Singapore as a Destination Among Trans-Border People: Migration from the Indo-Myanmar Borderland

Introduction

In contemporary times, an unprecedented number of individuals are leaving the India–Myanmar border. Shifting urban dynamics in developing countries are drawing individuals from these ‘shatter zones’ to cities safely within their own countries (Mcduie-Ra, 2013). According to McDuie-Ra (2012), people travel from the Northeast frontier into the Indian heartland in search of jobs and economic opportunities because of the demand for ‘Northeast labour’ in ‘de-Indianised’ zones of global capital. Some of the reasons for this exodus include safety from violence, improved transportation links between the frontier and cities, and jobs in retail, hotels, and call centres (Kikon & Karlsson, 2019; Mcduie-Ra, 2016a). According to Kikon and Karlsson (2019), the youths of Northeast India are desirable to employers in the hospitality industry because of their fair complexions and typical Asian features, as well as their proficiency in English and their general cosmopolitan mindset. Kipgen and Panda’s (2019, 2020) research on Kuki migrants in Delhi demonstrated that social networks not only originate, promote, and raise the chance of Kukis out-migration but also minimise costs and hazards associated with the migration process. Despite increasing research on Northeast migration to Indian cities in recent decades, studies on migration within and outside Myanmar are scarce for many reasons.

For many reasons, academic research of migration from the Indo-Myannmar borderlands is a mostly unexplored field. In the first instance, anthropologists and ethnographers primarily focused on customs, folklore, and the borderland’s ‘confrontation’ with modernity, with colonial and post-war academics uninterested in mobility analysis (Jones, 1978; Singh, 1987). Second, domestic and international migration has predominantly been investigated as a factor of ethnonationalist politics and insurrection (Bhaumik, 2009; Hazarika, 2000). Finally, research on migration in the borderland is concerned mainly with issues such as refugees, internal displacement due to ethnic conflicts and violence and statelessness (Dutta, 2012). However, cross-border travel and refugee mobility among affine ethnic groups are commonplace. Bal and Chambugong (2014) investigated how the Garos in the India–Bangladesh border region used the annual Wangala dance to reconcile and express a trans-border Garo identity. In addition, they examined how the international border has fostered racial disparities between hill Garos and lowlanders. McConnachie (2018) explores how the construction of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ shapes the integration of Chin refugees from Myanmar into Mizoram, despite the fact that they are of the same ethnic background. Pau (2018) investigates the numerous ways in which the Zo people were divided during the colonial and post-colonial eras, analysing how this division resulted in ‘differences’ and ‘otherness.’

Interestingly, the last few decades have witnessed the migration of ethnic minorities across the Indo-Myanmar borderland such as the Kuki tribe to global cities such as Singapore in search of jobs and opportunities (Kipgen, 2016). Voluntary international migration for work and employment among the Kukis is a very recent phenomenon though internal migration within India and Myanmar has been observed. This international migration to Singapore differs from what is commonly observed in internal migration within India and Myanmar for various reasons. First, the Kukis as a border community maintain close relationships with one another for reasons including trade, cultural preservation, and family ties. It is undeniable, however, that the Kukis’ political partition has led to distinct processes of ethnification and identification. One such example is the formation of ethnonyms like Kolgam mi, used by Indian Kukis to refer to Kukis from Myanmar, and Phaigam mi, used by Myanmarese Kuki to refer to Indian Kukis. Separate calls for statehood, or self-administered states, characterised by territoriality and national citizenship emerged as a result of political consciousness in both India and Myanmar. Second, the political barrier between India and Myanmar hindered the Kukis from sharing a common religious platform, isolating them according to their various denominational affiliations and limiting interfaith communication. Despite the fact that the Kukis on either side of the border are beginning to develop distinct ethnifications and identities as citizens of their own countries, they are still bound together by strong ties of kinship and ethnic ties. This robust kinship network is breaking geographical barriers and is instrumental in widening and sharing knowledge and information about opportunities, such as those in Singapore.

What explains the current long-distance movement of transborder communities like the Kukis, who have historically been isolated to ‘global cities’ like Singapore in pursuit of employment? Has migration to and reunification in Singapore after long political separations in the post-colonial era brought a renewal of their shared identity and the emergence of a new sense of community and belonging? What forms of a social world do the transborder communities create as they reunite in their new destination? Using this as a starting point, this article examines the determinants of migration, specifically the role of kinship and ethnic networks in Kukis migration to Singapore. The article will also examine the role of the church as a unifying institution and space of interaction. This study of contemporary migration to Singapore allows us to look at borderland people who may simultaneously identify as part of a single transnational ‘imagined community’, and as citizens of both India and Myanmar.

The Making of the Kukis as Borderland People

The Kukis are a subgroup of what the colonial ethnographers and officials referred to as the Kuki-Chin-Lushai people. They are also known by a generic name called Zo which means ‘highlanders’ (Lehmann, 1963). In colonial nomenclature, the Kuki-Chin-Lushai (today called Mizo) are Indo-Burma borderland tribes who lived in a contiguous territory and believed in a shared origin and descent (Pau, 2018). Willem van Schendel (2002) described the Kuki-Chin-Mizo’s territorial space as Zomia, which is characterised by shared beliefs, similar lifeways, and long-standing cultural linkages’ including language affinities, religious commonalities, cultural features, and ecological conditions. Zomia is a name Schendel coined from Zomi, which means ‘highlander’ in the Kuki-Chin-Mizo language spoken in Burma, India, and Bangladesh. Similarly, James Scott (2009, pp. 16–18) defined Zomia as ‘the hilly areas beginning from the Naga and Mizo hills in Northern India and Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts’, which are geographically and socially close but relatively isolated from the valleys. Guyot-Réchard (2021, pp. 3–4) identifies this area as the Patkai where various Mongoloid-descended ethnicities and tribes reside. A ‘practically impassable barrier of sea, mountain, and forest’, it was also a ‘zone of interpenetration’ and ‘tension’ where governmental authority between Burma and India was murky. Today’s Zo are identified by a variety of names, including Kukis and Lushais (now Mizos) in India, and Chins in Myanmar (Suan, 2011). Here, we are concerned with the people who identify themselves as Kukis inhabiting the Indo-Myanmar borderland. Today, the Kukis mostly reside in the states of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam in India and Sagaing Division in Myanmar. In India, they are recognised as one of the ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and as ‘ethnic minorities’ in Myanmar.

Colonial cartography ‘created arbitrary boundaries’, separating numerous culturally connected ethnic groups in the Indo-Myanmar borderlands (Haokip, 2015, p. 202). As a result, the Kukis, who had previously been undivided, were now spread among new independent states. Before European colonisation, the indigenous Kuki people had a political structure in which they were ‘not separated from one another’ by frontiers and independent nation-states. (Leach, 1960, p. 50). However, the colonial rulers’ creation of borders was based on an abject disregard for physical and historical reality, ethno-demographic diversity, and economic interdependence, with fatal results (Haokip, 2015). Many of Asia’s borders are a product of colonial statecraft, and as such, they separate people who share linguistic and ethnic ties and who have enduring relations in domains of ‘trade, agriculture, religious practice, and marriage’ (van Schendel & Erik, 2014, p. 3). In 1935 the British Burma government was officially separated from the British India administration by the Government of India (GoI) Act. The GoI Act of 1935 unintentionally split a wide swath of Asian borderland inhabited by a variety of indigenous peoples by drawing international boundaries between Burma and India (Zou, 2010). Burma’s separation and independence from India on April 1st, 1937, was not an unexpected outcome given the colony’s status as a ‘neglected appendage’ enjoying a minimal ‘skinny state’ administered from Calcutta and then Delhi (Saha, 2016). Second, the ethnic populations that had lived in harmony along the Indo-Myanmar border were split after the 1947 decolonisation of India (Majumdar, 2020). Residents of Burma were divided into two groups: the ‘hill peoples’, who included ethnic groups like the Chin, Karen, and Kachin and lived in the country’s Frontier Areas, and the ‘plains Burmese’, who lived in Ministerial Burma and endorsed the demand for a separate administration, especially in the wake of Japan’s defeat in the country (Tinker, 1986). The Wa, Naga, and Kuki are just a few of the many minor Frontier Areas ethnic groups that were denied a voice at the Second Panglong Conference in 1947 (Walton, 2008). As a result, the future ‘fait accompli’ of dividing this borderland [Patkai] between India, Burma, and (eventually) Pakistan was ensured (Guyot-Réchard, 2020, p. 15).

Finally, in 1967, India and Burma signed the Indo-Burma Boundary Treaty in the city of Rangoon, reaffirming the border between their two countries (Pau, 2018). As a result, the Kukis were instantly transformed into a marginalised minority group as well as border-crossers who were ‘incorporated into separate nation-states for the first time in their history’ (van Schendel, 1992, p. 110). Today, the region inhabited by the Kukis has become ‘not only the north-eastern borderland of South Asia, but it can also be described as the north-western borderland of Southeast Asia’ (van Schendel, 2002, pp. 67–68).

Given the marginal position of the geo-physical landscape inhabited by the Kukis in post-colonial nation building, this fluid borderland is difficult to locate in either Southeast Asia or South Asia. Simply put, ‘traditional frontiers’ were naturalised as colonial borderlands, which ‘forged national boundaries’ as a result of colonial cartography (Zou & Kumar, 2011, pp. 165). The demarcation of international boundaries has unquestionably altered the connections between Kuki communities on either side of the frontier. The indigenous solidarity of borderlanders had been disproportionately impacted by the hardening of boundaries brought about by the emergence of nation states (Zou, 2010).

Leaving the Borderland: Migration to Singapore

The Indo-Myanmar borderland, long plagued by underdevelopment, insurgencies, and violence, now links South and Southeast Asia. The Indian government’s ‘Look East’ policy (now ‘Act East’ policy) sparked economic progress and growth by building tighter strategic ties with Southeast Asian nations (Haokip, 2015). Symbols of the ‘new India’ may be found all across the frontier today, including expanding telecommunications, private airlines, branches of retail chains, and agencies that place workers in the hotel industry and call centres. With better access to communication and transport, the movement of people out of the frontier to seek job opportunities in ‘mainstream’ society is much faster, cheaper, and often safer. In other words, ‘dual connectivity’ is transforming the borderland from frontiers to corridors (McDuie-Ra, 2016b). In the same way that the underlying economic structure of developed nations necessitates an ever-increasing demand for immigrant labour, the global economic system is responsible for the current international migration that we see today. Chronic and unavoidable demand for foreign low-skilled workers for catering, cleaning, aged care and other domestic work in high income families of developed nations are important reasons for the rise in the demand for immigrant labour (Piore, 1979; Sassen, 1991). Since local inhabitants are less likely to fill low-wage professions, ‘global cities’ have a high demand for immigrant workers to provide the necessary services to keep the high-wage sector afloat (Massey et al., 1993). The Southeast Asian region is a significant part of the Asian continent’s migratory patterns. Demand for foreign workers and domestic workers in particular has increased in recent decades as a result of the rise of global cities like Singapore. Singapore is characterised by rapid economic development, expansion of the middle class, rise in educational standards, and women’s ability to move away from unpaid family labour or paid reproductive labour into more lucrative jobs (Piper, 2006; Yeoh & Huang, 1998; Yeoh, 2007). The Kukis are the recent contributors to the growing demand for domestic care in Singapore. The availability and high demand for work in Singapore, particularly domestic work, as well as poverty and unemployment back home caused the Kukis—some of whom had advanced degrees—to travel large distances, frequently at great expense and risk, to undertake low-skilled domestic work. This outmigration for work has become a significant social trend amongst younger generations to raise family income. Young people today are willing to leave the ‘land’ or encouraged to do so due to rising aspirations to travel, earn money, and realise their dreams of landing a job rather than just confront armed conflicts, violence, and unemployment (Kikon & Karlson, 2019). This outmigration is also greatly influenced by the kinship and ethnic links that connect the origin and destination. This will be covered in more detail in the following section.

Methodology and Brief Profile of the Kukis in Singapore

For this study, in-depth interviews and on-site observations were used in 2015 in fieldwork among the Kuki migrants in Singapore. Since the majority of Kuki migrants are Christians, they used their free time, primarily on Sundays, to catch up with friends and go to church. Most of the interviews took place on the open lawn of St. Andrew’s Cathedral, City Hall, Little India, and City Hub. Respondents were asked questions on their migration experiences, life histories, family backgrounds, methods of learning about jobs in Singapore, various migration-related issues, social lives, interactions with co-ethnic members, and the church’s function. According to the records of the Kuki Worship Service, there were between 300 and 400 Kuki migrants from India and Myanmar living in Singapore.

All migrants are first-time border crossers who primarily came from the Indian states of Manipur and the Sagaing Division of Myanmar. Most Kuki domestic helpers in Singapore are single women. They are engaged in activities including cleaning the house, caring for the elderly and young children, washing clothes, washing dishes, sweeping, and mopping. Despite the low-skilled nature of the labour requirements, a few immigrants have a university degree. Domestic work in Singapore routinely demands English language proficiency to carry out care and household jobs efficiently . University educated Kukis are able to offer this as a value-added skill in Singapore. At the same time, the prevalence of university-educated migrants engaged in low skilled domestic work also reflects the dearth of employment options back home.

Significance of Social Networks and Recruiting Agencies in Migration

In shaping the migrants choice of location and destination, social networks are a crucial factor (Boyd, 1989; Faist, 1997; Haug, 2008; Ritchey, 1976; Thieme, 2006). An essential resource that facilitates movement is a social connection to an individual who has migrated before (Faist, 2000). In this context, social networks are defined as ‘a composite of interpersonal relations in which migrants interact with their family or friends’ (Haug, 2008, p. 588). For Massey et al. (1993), networks are a complex of interpersonal links that connect people through bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. Social networks are as a driving force that lead to self-sustaining networks of information, support, and obligations that develop between migrants in the host society and family and friends’ destination areas (Boyd, 1989). There are two types of social networks that play a significant role in migration: kinship networks and ethnic networks. The bonds of blood and kinship are highly valued because they facilitate the development of long-lasting, friendly relationships between relatives (Boyd, 1989; Choldin, 1973; Haug, 2008; Litwak, 1960; MacDonald & MacDonald, 1964). Family and other close social links are very useful in making people aware of the destination areas and the assistance available there (Boyd, 1989). Interpersonal relationships may extend beyond kinship ties. It is possible that the high levels of trust and cooperation seen in small community family and kinship groups permeate into the broader society (MacDonald & MacDonald, 1964).

The Kuki migrant domestic workers arrive in Singapore with the help of networks via relatives, co-ethnic members and agencies. Migrant brokers and recruiting agencies are popular among the Kukis. The recruiting agencies in Singapore hire agents/brokers in India and Myanmar who recruit prospective workers on their behalf. The private recruiting agencies are involved in arranging all official requirements such as arranging in-principle approval from the Ministry of Manpower, Singapore. The Kuki migrants, mostly women are given orientation programmes by the brokers or agents at home before their departure to Singapore. Rather than collect fees before departure, recruiting agencies provide loans usually through a salary-deduction scheme. Deduction arrangement varies from six to eight months of their monthly salaries. The recruitment firms offer phone calls, resume services, language tests, testing of other necessary skills and flights for a fee. Agencies in Myanmar give training sessions ranging between one to three months to their clients before their departure to Singapore. In India, they are usually simply taught the basic skills and requirements, occasionally at the residence of the agents or brokers as the existence of institutional agencies seems to be missing here. It was learnt that potential domestic workers are taught basic skills such as cooking, laundry, deportment and, most importantly, basic spoken English. Many of them are simply verbally told about their wages and working conditions. A 28 year old Kuki woman migrant from Myanmar narrated,

They (agencies) gave us 3 months training in Rangoon. Mostly we were taught about the hosts’ lifestyles, culture and ways of dressing. Most importantly they taught us how to speak English because many of us cannot speak basic English in Myanmar. They also taught us the laws and rules of Singapore and our rights.

After preparing them with the basic knowledge and skills that their clients would require in Singapore, the agents send the migrants to their partner agencies in Singapore who drop them off at their employers’ immediately on their arrival or arrange accommodation for a few days until the employers pick them up.

Kukis from Myanmar were the pioneer migrants who had first-hand information about the availability of domestic work in Singapore. This can be attributed to the role of private recruiting agencies and agents who visited Kuki villages in Myanmar in search of potential migrants for domestic work in Singapore. For Myanmarese women, Singapore has been their preferred destination for a very long time. More and more women in Myanmar are leaving the country in search of better economic prospects, a trend shaped by the institutional and cultural barriers they face at home (Deshingkar, 2021). Therefore, Kuki women from Myanmar began emigrating long before Kuki women from India embarked on the same voyage. A 23 years, KuKi woman from Tamu, Myanmar) shared:

A broker from Rangoon visited our area in quest of Singapore-bound women. After a protracted conversation, I ultimately decided. Given that we come from a low-income family, my parents were not entirely opposed to the concept. We were also aware that few ladies from our village were currently employed in Singapore.

The strong ethnic relations and bonds that exist across frontiers acted as a medium of information and knowledge within and across political boundaries. The Kukis in India were believed to have gained knowledge and learned about the information and opportunities in Singapore through their co-ethnic members in Myanmar. Once the migration pattern was created, it travelled beyond the political boundaries and became a major driver of information among co-ethnic members across the borderland. In this way, ethnic networks carried information beyond the international boundary and helped in diffusion of job opportunities and the processes involved in it. The pioneer Kuki domestic workers who had work experience in Singapore would also return and eventually become agents in recruiting and sending Kuki women to Singapore for the same kind of work. This seems to be popular in India as it was found that most of the agents in India are returnees from Singapore.

The remittances that the villagers in Singapore sent home were utilised for a variety of purposes such as building homes, purchasing land, paying for the education of siblings, and covering family members’ medical costs. This enticed many others to move to Singapore. A 23 years old woman from Manipur, India narrated her story:

There was a girl from our village who was working in Singapore. After a few years another girl from our village left for Singapore. They have been helping their families back home such as supporting siblings education, buying property and houses. I talked to the girl who was in Singapore through the phone to get all the necessary information. Few days later, I approached one of the agents. That is how I ended up here.

Furthermore, it is important to note that due to their distinct racial characteristics, persons from the borderlands who relocated to urban areas in India in pursuit of employment opportunities, experienced various forms of violence and prejudice. They are perceived as racially separate from the various groups that make up India’s diverse citizenship. Although their racial attributes gives them an edge in the labour market, it also labels them as different and as outsiders to the dominant populations of urban India (Kikon & Karlsson, 2019). Because of their distinctive Mongoloid phenotype, they are sometimes mistaken for outsiders from countries like China, Thailand, Nepal, or Japan rather than ‘equal citizens’ (Wouters & Subba, 2013). The borderland people face discriminations in mainland India in various forms from being denied accommodation because they are misunderstood as foreigners, not allowed to cook their ethnic food in their rented houses and subjected to the term ‘chinky’ because of their distinct physical features (Haokip, 2021). The unpredictability of daily life, which is marked by violence and discrimination, has considerably influenced the Kuki’s preference for Singapore over mainland India. In actuality, their racial characteristics, which prevented them from assimilating into the dominant Indian culture, were largely responsible for their sense of security in Singapore. In addition, the presence of family members and ethnic networks in the new location provided additional protection and support. The thought that their son or daughter could rely on other members of the community in times of difficulties and emergencies gave parents at home some peace of mind as they sent their child out to an unfamiliar location. They receive some reassurance that they can get in touch with their co-ethnic family and friends overseas in case of an emergency or urgent necessity. The ability of family and ethnic networks to humanise migration and lessen the alienation that typically results from working in a foreign setting is therefore their most crucial quality.

Church as a Site of Re-Unification and Belonging

Migrants’ religious communities and communal locations are important components of their identities because they contribute to religious identification and allow immigrants to experience a sense of belonging in their new area of settlement (Ehrkamp, 2005). Most migrants turned to religion to find ‘places of belonging’ (Levitt, 2003). Similarly, faith and religious activities also acted as a source of support for the problems that one encounters in a new destination. This is because faith-based institutions like the church are vital to the lives of the migrants in dealing with the feelings of loss and the absence of the familiar religious rituals of home (Hirschmann, 2004). Handlin (1973) further argue that as immigrants face changes and challenges in many aspects of their life, they sought to recreate the church and faith of their homeland in their place of settlement. The ethnic community’s desire and incentive to own a church and participate in activities is not merely driven by the need for ethnic fellowship, but also by a strong desire to promote and maintain their identity and culture (Chong, 1998).

Religion has a tremendous impact on how individuals interact with one another and establish a feeling of community, as is noted among indigenous and tribal societies. Christianity was brought to the Kukis by the British missionaries in the late nineteenth century, decades before they were divided by distinct nation-states. After the Kuki defeat in the Anglo-Kuki War 1917–1919 the Kuki’s were forbidden from practising their old belief systems and there was a massive conversion to Christianity (Sitlhou & Nengneilhing, 2020). Today, the Kuki people are mostly Christians, though a few profess Judaism. Pachuau (2006) argue that Christianity has, hence, become integral to the Mizo cultural ethos and identity. According to Vibha Joshi (2012), indigenous groups like the Nagas show their ethnic identity through cultural rebirth, which is demonstrated by festivals and celebrations of milestones like the quasquicentennial of Christianity and Christmas. Slogans like ‘Nagaland for Christ’, which emphasise a pan-Christian identity, indicate how Christianity develops into a focal point for the mobilisation of Naga cultural identity (Pachuau, 2014). The phrase Mizo Kristian kan ni (we are all Mizo Christians) serves as a point of ethnic identification. In this the Nagas are not alone. Horstmann (2011) highlights the significance of Christian networks for social stability and camaraderie among Karen refugees along the Thai–Burma border. In a hostile environment, trapped in conflict and violence, and unable to return home, Karen refugees rely on the church to mobilise resources for a better life and refugee solidarity.

At the same time, religious differences also cause ethnic cleavages. Though Christianity is widely regarded as a unifying factor and a common identity marker, the diversity of beliefs serves to create ethnic differences and identification. Longkumer (2010) investigates how the Nagas, in their attempt to forge a distinct ethnic identity supposedly based on common Christian religion, marginalised and alienated local and indigenous religious groups and contributed to the construction of religious boundaries. Thomas (2016) also noted how the imposition of ‘Nagaland shall be a kingdom for Christ’ irked followers of the Heraka faith because their understanding of nation seemed to exclude them on religious grounds. According to Pau (2018), while Christianity brought Christian groups together and created strong bonds, it also destroyed kindred-relationships in the Zo society by categorising people as tapidaw (Christian) or lawki (animist). Nevertheless, what is significant about the Kukis in Singapore is that, despite the fact that they are sharply divided into a wide range of faith affiliations in their place of origin, the church in Singapore plays an important role in fostering ethnic harmony and creating a sense of inclusive ethnic identity and consciousness.

In Singapore, the desire for religious congregations with their co-ethnic members is extremely strong.. The Kukis in Singapore are mostly single female domestic workers with only a handful of males who are engaged in jobs such as electricians, stevedores, construction workers. The Kuki domestic workers in Singapore generally enjoy two off-days in a month though they are entitled to a once a week day-off according to the law. It was observed that the majority of the migrants converted their off-days into working days to earn extra wages. This was mainly because they wanted to earn every extra penny so that they could send more back home. Therefore, social life is very limited as the domestic helpers are closely confined to their own workplaces. Since they hardly meet each other in person, it made them pick a particular day collectively for a community gathering. Sunday is the most viable choice to attend church services collectively at the Kuki Worship Service (Singapore).

KWS Singapore was founded in 2011 to meet the religious requirements of the Kukis and to attempt to unite these migrants under a single organisation. The name Kuki Worship Service was taken because members did not want denominational indicators such as Baptist, Evangelical and Presbyterian, and so on, which had been a dominant dividing factor among the Kukis at home. KWS is an inter-disciplinary religious organisation with locations in India including Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad, and other major cities, Yangon, Myanmar and countries including Malaysia, the United States, and London. Since its inception in Shillong in 1975, the KWS has been a torch bearer for a common religious platform for Kukis. The non-denominational principle of KWS (Singapore) manifest the idea that forming a Kuki church was for all the Kukis living in Singapore irrespective of any denominational affiliation. Interestingly, even Kuki Jews were members of the KWS Singapore showing that there was a strong desire for ethnic solidarity and a search for a common ethnic platform.

Religious events give the Kukis the opportunity to worship as a single ethnic group. The social and cultural separation because of the existing political boundary at their places of origin—India and Myanmar, are bridged in Singapore which was visible from the formation of a common Kuki church. It can be seen that the church not only provides for spiritual needs for the migrants but also performs social and cultural roles by infusing a sense of ethnic solidarity and oneness tempering the ethnic separations from borders and boundaries at the place of origin. The church also creates new networks and maintains the existing networks with their co-ethnic members. The common congregation and ethnic solidarity found in the form of religion are highly regarded and appreciated by all the members. Sundays are eagerly awaited as the migrants meet, share, laugh and have a good time with their co-ethnic members. A 23 years old migrant from Manipur, India narrated the role of the church among the Kukis in Singapore,

I am very happy that we have Kuki Worship Service in Singapore. Because of KWS we can worship together as one people. The church is one uniting factor for us. We do not think of ourselves as someone from India or Burma. We are all Kukis. We attend services together where we share our thoughts, problems, blessings and many more. We meet, laugh, joke, sing and dance together. These are all possible because of KWS.

For many migrants, the separation from family, relatives, friends and community is hard which often leads to search for emotional stability, new friends and new connections and fellowship with co-ethnic members. The church, therefore, plays a crucial role in establishing the link among fellow co-ethnic members by pulling them together at a common worship place. The migrants receive the much-needed emotional support from their co-ethnic members through activities such as praying together and expressing their challenges and concerns with one another. A 28 years old migrant from Myanmar also narrated that

I feel blessed that we have KWS in Singapore. I can listen to the gospel in my own dialect. I eagerly anticipate Sundays. I feel secure when I meet my own people. KWS has given us a wonderful platform to sing and pray as one people.

From picnics to Golnop (sports) competitions in arm wrestling, football, and volleyball, the church organises a wide variety of events for its members. Using historical female figure like Jonlhing, Ahsijolneng and Lenchonghoi from Kuki folklore, they assign individuals to separate groups. The overwhelming popularity and acceptance of these heroines by everyone is evidence of a long-standing cultural tradition. The KWS led community days usually culminate in traditional dance and a feast. Chavang Kut, a post-harvest festival, is regularly and enthusiastically celebrated. During key events, such as the Chin National Day, which is yearly observed by Myanmarese Chin in Singapore, the church also sends a cultural troupe to present a cultural dance to display their ethnic identity. The yearly Kuki Nampi Angol Taona (Kuki Nation Fasting Prayer Day), which is well-known in India, is also observed in Singapore. This day is dedicated to prayer for peace, progress, and harmony among all Kukis.

At times of crisis or difficulty in the home region, the congregation pulls together to address the issue as a whole. When landslides in Manipur’s Chandel and Churachandpur in 2015 wiped out hundreds of Kukis, severely damaging their homes and left many homeless, KWS Singapore raised S$ 824.03 from its members and sent it home as relief for the devastated families. To help those in need of immediate aid, a Facebook group called ‘Fundraising Group For Eimi (Kuki people)’ was set up. One can therefore notice the Kukis in Singapore coming together and forming a shared interest through the numerous activities they initiated, such as sharing folklore, festivals, and cultural dances, and offering humanitarian aid to ethnic groups in India and Myanmar. As they reunite in Singapore, their activities and efforts to create relationships with ethnic community members back home reinforce their ‘we feeling’ and ‘oneness’ as a single ethnic group.

Conclusion

The migration of Kukis to Singapore for domestic work is a very recent phenomenon. Poverty, unemployment and limited job opportunities at home, economic globalisation and chronic demand for foreign low skilled workers in domestic care are important reasons that contributed to this phenomenon. The choice and destination of migration is heavily influenced by kin and ethnic networks. The Kukis from Myanmar are believed to be the pioneers in choosing Singapore as a destination for work. The strong ethnic networks that prevail across the Indo-Myanmar borderland intensify information and knowledge transfer about work opportunities in Singapore. Drawing on social ties to relatives and friends who have migrated before, non-migrants gained access to knowledge, assistance and other resources that facilitate the movement. Migrant brokers and recruiting agencies are popular among the Kukis. Migrant networks have emerged as a crucial concept for elucidating the Kukis’ migration decision to Singapore. What is significant is how a trans-border community, viewed as divided within Myanmar (Chin State–Sagaing Region), within India (Manipur–Mizoram), and internationally (Myanmar–India) reimagines its ethnic solidarities in Singapore. This is crucial since the Kuki migrants’ lifeworld in Singapore scarcely connects with that of other migrants from ‘mainland’ India; instead, it does so through kinship and ethnic ties with their fellow members of the same ethnic group from Myanmar. The distancing from the ‘mainland’ Indian migrants is also to do with the historical isolation and disconnection of Northeast India with other parts of the country and most importantly the extreme cultural differences. In the migration discourse, which frequently categorises immigrants in terms of the larger national identity such as Indians, this phenomenon experienced by a minority community like the Kukis is likely to go unnoticed. The way Kuki immigrants from the lower economic strata create their life in Singapore is also distinct from the experiences of the medium and upper immigrant groups, such as expatriates, highly skilled workers, and settled families, for whom integration is an integral part of the experience. For the Kukis, migration to Singapore is a discrete, short-term, and family-focused strategy to better their economic standing.

Religious denominations at home play a crucial role in ethnic division by dividing each ethnic group into smaller religious identity. A striking aspect of Kukis life in Singapore is their yearning for a common religious platform in the form of KWS that transcends their strict religious divisions back home. Nevertheless, it appears as though the unification mindset and the need for ethnic solidarity in a transitory location are a fleeting phenomenon caused by factors such as small population and the need for emotional support in a foreign land. As the migrants return to their original homes, they revert to the structural divisions brought on by denominational affiliations. What is noteworthy, though, is the attempt by the Kukis in Singapore to unite on an ethnic basis and to show solidarity, despite being divided by international borders and denominational categories at home. The church in Singapore is an important symbol of common identity for the Kukis, allowing them to re-create a sense of ethnic solidarity and community. The church plays a critical role in giving individuals emotional stability and resilience in a place far from home. However, as has been recently observed in a few cities where the KWS as a single religious organisation for the Kukis has been challenged by the emergence of new churches by members who want to distance themselves from the Kuki nomenclature, only time will tell whether or not this replication occurs in Singapore.