Abstract
In the new millennium, China has emerged as the second largest economy and as a challenger/contender to the US global pre-eminence/hegemony. Consequently, tomes of literature have been written on China’s rise and its relative decline, China’s core interests and factors affecting its foreign policy, US–China rivalry/competition, China’s relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific and other parts of the world, China’s economic statecraft and economic diplomacy, and China’s energy diplomacy. This book not only focuses on China’s energy diplomacy but also covers different aspects of China’s foreign policy and relations with states across the globe.
The main hypothesis of the book is that China’s energy diplomacy is an important tool of China’s foreign policy and its energy diplomacy has implications for China both at the domestic and international level. The author correctly asserts that energy diplomacy is a necessary tool for China to enhance its energy security. The primary aim of the book is to identify the key facets of Beijing’s energy diplomacy and determine China’s actions as an energy investor and its place in the comity of nations. The author also argues that because China lacks a Ministry of Energy (but does not explain why this is the case), its energy diplomacy and quest for energy security are guided by its strategic interests and economic and political motives. The book employs China’s energy diplomacy as the independent or the explanatory variable, China’s energy investments as the intervening variable and the implications of these as the dependent variable or outcome which needs to be studied (see the ‘Introduction’ and Chapter 1). However, the author never explains in the book why it is important to use the intervening variable, what is novel about the intervening variable and how is this book different from tomes of literature on China’s energy diplomacy and its relations with energy/fossil fuel-rich states?
The introduction to the book covers various aspects of China’s energy diplomacy and energy security and also discusses different theoretical perspectives regarding China’s energy diplomacy and its economic engagement with energy-rich countries (discussed in more detail in Chapter 1). But the author has not employed international relations (IR) theory or framework or concept to discuss China’s energy diplomacy and energy security, which raises the question: Why discuss different theoretical perspectives regarding China’s energy diplomacy? It would have been better and maybe the author would have been able to contribute to the existing literature by integrating the three variables (see above) with a theory, framework or concept.
The author chooses Russia (Chapter 2) and Australia (Chapter 3) as case studies to compare and contrast China’s economic, political and diplomatic relations/engagement with these countries and highlights Beijing’s energy diplomacy to achieve its energy security. The rationale for the case studies is that Russia–China enjoy cordial bilateral relations and have a comprehensive strategic partnership. Additionally, both are developing countries. Australia on the other hand is a US ally and a developed country which the author refers to as ‘enemy’s friend’. However, on page 15, the author states that Australia is ‘a new-found “ally”’.
The case selection is problematic. The author should have discussed and employed Mills’ case selection method: Method of Agreement (MoA) and Method of Difference (MoD). In MoA, there are overall similarities in the two cases and a crucial difference. In MoD, the two cases are different in all respects except for a crucial similarity. Based on Mills’ case selection method, Russia and Australia can be compared because one is a US ally and the other is not. Thus, China’s relations with both countries are different. Also, Australia is more developed than Russia (but Russia is not a developing country, it is ranked higher than China in the Human Development Index). However, the energy mix of the two case studies employed is different. In Russia’s case, China’s focus is on oil and gas although it also imports coal from Russia. Regarding Australia, Beijing is more focused on importing coal and clean/renewable energy sources/technology. Thus, the cases do not match based on MoA and MoD. If Australia was not a US ally (and/or a developing country), the cases could have been compared by employing MoA because of the difference in energy mix.
Another major problem regarding research methods is the time period. On page 16, the author states ‘The period covered is from the year China announced its “Go Out” policy in 2000 till the present times’. The time period of research cannot be open-ended. It should be fixed and close-ended. This has created numerous problems. For instance, as mentioned above, the author states that Australia is ‘a new-found “ally”’ but the bilateral relationship is in a downward spiral especially after the COVID-19 outbreak with Canberra demanding an independent investigation regarding the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. If the time period had been closed, this problem could have been avoided. Moreover, important aspects of China’s bilateral ties with Russia, Australia, the United States and other countries have not been discussed, and there is no uniformity of the time period in discussing bilateral ties with different countries. For instance, China–Australia ties are covered till November 2020 and COVID-19 is discussed (see p. 168) but there is no mention of US–China trade war under Trump or the deterioration of US–China relations after the COVID-19 outbreak. Similarly, in Chapter 1, the US$400 billion deal signed between China and Iran in 2021 is not discussed.
Additionally, there are numerous errors and omissions in different chapters both with respect to bilateral ties with different countries and also pertaining to China’s energy diplomacy and energy security. In Chapter 1, the author discusses the definition of energy diplomacy from a Western perspective (pp. 27–28) but not from the Chinese perspective. Hence, one does not know the difference between the Chinese and Western definitions of energy diplomacy. The author also fails to discuss the rationale for joint ventures by Chinese oil companies with foreign/international oil companies. The rationale is to get access to the latest technology, especially in the upstream sector. The Angola model coined by the World Bank or the oil for the infrastructure model is not mentioned in the discussion on China–Africa energy relations. The author also fails to mention that Chinese oil companies (like their Indian counterparts) are driven by profit motive and sell their overseas oil on the spot market rather than bringing it back to the home country. Verma (2017) has discussed this in substantial detail. There is no mention that China has been blamed for neo-colonisation in Africa and Latin America.
The book has one strength, which is the significant use of Chinese sources. However, this strength is also a weakness. By relying/focusing on Chinese sources, important non-Chinese sources have not been discussed. Thus, there is a lack of engagement with important scholarly literature pertaining to China’s energy diplomacy and energy security. For instance, there is no data from the International Energy Agency regarding energy projections or imports from different countries. Hence, the author has failed to provide a thick description in Chapters 2 and 3, which is necessary for case studies to develop cause and effect relationships.
This omission has also led to numerous errors. For instance, on page 58, the author writes ‘China was already a miracle and strategically China gained brownie points in terms of easy access to natural resources and on easy terms and conditions’. This is incorrect because most of the lucrative and best oil assets in Africa, Lain America, Europe and other parts of the world are in the control of the Western oil companies. China is a latecomer and has to pay astronomical prices in bidding for oil assets. On page 82, the author writes ‘Also, another development has been the state’s shift of emphasis from state-owned enterprises to privately owned enterprises, which shows that the state now wants companies to be responsible for their investment and not treat the public exchequer as a “bailout package” mechanism’. The oil industry in China is dominated by state-owned enterprises, and the government has provided only lip service to allow the private sector to increase its role in the oil sector. The private sector oil companies in China face numerous hurdles and are treated unfairly relative to the state oil companies (Verma, 2017). The author has also used Chinese sources for the Western IR theory leading to numerous errors. For instance, the author has cited Wang and Wan (2013) to discuss balance of power, balance of threat and balance of interest with incorrect explanations of the three theories.
There are also other numerous errors. For instance, page 200 states there are nine members in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) but since 2013, there are seven members in the PSC. Similarly, the author writes that China and Australia are neighbours but Australia is circa 4,000 kilometres away from China, which is the distance between Poland and China or Germany and Afghanistan.
The book also suffers from numerous grammar, syntax and copy-editing errors. Complete names of countries have not been provided in various places. For instance, the Soviet instead of the Soviet Union.
Overall, the book provides a good grasp on the nitty-gritty of oil, gas and coal deals that China has struck (or not struck) with Russia and Australia, but it leaves a lot to be desired in other areas. The book lacks a coherent structure and flow and is not an engaging read.