China’s Techno-Politics: The Impact on Belt and Road Partners

Abstract

The impact of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) on countries signing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a less explored area. This article argues that the repercussions of unregulated propagation of DSR on BRI countries are likely to go beyond economy and commerce because of the vastly different approach of China’s use of technology in its own governance. Since this aspect is inadequately covered in existing literature, an attempt is made to fill the gap. When external entities are allowed to setup large-scale digital networks, e-governance and e-commerce in technologically deficient countries of the Global South, the host country loses control over its digital data that such networks generate. Overdependence on technology of one nation can lead to a data monopoly with a potential impact on the entire polity. To what extent this hypothesis holds substance is the issue deliberated on in this article using inductive reasoning and qualitative methods.

Keywords

Digital Silk Road Belt and Road Initiative data sovereignty CCDM BRI DSR

Introduction

As China’s economic and political clout expanded in the twenty-first century, it manifested itself in multiple ways. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was one of them, which was introduced in 2013 by Mr Xi Jinping as a series of infrastructure and intercontinental connectivity projects. It took a digital turn in 2015 when the concept of the Digital Silk Road (DSR) emerged out of it (Robert Greene, 2020, pp. 1–2). The thrust of China’s overseas activities diversified thereafter from exporting merely hard-core infrastructure like rail, road, power and ports to the export of equipment related to information and communication technology. Activity related to laying fibre optic cables, satellite-based connectivity, e-commerce and setting up smart cities in BRI countries became essential components of BRI. However, this aspect has so far been ‘undervalued or even overlooked in the existing literature’ (Shen, 2018, pp. 2683–2711). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), USA, also acknowledged in 2021 that ‘DSR has received little attention compared to the BRI, and it has not been examined as broadly or as deeply as its parent initiative’. Gordan David further says that ‘The Digital Silk Road has been poorly understood both as a government initiative and a commercial endeavour’ (Gordon, 2021, pp. 1–14).

Though the overseas expansion of China’s digital technology and e-commerce appears logical, considering the existence of a vast difference in the Chinese approach to the use of technology in governance, it is argued that the impact of the unrestrained propagation of Chinese digital technology is likely to go beyond trade and commerce in technology-deficient BRI countries of the Global South. Keeping the above in mind, DSR in this article is not treated purely as a techno-commercial venture but as a techno-political strategy of China, and its potential is analysed in its socio-political dimensions. Techno-politics is a marriage between technological developments and political purposes. When political actors embrace new technologies to achieve political ends, techno-political strategies emerge (Kurban et al., 2017, pp. 3–20). Concerns about cyber security, data privacy and digital sovereignty vis-a-vis China have been raised frequently by many European and Asian scholars (Dekker et al., 2020, p. 4; Erie, 2021, pp. 1–91; Ghiasy & Krishnamurthy, 2020, p. 17). While Brigitte Dekker has studied DSR from the European perspective, covering areas such as digital sovereignty, individual privacy, the complexity of data-driven society and its misuse and so on, others have highlighted how China’s DSR constitute a challenge to the global digital ecosystem created and maintained by the West and how the conceptual foundations and the so-called value system upheld by the West are under strain by the arrival of Chinese digital technologies with a different philosophy. The issue of citizen surveillance in weak democracies in Africa using Chinese technology has also been investigated (Baggott Carter, 2022, pp. 1–20; Lugt, 2021, pp. 315–343). Considering these reports are inconclusive, more studies are needed to clarify. This article examines the tenability of the hypothesis about the adverse impact of DSR on BRI partners. Therefore, the question investigated is whether the Chinese DSR has the potential to impact the polity and sovereignty of BRI countries; if so, what are the possible implications, and how can it be overcome? To assess the impact factor, five main components of the DSR, namely big data, artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain technology, financial technology (FinTech) and smart cities, are examined to understand how their unrestrained propagation can impact domestic polity and infringe on the sovereignty of the BRI partners.

Limitation

The conclusions of this article are limited by the fact that DSR is still an evolving process, and the authors have tried to derive its potential influence through inductive reasoning following qualitative methods. Though information from both primary and secondary sources is relied upon, it cannot be treated as final or conclusive in nature.

Digital Technology

The term digital technology denotes an ecosystem that combines the power of computation, information and communication as one integrated process. It has enabled the migration of the entire gamut of human activity from physical space to cyberspace. It precludes physical contact by allowing many actors in various parts of the world to act in sync for common objectives. These technologies comprise techniques, systems, equipment, skills and resources to collect, store, process and transfer digital data and information electronically. Social media, multimedia and mobile phones are just a few popular applications. However, AI, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), blockchains, Internet of Things (IoT), Robotics, 3D printing, drones, facial recognition and other advanced modes of sensors, imaging, graphics, surveillance and biometric identity are all integral parts of the digital ecosystem. In a digital environment, a massive volume of information can be collected in real time from multiple sources without human interference. Such data can be condensed and stored on compact storage devices and moved electronically from one part to another part of the world seamlessly in real-time. The advantage of digitisation lies in its ability to handle, analyse and transmit unlimited data on a wireless global network. Digital technology has completely changed how people live, interact and work (Cortada, 2013, pp. 229–261; Milner, 2019, pp. 7–21). This technology is disruptive because it provides intrusive ways in which individual and national data can be mined and manipulated from within the unprotected digitised environment. Due to this, grave concerns arise about privacy, freedom, surveillance and data misuse by authoritarian regimes and extraterritorial agencies in weak democracies (Baggott Carter, 2022, pp. 1–20; Lugt, 2021, pp. 315–343 ). Fully digitised, open democratic societies are the most vulnerable to hostile grey zone (RAND, 2022, pp. 1–8) activities.¹

China’s Digital Silk Road

The blueprint for creating the ‘Information Silk Road’ was issued by the National Development and Reform Commission of China in 2015, which included laying the extensive bilateral, transcontinental land, submarine and satellite cable networks. In 2016, the State Council released the ‘13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization’, enabling domestic IT companies to participate in this plan (State Council, 2016). This action mitigated industrial overcapacity, facilitated corporate China’s global expansion, supported Renminbi’s internationalisation, constructed a China-centred transnational IT network infrastructure and promoted an internet-enabled ‘inclusive globalisation’ (Shen, 2018, pp. 2683–2711).²

By 2015, China’s e-commerce and software industries and digital technologies had matured and were ready to spread globally. China had 450 million mobile internet users in 2010 (Wright, 2011). The growth of digitisation in China was such that by 2019, out of 1.39 billion Chinese citizens, 854 million had started using the internet in China. A total of 99% of them accessed the internet through their mobile devices (State Council, 2016; Yingwei, 2019). According to Statista Digital Market Outlook, internet users in China reached 1,031.95 million in 2021, growing to more than two trillion USD in the e-commerce industry (Statista, 2021a). Global Data’s forecast puts this figure at $2.3 trillion (GlobalData, 2022).

Driven by such staggering domestic growth, capitalising on overseas e- commerce opportunities made great sense for China. To make that possible, China decided to make laying cross-border optical fibre cables (OFC) a priority area of DSR (Concept, 2017, pp. 18–23). To further boost the supply side of the process, Premier Li Keqiang announced the policy of ‘Made in China 2025’ (Keqiang, 2015) and the ‘Internet Plus policy’ in the same year (Keqiang, 2015) to establish China as a global leader in high-tech manufacturing and distribution. Along with it came the publication of China Standards 2035 (Matt Sheean, 2021, pp. 1–4), which charted out a 15-year blueprint for global digital expansion (He, 2022, pp. 1–23). The overall aim of the above measures is to create a China-centric transnational IT infrastructure and IT supply chain conforming to Chinese standards to promote cyber globalisation that leans on China (Shen, 2018, pp. 2683–2711). China’s digital technology market is worth 6.1 trillion US dollars in business today, that is, 38.6% of China’s GDP (Xinhua, 2021).

Therefore, it was not unnatural for China to encourage BRI countries to adopt Chinese digital technology for further expansion. During the meeting of the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in 2017, Mr Xi declared that China would

pursue innovation-driven development and intensify cooperation in frontier areas such as digital economy, AI, nanotechnology and quantum computing, and advance the development of big data, cloud computing and smart cities to turn them into a Digital Silk Road of the 21st Century. (Jinping, 2017)

The above goals were reiterated during the 20th Party Congress by Mr Xi Jinping in October 2022—

We will accelerate the development of the digital economy, further integrate it with the real economy, and build internationally competitive digital industry clusters. We will build a modern infrastructure system with a better layout and structure, more effective functions, and greater system integration. (Jinping, 2022)

Important Components of Digital Silk Road

Big Data

Data is the new oil (Rotella, 2012). As oil drove the growth of the global economy during the twentieth century, in much the same manner, data is poised to fuel the digital economy of the twenty-first century. Those who own the data will control the market (Girard, 2019, pp. 1–9). In a digital economy, tech companies, governments and institutions collect this data through routine operations.³

As the prime agencies setting up digital infrastructure in the technologically deficient Global South, Chinese tech companies can easily acquire enormous amounts of data about the people, societies and polities of their host BRI partners. Armed with such critical data, the Chinese Government can acquire the ability to influence the political elite of the host country. Access to this data, if acquired purposefully and institutionally, for which the silent backend technology and experience already exist in China, can give the Chinese state undue advantages in the overseas market and their polity (Tin Hinane El Kadi, n.d.).

Data mining is a practice rampant among Western tech companies too. However, if the control of such data passes into the hands of a foreign government for political and strategic reasons in an institutional manner, it becomes problematic. In the case of DSR, under which comprehensive digitisation of the BRI market and governance is envisioned, such possibilities are implicit in their policy document for the BRI (Vision, 2015). Therefore, the possibility of using such data to realise the overall objective of integrating the economies and societies of BRI countries with those of China remains high. Companies like Huawei, which is majorly responsible for exporting 5G technology abroad, have claimed not to share their data with the Chinese Government. However, critics disagree (Lewis, 2020, p. 1). Analysts believe that, considering the nature of state–private sector relationship in China, they are bound to do so (Kharpal, 2019).⁴

In a non-democratic setup, absolute control over information is vital for the state’s survival. For such regimes, the uncontrolled flow of information is sacrilege. In the digital age, open societies are also beginning to realise the importance of domestic digital data vis-a-vis national security (Rajan, 2020, pp. 40–46). With the above in mind, China has already enacted stringent laws to protect its data in a new digital environment (KPMG, 2016, pp. 1–14). In 2019, China’s National Cybersecurity Standards Technical Committee, called TC-260, proposed modifications to the Personal Identification Information Specification (National Standard, 2016, pp. 1–41). The first version of this specification came into effect in September 2020, which defines what constitutes personal identification information under China’s Cybersecurity Law (Liu, 2019, pp. 84–103).

Chinese information and communication technology (ICT) companies have been chastised about data ownership, usage, sharing and transmission (Kharpal, 2019). Foreign firms, too, were asked to comply with China’s multi-level protection scheme (MLPS) that seeks to protect information networks from being hacked or attacked.

Products are classified from one to five, one being the lowest and five being the most critical to China’s national security, social order, and economic interests. Technology products at MLPS levels three and above must include at least some domestic intellectual property (IP). MLPS also requires that traditional IT products at level three or above be subject to rigorous testing. (PrivacyShieldFramework, 2021)

Very few foreign companies are licensed to sell products above level three in China.

On 27 June 2018, China issued its draft ‘Cybersecurity Classified Protection Regulations’ (MLPS 2.0), laying down the rules to protect critical information infrastructure as envisaged in the Cybersecurity Law. It also expanded the scope of MLPS to cover emerging technologies such as cloud computing, big data and the IoT (Li, 2018). Therefore, while China’s data security laws have become stringent to protect its politico-economic and ideological integrity, the same remains vulnerable in the Global South (Griffiths, 2018). For example, African countries moved all government data from Western digital platforms in the USA and Europe to China-built data centres within the African continent. The idea was to claim digital sovereignty. However, dependence on Chinese hardware and digital platforms keeps them vulnerable (Cissé, 2022, pp. 1–9).

Artificial Intelligence

AI is another important strategic area of digital technology. China has developed enormous talent and skills in corporations like Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu. They are stiffly competing with their Western counterparts in game-changing technologies like AI (Li et al., 2021). Today, China publishes the maximum number of papers related to AI and files an exceedingly large number of patents compared to any other country in the world. Compared to 66,508 patents registered by China in AI in 2019 (Statista, 2021b), patents filed by China in 2019 increased to 389,571, accounting for 74.7% of the global total and ranking first globally (Hua, 2021).

China is allegedly also generously exporting face recognition and other digital surveillance technologies (products of AI) to BRI countries and encouraging some authoritarian governments to turn themselves into surveillance states (Shahbaz, 2018, p. 8). These tools are double-edged weapons that control crime but can also be used against political dissent (Jili, 2022). In order to check this claim, a case study was carried out at Amsterdam University to ascertain the impact of Chinese digital technology on Ethiopia. This study concluded that ‘the use of Chinese ICT does contribute to the control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens’ (Baggott Carter, 2022, pp. 1–20; Lugt, 2021, pp. 315–343). However, it could not establish any direct link between the Chinese state or the Chinese companies involved in this process in Ethiopia. The leading actor bringing surveillance tools into governance was the Ethiopian Government itself.

China is allegedly also exporting face recognition and other digital surveillance technologies (products of AI) generously to BRI countries and encouraging some authoritarian governments to turn themselves into surveillance states (Shahbaz, 2018, p. 8). These tools are double-edged weapons that control crime but can also be used against political dissent (Jili, 2022). In order to check this claim, a case study was carried out in Amsterdam University to ascertain the impact of the Chinese digital technology on Ethiopia. This study concluded that ‘the use of Chinese ICT does contribute to the control of the Ethiopian government over its citizens’ (Baggott Carter, 2022, pp. 1–20; Lugt, 2021, pp. 315–343). However, it could not establish any direct link between the Chinese state or the Chinese companies involved in this process in Ethiopia. The main actor bringing the surveillance tools into the governance was the Ethiopian government itself.

Blockchain

Blockchain is another technology predicted to play a crucial role in the future global digital economy. Realising the above, China gave full attention to setting global standards for blockchain ledgers as the foundational infrastructure for future innovation in inventory management and FinTech. As a result, in 2020, it launched the Blockchain Service Network (BSN), with a goal of leveraging blockchain technology and offer a cheaper alternative to existing international cloud server storage (Fanusie, 2020). Many overseas blockchain networks have since joined BSN. Opening a blockchain account and creating applications on the larger BSN is less expensive. Such integration has enabled Beijing to do international plumbing to connect blockchain networks in Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, South Africa and the United States. As China’s BSN white paper noted, once China deploys the BSN globally, ‘it will become the only global infrastructure network autonomously innovated by Chinese entities’ (BSN Development Association, 2020, p. 16). However, network access to BSN will remain under Chinese control.

American analysts and lawmakers have expressed concern that ‘Chinese firm’s dominance over BSN providing blockchain networks outside China presents security risks comparable to those raised regarding 5G networks’ (Hillman & Sacks, 2021; Lewis, 2020, p. 1). They warn that crypto crime, based on BSN applications, can only be prosecuted with Chinese cooperation.

Similar concerns arise over China’s fast-moving plans for a Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP) to replace its physical currency, Renminbi. DCEP’s design gives China’s central bank real-time financial surveillance of all users’ transactions, potentially bolstering the Government’s control over private behaviour and adding to the reach of its digital authoritarianism. (Ünver, 2018, pp. 1–17)

At the 20th Party Conference, Mr Xi pledged to ‘expand the globally-oriented network of high-standard free trade areas…promote the internationalisation of the RMB in an orderly way’ (Jinping, 2022).

Financial Technology

As per the World Bank, nearly three billion adults lack digital connectivity and access to a mobile payment service (World Bank, 2022). Their lack of access to more sophisticated financial services is perceived as an ample opportunity by FinTech companies. Chinese FinTech firms were ready to fulfil this unmet demand of BRI partners in the Global South. BRI countries and the DSR schemes support the overseas commercial activities of such FinTech firms. The Government of China facilitates the overseas operations of such companies by leveraging BRI. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) of the USA has mentioned in its report that ‘BRI creates unfair advantages for Chinese companies’ (Hillman & Sacks, 2021).

The Chinese FinTech market itself is the largest e-commerce market in the world. Domestic market data gave these companies a strong backbone to innovate products suited for e-commerce markets. For instance, the drugstore chain dm-drogerie offers Chinese tourists the Alipay option in Germany. Alipay and WeChat Pay have customised themselves to suit overseas customers (Slotta, 2023). Favourable incentivised government policies and subsidies ensure growth for Chinese FinTech companies. Under the aegis of China’s FinTech Development Plan for 2019–2021, ‘incentives typically span tax rebates, rent subsidies, expedited regulatory filings, and government-sponsored incubation’ (Hopkins, 2020).

China is growing its FinTech companies, which use BRI to gain privileged access to millions of consumers while potentially giving Beijing significant data mining and surveillance opportunities.

Ant’s mobile payment app, Alipay, is estimated to have more than 1.3 billion users, 900 million in China and the rest concentrated in BRI countries, representing nearly four times as many users as the largest US mobile payments company, PayPal. Close on Ant’s heels is Tencent, pushing its WeChat Pay into several BRI markets, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia and Thailand. (Hillman & Sacks, 2021)

Smart Cities

Smart cities are another area where Chinese digital technology engages deeply in local governance. ‘Smart City’ is broadly defined to mean everything from urban design to higher education management systems. However, by the most common definition, it means ‘using information technology to solve urban problems’ (India Briefing, 2014). This definition includes managing traffic, stabilising electrical grids, allocating and coordinating emergency services, collecting taxes and providing permits, certificates and licences. It is a technology to manage urban socio-economic data and provide more services to people and managers than possible. Digital city technology entails the intelligent operation, control and management of the physical city in cyberspace (Miguel Eiras Antunes, 2020). The problem is that as countries become increasingly dependent on foreign technology for their day-to-day governance, they open up the possibility of diverting their data for foreign intelligence (Gravett, 2022, pp. 39–58). Chinese telecom operators in North Africa allegedly installed digital surveillance tools without legal safeguards to prevent misuse. In 2017, French magazine Le Monde published an investigative report showing that confidential data on the IT network of the Chinese-built African Union (AU) headquarters was diverted to Shanghai every night between 2012 and 2017. Since then, the AU has acquired its independent servers and declined China’s offer to configure them (Kadi, 2022). In an article published on the Tech Crunch site, security researcher John Wethington claimed to have accessed a smart city’s unprotected Elasticsearch database, storing gigabytes of data—including facial recognition scans on hundreds of people over several months. Chinese tech giant Alibaba hosted the smart city data. ‘The exposed data contained enough information to pinpoint where people went, when and for how long, allowing anyone with access to the data to build up a picture of a person’s day-to-day life’ (Whittaker, 2019).

Analysis

IT and the digital revolution have given birth to a new kind of international relations distinct from the paradigms of spatial geopolitics. The BRI, coupled with DSR, are adding new dimensions to this relationship. International relations today need a new lens to understand the implications of relations forged in cyberspace (Bollier, 2003, pp. 1–60). The global digital economy has opened the possibilities of digital imperialism, colonialism and information hegemony. Weak nation-states’ increased dependence on intrusive foreign technologies for their day-to-day governance and economic activities will adversely impact their freedom of choice. Concentrating control of the electronic and digital ecosystem that generates individual and national data in the hands of private players like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Huawei or an outside powerful state or extraterritorial entity gives them the power to manipulate it. China recently used smart city data to enforce its zero COVID policy with excessive severity. It is also reported that China is using facial recognition technology to monitor the movements and activities of its profiled ethnic groups, like the Uighurs, attracting sharp reactions from many quarters (Whittaker, 2019).

The Risks of Digitisation

Growing economies need connectivity. Digitisation provides it with a cost (Cissé, 2022, pp. 1–9). This cost is the compromise of individual privacy and national data. In a digitised environment, the data is automatically collected by routine commercial activity and governance operations. It can also be collected through a specifically designed exercise. When foreign governments get involved in such activities through their corporations, Couldry calls it ‘data colonialism’ (Couldry & Mejias, 2019, p. 81). Digitisation then enables control of the market, people’s behaviour and political orientation.

Owing to its importance, data is treated today in the same manner as in the nineteenth century; colonisers treated the unprotected and unclaimed land under earlier forms of colonialism as ready to be appropriated by those who arrived first and those who had the means to occupy them (Couldry & Mejias, 2019, p. 81). Jonas Parello-Plesner and Parag Khanna, senior fellows at the European CFR, observed as early as 2011 that China has been acquiring colonies not by conquest but by buying them out (Khanna, 2011). Since 2015, digitisation has become a more convenient, compelling and legitimate way to achieve the same. Information and communication technology-enabled digital economies are the new way to create markets and dominance (Dekker et al., 2020, p. 4). Under these circumstances, digital authoritarianism (Shahbaz, 2018, p. 8), digital imperialism, digital colonialism and information hegemony are new phenomena in international relations (Couldry & Mejias, 2019, p. 81). ‘Rich capital’ is giving way to ‘Rich information’ (Nye, 1990, pp. 153–171).

China’s Contrasting Approaches

Approach to Overseas Investment

A detailed review of existing literature gives a fair picture of the extent of Chinese investment in developing nations under the BRI. Literature suggests that China has invested extensively in creating land corridors on the continent and maritime facilities at sea in Asia, Africa and Europe (Concept, 2017). BRI now covers more than 140 countries (Wang, 2020, p. 4). Together, they comprise 65% of the world’s population and account for 40% of global GDP. However, China’s approach to these investments differs significantly from the West.

The involvement of advanced Western democracies in third-world development activities post-colonially is mainly through independent financial agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and institutions like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Their involvement, too, remains confined chiefly to the scope of the sponsored projects.

In contrast, the Chinese approach to third-world investment and development goes beyond the specific projects, as they invariably form part of larger global agenda. Details of differences in approach can be found in the primary policy document of BRI titled ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ (Vision, 2015) and ‘Concept, Practice and China’s Contribution’ (Concept, 2017, pp. 18–23). The above two documents categorically mention that BRI’s vision is to (a) build ‘a community of shared interests and destiny’ (Vision, 2015, Chapter-III) (b) ‘economic integration’ (Vision, 2015, Chapter-III) (c) ‘policy coordination’ (Concept, 2017, pp. 18–23) (d) ‘connectivity of infrastructure and facilities’ (Concept, 2017, pp. 18–23) (e) ‘unimpeded trade and financial integration’ (Concept, 2017, pp. 18–23) (f) ‘cooperation in production capacity, and trade and investment’ (Concept, 2017, pp. 18–23). China has signed several documents of cooperation with BRI countries to promote their work and equipment alignment, technological standards coordination, mutual recognition of inspection results and networking of electronic certificates (Concept, 2017, p. 26). The document wants ‘unimpeded currency circulation’ among BRI countries (Concept, 2017, p. 30) and wishes ‘transplanting’ and ‘replicating’ China’s own development experiences in BRI countries (Concept, 2017, p. 28). Both documents above want these countries to form a closer community to create a shared future-oriented development pattern, maintain an open market-driven economy and explore new sources of growth. President Xi Jinping reiterated these objectives at the 20th Party Congress (Jinping, 2022). All the above elements of Chinese engagement in the development activity in third-world countries go far beyond the normal development engagement of other developed countries in the third world.

Chinese Approach to Cyber Space

The Chinese approach to cyberspace also differs vastly from that of Western liberal democracies, which treat this space as a global common based on the principles of freedom and openness with minor state interference (Kaushik, 2021, pp. 1–7). Though the international legal framework to regulate this space is in its infancy (Buck, 1998, pp. 1–17), China is clear that the jurisdiction and choice of law to be imposed on the internet must be in line with territorial regulation (Goldsmith, 1998, pp. 475–491). China’s internet policies reflect a robust regulatory model called by some scholars ‘Authoritarian Informationalism’ (Jiang M, 2021, pp. 71–89). It combines the elements of capitalism, authoritarianism and Confucianism. A white paper on the internet in China issued by the State Council Information Office of People’s Public of China (SCIO) declares categorically that

Within Chinese territory, the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected. Citizens of the People’s Republic of China and foreign citizens, legal persons and other organisations within Chinese territory have the right and freedom to use the Internet; at the same time, they must obey the laws and regulations of China and conscientiously protect Internet security. (China Daily, 2010)

Therefore, the global digital ecosystem that China is creating in BRI countries is expected to follow the above pattern.

BRI—Chinese Cosmopolitanism and the Vision for New World Order

After nearly a decade since its inception, the motivations driving China’s BRI are well established. They broadly fall into the categories of economic, strategic and domestic compulsions (Cai, 2017, pp. 6–12; Ghiasy, 2018, pp. 1–5; Sanjeev, 2022, pp. 3–16). They will not be discussed here because they are outside the scope of this article. However, there exists a fourth dimension that is less tangible and, hence, less talked about. Examining the Chinese literature on BRI to look for the ultimate philosophy that drives Chinese overseas investments under the aegis of BRI and DSR, one concept that appears repeatedly is the ‘Community of Common Destiny for Mankind’ (CCDM) (Bunskoek & Shih, 2021, pp. 85–101). If probed deeper, one cannot escape getting the sense that the Chinese vision for some kind of ‘global integration’ is at the core of CCDM. That is why the term ‘integration’ appears so frequently in Chinese policy documents and speeches about BRI and DSR. By combining DSR with BRI, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) exhibits great confidence that it will lead to BRI countries’ strong economic, financial and technological integration (NDRC, 2021).

Notably, the long-term Chinese world view has sharply turned towards Cosmopolitanism in the twenty-first century (Ouyang, 2021, pp. 1–10). Drifting away from Westphalian principles, China relapses into its traditional sense of civilisational centrality (Shih, 2011, pp. 537–560). This notion contrasts sharply with the philosophy on which EEU, ASEAN, SAARC, BIMSTEC, AU and similar economic blocks are based. As China’s gross national and global power increases, Chinese IR theorists push China to assume more responsibility towards humanity. This sense is like the West’s self-acquired responsibility to civilise the non- western world, and the USA claims to treat itself as the upholder of universal human rights and democracy. The rising China is likewise digging deep into its traditional belief that only a uniform, centrally integrated politico-economic system can bring stability to the world (Zhao Tingyang, 2013, pp. 46–65). Therefore, a view is taking root in Chinese leadership that the world is a community of shared destiny that needs an institutionalised system to promote universal well-being, which the ethically barren neo-realist Western approach has failed to provide (Cha, 2018; Ouyang, 2021, pp. 1–10; Rigby, 2012; Xiao, 2016). According to Professor Zhao, ‘The world in which we live is nothing more than a geographical physics where the political identity of the world is still missing. A world of perpetual peace will depend on a worldwide institutional system’ (Zhao, 2013, pp. 46-–65). Zhao further argues that in the Chinese way of looking at international relations, the question of national sovereignty and supernational global sovereignty is embedded in the ancient concept of Tianxia (Tingyang, 2016). His concept, when translated into a CCDM, can provide the analytical and institutional framework needed to end the chaos (Bunskoek & Shih, 2021, pp. 85–101). Therefore, there appears to be a strong possibility that a Chinese world order broadly on the above lines may be condensing and crystallising in the minds of the Chinese policymakers to give them moral legitimacy to go all out for long-term global projects like that of BRI, DSR, GDI and Global Security Initiative (GSI) to integrate the world into their image of a global community. Similar sentiments relevant to domestic and international contexts have been repeatedly echoed in President Xi Jinping’s address to the 20th Party Congress on 16 October 2022. He said in an international context that ‘building a human community with a shared future is the way forward for all the world’s peoples’, ‘we will upgrade trade in goods, develop new mechanisms for trade in services, and promote digital trade to accelerate China’s transformation into a trader of quality’ and ‘foster a world-class business environment that is market-oriented, law-based, and internationalised. We will promote the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative’ (Jinping, 2022).

In determining a nation’s foreign policy, narratives play a significant role (Subotić, 2016, pp. 610–627). As China’s gross national power increases, one wonders how much it may seek to remake the world in its image (Nathan, 2015, pp. 156–170). Michael Pillsbury of the Hudson Institute of the USA argues that if China continues to grow at its current pace and hardliners maintain control over Chinese policy, China will likely begin opposing democracy worldwide by mid-century. It will control information more effectively through internet censorship and profoundly influence global mass media (Pillsbury, 2019). Critics like Andrew J. Nathan believe that, currently, the Chinese leadership maintains normal relations with all countries regardless of the nature of their governance. This is because, at this stage of its growth, China does not have the economic, military or soft-power resources to influence the domestic political systems of faraway countries. However, the ‘regime-type-neutral’ approach may not be a permanent feature of Chinese foreign policy forever (Nathan, 2015, pp. 156–170). Hence, it is felt that this hypothesis cannot be dismissed completely. Today’s digital technology has given the new techno-rulers a potent tool to fulfil their eternal quest for complete control over their polity. China’s ambitious digital vision under execution through BRI, DSR, GDI and GSI opens a new realm of possibility for realising the above dream.

Choice Available to BRI Partners

BRI countries have many choices to avoid the hazards associated with digitalisation.

One of the options is not to put all their eggs in the same basket and hedge the risk of monopoly by spreading it. Avoidance of monopolies will protect their freedom and sovereignty from getting overwhelmed by any one single powerful nation. The dangers discussed above can be mitigated by not letting the technology of any one country dominate its digital landscape. This action can be achieved by ensuring multiple players and agencies from different countries balance each other out. For this, a robust domestic anti-trust/monopoly law is needed.

The second option is to develop a robust regulatory framework for foreign tech firms to ensure the nation’s cyber security. The country’s security and privacy laws must be strong enough to restrain foreign firms from unauthorised data mining and misusing private and national data against national interests. ICT hardware imported from foreign countries must be subjected to rigorous debugging and safe certification procedures to ensure that no data piracy features are embedded in the back end of their hardware and software. Stringent action against violators must be instituted.

The third option is that citizens and civil rights groups in BRI countries need to know that China has refined its ICT in tune with its governance philosophy. China has taken its electronic surveillance systems and profiling techniques to a very advanced level. Citizens in BRI countries have to rein in their governments from subscribing to such technologies and their unrestricted and indiscriminate use in governance. Liberal civil societies of the Global South and the Global North can collaborate in spreading awareness of this danger through publications, seminars, talks and workshops in Universities, Think Tanks and NGOs.

Fourth, technological, financial and commercial integration with a large, dominant economy may be helpful in the short term for development and raising the standard of living of its citizens. However, it should not be at the cost of freedom and sovereignty. Both need to be balanced through strong institutional mechanisms.

Conclusion

Digital technology has indeed changed the world we live in. No aspect of human life is left untouched by it. China’s DSR project holds great promise to broaden economic transactions, strengthen regional integration and boost growth and multilateralism. However, it carries some risks of data security and technical monopoly that cannot be ignored. Arguments in this article about DSR’s impact going beyond economy and commerce weigh strongly in favour of the affirmative. Considering the Chinese vision to integrate the BRI countries into one community of common destiny/shared future and the nature of digital technology employed to achieve it, the DSR’s abilities to impact the host nation’s sovereignty cannot be dismissed as merely a critique’s imagination.

Despite the above challenges and risks, the study concludes that digitisation in BRI countries under DSR is inevitable. It will likely get accelerated under the more refined and focused new Global Development Initiative (GDI) introduced by Mr Xi Jinping in his 20th Party Congress while pledging to boost digitisation under GDI and GSI along with BRI. Under-developed and developing countries have a natural desire to seek digitisation to speed up their development process. More affordable, no-strings-attached, sophisticated Chinese digital technology and equipment made available under DSR fit well to fulfil this need. However, BRI countries can avoid most of the adverse consequences of DSR by circumventing the Chinese propensity to create monopolies and crippling supply chain dependencies. This circumvention can be done by obviating the risk of monopolies and dependencies by subscribing to multiple technologies and suppliers and making multiple nations participate in their development journey. This subscription to multiple technologies in multiple nations can protect their national interests and sovereignty from being impacted adversely by one nation’s monopoly through DSR and BRI.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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