ties in with India’s own aspirations of leading with ‘The India Way’, a term made popular by Foreign Minister Jaishankar, where India ‘brings its capacities to bear on the international system for global good’ and to some extent shapes responses to calls for burden-sharing in global governance. Between the geopolitical jostling of ‘Grazie China’ versus America’s ‘Extraordinary Humanitarianism’, the ‘India Way’ positioned itself as collaborative and constructive.

The projection of India’s abilities in a multilayered and multi-dimensional operating environment, during a global crisis, was subtle yet largely effective.

For instance, at the beginning of the outbreak, PM Modi’s initiation of a virtual SAARC Summit, to commit resources and assist neighbours, sent out a message of regional solidarity consistent with India’s priorities of neighbourhood first. A $10 million contribution to SAARC COVID-19 emergency fund, leveraging India’s existing Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (e-ITEC) network to share expertise, and a COVID-19 Information Exchange Platform—(COINEX) for use by health professionals of SAARC countries—stood out as collaborative solutions which enhance regional capacity.

It broke away from expected narratives of South Asia: the redundancy of SAARC in times of crisis and a growing view of regional engagements confined to the narrow prism of zero-sum influence battles.

Power projection was evident on the high seas too. New Delhi’s largest amphibious assault ship, INS Jalashwa, and its counterpart have been undertaking HADR from the early days of the outbreak. Evacuation of Indians (and foreign nationals when requested) from China and Iran, repatriation of Indians under the Vande Bharat Mission, and so on have underscored Indian expertise and reliability.

Operationalising its Indo-Pacific concept of SAGAR, India deployed its naval ships to Mauritius, Maldives, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles, carrying medical assistance teams and essential food and medicinal items. India dispatched, on request, Rapid Response Teams from the Indian Armed Forces Medical Corps to Kuwait and Maldives. The Indian Air Force C-130J aircrafts lifted 6.2 tonnes of essential medicines and hospital consumables to Male, displaying India’s ability and commitment to being the first responder in the strategic IOR.

Post COVID-19, spotlight on India’s capacity in the pharma sector was evident in India’s labelling of itself as the ‘pharmacy of the world’. The explosion in demand for drugs such as Hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and Paracetamol produced in India was case in point. According to official figures, New Delhi was able to supply these essential drugs to 133 countries globally on commercial and grant basis. India’s efforts moved the Brazilian President Bolsonaro to invoke ‘the legend of Hanuman bringing the mythical life-saving plant (Sanjeevni) from the Himalayas to save the life of Lord Rama’s brother in the epic Ramayana’, in a letter of appreciation to PM Modi.

India’s steep learning curve in the production of PPE kits and N-95 masks has been projected as a demonstration of India’s ability to turn a crisis into an opportunity.

On the global stage, ‘more multilateralism’ not less, positioning itself as the ‘voice of the global south’, continues to be the leitmotifs of Indian engagement. Top diplomats, including those at the UN, have often spoken of India’s ability to bring everyone to the table—West, East, North and South—and straddle volatility. India has used this window to make headway with its partners in some of its flagship initiatives. In India’s foreign minister’s words,

India owes it to itself and to the world to be a just power, a fair power, to be a standard bearer for the South. I think it is part of our history, it is part of our political inheritance. So, I think India must live up to those obligations in a practical way and be the voice for the South.

India: The Quad and Building Habits of Cooperation

India’s participation in the Quad dialogue and openness to many building blocks in the Indo-Pacific has ensured that even when divergences emerge, New Delhi can engage in high powered diplomacy and steer global attention to the many disruptive challenges that continue to trouble the Indo-Pacific. For instance, when Australia, the UK and the United States signed a new security pact AUKUS—a $90 billion programme to build 12 French-designed submarines scrapped in favour of Australia using American and British technology to configure its next submarine fleet and future defence capabilities—the fallout among partner countries over ‘trust issues’ was perceptible. When questioned about India’s position, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla was clear in differentiating the two groupings and defining their objectives as distinct: AUKUS is a security alliance, while the Quad is a multinational grouping with ‘a vision for a free, open, transparent and inclusive Indo-Pacific’. His assertion that the AUKUS alliance was neither relevant to the Quad nor will impact its functioning conveyed India’s unambiguous stand. Given India’s openness to overlapping networks of partnerships in the region, the foreign secretary’s comments highlighted India’s push to build strength across multiple domains.

Remember the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad, with India, the United States, Australia and Japan) began as a coordination mechanism to respond to the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. It has had a tumultuous journey from its dissipation in 2007 to its revival in 2017. All countries have worked towards this according to India’s Foreign minister: ‘The Quad is an effort of cooperation, between four countries … all impelled by a sense of responsibility towards the global commons … mind you each one has made an extra effort.… It wasn’t something pre-destined’.

At the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, a joint statement from leaders of the United States, India, Japan and Australia, speaking of their shared vision for the Indo-Pacific, signified a realisation that managing the many disruptive challenges in the post-pandemic global order including that of a new, rising superpower will require collective action. This could only happen if all sides built on each other’s strengths. Capacity-building would be the thrust of the agenda. The mandate would be to sharpen collective aims, set timeframes and avoid duplication of effort. Practically, these efforts would identify collective challenges and tackle them through concrete work plans and activities via multilateral channels under the ambit of the Quad.

In fact, it is the formation of the Quad Vaccine Partnership, the Quad Vaccine Experts Group, the Quad Climate Working Group and the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group that shows the grouping has gone beyond being an ‘anti-China talk shop’. The joint statement while pegging maritime security, central to its agenda, also stresses an expanded focus on health, climate change, cyberspace, critical technologies, counter-terrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

It is reflective that Quad countries have internalised the understanding that while divergences can be managed, synergising individual approaches for delivering solutions to global challenges is the need of the hour. The message being reinforced time and again in meetings among the Quad countries in various permutations and combinations seems to be an acknowledgement that the group is willing to institutionalise networks of partnership which go beyond addressing just the China challenge and truly benefit countries in the Indo-Pacific.

This has not happened overnight; it has been a work in progress building on emerging geopolitical trends in the Indo-Pacific.

India Among ‘the Coalition of the Willing’ in the Indo-Pacific

What is apparent from the emerging geopolitics in the region are broad trends, namely a rebalancing of security and economic cooperation with the rise of militarisation, finding avenues for functional cooperation and reimagining of security, especially in the post-COVID-19 era in terms of broader conceptualisation of human security (Pandalai, 2021). The development and security agenda of the Indo-Pacific are certainly not mutually exclusive. Most of these efforts are aimed at building habits of cooperation among like-minded countries and are developing on parallel tracks.

Specifically, three trends have emerged as distinguishable features, which serve as building blocks of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific today: (a) issue-based coalitions driven by function, where flexibility of these configurations remains a strategic asset, (b) like-minded countries working together in overlapping bilateral, minilateral and plurilateral formats to expand global initiatives in a way that they are institutionalised within the national agendas of regional like-minded powers and (c) a focused effort on building capacity of countries in the Indo-Pacific to give them viable alternatives which go beyond binaries formed around ideological and political contestation.

It is established now that issue-based coalitions where function not form drive engagement are gaining traction and have become the arenas of functional cooperation. This has happened as a result of the old global multilateral order failing to manage rising challenges. There is a growing realisation that countries coming together in various formats across geographies with focused lines of effort (economic, security, tech, strategic) would be more productive than depending on the current fractured and non-delivering instruments of global governance. The flexibility of these groupings is their biggest asset.

Issue based coalitions are best exemplified by the work done by groupings like the Quad and its expanded formats, loosely termed Quad plus, at the peak of the pandemic—where countries came together to co-ordinate vaccine development, its export and to find ways to boost economic recovery. Subsequently, working groups in critical technologies, vaccines, climate change, space, biotech and 5G aimed to develop norms and global standards are case in point. The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative between India, Japan and Australia was undertaken to build resilience of supply chains to ensure dependable sources of supply and attract investment. On the sidelines of the COP26 summit, PM Modi emphasised that ‘trusted sources, transparency and time-frame’ are the three vital fields that regulate the global supply chain. Pitching India as a trusted source in IT and Pharma supply chains, he reiterated India’s willingness to participate in the clean technology supply chain. Untangling supply chains from over-reliance on China has been a painful process but one that is gathering momentum.

Second, congruence of efforts overlapping in bilateral, minilateral and plurilateral platforms that then loop into expansion of global initiatives is growing. Like-minded partners are also working at institutionalising these efforts in a way that they are underwritten into national agendas. For example, India has sought to leverage its bilateral relationships to bolster India-led multilateral platforms—The IPOI, The International Solar Alliance, The Global Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, and others.

India conceptualised the Initiative for the Resilient Island States (IRIS) launched at the 2021 COP26 Summit in Glasgow for developing the infrastructure of small island nations. India’s space agency ISRO is tasked with building a special data window to provide vulnerable states with timely satellite information about cyclones, coast-line monitoring and so on. This effort is a subset of the India–UK Coalition for Disaster Resilient infrastructure. Similarly, the India-led International Solar Alliance and the UK’s Green Grids Initiative have come together to unveil plans for the first international network of global interconnected solar power grids to accelerate the clean energy transition. The project, now also backed by the United States, will drive global interconnectivity across the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia, while leveraging African power pools.

When India tabled the IPOI at the EAS in November 2019, it aimed to invite ‘practical cooperation as an open, non-treaty-based global initiative’ building upon ASEAN-led frameworks. From maritime security to blue economy, its seven pillars cover what New Delhi described ‘as a lowest common denominator approach to shared problems that we all know require urgent and coordinated solutions’. Australia, Japan, France and Indonesia have come on board the initiative to find innovative solutions to shared concerns.

Third, as contestation between democratic countries and authoritarian systems sharpen in the primary theatre of the Indo-Pacific, middle powers are looking at building habits of cooperation. The imperative, while responding to the threat of a rising and aggressive superpower, looks at going beyond binaries and focusing on capacity-building. This gives all nations big and small in the region viable alternatives that help them exercise their agency. The new priorities of the post-COVID-19 world, health security and vaccine development, digital delivery and green growth all fall in this arena.

For example, since India’s infrastructure diplomacy is also linked with its development assistance programmes in the neighbourhood, new avenues for cooperation are emerging. Avoiding zero-sum game competition in the neighbourhood, India has aimed at synergising efforts with like-minded partners to provide viable alternatives for connectivity externally while energising its domestic industry to take the lead as well. India has emerged as a reliable cross-border electricity provider to Nepal and South Asian partners. It is important to note that the signing of this agreement was a prerequisite for the implementation of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant to Nepal, which, if implemented, would enable Nepal to receive $500 million for electricity transmission and road infrastructure projects. MCC is one of the largest US grants in the recent history of Nepal for the development of infrastructure. Similarly, India has been invited to join the US-led Build Back Better World Initiative, and experts are examining India’s opportunities to join the Blue Dot Network which aims to grade infrastructure financing across the Indo-Pacific to ensure transparency and confidence among economically weaker countries.

For India, the evolving geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific not only provides collaborative solutions to shared concerns but also is a theatre of opportunity to showcase itself as a leading power in the region willing to step up. India is now leading global conversations and initiatives from their inception. The Indian Navy and Coast guard are now more than before participating in plurilateral and bilateral exercises, to build confidence, achieve interoperability and evolve common Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). India has led efforts on White Shipping Information Exchange which has seen participation from several countries. Another example of practical efforts at cooperation would be India assisting countries with Hydrographic survey support for charting of water, especially in the IOR.

Conclusion: Future Considerations for India’s Indo-Pacific Vision

COVID-19 has thus ushered in a world order where disruptions in politics, economics and governance all have to be managed together. How India shapes geopolitics at the regional and global level will have impact on consolidating the New Delhi consensus.

Clearly, India has its task cut out, but with political will and a clear mandate, the Indo-Pacific will clearly remain India’s theatre of opportunity. As India’s foreign minister said on changes in Indian strategic thinking in 75 years:

[O]ne of the changes in these 75 years is really how much more Asian, Indo-Pacific, India has become.… But there is a big historical point here, which goes beyond the Indo-Pacific. You know, what the Partition did is it made us think smaller that because we ended up with Pakistan on one side, and Bangladesh on the other, we thought, you know, somewhere, we got straitjacketed, we straitjacketed ourselves in many ways. So what we are also trying to do is to rebuild our historical connections with the extended neighbourhood. In the East, it is ASEAN and then further into the Indo-Pacific, I would argue in the West, it is the Gulf, where enormous amount of energy has been expended in building those relationships and into Africa. And that’s work in progress, that is really a very big part of the foreign policy changes that you’re seeing. (MEA, 2021b)