India’s G20 Presidency: Implications for the Latin American Region in the Framework of the Global South

Abstract

The turbulent unipolar world order is on the descendant, paving the way for a more representative multipolar global order. One of the early signs of this trend was the emergence of the G20 as a forum seeking to shape and strengthen the international economic and world governance architecture. Since then, the G20 along with other multilateral forums like the BRICS has played a role in consolidating the identities and interests of its Global South member states. The article discusses the debate over using ‘Global South’ identity instead of ‘Third World’ image. It also provides insights into Latin American perspectives on India’s G20 Presidency and as a leader of the Global South, given the historical and contemporary strategic significance of New Delhi in the emerging multipolar world order. The article also reflects on how India engages and interacts with Latin America in light of China’s growing influence in the region.

Keywords

India G20 presidency Latin America Global South BRICS

Introduction

India’s accession to the presidency of the G20, on 1 December 2022 signifies a major shift in the historical trajectory of the Global South, especially given that it fits into an ongoing trend of emerging countries assuming the leadership of such institutions—India succeeded Indonesia, and Brazil will follow. Out of these three countries, Brazil and India are the only two nations with a prospective global influence and a strong relationship, as evidenced by their participation in organisations such as BRICS. Considering the relationship between India and Latin America, we cannot help but wonder what opportunities and possibilities this partnership may present for the Global South’s influence on the G20 agenda.

Only three Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, are members of the G20, separately known as Group 3. This article briefly discusses the debate on using the terminology of the ‘Global South’, in the first section. The second part examines India’s relations with the Latin American region. How India’s G20 presidency impacts Latin America beyond the G20 has been dealt with in the third section. Finally, the article evaluates the significance of South-South Cooperation for the G20 via the BRICS.

But before we delve into details, the article briefly discusses the debate on using the terminology ‘Global South’ to describe the erstwhile ‘Third World’. The study also investigates if the factors that united the third-world countries during the Cold War, still resonate today or if underlying dynamics have changed.

Global South: Consolidation of Identity and Interests

The Global South traces its origins to twentieth-century anti-colonialism. South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) began with the establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1950 to promote collective intergovernmental efforts towards cooperative economic and social development; technical cooperation and assistance in the sharing and transferring of technology; and to facilitate the transferring and sharing of the developmental experiences among member countries in Asia and the Pacific. It was a paradigm shift in the consolidation of identity and interests of the Global South. The Bandung Conference 1955, the Non-Aligned Movement 1961, and the formation of G77 further solidified the identity (Grovogu, 2011). The term was seen as a geopolitical concept replacing ‘Third World’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a term which defined the Global South as the location of underdevelopment, and emerging nations which needed the ‘support’ of the Global North (Levander & Mignolo, 2011).

Nevertheless, this was a problematic proposition as, except for the G7, other international organisations have members from the north and south yet are dominated by the north. Therefore, the term Global South can be considered not just as a geopolitical concept but also as a geo-ideology that seeks to rectify the privileges of the North and assert the rights of the South to make international platforms inclusive. As a concept, it is created, imagined, invented, maintained and recreated (Kloß, 2017).

The term reinvents the ‘Third World’ as emerging economies which demand rights and inclusiveness, which participate in a post-global discourse, without renouncing an identity as the Third World (López, 2007). This change signals an ‘adjustment in ideological and political positioning to reflect the new forms of contentions around the legacies of colonialism’ (Grovogu, 2011, p. 176).

While the idea of ‘Third World’ is inseparable from the emergence of global capitalism via colonial conquest and exploitation, the Global South is not just a ‘space of resistance against neoliberal capitalism’ (Haug, 2021; Sajed, 2020). The political economy of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ (Frank, 1966) in post-global discourse has blurred distinctions. However, core assumptions remain unchanged in that it is striving for identity and interests (Wendt, 1999). Hence, the Global South, like the ‘Third World’, has emerged as an idea which defines not only poor and decolonised countries but also emerging economic and political powers that aspire to create One Earth, One Family, One Future (G20, n.d.). Given the diversity in the Global South, each country has its own vision to shape the world but the prime objective remains unchanged.

Recent global tragedies like the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war impacted the Global South negatively (Lin et al., 2023; Sow, 2022). The international arena remains even more complex and challenging in the face of a post-pandemic global recovery, and environmental and energy supply issues, which have recently been followed by the IMF’s forecast of a contraction in real GDP for the coming year (IMFBlog, 2022).

Hence, Indonesia, as past president of the G20, focused on promoting health management, digital-based economic transformation, and the transition to sustainable energy (Moegiarso, 2021). India has also set up goals for its presidency which focus on inclusive, equitable and sustainable economic growth, women’s empowerment, digital public infrastructure, technological development, climate financing and multilateral reforms (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022). Under India’s leadership, the G20 will strengthen and expand the agenda put forward by Indonesia. At the same time, it is also an opportunity for India ‘to demonstrate to the world the country’s strengths as a responsible and collaborative global actor’ (Palit, 2023). This collaborative global actor role was perceptible when India hosted a two-day ‘Voice of Global South Summit’ on 12–13 January 2023. Addressing the inaugural session of the summit, Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, emphasised that ‘India has always shared its developmental experience with brothers of the Global South. As India begins its G20 Presidency this year, it is natural that our aim is to amplify the “Voice of the Global South”’ (Indian Express, 2023).

India proposed the membership of the African Union in the G20, thus imprinting its presidency on the Global South. As Indian Sherpa Amitabh Kant said, ‘with the African Union joining the G20, 90% of the global population will be represented by the grouping, which will be unique’ (Haidar, 2023). He also added that the induction would be a ‘huge achievement’ for India’s G20 presidency (Haidar, 2023). Given the revived attempt by India and China to take on the leadership of the Global South, New Delhi will strive not to lag behind Beijing.

India and Latin America: Expanding Ties and Opportunities

The G20 presidency of India is the transverse axis connecting Latin America, the Global South and BRICS. Although the Latin American region is diverse, common characteristics and overlapping interests can be maximised through investing in building a strong partnership with India. The untapped human and natural resources, technological prowess, and capital can be better utilised to improve the lives of common citizens. India and Latin American countries can explore developmental solutions in renewable energy, climate change, health, agriculture and waste management in the broader framework of south-south cooperation. Several agreements have already been concluded in the SSDC but have not yet been implemented; thus, collaboration is required for their reactivation (Baroni, 2023).

Latin America continues to be a major export destination for Indian cars, motorcycles, pharmaceuticals, organic and inorganic chemicals, and textiles and imports products, like crude petroleum oil, copper, silver and gold, and fruits and vegetable oils from Latin America. The food market offers the opportunity to expand the basket of traded products and promote industrial development and mutual gains. Additional potential for complementarity exists in the automotive industry, human capital exchanges, technology, the audiovisual industry, and services (Baroni, 2023).

In fact, India’s exports to some distant Latin American countries are more than those to its neighbours or traditional trade partners (Viswanathan 2022). However, although New Delhi enjoys Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) with Chile and Mercosur, India has yet to negotiate an FTA with Latin America. It has not shown any interest in doing so either (Seshasayee, 2022).

India’s commitment to Latin America stems from its status as a growing power and its rapprochement with countries that share these conditions as well as SSC goals, such as Brazil (Misra, 2020). India sees the larger countries in the region, such as Brazil and Mexico, as growing powers capable of coordinating common interests on the international agenda. For India, Brazil is a regional voice and a leader, while Mexico’s proximity to the United States makes it an important partner that could facilitate entry into the American market (Baroni, 2023). India also aims to advocate UN Security Council changes, push its application for permanent membership in the body, and highlight the issue of terrorism in the UNSC. Boosting connections with Latin America could help it achieve its goals at the UN (Misra, 2020).

Examining India’s relationship with this region is critical to fully grasp the benefits of India’s G20 presidency for Latin America. Until 2019 Latin America was mentioned in foreign policy speeches only in passing as part of ‘other nations in the South’ (Misra, 2020).

Latin America was perceived historically as politically unstable but by 2019 India began to show a growing interest in the region. The new global agenda encouraged a new approach that involved economic reforms and the need for new markets. As a result, India’s relations with Latin America are relatively new and require the need for construction, reinforcement, and advancement to strengthen Indian and Latin American cooperation (Misra, 2020).

As Heine and Seshasayee note, alongside the shared principle of democracy,

The links of India with Latin America have gone through a long road in the last two decades. The benign negligence which characterised the relations between India and Latin America during the first five decades after the independence of India in 1947 has transformed into a more dynamic commitment shaped by the economic diplomacy in the 21st century. (Heine & Seshasayee, 2019, 94)¹

Several ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) studies have demonstrated India’s growing significance to Latin American nations in terms of trade of commodities, services, and investment flows (Bartesaghi, 2015). On a cultural level, relations have become more amicable, particularly as a result of Latin America’s interest in specific Indian sectors such as football (soccer), the film industry, and yoga (Misra, 2020). However, this is more indicative of the influence of Indian cultural characteristics on the region than the reverse.

In addition, MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) is India’s main economic partner in Latin America (Bartesaghi, 2015). Although India has an Agreement of Preferential Trade with this bloc, most of its efforts have been focused on generating consensus for its own systemic and strategic purposes (Misra, 2020). Here, however, it lacks a regional strategic view of Latin America as a partner on global issues. As a result, India’s agreements with Latin American countries are not based on free trade but in narrow preferential treaties regarding specific products; not only are its accords with MERCOSUR an example of this, but also the agreements it has signed with Chile (Malacalza, 2019).

Although there has been an increase in official diplomatic visits and the establishment of diplomatic missions from India in Latin America in recent decades, the majority of scholars are beginning to think that the political relationship between India and Latin America has not yet developed in tandem with their economic ties (Heine & Seshasayee, 2019). In what has been called a ‘poorly proactive’ policy, the strategic partnership is not equally extended to all the countries in the region. At the moment, India has established a strategic relationship with Brazil, and it is currently in negotiation with its special partner Mexico and, more recently, with Argentina (Misra, 2020)—all members of the G20.

These commercial relations are characterised as ‘inter-industrial’ and ‘complementary’ (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014), ideas that could be seen positively because they indicate shared benefits for India and the Latin American continent. India’s attitude to Latin America originates from its desire to increase its worldwide influence and extend similar interests, particularly in terms of the international economic order, as seen by its membership in various multilateral forums. As a result, from this perspective, where India and Latin America need encounters beyond commerce, the G20 and the G33, as multilateral forums, become critical (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014).

At the same time, India’s economic diplomacy in Latin America

has reinvigorated the SSDC [South South Cooperation for Development] under the conception of the pact for development. This demands the mobilisation of ‘all economic, commercial, financial, monetary, technical and scientific/technological resources to achieve structural change in developing countries’ and is ‘crucial if economic and social challenges such as inequality are considered and the need to reduce the financial and climate vulnerabilities to which they are exposed’. (Malacalza, 2019, 133)²

Nevertheless, the presence of the People’s Republic of China in the region (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014), challenges the ties between India and Latin America. The influence and leverage India could create in Latin America is vastly outweighed by the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative and the rising commercial ties with China. This makes Latin America significant to global geopolitics.

G20 and Latin America: Connecting the Global South

To understand the scope and influence of the G20 and the extent of its relevance for a region belonging to the Global South, such as Latin America, it must be placed in the framework of the idea proposed by Amitav Acharya regarding the ability of the G20 to ‘blur or bridge the traditional North-South, or West versus the Rest’ gap (Acharya & Buzan, 2019, 68). Resolving common geopolitical and geo-economic challenges necessitates finding partnerships and a platform (Ayllón Pino, 2014). The democratic structure and representative architect of G20 allow onboarding and engaging with countries not part of global governance, as the saga of G7 and other international bodies tell.

The 2008 financial crisis unravelled the limited reach and influence of existing mechanisms in the changed economic environment; thereby, the need to include the voices of the Global South became inevitable. In the G20, countries of the developing world, including three Latin American countries, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil (Argüello, 2017) became part of the global governance apparatus. Argüelo argues that ‘it was a first validation of Latin America –located in the “emerging” and “developing” world –as part of a bigger table in which to discuss, conclude and coordinate global reach interests’ (Argüello, 2017, 73).³

While the G20 provides a forum for discussions and consultations in which countries from the South can exert influence over international decision-making the current debate among Latin American scholars focuses on the G20’s capacity to consider the interests of the South (Maihold & Zirahuén, 2016). Consequently, it is reasonable to question whether Latin American G20 members adequately represent the requirements and aspirations of Latin America or whether another country from the region should be added to the forum.

For instance, three Latin American members have differing views on free trade. When Mexico presided over the forum, little focus was given to the Latin American region (Maihold & Zirahuén, 2016). When the 2012 Summit was held in Los Cabos, it focused on the economic slowdown brought on by the 2008 financial crisis and issues that affected both the United States and Europe, reflecting a relatively ‘Global North’ point of view.

However, this changed when the 2018 G20 Summit was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, to introduce an agenda to reflect the interests of the Latin American region (Argüello, 2017). The theme of the summit ‘equitable and sustainable growth, with a particular emphasis on constructing a structure for development, food security, and gender equality’, justly reflected the realities of Latin America and other developing nations.

In future, any effort to localise the contours to include the fight against drug trafficking, the exploitation of natural resources, and immigration must consider Latin America’s political, institutional, ideological, economic, and social diversity, as well as the historical trajectory of each of its countries, when addressing the continent’s interests. Consequently, the global dimension must be approached with regional governance in mind, as with the MERCOSUR (Argüello, 2017).

The rest of the Latin American states may anticipate that the G20 will look beyond the interests of its three Latin American members. It is realistic to anticipate that India will focus on the diversity and uneven development in the region while setting the agenda. As previously mentioned, there are core Latin American issues that do not only affect the region; instead, they have a global impact, such as food security, unemployment, inequality, and natural resource exploitation. Latin America could reasonably expect India to pay attention to these issues, given that both countries are in the Global South and share historical ties.

Although the G20 is a mechanism with a global reach, it should not ignore the issues that pertain to the uniqueness of countries within regions, which is one of its purposes: an agenda that integrates domestic and international issues (Botto, 2010). The G20, with India as its chair, faces the emergence of new situations, including climate change, the consequences of pandemics, the new stages of global confrontation such as the Ukrainian War, and the division of the world between NATO allies and Russian supporters.

According to Botto, the reality that both developed and emerging nations are members of the G20, makes it a more democratic summit than its predecessors. However, it indicates a high level of disparity and underrepresentation because the underdeveloped nations and regions are absent (Botto, 2010).

Given that India can be considered as having the ability to influence international politics without adhering to hegemonic power norms, this could signal a positive change for Latin American nations, which are more accustomed to the Western model of governance. Some authors view India’s non-interventionist, neutral, and pluralist stance as a positive indicator, traced back to the Non-Aligned Movement of 1961, of which it was a promoter and founding member. India’s foreign policy is characterised by the ‘… the respect for sovereignty of States, the non-intervention in internal affairs, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the international cooperation as argument in an international system based on norms’ (Barrera, 2018, 138).⁴

It is not by chance that India’s biggest economic partners in Latin America are also G20 members. At the same time, Latin American countries can become strong and supportive allies, particularly in terms of India’s objectives: generating consensus in the UN Security Council reform and the country’s candidature for permanent membership, achieving support for its inclusion in the group of nuclear providers, fighting terrorism, coordinating to combat climate change, and striving for the development of the Global South (Misra, 2020). It is also imperative that goals should not be limited to Argentina, Mexico, or Brazil, especially considering that the G20 blueprint encompasses a broader global scope.

In conclusion, the ideas mentioned above demonstrate the importance of coordination with Latin American member states; as a platform for agreement, the G20 requires India to address global issues while broadening its perspective to the rest of the Global South and expanding its cooperation beyond an economic perspective. As argued by Argüello, the G20 presidency of Indonesia in 2022,

[W]hich will be followed by India in 2023 and Brazil in 2024, open a continuity without precedents of emerging countries in charge of a forum that could, finally, displace the world attention towards the necessities of the countries of the Global South. (Argüello, Un G20 con la impronta de sur global, 2022)⁵

The Influence of the BRICS in the Framework of the G20

As previously noted, India has invested in developing partnerships with Latin American countries that comprise the G20. Brazil, a member of the BRICS, is also a strategic partner of India. Both countries share common principles such as democracy, their transcendent significance in geopolitics today, and their aspiration to achieve higher levels of development (Bartesaghi, 2015).

It is crucial to emphasise the role of BRICS countries as advocates of reforming global economic governance, thereby reducing the influence of dominating North Atlantic countries (Heine & Seshasayee, 2019). China and India have taken the lead in strengthening the voices of the developing world.

More importantly, according to Bartesaghi, India should capitalise on the strategic partnership with Brazil to further strengthen the voices of the Global South in the G20. Brazil and India share common concerns, such as combating poverty and social inequality and enhancing the education system and access to technology (Bartesaghi, 2015). At the same time, India can also engage with non-governmental organisations, businesses, and scientific and academic communities in its active economic diplomacy and forge multi-actors and multi-dimensional strategies (commerce, financing, investment, etc.) (Malacalza, 2019).

India’s leadership position in the G20, the close ties with countries of Latin America, and the BRICS partnership could all be used as tools to help address global problems and enhance the environment for economic growth and development. In this regard, Brazil and India’s prominence within the BRICS and SSDC frameworks encourages them to focus on shared interests, suggesting that India will be a driving force for South-South Cooperation.

Even though reflection on the BRICS and the G20 requires acknowledging that they are two entirely different forums, it is worth noting that the former’s operational capacity is a determinant to protect and maximise the interests of developing countries in the latter.

Conclusion

As the fault lines in the world system have intensified, structural adjustments are inevitable. The process of ‘gated-globalisation’, Russia and the West confrontations over Ukraine, increasing US-China rivalry, and the changing regional dynamics, including Brexit and India-China tension, show that India, at the helm of G20 must help to create a constructive and conducive environment for global prosperity and peace.

India plays a critical role in putting forward issues important to the Global South and has already expressed an interest in adhering to specific issues relevant to Latin America. Brazil succeeding India as the President of G20 presents another opportunity for India and Latin America to deepen their cooperation.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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