Border Region Railway Development in Sino- Indian Geopolitical Competition

Abstract

India and China share about 3,488 km long International Boundary, which has three sectors: Western, Middle and Eastern. The Eastern sector comprises two Northeastern states, that is, Arunachal Pradesh measuring 1,124 kms and Sikkim measuring 219 kms, respectively. Due to recent changes in the geopolitical relationship with China, border management and transport infrastructure development have occupied centre stage. In recent years, the Government of India has taken initiatives to develop railway infrastructure in Northeast India. The study will focus on the role of railway transportation in Sino-Indian geopolitical competition. The study is based on secondary data collected from the office of General Manager, Northeast Frontier Railway, the Census of India and reports of Memorandums of Understanding between India and China. The study reveals that railway infrastructure along the border creates geo-psychological pressures on both countries, influencing the divergent geopolitical relationship between India and China. Railway diplomacy is a tool kit of critical geopolitics which reveals the contours of geopolitical competition in borderlands.

Keywords

Northeast China railways economic security diplomacy

Introduction

Railway diplomacy is a term used to describe the use of railway infrastructure and transportation networks to facilitate diplomatic relations between countries (Pavlicevic & Kratz, 2018). It involves the construction of railways, the development of trade agreements and the promotion of cultural exchanges (Liu & Dunford, 2016). While railway diplomacy has been used for peace-building, economic development and regional integration, the development of railway infrastructure in the border regions of China and India has also become a significant point of geopolitical competition between the two countries (Rahman & Shurong, 2017; Shivamurthy et al., 2022). Both nations have invested heavily in constructing new railway lines to improve transport links and economic opportunities in line with strategic objectives (Qin, 2016; Roy et al., 2022).

China has been particularly active in this regard, constructing several high-speed rail lines that connect its western provinces to India’s eastern states (Liu et al., 2020). This has enabled Chinese companies to access new markets and resources while providing an essential strategic advantage regarding military mobility (Kothari, 2013). India, meanwhile, has also focused on developing its railway network in the border regions (Baruah, 2018). This includes constructing new lines connecting its Northern states to China’s southern provinces (Dave & Kobayashi, 2018). The Indian government has also sought to improve existing infrastructure, such as upgrading existing tracks and increasing capacity on existing routes (Pucher et al., 2004). The development of railway infrastructure in the border regions is likely to continue for some time as both countries seek to gain an edge over one another regarding economic and military power. This competition will significantly impact both countries’ economies and security strategies. Railway diplomacy is crucial in addressing the India–China geopolitical and geo-psychological issues. In the last few years, India initiated railway infrastructure in the Northeast. The socio-economic, political and geographical structure of the Northeast is unique and plays a significant role in local and global geopolitics. Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh directly impact the India–China geopolitical relationship as both states share an international border with China.

The study aims to determine the impact of the India–China geopolitical relations on the railway network development with particular reference to Arunachal and Sikkim. It also looks at the scope of railway development in Northeast India and the possibility of railway diplomacy with neighbouring countries. The study is based on secondary data and information. Information about railway infrastructure has been collected from the Office of the Northeast Frontier Railway (NFR). The NFR serves all Northeastern states, including the Northern part of West Bengal. The article considers reports of the expert groups from the Ministry of External Affairs, Railway Board, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Development of Northeast India. The location of all 344 operational railway stations has been mapped using ArcGIS v.10.8 software. Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim’s Digital Elevation Model (DEM) has also been analysed. The DEM data have been collected from the USGS earth explorer platform.

This study has been conducted in the Eastern sector of the Sino-India International Border, comprising two Northeastern states, that is, Arunachal Pradesh, located in the Shivalik Range of the Himalayas, and Sikkim, with a border length of 1,124 km and 219 km, respectively (Figure 1). The total geographical area of the state is about 83,743 sq. km. Kangto, the highest point in Arunachal Pradesh, is 7,060 m from Mean Sea Level on the border of Tibet, China’s Autonomous Region. The land of Arunachal Pradesh is divided into six natural regions. These include the Western parts of Kameng District, Tirap District, the upper, middle and lower belts and concentrated pockets of Arunachal Pradesh foothills (Balasubramanian, 2013). In Arunachal Pradesh, the Brahmaputra, also known as the Siang, and its tributaries, the Tirap, Lohit, Subansiri and Bhareli, are the most important rivers. The climate in the foothills is subtropical. However, temperatures drop dramatically as the altitude rises in the highlands. The yearly rainfall ranges from 2,000 to 4,000 mm (Dikshit & Dikshit, 2014).

Figure 1.

Source: Prepared by the authors, 2021 (data extracted from Google Earth and SRTM DEM).

Sikkim, the country’s second-smallest state after Goa, is in the Eastern Himalayas with a total geographical area of 7,096 sq. kms. The state is surrounded by Tibet (an Autonomous Region of China), Bhutan, Nepal and West Bengal in the North, East, West and South. Testa, Lachung, Rangeet, Lhonak, Rangpochu, Jaldhaka and Lachen are the major rivers of Sikkim. The rivers run down through the gorge and create a unique topography. The diversity of topographical, locational, climatic conditions, culture and ethnicity of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim have added to their strategic significance (Malik, 2021).

Present Geopolitical Relationship Between India and China

The geopolitical rivalry between India and China explains why India views China’s building of railway infrastructure in the Eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as part of its larger strategy to create geo-psychological pressure against India. Geopolitical competition between India and China is due to the bilateral relationships between India and China in South Asia and the geo-psychological pressures in South-Asian politics.

The China–Pakistan relationship is critical to these positions. In the 1960s, China became a major arms supplier to Pakistan to create geo-psychological pressure on India. Under the 1963 China–Pakistan boundary agreement, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam valley of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China. The Shaksgam valley has a substantial geostrategic significance for China in its control of Central Asia. During the cold war and in the 1990s, China maintained a close relationship with Pakistan, much to India’s dismay.

The start of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion-dollar project forming an integral part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2015 marked the strengthening of ties between China and Pakistan. The CPEC also passes through the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir, which India claimed as an integral part of its territory. Diplomatically, India has consistently opposed the activities of China in the Kashmir region. India has opposed the CPEC project for violating India’s territorial integrity. China may want to maintain close ties with Pakistan to hedge against a hostile United States, Japan and India in an uncertain future (Lal, 2016).

The military clash influenced the present geopolitical relationship between India and China in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley between the Indian and Chinese armies on 15 June 2020 (Gokhale, 2021). The casualty of the military clash at Galwan Valley was the worst military standoff between the two regional powers in 45 years (Rafi, 2020). However, this military clash and the recent tensions between India and China along the LAC must be viewed as a significant geopolitical issue between the two countries. The incident created geo-psychological pressure on China, which considered Ladakh a disputed territory impacting divergent geopolitical relations. On the other hand, in 2019, the Government of India abolished Article 370 of the Indian constitution. As a result, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was bifurcated into the union territory of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

India perceives itself as the dominant South Asian power and sees China as challenging its regional dominance. The investment policies of China and its growing relations with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have created geo- psychological pressure on India. The tension between India and China in South Asia further increases this geo-psychological pressure.

Railway Diplomacy and India–China Geopolitical Relationship

In the contemporary era of International Relations, dominated by ‘hard power’ diplomacy limited to treaties, conventions and arms control, countries who realise the redundancies of the conventional approach to forging diplomatic ties have switched to exploiting the potential of establishing networks of roads and railways to develop relations and stimulate mutual economic gain (Shrivastva, 2018). Railways are crucial in developing transboundary trade facilities and creating positive diplomacy between countries. Railway diplomacy moves beyond countries’ economic interests and facilitates exchanges and greater power over the regions. Railway diplomacy arises from the primary motivation to establish rapport with countries with sufficient technological and financial resources to invest in their partners’ domestic railway infrastructure projects. The larger picture of rail diplomacy indicates a dual purpose, serving as a productive alternative to military approaches. It also amplifies the scope for claiming power over regions through the strategic alignment of railroads in areas of geopolitical and geostrategic importance. Railway diplomacy can be counted as a part of the larger arena of international resource politics. India’s railway diplomacy is more culture-oriented, focusing on the people-to-people exchange, promoting peaceful existence with its neighbours like Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In their article, Chaudhury Basu Ray and Basu (2015) discuss the proposed Agartala–Akhaura rail connectivity to enhance surface connectivity. The Indo-Bangladesh connectivity is part of the Trans-Asian Rail Connectivity expanding further into Myanmar from Manipur. The Agartala–Akhaura will help improve multimodal links to critical points in Bangladesh and Northeast India. India has requested Bangladesh to permit movement through the proposed route, helping reduce the distance to be covered. The project is being executed at USD 35 million, partly funded by the union government and partly by the Northeastern region and mainly by the Ministry of External Affairs. The other significant development has been constructing the road-cum-rail bridge on the Jamuna River.

With the growing cooperation in the railway sector, Bangladesh and India are heading towards a more robust infrastructure setup but an ever-increasing connectivity scale between the developing economies. The two countries have recently actively traded assets such as locomotives and rolling stock. Amidst the pandemic, the two countries flagged off 10 locomotives in a handing-over ceremony. The political perspectives from the point of railway diplomacy involve the institutional framework at the regional organisation level with the involvement of The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation and International Forums such as the International Union of Railways and the International Transport Forum.

From the perspective of improving connectivity, the members in the 14th Summit held at New Delhi in 2007, as per Para 4 of the declaration, agreed to improve intra-regional connectivity, realising the importance of enhancing the connectivity of the member countries (Patil et al., 2019). The Chinese interests in railway expansion go beyond its economic interests. China’s approach to railway expansion also signifies its geopolitical objectives and control over territories through which its rail lines would pass. As part of the initiative, two Chinese connectivity projects are being actively pursued, which include an ‘economic belt’ along the historical Silk Road in Eurasia and a twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road aimed at strengthening the cooperation between China and the Southeast Asian Nations. A massive investment by the Chinese in various sectors characterises the BRI. Railways form an important sector of investment under the BRI. The 2017 Doklam conflict and the recent Galwan clash have made India apprehensive of China’s connectivity project, given the volatile political situation in the Northeast, some of which borders China.

India’s neighbour Nepal has been optimistic about the BRI as it would help the buffer state reduce its dependence on India. Nepal was the first country to join the initiative after its announcement in 2015 and officially signed in 2017. Nepal and China have adopted a two-pronged approach to the project encompassing connectivity and infrastructure. The most important is the Trans Himalayan Economic Corridor, proposing direct connectivity between Kathmandu and Beijing through rail and road. One of the proposed rail routes under the project is the Kyirong–Kathmandu railroad, with a total investment of USD 2.15 billion. The start of a rail and road route through Nepal would facilitate Nepal’s establishment as a ‘transit economy’ or the Southern conduit for trade between China and South Asia. The BRI will also boost border trade and tourism between the Tibetan Autonomous Region and neighbouring countries like Nepal.

China has succeeded mainly in its railway diplomacy owing to its technical and financial power. Chinese railway diplomacy is driven by the need to export high-speed rail technology to Southeast Asia to forge better ties with Southeast Asia (Ieong, 2014). Given its ambitious high-speed rail network, China has proactively pushed its high-speed rail (HSR) technology across Southeast Asian nations.

The response to the project is determined by two factors: the legitimisation of domestic rule by political elites and the distribution of political power across the ruling class and different segments of society. An example of this was the Indonesian election of 2019.

Indonesian President Jokowi emphasised infrastructure development, ultimately emerging victorious. However, despite the favourable political standing, the HSR has yet to progress in Indonesia. Apart from Indonesia, Laos has been highly receptive to China’s HSR diplomacy, becoming the first Chinese HSR project to complete the three stages of initiation–negotiation–implementation with the construction ongoing since 2016. By mid-2018, about 40% of the first phase was completed, with the entire 414 km long rail project opened on 3 December 2022 (Lampton et al., 2020).

The project’s total cost is USD 7 billion and will connect Southeast Asia to the HSR system via Yuxi–Mohan line. Once completed, the line would play a crucial role in regional integration, given Laos’s strategic location, centrally positioned among giant economies and as a gateway connecting China with the 10-member ASEAN regional bloc. China plans to extend the Qinghai–Tibet Railway route to Rasuwagadhi, located on the Tibet–Nepal Border. This will facilitate the quick mobilisation of resources to remote Tibetan areas and boost tourism to Shigatse’s monastery town near the Nepal border (Bose, 2018).

Impact of India–China Railway Diplomacy in Northeast India

Haokip (2011) has discussed the physical isolation of the Northeastern region from the rest of India, with the connectivity between the two made possible only through a 27 km landmass known as the ‘Siliguri Corridor’ or the ‘Chicken Neck corridor’ which was also the escalation point during the 2014 Doklam standoff (Debroy et al., 2017; Haokip, 2011). The Siliguri corridor also connects the eight Northeastern states of Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and Manipur with the Indian mainland (Kukreja, 2016). The corridor poses a serious defence challenge for India because the Chinese military might seize the Siliguri corridor during a conflict, cutting off West Bengal and the Northeastern states from the Indian mainland. China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh pose a severe defence problem for India when defending the Siliguri corridor. China’s rapid infrastructure building activities on its side of the border involving road, airstrip and railway construction constantly threaten the Siliguri corridor. The infrastructure could help China rapidly mobilise its regional military forces.

Northeastern India is a culturally homogenous region of Mongloid races. The area is characterised by ethnic, cultural, religious, social and economic diversity (Borgohain, 2021). The region is known for its proximity to Myanmar (Roy & Mitra, 2020). Since the colonial period, the area has been rich in natural resources and actively engaged in trans-border trade with the neighbouring countries (Pommaret, 1999). Abundant in tea plantations and other valuable resources such as timber, coal and petroleum and a suitable venue for producing and exporting tea, the Northeastern region has been of immense significance to the erstwhile colonial regime. However, it remained isolated from the Indian mainland owing to the swampy terrains and crisscrossing of the rivers (Roy & Mitra, 2021). In the beginning, exploration of the resources from Assam Province was associated with the ‘Treaty of Yandaboo’, signed between the British and the king of Myanmar on 24 February 1826 (Saikia, 2010). The region is a natural mineral, forest, water and plant resource storehouse encouraging the British to explore the area (Pandey, 2008). The main goal of railway development in British India was exporting raw materials like cotton, jute and other agrarian products to support Britain’s industrial development and to rule India smoothly (Figure 2) (Bogart & Chaudhary, 2012).

Figure 2.

Source: Prepared by the authors, 2021 (extracted from Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909).

Until the 1830s, travellers travelling to the port of Calcutta had to cross Brahmaputra, Ganges and its distributary Hooghly with the trip taking around four months to complete (Debroy et al., 2017). This difficulty led to hindrances in trade and communication, driving the need for a railway line with the first-metre gauge line proposed between Dibrugarh and Sadiya by a tea plantation owner and surgeon, Dr John Berry in 1881, forming the Assam Railways and Trading Company. Close to 5,872 workers and 100 European overseers worked on the first line. By 1882, the Mohonamukh Ghat near Dibrugarh was connected to Dinjan Town near Tinsukia, with the 124 km long section between Dibrugarh–Sadiya Railway in Lakhimpur completed and opened for traffic. Given its commercial and strategic advantages, the government pushed for further construction of lines to improve connectivity between the Northeast and the rest of British India with the incorporation of the Assam Bengal Railway in 1892 and the construction of the 486 km long line between Chittagong and Badarpur, which was completed in 1899. By 1903, the connection between the Northeast to the rest of India was completed.

Strategic Importance of Railways in Northeast India

The partition of India in 1947, which resulted in the carving out of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), had severe economic consequences for the Northeast region. Before 1947, various sectors of the Northeast region, such as agriculture, horticulture and mines, had a market for their products in East Bengal and West Bengal and beyond.

After India’s independence, the Northeast region remained underdeveloped in railway infrastructure for many years. For several years, the railway infrastructure in India’s Northeast states was neglected for several reasons. The Northeastern states have strategic significance due to their sharing proportion of international boundaries with neighbouring countries (Debnath et al., 2022). However, in 1947 East Bengal became a part of Pakistan, resulting in the loss of this market, affecting people’s livelihoods along the eastern border of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh).

The Northeast is also significant for India’s defence strategy because of its connectivity. However, in recent years as part of the Act East policy, the Indian government has expanded the railway network in the Northeast region, with the Indian railways pursuing a plan to connect all state capitals in the Northeast region to the rail network. The Northeast region’s rail network is currently 2,599 km long, and 11 new projects will add another 879 km of the railway line. Assam and Tripura are the states with the maximum railway connectivity in the Northeast. Due to its strategic location with China, there is a need to improve railway connectivity in Arunachal and Sikkim and the Northeast region.

In contrast, bordering China, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are the most underdeveloped in railway connectivity. The Ministry of Railways, Government of India, decided to expand railway connectivity between Murkongselek railway station (27°49’44.85 “N and 95°13’7.72” E), situated in Dhemaji district of upper Assam and Pasighat (28° 3’47.43” N and 95°19’26.11 “E), the headquarter of East Siang district in Arunachal Pradesh. The 26.15 km long Murkongselek to Pasighat railway project was halted due to land compensation issues (Nag, 2021).

The fast-tracking of Indian railway networks in the Northeast, especially in border states like Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, is extremely important for India in border defence against China. Between 2014 and 2017, 970 km of railway lines were converted into a broad-gauge network in Northeast India.

Except for Sikkim, all states in Northeast India have been connected by Indian railways. It is also expected to connect Sikkim by Indian Railways in the coming years. China is constructing two new rail lines, improving the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capability to deploy its troops along the border rapidly. The first railway line which has implications for India’s defence is the 434 km Lhasa–Nyingchi rail line which runs close to Arunachal Pradesh and links the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, with Nyingchi, a town opposite India’s Tuting sector, in the Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh.

This railway line has military significance as the PLA’s 52nd and 53rd Mountain Infantry Brigades and Nyingchi are 25 miles from Arunachal Pradesh’s border (Jakhar, 2020). The construction of the Lhasa–Nyingchi rail line began in 2015, and the track laying for this railway line was completed in December 2020 for USD 4.8 billion. Amidst the current India–China border standoff, China opened the Lhasa–Nyingchi rail line on 25 June 2021.

Recently, the Government of India approved three railway projects in Arunachal Pradesh. These projects include the 377 km long Bhalukpong–Tawang railway line, the 245 km long North Lakhimpur–Silapathar railway line and the 227 km long Pasighat–Rupai railway line, respectively (Bisht, 2021). Meanwhile, China also completed the 253 km Lhasa–Xigaze railway line linking Tibet’s capital Lhasa with Xigaze, the second-largest city in Tibet, at USD 2.16 billion. This railway line has military significance as it runs close to the Indian border near Sikkim, enabling the Chinese PLA to rapidly deploy its troops near the Indian border with Sikkim (Gupta, 2021).

There is a need to expedite the construction of the railway lines in the Northeast, especially, in border states like Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. Not doing so would give China significant military advantages due to its rapidly evolving railway network in areas bordering Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. The upgradation of railway networks in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim would enhance India’s border security vis-à-vis China and enhance India’s railway diplomacy, given the strategic inroads China has made into India’s neighbourhood using railways as a tool of diplomacy. One such example is China’s plan to build a railway link connecting the vital oil and gas port of Kyaukphyu in Myanmar with China’s Yunnan province. This proposed railway link will transport oil and gas from Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s Indian Ocean coast to China’s Yunnan province.

It has been observed that among the total of 3,789 km railway track length in the Northeastern states, 3,450 km (91.05%) is in Assam, and the remaining 339 km (8.95%) is extended among the six states, excluding Sikkim (0 km). Similar observations were made for other variables (i.e., the number of railway stations). It has been reported that 344 stations are in the Northeastern states, with 305 (88.66%) in Assam and 39 in the other six Northeastern states (with none in Sikkim). In addition, the infrastructure in the remaining four Northeastern states—Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Sikkim—was subpar. Tripura, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh were deemed to have comparable good infrastructure.

This is reflective that Northeast India’s railway infrastructure is distributed unevenly among the states. Assam’s excellent infrastructure may have an advantage due to its strategic location. Assam acts as the entryway to the states of the Northeast. The categorisation of their railway stations reflects the dearth of well-developed transportation hubs in the remaining Northeast Indian states (Roy et al., 2022)

Future Scope of Railway Development in Northeast India

As of 2010, the total route km in the Northeast stood at 2,451 km. China’s growing penetration through its aggressive railway diplomacy has threatened India’s internal security, prompting the government to focus on infrastructure development in the Northeast, with railways being the focal point. The Government of India has been committed to developing the railways in the Northeast (Roy et al., 2022). The Ministry of Railways has committed USD 1.5 billion to expand the railway network in the Northeast. Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Tripura have been brought on the railway map.

Over and above this, a few more railway projects introduced by the Government of India include the Jiribam–Imphal–Manipur section (110.625 km), Dimapur–Kohima–Nagaland section (82.30 km), Dimapur–Tizit–Nagaland section (257 km), Bhairagi–Sairang (51.38), Tetelia–Byrnihat–Meghalaya section (21.50 km) and Byrnihat–Shillong–Meghalaya section (108 km), respectively. The three proposed strategic railway projects, namely Bhalukpong–Tenga–Tawang (378 km), North Lakhimpur–Bame–Aalo–Silapathar (247.85 km), Pasighat–Tezu–Parsuram Kund–Rupai (227 km) and Sevoke/Sivok–Rangpo (44.96 km) have immense geostrategic value. The rail links will pass through the steep terrains of the Kanchenjunga mountain range foothills and the Teesta River valley. The projects are facing indefinite delays in implementation due to the physiographic structure and environmental issues.

In recent years, there has been a growth in investments for the Northeast region’s rail connectivity, with USD 5.9 billion allocated for expanding the regional railway network. At the domestic level, tourist attractions such as wildlife sanctuaries, adventure and eco-tourism, hill stations and lakes act as important determinants for expanding railways.

The large production of rice, maise, millet, sugarcane, jute, cotton, rubber, tea, mustard and grapes also needs market access (Barthakur, 2015). The railway connectivity in the strategic areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, like Tawang–Tuting, Kibithoo and Nathula in the Eastern sector of the China border, will become India’s geoeconomic and geostrategic centre with the execution of these projects.

Environmental Challenges

India and China are two of the world’s most populous countries, and both face unique environmental challenges when developing railway transport systems (Suzuki et al., 2015). In India, the challenge lies in that much of the country is rural, with limited access to electricity and other resources needed for railway development (Chakraborty & Dutta, 2022). Additionally, India’s climate is highly variable, making maintaining a reliable railway system challenging.

In China, the challenge is more related to air pollution caused by burning coal for energy. This has led to increased respiratory illnesses among citizens living near railway lines and an overall decrease in air quality (Liu et al., 2022). Additionally, China’s rapid economic growth has increased demand for railway transportation, leading to overcrowding on existing lines and further exacerbating air pollution issues (The World Bank, 2014). India and China must address these environmental challenges to develop their railway transport systems successfully. Solutions may include investing in renewable energy sources such as solar or wind power, implementing stricter regulations on air pollution, and increasing investment in public transportation infrastructure (Eboli & Mazzulla, 2021).

Conclusion

India perceives China as using the undemarcated LAC to exert geo-psychological pressure on India through frequent military incursions. India also perceives China as encircling India in its neighbourhood by forging close relations with Pakistan and India’s other neighbours, such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, through its investment policies. Hence, China’s railway projects along the LAC are another form of geo-psychological pressure as improved railway infrastructure in the border areas gives the Chinese PLA an advantage in terms of rapid deployment of troops in any military conflict with India. In response to this, India has focused in recent years on improving its railway connectivity in the Eastern sector of the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim

Northeast India has enormous strategic significance for India as the entire region shares international boundaries with China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan. China’s ambitious plan to link the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, with Nyingchi, located opposite India’s Tuting sector in the Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh, is also a contributing factor to India’s fast-growing railway network in the Northeast. Arunachal Pradesh has been a region vulnerable to possible Chinese intrusion and territorial disputes between the two nations.

Despite the physiographic hindrances, the Government of India has expanded the strategic railway network in the Northeastern region. The government has provided an impetus for the execution of three railway projects in Arunachal Pradesh. The project includes the 377 km long Bhalukpong–Tawang railway line, the 248 km North Lakhimpur–Silapathar railway and the 227 km long Pasighat–Rupai railway line to strengthen the strategic value of the region. Further, the Bogibeel Bridge has helped check China’s attempts to annex Arunachal Pradesh and improve access to strategically vulnerable areas. Consequently, from an economic, geopolitical and security perspective, China’s growing aggression has been a critical factor in developing railways in the Northeast.

India’s railway diplomacy has been crucial in challenging China’s claims. The geostrategic location of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim is a significant contributor to the geopolitical and geo-psychological relationship between India and China. Gauge conversion and ongoing railway projects in the Northeast, especially in Arunachal and Sikkim, emphasise the geopolitical value of Northeast India and create significant geo-psychological pressure on China. The region serves as a buffer between India and China, making it difficult for either country to gain an advantage. This tension has led to increased military presence in the area and has caused both countries to take steps to protect their regional interests.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr Saptarshi Mitra, Assistant Professor, Regional Planning and Urban & Rural Development Laboratory (RPURDL), Department of Geography and Disaster Management, Tripura University, for his technical advice. The authors would also like to thank Dr Tanupriya, Assistant Professor, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR and Mr Debasish Acharjee, Research Scholar, Department of English, Tripura University, for providing inputs on language enhancement and two anonymous reviewers for their critical review and valuable suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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