Soft Power in India’s Act East Policy: A Cambodian Perspective

Introduction

In an anarchic international system, it is natural for states to struggle for power, expand their sphere of influence and create a positive image conducive to bilateral and multilateral partnership and cooperation among them. A state needs not only hard power but also soft power to be successful in international relations. In realist terms, power refers to the ability of a country to influence others to want what it wants. There are two types of power: hard power is based on tangible military and economic strength, whereas soft power is based on intangible abilities such as agenda setting, attraction and co-option. As states acquire relative power, they need to have a soft power strategy in order to gain acceptance in the international hierarchy because tangible hard power alone may not lead to a comprehensive recognition of their credibility and legitimacy in global affairs. In this sense, public diplomacy has been utilised by national governments as an important tool to mobilise resources for promoting their soft power to achieve foreign policy objectives in the international arena.

India’s use of soft power in public diplomacy has a long history, even before such a concept was incorporated into the international relations discipline in the 1990s. In the third century BCE, King Asoka sent two Dhammaduta monks, Sona Thera and Uttara Thera, to spread Buddhism in Mainland Southeast Asia, known as Suvarnabhumi, meaning ‘land of gold’. Indian priests (Brahmins and monks), princes and merchants were responsible for cultural diffusion in Southeast Asia as a whole. For centuries, ancient kingdoms in Southeast Asia accepted, absorbed and adopted Indic culture and civilisation. Srivijay in Indonesia, Pagan in Myanmar, Funan in Cambodia and Champa in central Vietnam were the early kingdoms that flourished in the region, and they were deeply connected with India in terms of statecraft, religion, literature, language, script, architecture and arts.

The long trajectory of socio-cultural connections between India and Southeast Asia is one of the strongest foundations of present-day interactions between the two regions. Cambodia often occupies a focal point in any deliberation about Indian connections with this region. The manifestations of Indian culture remain enormously visible in Cambodia. In contemporary times, although Cambodia is a Buddhist kingdom, it retains a strong influence of Indian Hindu and Buddhist rituals, mythology and idolatry. It has been argued that the cultural and historical connections between India and Cambodia reflect peaceful coexistence and harmony between the indigenous culture and imported elements, which form the foundation of Khmer civilisation (Bunthorn, 2022a). In turn, these connections become the core component of India’s soft power diplomacy towards Cambodia as part of New Delhi’s Act East Policy (AEP) in the twenty-first century.

Several studies on India–Southeast Asia relations are based on historical, cultural and contemporary perspectives. However, some recent studies of India’s soft power diplomacy towards this region have been conducted using a holistic approach. The countries in the region have varying degrees of historical and cultural connections with India, and the focus of India’s public diplomacy towards countries in this region is also different. There is a need to study India’s connections with each country. So far, there is comparatively less literature on India–Cambodia relations from a soft power perspective. Therefore, in bridging the gap of literature, the main objective of the present article is to examine the concept of soft power and its implication in Asia, and particularly to underline its deployment in India’s foreign policy by looking at Cambodia as a case study. The key questions that emerge from the study pertain to what drives India to utilise soft power in its external engagement, especially in the context of the AEP, the extent to which the Indian government leverages its cultural resources to build its global image, how that has been perceived in Cambodia, given that both countries have deep-rooted cultural and historical linkages, and what have been the outcomes.

In a practical approach, soft power assessment is challenging but usually involves four stages: resources, transmission, reception and outcomes. Here, Cambodia is considered a significant case study of India’s soft power projection for two reasons: (a) the deep-seated cultural and civilisational bonds between the two nations and (b) India’s multifaceted soft power initiatives in Cambodia. The article makes a modest effort to examine the concept of soft power in general and its implications for Asian nations and to explore the resources of soft power and its utilisation in the context of India’s public diplomacy before showing how Cambodians view the South Asian country in modern times, given the profound historical and civilisational connections between the two countries for over a millennial. Additionally, it discusses the outcome limitations of India’s soft power projection in the Southeast Asian kingdom by looking at the current status of India–Cambodia relations and factors affecting them with reference to some existing surveys and reports on soft power nations. The article concludes that India succeeds in image building as a benign power and projecting the greatness of its ancient civilisation, but with limited political influence on the recipient country, at least for now.

Concept of Soft Power

Soft power is a concept in political science coined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye in the 1990s in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. According to him, soft co-optive power is the ability of a country ‘to structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with one’s own nation’ (Nye, 1990, p. 191). Later, he popularises the concept of soft power further to suit countries other than the USA in his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. He defines soft power as ‘the ability to shape the preferences of others’ through appeal and attraction, which is non-coercive and non-payment (Nye, 2004, p. 5). While hard power is based on coercion (sticks) and payments (carrots), soft power is based not only on ‘persuasion or the ability to move people by argument’ but also ‘the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence’ (Nye, 2004, p. 6).

The notion of soft power in international relations emerged primarily as an American strategy to influence the world in the post-Cold War. Moreover, the concept of soft power has been popularised as a consequence of the growing importance of culture in public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy in the globalising world. Eventually, this concept has attracted the attention of policymakers, scholars and commentators alike in several major countries such as China, India and Japan (see, for instance, Kugiel, 2017; Kurlantzick, 2007; Shiraishi, 1997; Tharoor, 2008, 2012; Thussu, 2013). While democracy and free market are the sources of American soft power, Asian countries such as India draw their soft power potential from historical and civilisational heritage and culture. Culture is indeed one of the three soft power currencies, the other two being political values and foreign policies. It has been noted that ‘[when] a country’s culture includes universal values, and its policies promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the attraction it creates’ (Nye, 2004, p. 11). Therefore, cultural convergence could provide sustained soft power based on shared civilisational values in the contemporary world.

It is problematic when it comes to the agency of soft power. Who/what is best positioned to generate and promote soft power, the state or non-state actors? Soft power is a process rather than a product. Culture as a soft power instrument should not be imposed by the big state on its small counterpart, or it would be counterproductive as the recipient state may perceive it as cultural imperialism, particularly in the neighbourhood. In this sense, a state’s heavy-handed propaganda will repel rather than attract other states. Therefore, soft power projection should be people-centric, and the state’s role in this regard is merely to facilitate the process. Non-state actors, civil society and individuals can play a vital role in promoting a country’s cultural values. Therefore, soft power is based ‘less on what you own, and more on what you represent’ (Hymans, 2009). In other words, it should send the message of what a country is rather than what it wants to show.

Building a positive image at the international level is crucial for a country to generate attraction and win the favour of others in order to achieve its foreign policy goals. It has been noted that Nye does not directly talk about ‘image’ or ‘country/nation brand’, although this is implicit (Rana, 2017). A country’s image is how it is perceived by the people and governments of other countries. The positive perceptions as the source of soft power can be acquired through a country’s traits of ‘benignity, brilliance and beauty’; these particular traits generate soft power through the production of ‘gratitude and sympathy’ as a result of the reciprocal altruism towards one’s positive attitudes, ‘admiration’ as a result of the accomplishment of one’s high performance and ‘inspiration’ as a result of the neat resonance of one’s ideals, values, cause, or visions, respectively (Vuving, 2009, pp. 8–9). It has been found that ‘The way a country is perceived can make a critical difference to the success of its business, trade and tourism efforts, as well as its diplomatic and cultural relations with other nations’ (GfK Roper Public Affairs and Media, 2009, p. 2). Similarly, the British Council, the UK’s international organisation for cultural relations and educational opportunities, uses perceptions to determine the success of nations. As noted in its soft power report, ‘Perceptions influence behaviours, behaviours influence reality’ (MacDonald, 2020, p. 7).

The Asianisation of Soft Power

As soft power is an American-centric concept, the puzzle is how it suits the Asian context and can transfer to political ends and influence. Nye claims that ‘the concept is general and fits all countries, groups, and individuals’ (Kang, 2008). Major Asian countries such as Japan, China and India have realised the values of their popular culture and cultural heritage as the foundation of soft power and interpreted them to suit the regional context. Accordingly, the use of the soft power concept in the Asian context may be defined as the Asianisation of soft power, as one scholar suggests, to de-Americanising soft power (Thussu, 2013).

Japan has been considered one of the most successful countries in utilising soft power in the modern world. After the Second World War, sources of Japan’s soft power have been generated from its popular culture, successful economic model and heavyweight industrial giant status in the world. One of the early studies of Japanese soft power was perhaps conducted by Saya Shiraishi, an anthropology professor at Kyoto Bunkyo University. In response to Nye’s argument that Japan is a ‘one-dimensional’ economic power marked by cultural insularity and thus irrelevant for other societies, he contends that ‘Japan’s supposed insularity is less pronounced than Nye and others assume’ (Shiraishi, 1997, p. 234). Indeed, Japan has adopted a ‘co-optive’ behavioural approach to soft power strategy. Japanese artistic innovation and creativity have created popular cultural products—comic books and animation—spreading throughout East and Southeast Asia. As a result, popular culture and traditional diffusion have generated new images for Japan, diluting its bad reputation in Asia. The cultural industry has, therefore, led to the indigenisation of soft power in the Japanese context. On the flip side, it has been argued that although Japan’s popular culture has shaped the cultural markets in the region, it has not exerted local influence: no conversion of resources to diplomatic power and no creation of any substantial ‘spheres of influence’ for Japan (Otmazgin, 2008).

With the rise of China, soft power has become a competitive affair in East Asia. In the early 2000s, China began its ‘charm offensive’, and eventually, Chinese scholars and officials coined and frequently used the term ‘peaceful rise’ to change the country’s image on the global scene ‘from dangerous to benign’ (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 226). As China continues to rise economically and militarily, it has also developed sophisticated soft power tools. Culture and public diplomacy have been China’s soft power instruments to influence other countries in international politics, which has given rise to the spread of state-driven Confucius Institutes worldwide. In a competitive environment of soft power between China and Japan, it has been said that while ‘being Chinese is cool’, concurrently Japan is ‘the coolest nation on Earth’ (Heng, 2010, p. 277). In other words, while ‘peaceful rise’ describes China, ‘Kawaii’ or ‘cool’ culture defines Japan, projecting itself as a benign, pacifist country in the world. That said, adding to its economic slowdown and the lack of hard power as its defence capability has been limited by the Pacific Constitution, Japan’s inability to deal with the wartime past has undermined its influence. In China’s case, its authoritarian political system undercuts the effectiveness of soft power diffusion, and its aggressive behaviour towards its neighbouring countries over the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas also undermines its soft power projection.

In South Asia, perhaps among the first promoters of the Asianisation of soft power in the Indian context is Shashi Tharoor, an influential Indian intellectual and politician. Back in 2008, while acknowledging the country’s weaknesses—poor infrastructure and poverty—he suggested that:

I would not want to rest my case for today’s India or twenty-first century India on an economic transformation that is still, in many ways, incomplete. Rather, if there is one attribute of independent India to which increasing attention should now be paid around the globe, it is not economics or military or nuclear strength, but the quality that India is already displaying in ample measure today. And that is our soft power. (Tharoor, 2008, p. 35)

Other scholars have explored the modes of transmission and implementation of the Indian soft power accumulating from both ancient and contemporary resources of attraction. Thussu (2013) focuses on the modes of transmission rather than the extensive outcomes of soft power, as he aims to ‘de-Americanise’ the concept of soft power and uses it in the Asian context of Japan, Korea, China and India. By focusing on the modes of transmission, he substantially examines various aspects of India’s soft power, from Buddhism to Bollywood, and how these can make India attractive to the world. He writes, ‘Home to one of the world’s oldest surviving civilisations and religions—Hinduism—and of Buddhism, its biggest ideological export, India’s spiritual, artistic, and cultural impact makes its soft power global’ (Thussu, 2013, p. 45). Similarly, another scholar also tries to extend the concept of soft power in the Indian context and discusses the tangible and intangible assets of India’s soft power. According to Kugiel (2017, p. 31), ‘[India’s] soft power resources would include along with culture, political values, foreign policy, its diaspora, and growing economic potential’. These two studies provide a valuable and contextual analysis of soft power in India’s foreign policy, though there is no specific case study of Southeast Asia. Filling this gap, Palit (2017) comparatively analyses and examines Chinese and Indian soft power in the context of South Asia, Southeast Asia and other regions. She devotes much effort to studying Chinese soft power in various regions but largely confines India’s soft power initiatives to South Asia and the competition with China in this region. She argues that ‘Unlike China, [India] does not suffer from adverse impressions characterising it overtly assertive’ (Palit, 2017, p. 261). Indian scholars and diplomats have long been cautious about assertiveness in cultural projection, especially towards Southeast Asian countries, since Indian influences have experienced qualitative changes and become integral parts of these societies’ psyche and ethos. One Indian diplomat demonstrates that ‘So, any assertive attempts at cultural diplomacy on the part of India in relation to these countries can, and does, affect their sensitivity’ (Dixit, 1979, p. 463). For this reason, India’s soft power diplomacy has been relatively low profile.

In parallel with Chinese foreign policy, India finds soft power resources from its cultural richness and heritage. India possesses numerous qualities that fit in with the concept of soft power. The enigma and exoticism of Indian culture have attracted the imaginations of many poets, novelists, thinkers, philosophers and scientists worldwide. In this connection, it has been suggested that ‘Belief in the greatness of Indian civilisation lies at the core of Indian nationalism and foreign policy’ (Pande, 2020, p. 77). Historical figures such as Gautama Buddha, Emperor Asoka and Mahatma Gandhi were the sources of India’s soft power in the philosophy of non-violence. On that note, it has been argued that ‘Mahatma Gandhi won India its independence through the use of soft power—because non-violence and satyagraha were indeed classic uses of soft power before the term was even coined’ (Tharoor, 2012, p. 286). Being the world’s largest democracy, with benign foreign policy and one of the world’s oldest civilisations, India recently began to make more active efforts to invest in soft power resources to extend its stronghold in Southeast Asia and beyond.

Based on the cultural aspects of its civilisation, India had been advocating for the idea of Pan-Asian identity, Asianism or Asianness. Leaders of post-independence India, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, put forward this idea, which became the foundation for its relations with Southeast and East Asian countries (Muni & Mishra, 2019). The 1955 Bandung Conference, which was ‘formally known as the Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers’, was held in exemplifying the spirit of the shared ideational linkage in fighting against colonialism and imperialism, and building Asian identity (Acharya, 2012). To this end, India institutionalised external cultural relations with the rest of the world. In 1950, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) was instituted as the ‘soft power’ wing of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Its main objective is to foster and strengthen cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and the world and to promote cultural exchanges with other countries and people. Nehru, being described as ‘a skilled exponent of soft power’, extensively utilised cultural diplomacy in engaging with Southeast and East Asian nations (Tharoor, 2012, p. 286). As a pan-Asian religion, Buddhism became one of the foreign policy instruments of independent India. Nehru supported the revival of Buddhism, which has been professed by the people of these regions, as reflected in his government’s sponsorship of celebrating the historic Buddha Jayanti, or Buddhism 2500, in 1956 and the restoration of the Buddhist sites in various parts of India (Ober, 2019).

Soft Power in India’s AEP: International Image Building

Indian cultural linkages with East and Southeast Asian nations have been the foundation of India’s Look East Policy (LEP), which can be seen as legitimate and having moral authority and therefore has formed a source of soft power. During the post-Cold War period, India’s foreign policy significantly shifted to Southeast Asia with the launch of the LEP under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991. The LEP initially aimed to promote economic cooperation, security and strategic relations with countries in Southeast Asia, and since 2003, it has expanded to include other Asian countries such as Australia, East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Further, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after he came to power in 2014, has transformed the LEP into the AEP, indicating the pivot of the region in India’s foreign policy in an increasingly connected world.

In addition to political, security and economic dimensions, the cultural element has been pivotal in the AEP through bilateral, multilateral and sub-regional engagements with extended neighbours under many crucial frameworks, such as ASEAN and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Established in November 2000, the MGC focuses on four essential areas of cooperation—tourism, culture, education, and transport and communication—between India and five Mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, that share deep historical, cultural and physical connections with the Indian subcontinent.

Under the AEP, India has been active in using soft power mechanisms in international communication in a more systematic way, and its cultural heritage and ancient civilisation have become an indispensable component of soft power diplomacy towards the region. Notably, India has increased its soft power initiatives in the global arena, following the ascension to power of Prime Minister Modi, ‘[who] has missed no opportunity to promote Indian traditions’ (Kugiel, 2017, p. 163). The Modi government has increasingly utilised Buddhist diplomacy to boost cultural ties with Southeast Asian countries. For instance, India sponsors numerous Buddhist conferences, conclaves and events to promote historical and cultural relations between India and Buddhist countries in Southeast Asia and increase Buddhist tourism in the country. More importantly, the Indian government revived ancient Nalanda University in Rajgir, Bihar, designing it an ‘International Institution of National Importance’.

The Modi government has also made an effort to promote the Indian traditional medical system of Ayurveda keeping in view the Indian ancient philosophy of Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam (the world is one family). Since 2016, Ayurveda Day has been celebrated annually in India and abroad, while the annual International Day of Yoga has been celebrated across the world since 2015, following its recognition by the United Nations General Assembly in 2014. Ayurveda and Yoga seemed to receive special attention from New Delhi during the pandemic, as it was the opportunity to promote India’s age-old medical system and wellness to the world.

More importantly, ‘archaeology as soft power’ has gained traction in the context of India’s cultural relations with Southeast Asia—the region packed with several thousands of Hindu-Buddhist temples, which serve as ‘the panorama of the ASEAN–India cultural interface’ (Sahai, 2018). Tangible archaeological objects that bear historical and civilisational connections between states can be classified as a cultural source of soft power. As part of its soft power strategy, India undertakes numerous projects to preserve and restore the ancient temples in the region.

On a basic level, India’s soft power actions in Southeast Asia are about winning the hearts and minds of people through the reflection of past connections and shared cultural values. As India rises to a great power status with a firm belief in strategic autonomy and independent foreign policy, its soft power helps enhance its image as a benign, non-aggressive power. As a result, India is not generally perceived in Southeast Asia as a threat but as an important strategic partner in the region in the face of rising China.

Cambodian Perceptions of India’s International Image

India uses the discourse of historical linkage to build trust and foster diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian nations. Cambodia occupies a special place in Indian cultural and civilisational linkages with the region. Centuries of peaceful coexistence between the two great civilisations have been conducive to a long-lasting relationship between Cambodia and India. It is therefore important to shed light on Cambodian perceptions of India’s international image as a way to determine the latter’s attractiveness.

The reception of India’s soft power diplomacy among the Cambodian political elites has been appealingly enthusiastic. For India, the cultural affinity has ostensibly transformed into its soft power, which can be deployed to attract Cambodians to think positively about India. Indeed, India does not create a feeling of ‘an imperialist past among Cambodians’, and instead, India ‘can claim credit for shaping the Cambodian psyche through Indic philosophy, political ideas, religion, arts and language over a period of two millennia’ (Bhati & Murg, 2018, p. 293). As far as Cambodian nationalism is concerned, it has been noted that the by-product of Indianisation in Cambodia has not been viewed as ‘the produce of a struggle against foreign invaders and advice’, and the borrowed cultural elements from India are merely components of Cambodian social arrangements (Chandler, 2008, pp. 17–18). Hence, there is no reason for alarm, although it is true that they came from India, since both cultural elements were blended and peacefully co-existed.

In modern times, Cambodia and India have enjoyed a warm and cordial relationship. However, their diplomatic ties were ups and downs during the Cold War. Both countries officially established diplomatic relations in May 1952, one year before Cambodia fully became an independent nation. In March 1955, Cambodian Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk paid a 12-day visit to India at the invitation of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, during which Prince Sihanouk endorsed Nehru’s five principles of peaceful coexistence or Pancasila (Nasarenko, 1977; SarDesai, 1968). At this point, he decided to adopt a ‘neutrality’ foreign policy for Cambodia while staying out of the American-led military alliance, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO).

It is interesting to recall that Prince Sihanouk sincerely acknowledged the Indian role in the evolution of Cambodian culture and civilisation. At the inauguration ceremony of the Jawaharlal Nehru Boulevard in Phnom Penh in May 1965, he was quoted as saying that ‘In fact, it was about 2000 years ago that the first navigators, Indian merchants, and Brahmins brought to our ancestors their Gods, their techniques, their organisation’ (Singhal, 1969, pp. 131–132). More importantly, Indian influences extended beyond ancient times. Prince Sihanouk regarded Nehru as ‘my greatest friend’ (Patnaik, 2012). He took the lessons of non-aligned foreign policy from Nehru, and he formulated his own ‘neutrality’ foreign policy during the Cold War, by which he kept his country in peace for about 16 years until his deposition in a coup in March 1970. For this, it appears that he regarded Nehru as his political guru (master). At the reception party held in his honour in Delhi in 1963, Prince Sihanouk openly acknowledged that

For it was by studying his methods and teachings, and by following his sage counsels that I was able to decide upon a course of action which has assured our independence, and national unity, together with peaceful internal conditions and the respect of our sovereignty. (Foreign Affairs Record, 1963)

It is noteworthy that the two leaders had two special bonds with each other. First, they both were the co-founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, aiming to prevent their countries from being dragged into the Cold War ideological polarisation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, the fond link between the two leaders was a Cambodian Buddhist monk, Dharmawara Mahathera, who long resided in India. Commonly known in India as Bhante Dharmawara, he was a spiritual advisor to the Cambodian monarch, and as recent research shows, his life story illuminates the cultural interface of Cambodia’s Cold War relations with India through his association with influential political elites in the two countries (Marston, 2022).

It is noteworthy that there were no major interstate animosities and political tensions in the modern history of India–Cambodia relations, though some constraints could not be ruled out. The 1962 Indo-China war posed some sort of challenge for Prince Sihanouk, as he had to keep a balance between Beijing and New Delhi, the two close friends of Cambodia. With the death of Nehru in May 1964 and at the same time, Cambodia moving closer to China and the communist bloc, India–Cambodia relations became lukewarm and slid towards a more undesirable direction. Moreover, when Prince Sihanouk was deposed by a coup in 1970, India did not recognise the new Phnom Penh government but continued to deal with it on a de facto basis while declining to recognise Sihanouk’s government in exile in Beijing. Thereafter, the extraordinary Nehru–Sihanouk era of Indo-Khmer friendship appeared to be over, and so did Sihanouk’s close relationship with Nehru’s family. Added to that, after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime following Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia, Nehru’s daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, supported the Hanoi-controlled People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime against Sihanouk’s Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

Similarly, Son Sann, Prime Minister of the CGDK, reminded Congress MP Shashi Tharoor in the 1980s about Cambodia as an important link to Indic civilisation. He convincingly said, ‘You Indians have allowed yourselves to forget that there is such a thing as Indic civilisation and we are its last outpost’, but paradoxically, India supported the Vietnamese, who were Sinic during the Cambodian conflict (Tharoor, 2008, p. 37). This instance shows how political and strategic interests surpassed cultural affinity. Subsequently, this problem seemed to have been mitigated by New Delhi’s role in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements (PPA), which brought about a comprehensive political settlement of the decade-long Cambodian conflict. As part of the PPA obligation, India sent over 1,000 army personnel to Cambodia under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) peacekeeping mission (1992–1993).

In short, it is important to mention that besides the cultural and civilisational aspects, the current leadership in Phnom Penh, led by long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen, remains grateful to India for three things. First, India recognised Hun Sen’s PRK regime by opening its embassy in 1981 in Phnom Penh, the first non-communist country to do so. On many occasions, Hun Sen and Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) leaders have never forgotten to recall India’s friendly gesture to Cambodia during the time of its international legitimacy crisis (First Post, 2018). Second, India undertook restoration works at Angkor Wat temple in Siem Reap from 1986 to 1993, enabling the potential of Cambodia’s cultural tourist industries. With US$4 million financed by the MEA, Cambodia was the first country to receive such single-largest assistance from India, which ‘is still appreciated by Cambodia’ (MEA, 2017). Third, as pointed out above, India actively participated in Cambodia’s peace process in the 1990s. Prak Sokhonn, Cambodian Foreign Minister, later appreciatively described India’s association with the PPA as ‘fondly remembered by the Cambodian leadership’ (Prak, 2016).

Likewise, even Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy also expressed a similar view about the historical relationship between India and Cambodia. He recently said in his article that ‘India provided the principal elements of Cambodia’s civilisation, in particular the different religions that have existed in our region for 2,000 years’ (Sam, 2020). Saying so in the article published by the New Delhi-based online media, The Kootneeti, arguably he intended to convey to Indian audiences his general views about India and the support for stronger India–Cambodia ties and called on the possible role of India in the process of democratisation in Cambodia. This is particularly in line with the suggestion that integrating democratic projection into India’s foreign policy is a potential strategy to compete with the Chinese authoritarian, single-party model for forging reliable partnerships with Asian countries (Khanna & Moorthy, 2017).

The positive perception of India can also be seen among Cambodian youth, who often argue for a closer relationship between the two countries, especially in the context of intense geopolitical competition in the region. Considering India’s political support for the PRK regime, which has been in power till date, one Cambodian journalist and commentator argues that Cambodia’s special relationship with India, which ‘developed during the Cold War can expand even further under Modi’s [AEP]’ (Sao, 2018). Similarly, young Cambodian scholars urge that ‘Cambodia must step up to engage India’, given the latter’s inevitable rise in the multipolar world order, to avoid overdependence on China (Vann & Heng, 2020). Thus, Cambodia will be benefiting from foreign policy diversification towards India and mitigating the risk of overreliance on China amid external pressures from the USA and the EU for its poor record of human rights and democratic downturn. In economic diplomacy, Cambodia has a keen interest in forging a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with India, which will offer a vast market for Cambodian export and, as a result, attract foreign direct investment to the kingdom.

This set of positive perceptions of India indicates that different politicians in Cambodia commonly view India as the source of their culture and civilisation. Buddhism is an invaluable gift from India to Cambodia, where about 95% of its population follows the teachings of Buddha. In Cambodian public opinion, India has been well recognised as the birthplace of Buddhism. Originating in India, which is believed to be the Jambudvipa (the island of the Jambu tree) in religious texts of Buddhist countries, Buddhism generates an enormous soft power resource for India. In the post-independence period, India attracted Buddhist countries around the world to establish Buddhist temples and monasteries in various Buddhist sites in the country to represent their respective Buddhist cultures and traditions in the Buddhabhumi or ‘Land of the Buddha’, especially in Bodh Gaya (Bihar), where the Buddha attained his enlightenment over 2,600 years ago. So far, Cambodian Buddhists have established at least 15 monasteries and temples in sacred Buddhist places across India (including one in Nepal). Visiting these places is considered spiritual fulfilment for both international and Cambodian Buddhists. Attending the inauguration of Kushinagar International Airport among diplomats from 12 Asian countries in October 2021, Cambodian Ambassador Ung Sean expressed his excitement to have visited the sacred Buddhist site, saying, ‘I’m here in Kushinagar for the first time. We have a lot of similarities in terms of religion and culture. In Cambodia, Buddhism is the religion of our State… So I’m very glad to be here today’ (First Post, 2021).

The Buddhist faith is based on the principles of loving-kindness, peace and non-violence, and it is a pan-Asian religion. Indian Emperor Asoka was considered the role model for many Buddhist kings and leaders in Southeast Asia who upheld the Buddha’s teachings and observed the Dasavidha-rajadhamma, or ‘tenfold duty of the ruler’. He was the great royal patron of Buddhism in ancient India and was responsible for spreading Buddhism beyond India during the third century BCE. The Buddhist King Jayavarman VII of the twelfth-century Angkorian Empire was the equivalent of King Asoka in Southeast Asia, and ‘under both of them, their states even reached their climax’ (Kulke, 2014, p. 327).

Nonetheless, although there is an absence of anti-India feelings in Cambodia, perhaps except for the Cambodian public and official protests against the Angkor War replica project by the Hindu trust in Bihar (NDTV, 2015), problems about India’s international image in Cambodia today are not entirely non-existent. Cambodia’s unrecorded but observable negative view of India is related to its persistent social issues such as women’s safety, poverty, inequality, communal violence and intolerance, which are often widespread internationally due to Indian free media. Otherwise, India’s cultural and civilisational attributes and its global status as a rising power in international politics are attractive to Cambodians in general and policymakers in particular.

The positive perceptions of India and Cambodia’s shared culture and civilisation are in turn advantageous for New Delhi’s soft power formation in the Southeast Asian country. Indeed, culture is one of the three Cs pillars in India’s AEP (the other two being connectivity and commerce) to advance the engagement with ASEAN member countries, mainly through its North Eastern States bordering Myanmar. Therefore, in the context of the AEP and ASEAN, Cambodia is an important partner and interlocutor. ‘India shares deep cultural [and] historical links with Cambodia, an important partner in our extended neighbourhood’, Prime Minister Modi tweeted after talking with his Cambodian counterpart, Prime Minister Hun Sen (The Tribune, 2020). To this effect, it attracts India to pay more attention to enhancing bilateral relations with Cambodia through narratives of historical and civilisational linkages.

The Modi government has intensified these multipronged initiatives to increase the country’s soft power abroad. In general, India’s efforts to build an international image in Cambodia have mainly been state-driven initiatives, including Hindu-Buddhist archaeological preservation, education and capacity building through scholarship provision and training, cultural events, Indian soap operas and Bollywood movies, the role of the Indian diaspora and Buddhist diplomacy (Bunthorn, 2019). According to the joint statement between India and Cambodia during Prime Minister Hun Sen’s meeting with his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Modi, in New Delhi in 2018, both countries specifically ‘agreed to cooperate further in the areas of archaeology, conservation and museums to revive and reconnect the civilisational and cultural connections between the two countries’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation [MFAIC], 2018). On top of that, India has made ambitious efforts to promote its ancient wisdom and civilisational values, such as Yoga and Ayurveda, in the modern world. The popularity of Yoga is on the rise in Cambodia among youth and celebrities as they start to realise that Yoga is good for their health. As of 2015, there were at least 20–30 Yoga clubs in Phnom Penh and 15 in Siem Reap, an ancient province of Cambodia that emerges as a world Yoga destination (Nhean, 2015).

Moreover, maritime diplomacy has been India’s long-standing way to project itself as a benign power and not a revisionist state in international politics. Maritime diplomacy activities such as port visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions can also constitute soft power outcomes through the use of hard power assets (Le Mière, 2014). One such recent activity was when the Indian Naval Ship (INS) Kiltan arrived at Sihanoukville Port to deliver 15 tonnes of flood relief material to Cambodia as part of Mission Sagar III (ANI, 2021).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccines became the latest form of soft power potential since they created a positive image of the vaccine provider countries in the recipient countries without using coercion, which is in line with the definition of soft power (Nye, 2004). Vaccine diplomacy is another dimension of India’s efforts in generating soft power in Cambodia and beyond. During the near-peak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2021, India provided 100,000 free doses of made-in-India Covishield to Cambodia under the Vaccine Maitri Programme at the request of Prime Minister Hun Sen. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaihshankar called it ‘A civilisational commitment’ (Baibhawi, 2021). In terms of trust perceptions of vaccines, one local journalist observes that the Cambodian general public is more confident in India’s vaccines compared to others, including those developed in China. He opines that ‘In Cambodia, there is far more defiance to Chinesiness than to the Indianess’, although China is one of the largest vaccine suppliers to Cambodia (Sao, 2021). In short, vaccine diplomacy can generate a sense of gratitude on the side of the recipient countries towards the provider countries.

Outcome Limitations

While soft power is the ability of a country to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction without using coercion, it is considered ‘more difficult for governments to wield than hard power’ (Sahai, 2018, p. 241). There are some limitations in India’s soft power outcomes in Cambodia in terms of political influence at the state-to-state level compared to other countries, fundamentally due to India’s lack of economic hard power and Cambodia’s overdependence on one major power and slowness in foreign policy diversification. Although soft power projection has improved India’s international image, at this stage the effect has been somewhat limited in shaping the foreign policy of the ASEAN Member States, including Cambodia, towards India.

Despite strong cultural and historical connections between the two countries, Cambodia has not enjoyed political and economic relations with India at the level that it has enjoyed with other major countries such as China and Japan. Currently, India has established a comprehensive strategic partnership only with Vietnam (2016) and Indonesia (2018) within ASEAN. It signed strategic partnership agreements with more than two dozen countries, including Malaysia, Singapore and ASEAN. Vietnam has become an important pillar in India’s AEP despite the former’s cultural and political affinity with China. Strategic and economic convergences have driven New Delhi and Hanoi into the principal allies in the face of the rise of China and intense geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific.

By contrast, soft power alone does not lead to a strategic partnership between India and Cambodia. As a small and least developed country, Cambodia has limited options in its foreign relations and relies substantially on ASEAN as a gateway to the outside world. Cambodia is a very close ally of China, which has been often noted in Indian media. Phnom Penh raised its relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation with Beijing in 2010, and the two countries signed the ‘Action Plan 2019–2023 on Building China-Cambodia Community of Shared Future’ in 2019 (Bunthorn, 2022b). On the other hand, Cambodia signed a strategic partnership agreement only with Japan in 2013 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2013). But, according to a public opinion poll conducted by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2019, Japan was ‘the most reliable’ country for Cambodia (MOFA, 2020).

On the other hand, as a small country emerging from decades of civil war, Cambodia has limited capacity to implement foreign policy diversification. Securing foreign aid and economic assistance from major powers and development partners has been one of the top priorities in the foreign policy of the Royal Government of Cambodia over the past decades. In the meantime, India may not be in a position to provide the significant economic assistance that Cambodia needs as compared to China. Moreover, Phnom Penh has been seen as overdependent on Beijing, India’s regional adversary, for political and economic backing amid Western pressures due to democratic backsliding in the country (Bunthorn, 2022b). Perhaps, these are the primary reasons hindering the elevation of relations between Phnom Penh and New Delhi to the strategic partnership and the expansion of economic cooperation. As of 2019, India was not among the 10 major trading partner countries of Cambodia. According to Sam (2020), Cambodia’s main opposition leader and former economy and finance minister, ‘Cambodia’s economic relationship with India remains largely unexplored, with trade and investment running at tiny fractions of Chinese levels’. Indeed, China remains Cambodia’s biggest trading partner, with total bilateral trade reaching US$9.43 billion in 2019 (Lee, 2020). Comparatively, Cambodia’s two-way trade with India was just US$250 million in the same year (MEA, 2020). Conversely, due to Beijing’s pursuit of assertive foreign policy and the lack of soft power attraction, ‘Increasing Chinese political influence and presence in Cambodia has sparked anti-Chinese sentiment’ (Wright, 2018).

Moreover, even though India shares deep cultural and civilisational bonds with Cambodia, it has yet to establish ICCR’s cultural centre in Phnom Penh, which could help expand the scope of cultural and educational engagements. So far, as listed on its official website, ICCR has established 37 cultural centres globally, with six of them in the capitals and cities of ASEAN Member States, including Hanoi, Bangkok, Yangon, Kuala Lumpur, Bali and Jakarta (ICCR, 2023).

Nevertheless, Cambodia has reiterated its support for India’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, whilst the proposed reform of this global organisation has repetitively been vetoed by China (MEA, 2017; The Economic Times, 2020). In 2018, both countries endorsed the importance of international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as mechanisms to resolve maritime issues, and they also supported freedom of navigation and overflight (MFAIC, 2018). As far as China’s assertive, if not aggressive, behaviour in the South China Sea is concerned, the endorsement of UNCLOS is significant.

Besides, according to the widely cited report of The Soft Power 30, released by the strategic communications consultancy Portland in 2019, India was not among the top 30 global soft power nations (McClory, 2019). The report, as recognised by Nye, measures soft power by combining objective data from six categories including culture, digital, enterprise, engagement, education, government and public polling. The top five most powerful global nations in terms of soft power were France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and the United States. India was ranked eighth in the top 10 Asia soft power index, just above Indonesia and the Philippines. Meanwhile, Japan was placed the highest on the top 10 Asian soft power list, followed by South Korea, Singapore, China, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia.

Likewise, a noteworthy annual survey, The State of Southeast Asia, conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute based in Singapore, shows the regional perceptions of trust and distrust in India and other major powers among Southeast Asians. According to the 2021 survey report, more than half of the total participants in the survey have either ‘no confidence’ or ‘little confidence’ in India (50.3%) to ‘do the right thing’ to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance, a minor decrease from 53.5% in the 2020 survey (Seah et al., 2021). Besides the high level of doubts (over 60%) towards India to provide global leadership found in Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia, Cambodia has the most significant shift in perceptions towards India. Cambodia’s distrust level decreased from 76.9% in 2020 to 57.7% in 2021, while the trust level rose from 7.7% to 15.3%. On the other hand, respondents from Cambodia (60%) shared the strongest view that ‘India does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership’. However, 50% of them expressed the strongest view that ‘I respect India and admire its civilisation and culture’, the most significant change in perceptions towards India from the bottom in 2020. The survey notes that the regional respondents also have the pessimistic view that ‘India is distracted with its internal and sub-continental affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns and issues’.

Conclusion

By definition, soft power is the ability of a country to attract and persuade other countries to want what it wants without using coercive hard power. Soft power is charming power that is difficult to wield. A country’s good image as perceived by other people and governments has a critical impact on the success of its foreign policy objectives while also affecting its ability to attract international trade, investment and tourists.

Since its inception in the 1990s, soft power has entered common parlance. Despite its initial use in US foreign policy, the concept has gained popularity in Asia, where rising powers, such as China, India and Japan, see the need to project their image as being benign, peaceful and thus attractive in international politics, each with relative success. Cultural soft power is an important instrument in a country’s public diplomacy to achieve national interests. In addition to traditional sources, soft power can be acquired through maritime diplomacy in the area of humanitarian assistance and health/vaccine diplomacy during the pandemic, since these can create a positive image of a country in the recipient countries. India has a long history of utilising cultural soft power in its relations with other states, especially with Southeast Asia, since the two regions share strong bonds of cultures and civilisations. Cultural aspects have been the core elements of India’s soft power diplomacy towards the region under the AEP, operating under the regional frameworks of the ASEAN and the MGC as well as bilateral cooperation.

India has increased its soft power deployment to shape the preferences of other countries through the attraction of its rich cultural heritage. It is believed that India’s global soft power mechanism is more about image building rather than asserting influence on other nations. This benign approach fits squarely in the Cambodian context, considering Phnom Penh’s close ties with China, India’s geostrategic rival. Moreover, the deep-rooted cultural and civilisational linkages between Cambodia and India have shaped Cambodian elites and people to think positively about India through generations without significant political tensions.

The soft power strategy in the AEP has improved India’s image before the international community. To a large extent, India succeeds in building its image as a benign power and projecting the greatness of its ancient civilisation globally, which is one of the primary objectives of New Delhi’s public diplomacy in Cambodia. But in terms of influence, it has a limited effect. With regard to bilateral trade, India’s relations with Cambodia remain far behind many countries. Given the strong religious and cultural affinity and positive perceptions that India’s soft power has generated, India–Cambodia relations deserve deeper political and economic engagement than they are today, though they have enjoyed a very good relationship.

In sum, considering the resource constraints, India has vigorously pursued an economised strategy to leverage a soft power approach to create bonds with Cambodia, which is part of India’s extended neighbourhood, and to enhance its international standing from a regional power to a great power. India is in the right direction by utilising soft power instruments in its foreign policy to win people’s hearts and minds. In the long run, the cultural aspects will remain a cornerstone of India–Cambodia bilateral and multilateral engagements and set a foundation for deepening future cooperation between the two nations. It is worth mentioning that culture is one of the pillars of most interactions today between the two peoples, mainly through the exchange of religious tourists. Thus, the promotion and facilitation of cultural tourism will generate mutual interest and increase citizen interactions whereby the people of the two countries can develop mutual understanding and trust. At the same time, India needs to overcome the trust deficit among ASEAN’s policy elites through effective communication at multi-level engagements. Nevertheless, as India continues to rise on the global stage, it is positive that this will naturally enhance its attractiveness to Cambodian beholders.