Geopolitical Dynamics in the Afghanistan–India–Pakistan Triangle

Introduction: A Troubled Region

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 was a turning point in South Asian history because the region has taken a different path since then. New dynamics occurred after the inception of new states in the post-colonial phase, with exclusive ideas of nationality, ethnic community, identity and citizenship within a fixed territory. Other major developments include political heterogeneity, economic asymmetry and geopolitical direction. As a result of overlapping geographical, geopolitical and ethnic interests, South Asia’s history has been volatile and convoluted, resulting in conflicts and multiple challenges. With two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, as well as a fractured state, Afghanistan, the region is undoubtedly crisis-prone, turbulent and unpredictable. The political and economic profiles of these states are asymmetric. The region lacks both internal and outward unity due to deep-seated social, linguistic, ethnic, religious and gender discriminations. Therefore, severe stresses, economic and social dislocations, and other forms of persistent issues and threats to people have emerged not only in north-western South Asia but also throughout the region. Its division is one of the causes behind its poor and sluggish progress. As T. V. Paul (2011), one of the leading scholars on the subject, argues that highly geostrategic regions with multiple weak states in terms of political and institutional capacity are ripe for major powers’ activism and intervention, especially if they pose serious security threats to regional and global arrangements. Furthermore, areas with substantial strata of ‘enduring rivalry’ draw world powers’ interest and attention due to rising stability or specific extra-regional stakes in these countries’ economic and security calculations. In this perspective, the north-western South Asian region—Afghanistan, India and Pakistan—fits comfortably into the above description, and prospects for peace, governance and stability in South Asia are largely dependent on this sub-region. A close assessment of the security dynamics in north-western South Asia reveals that some domestic risks are more severe than external threats, including fundamentalism, political instability, refugees and displacements, separatist movements, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Extra-regional countries’ active involvement in regional affairs has exacerbated the problem, affecting internal political systems and imposing considerable economic costs on the region. Threats to peace, growth and stability will persist unless they are adequately addressed. Thus, it is important to examine the origin and nature of the Afghanistan–India–Pakistan triangle, as well as its implications for South Asia’s international relations.

The Emergence of the Afghanistan–India–Pakistan Triangle

This section is premised on two questions: How did the Afghanistan–India–Pakistan triangle come into existence? What is the impact of the triangle on the geopolitics of the South Asian region? Afghanistan, India and Pakistan have a lot in common in South Asia, including a shared history and cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic ties. Their relationships, which have overlapped in multiple areas at the same time, are marked by collaboration, conflict and differences. Thus, these states are known to the world not for their amity but for hostilities based on conflicting territorial claims and regional aspirations and asymmetrical distribution of economic and military power among the three states. Following the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the region’s geopolitical cohesiveness was disrupted, prompting these states to consolidate their new borders, thereby the new geopolitical realities forced states to perceive each other from their ‘narrow sovereignty-sensitive prisms’ (Pattanaik & Behuria, 2016, p. 399). Nonetheless, once the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the triangular relationship of Afghanistan–India–Pakistan began to take shape.

A triangle, according to Lowell Dittmer (1981, p. 485), can be described as depicting interactions that occur between three actors. Triangular relationships are characterised as close and interdependent interactions between three countries whose existence helps in the establishment of incentives and constraints in terms of cooperation or conflict. All countries in the triangle view the other two as having the capability to offer security or pose a security threat (Freddy, 2021). The emergence of a strategic triangle requires the presence of three factors: (a) all three states must be sovereign or independent actors; (b) the behaviour of one state towards another in the triangle has consequences or implications for the other and (c) there is always the possibility and potentiality of two states banding together against the other (Freddy, 2021). All three prerequisites appear to be fulfilled in the relationship between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. This triangle is primarily the result of two bilateral conflicts, India–Pakistan and Afghanistan–Pakistan, which involve diplomatic rivalry, differing viewpoints, divergent defence and security perceptions and aspirations, including overlapping claims to territory, resulting in mistrust, suspicions and wars, all of which have threatened regional security and cooperation in the past.

Pakistan was the first practitioner of regional triangle construction because it had a strong interest in geo-political frontiers (Kashmir and Afghanistan), Islamic identity and an anti-Indian approach that reflected its insecurity (Kapur, 2011). In terms of geo-economics, geopolitics and geostrategy, Pakistan is uniquely located in South Asia. It has the potential to serve as a bridge between South Asia and Southwest Asia and is very close to the Central Asian republics. Thus, in the international system, Pakistan occupies a pivotal area (Talbot, 2009). The country’s defence and diplomatic policies are shaped by geography and the history of tense relations with India and Afghanistan. While Islamabad’s major power interests and dysfunctional geopolitical tactics collided, the country’s own problems were exacerbated (Lodhi, 2011). In its diplomatic and military history, Pakistan has secured outside support and military help, including nuclear assistance, as a result of its links with the United Kingdom, the United States, China and friendly Middle Eastern countries (Kapur, 2011). Pakistan signed a joint defence assistance arrangement with the United States in 1954 before joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. Thus, diplomatic and defence policies have been decisively influenced by the need to counteract the Indian regional preponderance, because Islamabad always worries that a hegemonic India would dominate and rule South Asia and bring Pakistan under its thrall. While wedded to an Indian-centred national security paradigm, Pakistan’s military high command is single-mindedly committed to pursuing their major strategic goals in Afghanistan.

When British imperial rule was over, mainly India was left with territorial disputes as an inheritance of the brutal partition of the British Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan, and later Bangladesh. The McMahon and Curzon Lines were used to demarcate the country’s northern borders, resulting in border disputes with China and a territorial conflict with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir (Ogden, 2011). These two issues produced Indian wars/conflicts with Pakistan in 1947–1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999, and with China in 1962. They also led to decades of skirmishes and low-intensity conflicts. During this period, India adopted a geopolitical and military approach to boost its diplomacy, amid opposition from both fronts. With larger social diversities to account for, India laid the foundations of a constitutional democracy. To its weak and smaller neighbours, India has always been a hegemonic power, with influential impact on their economies, cultures and even their identities (Cohen, 2001). After independence, the memory of terrible partition remained intense and made national unity a priority, with many obstructions. The proclamation of the Constitution on 26 January 1950 embraced crucial elements, including multiculturalism in the form of a secular state and social democracy. Despite many challenges and concerns since its independence, India is a stable and unique state when compared to Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the last three decades, India’s rising economy, along with its massive population and nuclear weapons, has attracted international attention and transformed India’s image (Kukreja, 2020).

Afghanistan’s—the third state in the triangle—strategic location as a landlocked country at the crossroads of Central Asia, Iran, India and China has made it a significant geopolitical player. At certain times, ‘Afghanistan has been more or less unwillingly enmeshed in other countries’ politics, competing ideologies and strategic battles; while at other moments it merely served as a corridor through which armies marched’ (Wani, 2021, p. 220). The country has experienced military intervention and occupation by the British (twice in the nineteenth century), the Soviet Union (in the 1980s) and the United States (since late 2001) (Saikal, 2014), and this ended only in October 2021. Afghanistan’s antagonistic relationship with Pakistan over the legacy of the Durand Line, for the establishment of Pashtunistan and preferences of non-alignment policy brought it very close to India during the Cold War era. Therefore, Afghanistan tilted towards India (signed a Treaty of Friendship, 4 January 1950) and, later, the development of closer relations with the Soviet Union had negative effects on its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan, however, viewed Afghanistan’s participation in the Soviet Union–India cooperation as hostile and dangerous. To improve collaboration and strengthen India’s influence in the region, India signed numerous protocols and agreements with various pro-Soviet administrations in Afghanistan.

Hence, since 1947, the triangle has developed its own structure and dynamics as a result of each state’s domestic and international compulsions. Their relationship demonstrates that their fates are intertwined due to a pattern of divergence that impacts on each country’s territorial security, diplomatic and political identity, and international standing. Indeed, the geopolitical significance of the triangle is determined by the following factors: (a) the geographic location of north-western South Asia on the global atlas, (b) the area’s valuable natural resources and productivity, (c) technological advancement, (d) massive manpower and (e) the area’s accessibility from the outside. As Siegfried D. Wolf (2012, p. 25) has argued, ‘The triangle is gaining impetus because of the nature and complexity of the multidimensional configuration of conflicts interweaving international and domestic determinants’. This also illustrates that these states are reluctant allies, and their relationships are based on political expediency and trust deficit, even cursed with incompatible strategic goals and interests. The triangle is distinguished by the following characteristics: (a) the adoption of geo-politics as a basis of foreign policy, (b) existence of incompatible or irreconcilable imperatives of the countries aspirations and interests, (c) the build-up of military and economic strength, (d) intimate attention to the actions and behaviour of opponents, (e) a reliance on policies to build pressure on one another rather than on dialogue and mediation to resolve basic issues and (f) to borrow external compatible power to balance the adversaries even as the countries build vitality.

Understanding the dynamics of the triangle necessitates a geopolitical perspective. Three primary reasons for considering relations in a geopolitical context are vital for comprehending the geopolitical position of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan in South Asia. The first factor is the three countries’ geography, location and borders. The second factor is that these countries share historical, religious and ethno-linguistic ties. The third and most significant point to consider when looking at South Asia’s geopolitical dynamics is that each state has its own distinct character and identity, with far-reaching implications for the geopolitical direction of not only north-western South Asia but also the entire region. Depending on geopolitical situations, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan adopt different policies and approaches, making their relationships exceedingly complex and even overlapping with other geopolitical rivalries and tensions. Indeed, they share a variety of political, economic and security interests. However, their relationships with one another are aimed at furthering completely distinct and diverse goals and interests. Any agreement or policy established by two states in a triangular relationship has an immediate impact, and often response, from the other. It is essentially a geopolitical fight for control of South and Central Asia’s landmass. That is why these countries accuse one another of interfering and intervening in each other’s affairs. There is also the argument of squabbling members of an extended family fighting over its inherited resources (Kadir, 2022). In this context, all three sides have overarching national interests and objectives. Components of Mahan’s (1987) Oceanic view and Mackinder’s (1904, 1919) Heartland theory paradigms operate for the triangular dynamics. Consequently, as political events in one of the sub-states’ regions inevitably affect the others, by seeking to achieve greater security, these states act in ways that others perceive as intimidating and unfriendly, thereby jeopardising their own security.

Geopolitics alters with the rise and decline of centres of valuable resources and shifts in routes. Therefore, geopolitics is never a constant but a variable that describes the altering geographic distribution of routes and of natural and economic resource. The new geopolitical realities are essentially motivating major regional and external powers to compete for influence and dominance in north-western South Asia to maximise their respective economic and security stakes. The propensity among the states of the region to interfere in the internal dealings of each other also offers a chance for extra-regional powers to uphold or act contrary to political or territorial assertions (Paul, 2011).

Meanwhile, the world’s attention has turned again to South and Central Asia in the post-Cold War era because of some significant considerations: (a) abundant natural resources such as gas and oil, (b) the rise of China and India, (c) the nuclear element in the Indo-Pak conflict and (d) dynamic relations among Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. Thus, the region became the ‘debatable and debated ground’, as Alfred Mahan (1987) puts it. Clearly the post-Cold War world heralds two major problems for north-western South Asia: the containment of ethno-Islamic extremism and the growth of economic cooperation. Political instability, religious extremism and various modes of armed conflict contributed to perpetuation of violence, extremism and anarchical conditions in the region. In fact, the enduring Indo-Pak enmity is seen as a major factor that has prevented sub-regional harmony and made the whole region anarchical, unstable, insecure and chaotic. Interestingly, the central geopolitical channel between South and Central Asia is the Afghan–Pakistan continuum. Thereby, the current situation in Afghanistan and the presence of radical organisations, such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the ‘Af-Pak’ region, is seen as another deterrent factor for establishing peace, prosperity and stability in South Asia. As a result, cooperation among the triangular states has become critical in imagining a shared regional future for the whole region.

Afghanistan–India–Pakistan Engagements Since 2001

Earlier, north-western South Asia’s geostrategic, geopolitical and security landscape underwent a major transformation following a series of nuclear experiments detonated by India and Pakistan in May 1998 and the 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the United States. The Afghanistan–India–Pakistan relations represent a major subset of post-2001 South Asia as a region, a kind of secondary conflict in the world system, where the ambitions and interests of numerous important powers are engaged. However, various scholars, analysts and policymakers have argued that the post-2001 geopolitics offers vast opportunities to these three countries to rearticulate their policies to build an integrated and prosperous South Asia.

India and Afghanistan have renewed diplomatic ties and established a strong and friendly relationship based on their historical and cultural relations. Their relationship is not merely a product of contemporary geopolitical orientation, but the geographical and sociocultural dimensions reflect the long legacy of the close links between the two states. However, the cruel partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947 ended India’s physical proximity with Afghanistan. Since then, India’s ties with Afghan governments have remained relatively amiable except during the Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001. The issue of the famed Durand Line, however, got transferred to Islamabad given the nemesis nature of Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship. After the demise of the Taliban rule in 2001, India increased its presence in Afghanistan, re-opened its embassy in Kabul, re-established four consulates across Afghanistan, and made extensive efforts in the reconstruction of this war-torn state. More recently, India has adopted a soft power approach towards Kabul, sticking to humanitarian rather than military affairs. It focuses on building human capital and helping in a number of social and economic projects such as rural electrification, small-scale irrigation projects, as well as improving security. It has also been providing medical care, constructing new roads and dams, and assisting with the educational system in an attempt to enlarge and improve Afghanistan’s long-term capabilities (Paliwal, 2015, 2016; Pant, 2011). When India withdrew its diplomatic presence from Afghanistan after the Taliban retook power in August 2021, pessimist elements and comments emerged in some quarters about India–Afghanistan’s future relations. Indeed, many people saw it as a significant victory for Pakistan’s ability to control the Taliban and bemoaned India’s inability to shape its strategic and security environment (Pant, 2022). However, on 2 June 2022, India sent an official delegation to Afghanistan led by joint secretary J. P. Singh of the Ministry of External Affairs to meet with Taliban officials and oversee humanitarian aid delivery operations. The Indian government’s decision to send 50,000 tonnes of wheat, 213 tonnes of medicine, 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccine, and 60 million doses of polio vaccine to Afghanistan as humanitarian aid assumes great significance in their long-standing historical and civilisational relations, thereby seeking to reclaim its traditional ties with Afghanistan irrespective of the nature of the regime. With an eye on Pakistan, deputy foreign minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai stated that ‘Afghan-Indian relations would move forward based on mutual respect and joint bilateral legitimate interests’ and that ‘would not be influenced by other countries’ inter-rivalry’ (Pant, 2022). Both countries claim to share a vision of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan and agree that a democratic, stable and prosperous Afghanistan is crucial for security, development, peace and stability not only in this sub-region but also in the entire South and Central Asia. For the purpose of this article, it is notable that India and Afghanistan have joined in asserting the value of democracy. Globally, there are of course many different perspectives about the extent of democracy in Afghanistan (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012), not to mention huge criticisms of recent developments in India regarding democratic practices. From an Indian perspective, Afghanistan’s stability and sustenance of its democratic set up is a critical aspect of India’s interest (Verma, 2020). That is the main reason India has pledged in various international forums that its major objective is the enhancement of democratic institutions and practices, and strengthening the rule of law, in this war-ravaged country. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, a former Indian Ambassador to the United States, even argued that ‘democracy and constitutional order in Afghanistan are the major gains achieved in the last eighteen years, and we believe these are worth preserving’ (cited in Verma, 2020, pp. 10–11). This raises huge questions, which go beyond the scope of the present article.

India’s growing interests in Afghanistan have not just been restricted to related threats of separatism, drug trafficking, terrorism and civilian carnage but also have profound and long-standing commercial and strategic interests and aspirations in Afghanistan and Central Asia as well. According to the Strategic Partnership Agreement (hereafter SPA) in October 2011, these two countries agreed to a number of guiding principles: (a) protecting and fostering shared democratic principles and practices; (b) enhancing long-term stability, peace and security; (c) strengthening bilateral and regional collaboration and security; (d) socio-economic growth and (e) fortifying democratic establishment and local governance in this war-ravaged country. Following the signing of the SPA, C. Raja Mohan (2011) argued that this agreement ‘is bound to add a new layer of complexity to the triangular relationship between New Delhi, Rawalpindi and Kabul’. He further argued: ‘The big challenge for the prime minister is to signal India’s determination to do all it can to strengthen Kabul’s capacity to preserve its independence while dispelling the widespread perception that Delhi is eager to compete with Rawalpindi in Afghanistan’. This appears to indicate that India is deeply concerned to stand up for Afghanistan’s national independence, which is maybe more than just an echo of its own traumatic memory of being subjugated by others. As is well-known, this drove India towards non-alliance during Cold War times (Ball et al., 2019), but this desire and determination to prevent being subjugated and dictated to is still a major issue in twenty-first century postcolonial India that itself aspires to be a global leader.

Before the Taliban came to power in August 2021, India was one of the largest donors—certainly the largest from the region—to Afghan rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. Indeed, India’s capabilities—military, political and economic—have markedly enhanced. It has also become aspiring in defining its foreign policy objectives and strategic programme (Pant, 2010; Verma, 2020). Afghanistan is gaining enormously ‘by economically integrating itself with India, given the nature of its economy and its limited access to markets and the sea’ (D’Souza, 2009, p. 25). New Delhi’s objectives in Kabul, according to C. Christine Fair (2010, pp. 4–8), are about India’s emerging power to influence its wider strategic neighbourhood. She extended her argument that New Delhi’s current goals and interests in Afghanistan are not only Islamabad-centric but also tied to India’s desire ‘to be, and to be seen by others as, the dominant power in South Asia’ (Fair, 2011, p. 180). While broadening its geopolitical horizons, India has been working hard since Narendra Modi took office as Prime Minister in 2014 to consolidate its dominant position in South Asia and expanding and renewing its strategic connections in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa (Kaura & Rani, 2020; Kukreja, 2020; Mohan, 2019). The Modi administration set India a new aspirational international identity as a ‘leading power’, exhibited India’s confidence in dealing with major powers, and poured new vigour into India’s relations with its neighbours. However, India’s near-term global ambitions expect to be hampered by inertia against economic and political modernisation, as well as a rise of nativism (Mohan, 2019). The strategic investment India has made in opening sea, rail and road links through the Iranian port of Chabahar serve to increase its access to the region and Eurasia market as well. It wants to diminish Afghanistan’s dependence on Islamabad for trade and transit and added the benefit of diluting Pakistan’s influence over Afghan affairs (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012). Even it has been argued by some think tanks and scholars that India’s policy and approach towards Kabul has primarily been a purpose of the aspiration to prevent Islamabad from dictating to and dominating that state, something Pakistan perceives as an imperative counterbalance to New Delhi’s dominance in the region (Hussain, 2007; Pant, 2011; Weinbaum, 1991). The trilateral accord between Afghanistan, India and Iran to build up the Chabahar route through Zaranj, Melak and Delaram would ease regional trade and transit (Omidi & Noolkar-Oak, 2022). As a result, it would also contribute to regional economic security.

India as an ambitious emerging power in an international system has consistently pursued a more proactive policy in its extended neighbourhood through building institutional, military and economic ties. Afghanistan has become symbolic of such an aspiring trajectory that New Delhi ‘seems to be charting in its foreign policy’ (Pant, 2016, p. 119). C. Raja Mohan (2006, p. 18) explains that India’s grand strategy divides the world into main ‘three concentric circles’. The first circle covers the immediate region; ‘India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers’, acting like a regional hegemon. The second circle covers the extended regional level and encompasses the whole of Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral; ‘India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests’. And the third covers the whole world; the country is trying to acquire its seat in the UN Security Council as one of the major powers, a vital actor in global security and peace. Mohan (2007, pp. 9–14) also argues that without enduring primacy in one’s own neighbourhood, no nation can become a credible power on the global stage. S. D. Muni and Raja Mohan (2004, p. 318) argue that for India, ‘achieving the objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India’s ability to manage its own immediate neighbourhood’. Some scholars perceive the sustainability of New Delhi’s engagement in Afghanistan as a ‘test case’ for this growing power (Fair, 2010, p. 189; Pant, 2010, pp. 133–153).

Consequently, Jagmohan Meher (2008) in his book Afghanistan: Dynamics of Survival provided an important account of the stakes of India in Afghanistan and in the whole region at the time. The study also focused upon the diverse aspects of Afghanistan’s problems and highlighted the various forces at work in this war-torn country. India’s interests in Afghanistan in terms of people-to-people contact, geopolitics, and trade are far too basic to remain severed and disconnected from the unfolding crisis. They have to contend with growing religious radicalism, too. To understand this, one can present three important factors which explain why Afghanistan continues to choose India as its strategic partner. First, the primary reason is a convergence of certain values, despite major differences as well. Indeed, India is the world’s largest democracy and a widely recognised example for managing pluralistic and multi-cultural societies, though many observers strongly disagree about this as well (Chatterji et al., 2019). Afghanistan clearly needs a more credible democratic set up and enhanced development to bring enduring stability and peace in the region. Afghanistan faces several challenges, and there is much that it could learn from New Delhi’s models of development, governance and nationalism-centred democracy. Second, another major reason is the convergence of national interests of both nations. They both face terrorist and radical activities. So, they need to tackle the issue of terrorism through a cooperative approach. This suggests that there is something far beyond the historical and cultural ties between the two states that bind them together (Meher, 2008). On 9 July 2008, Nirupam Sen, Permanent Representative from India to the United Nations, argued that ‘security within Afghanistan, and coordinated efforts to stop terrorists from operating with impunity beyond Afghanistan’s borders must be the paramount priority of our collective efforts in Afghanistan’ (cited in Bhasin, 2009, p. 2534). Third, the economies of the two states are compatible as they complement each other. Afghanistan has enormous natural resources that can offer ample support to India’s rising economy and at the same time India can act as a large market for Afghanistan’s products. For India, Afghanistan is a gateway to Central Asia and a part of the Middle East; in a similar way, India is a gateway for Afghan exports. Thus, three major reasons—shared values, common national security interests and complementary economy—used to bind these two countries as strategic partners (Bhasin, 2009).

Meanwhile, India is of course deeply apprehensive of the fact that any space for the radical and extremist elements in Afghanistan would marginalise its influence as well as boost internal disturbances to India. It is under these security concerns that New Delhi is designing its approach and policy to tackle terrorism, extremism as well as curb religious radicalism. In a letter delivered to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani a day before the Khalilzad-Baradar peace agreement was signed on 29 February 2020, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote, ‘We also remain committed to our principled position of support for an inclusive Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled peace and reconciliation process’ (Roche, 2020). This, significantly, stresses the already mentioned point from India’s perspective about Afghanistan’s control over its own affair. After the Taliban came into power in Afghanistan, the question of whether India should engage directly with this government or not has been widely discussed. For India, there is little or no merit in engaging directly with the Taliban because of their close relation to Pakistan (Chaudhuri & Shende, 2020; Constantino, 2020; Verma, 2020). In addition, the Haqqani group, an important Taliban faction, is staunchly anti-Indian (Ghosh, 2020). However, Dawood Azami, who was present in Doha in February 2020, indicated that ‘the mainstream Taliban is very careful with India’. He suggested that ‘they are not always trapped by their Pakistani handlers’ as it might seem the case. There are factions within the neo-Taliban who are willing to engage and work with India’ (cited in Chaudhuri & Shende, 2020, p. 15).

Thus, India has had close ties with Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, but engaging with the Taliban leadership presents definitely a challenge. Because the Taliban has a long history with Pakistan and seeks closer links with China, both of which are India’s rivals. India’s diminishing influence in Afghanistan is not only a geopolitical loss but also puts the country’s various investments in jeopardy (Kugelman, 2021). Indeed, under the Taliban administration, India lacks adequate influence to rectify its strategic defeats in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Indian government may have to accept that it would have to communicate its concerns to countries with greater clout, such as the United States, Russia, Iran and the Central Asian republics (Kugelman, 2021), but India is likely to wish to pursue its own readjusted Afghanistan policy, which at the moment remains unclear.

If the above discussion offers a brief understanding of the nature of the Indo-Afghan relationship, questions arise about the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Geo-strategically, Pakistan is situated between India and Afghanistan and shares long borders with both. A natural convergence of interests was very likely between Afghanistan and India as both countries realised that they have a common problem in border relations with Pakistan: India over Kashmir and Afghanistan over Pashtunistan (Yadav & Barwa, 2011). Although Afghanistan and Pakistan share common cultural, historical and religious traditions, they have had a troubled political relationship since the inception of Pakistan as a sovereign state in 1947. Since then, both states have interfered in each other’s internal affairs. Interestingly, Afghanistan was the only country in the world that voted against Pakistan’s inclusion in the UNO (Jalalzai, 2003, p. 210).

Struggles over the ownership of the Pathan-dominated North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) region have been the crux of the trouble between the two neighbouring states (Abbas, 2014; Taye & Ahmed, 2021). Apart from the historical disputes regarding the demarcation of borders, political changes in Pakistan and Afghanistan have always affected their ties in general and South Asia in particular. However, new issues have emerged in their relationship after the US-led military intrusion in Afghanistan. The hostile attitudes of both countries have continued. Islamabad has always seen Kabul as its backyard and a basis of ‘strategic depth’ as a vital element of its sphere of influence, shaping its ‘intrusive foreign policy’ towards Afghanistan (Akhtar & Sarkar, 2015). The strategic triangle of India–Pakistan–Afghanistan is apparent with the observation that ‘[a] central aim for Pakistan’s military tsars is to make sure that the future political make-up in Afghanistan does not allow India to expand its security or even development footprint’ (Chaudhuri, 2011, p. 85). Pakistani policymakers have found themselves bound by both India and Afghanistan with whom they have been involved in territorial disputes since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 (Barnett & Siddique, 2006). Moeed Yusuf (2013, p. 4), one of the most prominent experts on the Pakistani policymaking processes, sets out clearly and realistically the thinking that has guided Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan. He has pointed out three considerations in Afghanistan that are guiding the changing nature of Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan, namely the rise of domestic instability and terrorism, which is now its top priority; its longstanding rivalry with, and suspicion of India; and its desire to avoid a surge in Pashtun nationalism among its own large Pashtun population.

The major objectives of Pakistan in this region and Central Asian Republics (hereafter CARs) are determined by security and political imperatives, commercial and economic gains, opposing New Delhi’s influence and the aspiration to be an energy transit-corridor in this region and the Asia-Pacific region (Roy, 2006). Also, Pakistan has always wanted to enlarge its power and influence in Afghanistan and CARs (Haqqani, 2005, pp. 159–197). As Christopher Budihas (2011) claims, four main objectives drive Islamabad’s aspirations and interests in Afghanistan: (a) dynamics of its domestic politics, (b) external security complexities, (c) the search for economic resources and (d) the complexities of internal security. The major reason for the persistent instability in Afghanistan is that international attempts to address enduring disagreements on issues including Pashtunistan and the Durand Line border between these two countries have failed. Additionally, Pakistan has been concerned with New Delhi’s ties with Afghanistan and has attempted to build an ‘Af-Pak’ alliance to protect its sovereignty (Taye & Ahmed, 2021).

Stephen Philip Cohen (2006, p. 194) argued earlier that ‘any comprehensive policy toward Pakistan must also address Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan’. Adam Roberts (2009, p. 52) similarly explained that ‘granted the indissoluble connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan, any policy in respect of the one has to be framed in light of its effects on the other’. In December 2008, the former President of the United States, Barack Obama, argued: ‘We can’t continue to look at Afghanistan in isolation. We have to see it as part of a regional problem that includes Pakistan, includes India, includes Kashmir, includes Iran’ (cited in Jaffrelot, 2016, p. 233). The Obama administration and that of his successor have carried on a violent struggle against the Taliban and its allies, claiming to ensure security, peace and economic development in Afghanistan, which has been seriously questioned (Connah, 2021).

India–Pakistan Rivalry: Afghanistan, a New Battlefield?

Following the September 2001 terror attacks, the dynamics of the new competition for hegemony, power and profits of the South Asian region have been constantly evolving. It has been argued that India–Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan is an extension of the ‘New Great Game’, and they have become embroiled in a proxy conflict there, if not outright war. This is apparent in the military–security, commercial dealings and political–diplomatic arena. Both use extra-regional powers for advancing their strategic goals and major interests and indict the other of utilising their country to exert influence and destabilise the other. Hence, South Asia has yet again become a battlefield for this ‘New Great Game’ though the players of the game have not remained the same. It is now being manipulated on a wider canvas with different rules and players, not just the United States, Russia, Iran and China but also India and Pakistan.

Afghanistan as an arena for India–Pakistan rivalry and zero-sum dynamics in which one side’s gain is a loss for the other risks, victimising the Afghans further. Pakistan’s mistrust of India and insecurities about India’s engagement in Afghanistan are a major obstacle in Afghanistan–India relationship. On Pakistan’s obsession with India’s interests in Afghanistan, Ahmad Rashid (2008, p. 110) argues, ‘Islamabad viewed its Afghan policy through the prism of denying India any advantage in Kabul.… Kabul had suddenly become the new Kashmir – the new battleground for the India–Pakistan rivalry’. After the withdrawal of US-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, India’s main concern has been that Pakistan would support and facilitate a Taliban–Pashtun movement, one that ejects Indians from the country. A former French diplomat and leading expert in South Asia, Frédéric Grare (2010, p. 21) argued that ‘whatever India does in Afghanistan is a ploy against Pakistan, be it economic investment, infrastructure, or any related matter’. He has further argued that Islamabad has ensured that New Delhi’s ‘interests would be blocked whenever and wherever possible. It has refused, for example, to give India and Afghanistan transit rights to trade goods across Pakistan’ (Grare, 2010, p. 21). The diverse interests of sub-regional stakeholders have contributed to the regional instability, disorder and insecurity. In addition, the instability in the ‘Af-Pak’ region has also hindered the constructive peace process and positive developments among these countries. Undoubtedly, they are the biggest rivals in this region, and Afghanistan has also suffered from this antagonism (Hameed, 2012).

Earlier, Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2003) argued that these two major South Asian states now have to live under the shadow of nuclear arms, and both suffer from being described as the most dangerous flashpoints on earth. As discussed, both have very different vision for Afghanistan, and they seek to advance highly diverse interests and concerns through their respective engagements in Afghanistan. Shahram Akbarzadeh (2003) argued that India and Pakistan try to outpace each other along three lines of competition in Central Asia, while William Dalrymple (2013, p. 2) argued that ‘hostility between India and Pakistan lies at the heart of the current war in Afghanistan’. This claim remains the major reason for this triangular dynamic.

India’s concerns increased, however, when Pakistan became a frontline state in the ‘War against Terror’. After the fall of the Taliban regime, New Delhi’s return to Afghanistan was bound to raise fears in Islamabad (Grare, 2010). The growing partnership between India and Afghanistan has caused apprehension within Pakistan. Marvin G. Weinbaum and Jonathan B. Harder (2008, p. 26) have examined how Pakistan has pursued a ‘two-track foreign policy’ towards Afghanistan that repeatedly bound incompatible and diverse objectives. They argue that ‘India is viewed as engaging in activities in Afghanistan intended to destabilise Pakistan domestically and threaten it militarily’. Regarding India’s presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan perceives that its strategic plan is to undermine Pakistan’s arrangement to become a strong partner of the CARs. Pakistan also comprehends that India perceives Afghanistan as a geopolitical constraint on it (Baloch & Niazi, 2009). Pakistan insists that India uses separatist groups like the Baluchistan Liberation Army to stir dissent in Baluchistan and other provinces across the border (Perlez, 2021). As a result, Pakistan continues to regard India’s actions in Afghanistan as inimical to its interests. Their continuing enmity lies at the heart of both states’ policy towards Afghanistan, which does not bode well for prospects of peace, stability and security in the sub-region. Retrogressive forces, including the Taliban, have been direct and immediate beneficiaries of this ineffectiveness and incompetence (Wani, 2021). After the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Russia have considerable opportunities to strengthen their position in Afghanistan and present themselves as viable or even desirable alternative international partners (Hill, 2021; Perlez, 2021). In the current situation, it is clear that cooperation between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan is less certain because the triangular relationship is more conflictual than cooperative, owing to the involvement of other actors, including hegemons.

Conclusion

Within their triangular entanglements, the behaviour of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan has changed according to their national interests to survive in the international system and to protect themselves from hostile neighbours. Two major factors, that is, an anarchical world and mistrust in their respective relations, led all three of them to make alliances with each other’s arch-rivals. India and Pakistan have adopted soft power strategies to establish their influence in Afghanistan. Both were competing in the post-Taliban era for gaining greater influence and power. As far as their strategies and policies towards Afghanistan are concerned, they have been trapped in the classic security dilemma ‘in that any measure by either side to increase its security is liable to trigger a reaction thus causing deterioration in the overall regional balance’ (Pant, 2011, p. 31). Afghanistan remains significant for both Pakistan and India for strategic, economic and security reasons.

The dynamics of this triangle have considerable bearing on the prospects of regionalism in South Asia. An influential section of South Asians is working towards regional processes that can enhance cooperation and connectivity. But if the situation in north-western South Asia, involving these three countries, remains geopolitically charged and influenced by competing national interests, then regional cooperation is unlikely to progress. So, without a potential trilateral engagement and cooperation, endeavours towards enduring peace, security and stability not only in north-western South Asia but also in the entire region will most likely fail. Therefore, stronger diplomatic cooperation among these countries would be necessary to achieve success in calming the region, because if triangular countries remain hostile to, and isolated from, one another, then any form of regional cooperation will be difficult to maintain.