Abstract
The return of the Taliban to Kabul in 2001 has struck a final body blow to the ill-conceived policies of democratic nation-building in a largely tribal, divided and fundamentalised Afghanistan. While this has resulted in questions about the endgame of the western alliance in Afghanistan, it has also revealed that the post-Taliban national government was merely a hiatus between the first and, now, the second Taliban regime. And, once again, it has raised questions over the nature of the regime given the now greatly complicated situation with the rise of the Islamic State and its many regional branches, new alliances among Afghan fundamentalist groups seeking a voice in a politically fragile state and the stakes of Afghanistan’s neighbours in preventing a spillover across borders.
This issue of the India Quarterly addresses many of these issues. As one article points out, Afghanistan is ‘in the crosshairs of a security vacuum and a near-failed state, where increasing radicalisation of its populace appears to be an inevitable reality’. An imminent danger to the new Taliban regime comes from the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) which since 2015 is increasingly popular given demands for the greater radicalisation of the state and demands for a pan-Islamic vision for the Afghan regime. Other jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda (largely Afghan-Arabs), with roots in the mujahideen of the 1980s, also shape the conflict in Afghanistan given the Taliban’s tolerance of them. This lineup provides meagre space for a different domestic and foreign policy course from the Taliban’s earlier avatar, as another article argues. Foreign policy choices are also hindered by Afghanistan’s geostrategic space in the sub-continent, as another author notes, with policy ‘shaped by a dynamic triangular relationship among Afghanistan, India and Pakistan…’ with little potential for addressing stability in the region.
Yet, the objective situation also provides scope for new policies on many fronts. In 2022, the Taliban faces a different set of aspirations and opportunities. The jihadi war can no longer be the state’s objective. The years between its first coming and its second have also planted the seeds of new aspirations for prosperity and well-being for its young population; the tide of women’s rights may not be possible to elide for long and the Taliban’s own ambition to be regarded as part of the global community as it pulls Afghanistan back from becoming a perpetual failed state are gradually moving it towards greater pragmatism in dealing with neighbours like India.