Promoting Green Energy Transition Through G20

Abstract

The G20, a leading multilateral forum for global cooperation and decision-making, is taking the lead to foster dialogue and deliberation on green energy transition through energy collaboration and action agenda. The G20 countries are accountable for more than three-quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions collectively. Individually, all the members have net-zero emissions domestic pledges and action plans to gear up their transition towards green energy regimes. Although most countries have submitted stronger NDC targets over time, their overall implementation is still insufficient to meet 1.5°C goal. India, as the current President of the group, strived to build consensus on decarbonisation, rationalisation of energy mix, and financing the transition to green energy. The article, while examining G20’s attempts in this direction, examines India’s constraints on the way to building consensus on green energy transition for net-zero emissions.

Keywords

G20 green energy transition renewable energy net-zero emissions

Introduction

In this carbon-constrained world, guiding the transition to clean energy and especially the pathway to zero emissions without compromising energy security and sustainable economic growth remains a critical task for every nation. And even more for multilateral platforms which seek to meet the twin challenges of decarbonisation and climate adaptation collectively. The G20, a leading multilateral forum for global cooperation and decision-making among the world’s largest economies, has taken the lead in fostering dialogue on energy collaboration and action agenda. Currently, the grouping under India’s presidency is striving hard to engage multiple stakeholders for a smooth transition adhering to the mantra of Vasudheiva Kutumbakam—‘One Earth, One Family, One Future’.

The G20 members are collectively accountable for more than three-quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions and 19 out of its 20 members’ emissions originate from the energy sector. Individually, all members have net-zero emissions pledges and action plans for the transition towards clean energy regimes. This ensures that all members are collectively aligned with the energy transition roadmap of the group by re-emphasising their nationally determined contribution (NDC) target. Therefore, the group has to bear the onus for action for a green energy transition. As of 2021, around 29% of the energy mix of all members is renewable energy, a two-digit (19%) increase from the 2010 position (Climate Transparency, 2022). Their projected target and consequent actions are still falling short of meeting the 1.5°C goal (Perinchery, 2023) even though most countries have adopted stronger NDC targets over time. While the energy intensity of G20 countries has started to decline, ‘carbon intensity’ has not transformed significantly as their energy sector has yet to decarbonise sufficiently. Nonetheless, China, the EU and the USA, whose emission level is highest, have mentioned the greatest increase in their updated NDCs, which is promising (Climate Action Tracker, 2022a). Undoubtedly, all G20 members are sensitised and willing to collaborate but for various constraints on policy implementation, neither their NDC 2030 nor their policy projections are aligned fully to the climate change goal of 1.5°C.

G20’s Energy Transition Process and Agenda in Retrospect

The G20 forum has always kept the issue of the management of ‘energy’ as a critical element for a sustainable global economy on its agenda. Through institutional arrangements, narrative development, and action agenda, the forum strives to promote green energy transition.

Institutional Arrangement

In 2013, the G20 Energy Sustainability Working Group (ESWG) was created to deal with the entire gamut of energy-related issues. Subsequently, energy collaboration principles were endorsed at the Brisbane Summit in 2014 where achieving ‘energy efficiency’ to pursue economic activity while ensuring energy security and improving environmental outcomes was agreed upon (Climate Action Tracker, 2022b).

Considering the close linkage between energy policy and climate change, the Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) was created under the Sustainability Working Group (SWG) in 2017. But, under the Argentine presidency in 2018, energy issues were de-linked from climate change and debated within the ‘energy transition’ framework under the Energy Transition Working Group (ETWG). This falls under the Sherpa Group, which primarily mulls over issues such as energy security, accessibility and affordability, energy efficiency, renewable energy, innovation, and technology and financing (G20 Leaders Statement, September 2009) In this way, with a dedicated institutional set-up a systematic institutional framework for mobilising energy transition was laid out within the G20 forum to streamline energy transition and sideline the complexities in addressing both issues jointly.

Narrative and Framework

During the last five years, gradual momentum towards the green energy transition can be seen. The Osaka Declaration 2019 acknowledged the urgency of ‘energy transition’ along with ensuring ‘3E+S’ (Energy Security, Economic Efficiency and Environment + Safety) (G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration, 2019). The biggest achievements of the Osaka Summit were that (a) 19 members, except the USA, agreed to recommit to the Paris climate deal; and (b) Japan agreed to host Resource Efficiency Dialogue. In the Riyadh Summit 2020, the members ‘endorsed the Circular Carbon Economy (CCE) Platform and its “4Rs” framework (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle and Remove)’, taking into account system efficiency, national circumstances, resources endowment and socio-political development contexts in member countries (G20 Energy Transitions, 2023).

Similarly, in the 2021 meetings in the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian Presidency along with the International Energy Agency (IEA), premising on three broad, interconnected pillars of action—People, Planet and Prosperity—emphasised the global pathway to net-zero emissions by 2050 (G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration, 2019). The Bali Summit emphasised people-centric clean energy transition policies and ‘the need for jobs, skills and training to be at the heart of energy transitions’ (G20 Information Centre, 2022).

By now a narrative and collective effort roadmap is laid down and a stage is set to wholeheartedly implement the net-zero emissions framework. It is pertinent to enquire what value India can add to the collective roadmap and implementation of the transition process; and whether India, being its current President, will be able to synchronise members’ efforts and channelise required transition finance and achieve new heights.

Evaluating Members’ Action Agenda

Given this one and half decade of G20 efforts and the availability of institutional arrangements to facilitate green energy transition, it an imperative to take stock of the progress made by member countries in realising the goals so far. Some value judgments can be made based on policy orientation and the trajectory of implementation of pledges by the members.

Net-zero Pledge: Almost every G20 member has a net-zero pledge in place, except Mexico which has a solid regulatory framework for heavy producers of greenhouse gases. Besides, the Bali Energy Transition Roadmap prioritised clean energy technology, energy access, and finance and investment as components of ‘just energy transition’ which all members have pledged to implement by formulating domestic laws to achieve net-zero targets. Many developed countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the UK and the USA have formulated their domestic regulations. But according to the IEA 2021 report ‘Net Zero by 2050’, ‘most pledges are not yet underpinned by near-term policies and measures … the pledges to date would still leave around 22 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions worldwide in 2050’ (IEA, 2021, p. 13).

De-carbonisation of Transport and Other Sectors: According to Climate Transparency, though G20 emissions intensity has decreased between 2017 and 2021, the overall energy-related CO₂ emissions are still growing (Climate Transparency, 2022, p. 34). Equally, the transport sector accounts for a fifth of the G20’s energy-related CO₂ emissions. Heavy-duty vehicles (HDV) consume around half of all transport fuels and emit higher fractions of air pollutants and about 75% of their sales occur in G20 countries (Australia G20, 2014, p. 4). Due to global lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, the per capita CO2 emissions from the transportation sector decreased by an estimated 2.4 billion tonnes in 2020 (Stanford Earth Matters, 2020), but by 2021 it rebounded. Despite work-from-home practice even after the pandemic, the road transportation sector in G20 member countries accounted for two-thirds of the emissions. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members of G20 have registered reduced emissions from this sector and the non-OECD G20 members such as India, Indonesia, China and Turkey have still very high percentages of emissions.

Therefore, the de-carbonisation of the transport sector is an urgent necessity that the forum must focus on. As per the G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2014, the United States is coordinating the faster development and introduction of stringent vehicle fuel efficiency requirements and emissions standards (Australia G20, 2014, p. 4). Similarly, the decarbonisation of the building and industrial sector are most urgent. Green hydrogen is one promising fuel to lessen the carbon footprint and 15 members of G20 have hydrogen strategies today.

Energy Efficiency Financing: Investment and financing of advanced and clean technologies, including Carbon Recycling and related technologies involve huge costs. The major hurdle for most countries in the energy transition is the availability of adequate financing and investment. Given the rise of interest rates, the cost of capital for project financing is also escalating. No single country can fully fund the entire transition process. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the G20 forum to ensure the availability of low-cost finance for the transition process (Australia G20, 2014, p. 6). In the Petersburg Summit (24–25 September 2009), member countries were unanimous to increase funding for programs in poor countries on a voluntary basis to bring clean affordable energy (Climate Transparency, 2022). As per the 2014 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, member ‘countries will work with IPEEC to create an Energy Efficiency Finance Task Group, supported by OECD and other international organisations and initiatives’ such as the World Bank, UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative and private initiatives (Australia G20, 2014, p. 6). Mexico and France were tasked to coordinate this work.

Some member countries have made commitments to increase and improve their overall international public climate finance contributions. At Riyadh in September 2020, the members expressed their commitment to ‘promoting public and private investments and financing, policy enablers, and cross-sector collaborations’ (Australia 2014 G20: G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, 2014). According to the IRENA report World Energy Transition Outlook 2022, the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement ‘will require investments of USD 5.7 trillion per year until 2030’, especially to scale up renewable power generation, electrify end-use sectors and deploy the technologies required (IRENA, 2022, p. 26). The global investment in clean energy (including renewable power, nuclear, grids, storage, low-emission fuels, efficiency improvements and end-use renewables and electrification) is on course to rise to only USD 1.7 trillion in 2023 (IEA, 2023, p. 12). Additional capital can come from the private sector; ‘public funding will have to be doubled to catalyse private finance’ and ‘create an enabling environment for a quick transition’ (IRENA, 2022, p. 56). Therefore, active engagement of the private sector in the pursuit of net-zero is vital.

Towards Green Investment

Mobilising investment and finance will require wide support for national plans and infrastructure projects facilitating structural shifts towards resilient and cleaner energy systems. In the G20 Rome Summit 2021, it was agreed to make available USD 100 billion voluntary contribution per year to countries in need to counter climate change (G20 Italia, 2021, p. 4), and also to end international public financing for all new coal plants by 2021. However, the summit made no mention of domestic commitments to end coal power generation. Coal still accounts for approximately 30% of the primary energy supply in the G20 countries, therefore, ‘accelerated coal phase-out remains critical to energy transition and climate mitigation’ (Climate Transparency, n.d.). Prominent G20 members, such as China, Australia, India, Indonesia and South Africa who still rely heavily on coal as the primary source of energy, should prioritise phase-out.

Undoubtedly, the G20 countries have invested heavily in nature-based solutions (NbS) during the last decade, but more is yet to be done. The current G20 investment in NbS is estimated to total USD 120 billion annually and approximately USD 165 billion total additional investment would be needed for NbS in the G20 in 2050 (UNEP, 2022a, pp. 3, 11). Undoubtedly public funding would pave the way for more private funding as an alternative source of finance. To mobilise the additional funds to achieve the required pace of green energy transition, can the G20 be able to create its pool of financial resources, like the Green Climate Fund, to cater to membersʼ needs?

India’s Presidency and Energy Transition Strategy

India has assumed the G20 presidency at a very critical juncture, and there are high expectations from India’s leadership. How should one evaluate India’s G20 presidency, especially in the energy transition realm? What has been India’s strategy and what India is seeking in the G20 about the climate agenda? Can its achievements in relevant sectors be projected as best practices? Will the member states come on board and enthusiastically facilitate technology transfer for building climate resilience?

As aptly asserted by Prime Minister Modi in his Independence Day speech on 15 August 2022, ‘India’s long-held ethos of eco-friendly, sustainable lifestyles can provide a solution to the global climate crisis’ (Hindustan Times, 2022). The same has been reflected by the mantra of LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) advanced by him (NITI Aayog; https://www.niti.gov.in/life). But with a soaring population and a fast-growing economy, India’s emissions level has been rising in recent decades and, as per UNEP, it has become the world’s third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), after China and USA (UNEP, 2022b). India’s total emissions in 2021 have been 2.7 billion tonnes, which is around 8% of global emissions. However, despite India’s relatively higher emission growth rate, the country’s per capita emission is still lower than the global average (Bhattacharya, 2022).

India’s own energy transition strategy starts with the target of 500 MW of non-fossil energy production by 2030. By February 2023 India has a total renewable energy capacity of 168.96 GW in addition to 82 GW at various stages of implementation and about 41 GW under the tendering stage (PIB, 2023b). Upon maturing within 18–24 months, India will have around 300 MW of green energy. Meanwhile, the Government plans to invite bids for 50 GW of renewable energy capacity annually for the next five years (2023–2024 till 2027–2028) which will add 250 MW (PIB, 2023b). Put together, this is expected to ‘achieve about 50% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030’ (PIB, 2022a), India’s second commitment at Glasgow.

Meanwhile, India stands committed to reducing the Emissions Intensity of its GDP by 45% by 2030 (PIB, 2022a). According to a report of the Colombia Centre on Global Energy Policy by K. Deb and P. Kohli, ‘India’s emission intensity in 2022 was already 34% lower than in 2005 and even if GDP growth continues at 8% per annum in PPP terms … India will achieve a 45% reduction in emissions intensity before 2025’ (Deb & Kohli, 2022, p. 5).

Pressing Challenges

India achieving the target of net zero emissions, or carbon neutral by 2070 has been a matter of speculation as the country is still heavily dependent on coal; ‘the share of coal in power generation in India has grown slightly to 72.8% in 2022 from 72.3% in 2019’ (Singh, 2023b). In its march towards carbon-neutral economy, India faces several challenges such as the price rise of essential commodities, continued reliance on traditional fuel, and lack of adequate finance. The IEA estimates that to achieve net zero emissions by 2070, $160 billion per year (three times today’s investment levels) is needed across India’s energy economy between now and 2030.

Besides, phasing out coal is time-consuming; shifting away subsidies in fossil fuels in favour of renewables should not affect the downtrodden. According to a study by the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD), ‘subsidies for renewable energy rose from ₹5,774 crore in 2021 to ₹11,529 crore in 2022, while support for electric vehicles jumped 160% from ₹906 crore to a record-high of ₹2,358 crore’ (Economic Times, 2022). In 2022, India provided at least ₹5 lakh crore to support the energy sector, including over ₹2.2 lakh crore in the form of subsidies. This suggests that while keeping the welfare measures for the needy intact and ensuring universal access to energy, India can do away with subsidies for fossil fuel, though gradually.

Harnessing Renewables

The share of renewable energy in the total electricity produced in India has increased to 11.6% from 9.4% during 2019–2022 (Singh, 2023b). Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries are involved in developing rooftop and ground-mounted solar projects of 600 MWe. With the ambition to contribute to India’s Net-zero goal, it ‘has set an ambitious target of … installing 3,000 MW capacity renewable energy projects by 2026 as part of a broader plan to reduce the company’s carbon footprint’ (PIB, 2023c). In addition, India aims to become a global hub for green hydrogen production and exports. India’s National Green Hydrogen Mission aims to develop a green hydrogen production capacity of 5 million metric tonnes per annum which aims to reduce the import of fossil fuel by over USD 12 billion (Fang, 2023, p. 7). This proportion will grow if India fructifies the green hydrogen economy resulting in 400 million tonnes of CO2 abatement by 2050 (Birol & Kant, 2022).

Even though achieving a complete carbon-neutral economy in less than five decades is tough for India, the incentives for inching towards the goal are equally immense. According to the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero, efforts to achieve such a goal require an investment of $10 trillion (Fang et al., 2023), which in turn ‘could boost annual GDP up to 4.7% by 2036 and create some 15 million jobs by 2047’ (Sirur, 2022). With all these challenges, opportunities, and self-set national goals India presided over the G20.

India’s Leadership Efforts

Ever since the climate change debate surfaced at the global level, India has been very vocal on every platform. It is, therefore, interesting to observe how India, currently at the helm of affairs, shapes the G20’s policy, especially in matters of building consensus for energy transition, decarbonisation, rationalisation of the energy mix, and financing the transition.

In the fourth ETWG meeting at Goa (19–20 July 2023), the energy ministers reportedly disagreed on the language related to ‘phasing down fossil fuels’ and ‘trebling of renewable energy capacities by 2030’ (Nandi & de Souza, 2023). Countries highly dependent on oil and gas resisted any strong wording on phasing down fossil fuels, and others urged ‘developed countries to deliver on the goal of jointly mobilising $100 billion per year for climate action in developing economies from 2020–2025’ (Vardhan & Verma, 2023). This suggests that building consensus on the crucial issue of the green energy transition is still elusive within G20 and India has not been able to build a singular agenda.

In all four ETWG meetings under India’s Presidency, six major priority areas have been intensively deliberated. They include Energy Transition through Addressing Technology Gaps; Low-cost Financing for Energy Transition; Energy Security and Diversified Supply Chains; Energy Efficiency, Industrial Low Carbon Transmission and Responsible Consumption; Fuel for Future (3F); and Universal Access to Clean Energy and Just, Affordable, and Inclusive Energy Transmission Pathways (PIB, 2023f). Consensus has emerged amicably in all areas, except on the pace with which phasing down of fossil fuels should be pursued. In the first ETWG meeting in Bangalore (5 February 2023), a clear understanding emerged on fossils for which members agreed that they would continue to be used in most countries in the coming two decades to increase the share of renewal energy (PIB, 2023h). The members favoured a people-centric energy transition mechanism, instead of targets imposed devoid of humanitarian considerations. India showcased its plan for ‘transnational grid interconnections’ for better utilisation of available energy sources (PIB, 2023d), and mission mode implementation of Saubhagya, Ujjwala and Ujjwal energy schemes. It projected how its energy-saving schemes have led to 267.9 million tons of CO₂ reduction per year, resulting in an estimated cost savings of $18.5 billion (PIB, 2023g).

In the second ETWG meeting in Gandhinagar India proposed for Global Biofuels Alliance which received wide-ranging support (PIB, 2023e). The third ETWG meeting reflected the consensus on giving high priority to ensure universal access to modern and sustainable energy to all. The fourth ETWG meeting in Goa marked significant convergence on hydrogen-related issues. Here India highlighted its proposal for setting up the Green Hydrogen Innovation Centre (PTI, 2023a). Most importantly, keeping the concerns of emerging economies in mind, India emphasised a voluntary Action Plan on Doubling the Rate of Energy Efficiency improvement by 2030 along with High-level Voluntary Principles on Hydrogen (G20 India, 2023).

Essentially the ETWG process under India’s presidency attempted to ensure a ‘just energy transition’ and not merely facilitate the withdrawal of coal-related investments. Besides, India emphasised technological innovations for a smooth transition; such as green hydrogen, small modular reactors (SMRs), energy storage technology such as electrolyser, biofuels, carbon capture utilisation and storage, and under-sea interconnection for energy trade. India is essentially advancing a Green Development Pact, a blueprint of strong actions for the next decade, powering green development all over the world. The Pact has five pillars: LiFE, circular economy, climate finance, accelerating progress on SDGs, and energy transitions and energy security (TERI, 2023). Interestingly, in none of the ETWG meetings, nuclear energy was included in the agenda for discussion, except for a seminar on SMR. India has reportedly stressed nuclear power as a non-renewable source of energy and, therefore, is out of the G20 deliberation agenda (PIB, 2023h).

Primarily in two issue areas bickering has emerged in G20 meetings: over the Russia–Ukraine war in the initial meetings, and over the energy transition in the fourth ETWG meeting. According to observers, the USA has resisted targets on ‘trebling renewable energy’, while Saudi Arabia objected to the wording ‘fossil fuel phase down’ (Nandi, 2023). Reportedly, some parties pushed for ‘zero-carbon technology’ which was viewed as unclear as it ‘could even mean coal with carbon capture and storage’ (Nandi, 2023). As expected, the China–US track did not go well and there was a lot of resistance on the issue of ‘financing transition’. Another report reveals that India with support from China and South Africa tried to build a consensus to let G20 countries choose a roadmap to cut down emissions instead of fixing a deadline for the use of fossil fuels (Singh, 2023a). While representing the Global South, India tried to introduce the idea of ‘multiple energy pathways’ denoting that the energy transition pathway should be different for each country depending on its energy base and potential (PIB, 2023h). This would enable developing economies to choose resources, even coal while working towards plans on net zero emissions.

A Prognosis

India’s efforts involving its own energy transition pathways indicate that its green energy focus is in sync with the G20 energy goals. New Delhi could take more actions to help achieve carbon neutrality even earlier, says the Managing Director of IMF, Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva (PTI, 2023b). Nevertheless, the new target in its 2022 NDC warrants an unprecedented level of effort. The next few years will prove how well India performs on this metric to get closer to its net-zero emissions goal.

From the G20 Presidency point of view, India has walked a tightrope to steer the group and produce the desired outcome. During its tenure, India strived hard to form the necessary consensus for a united strategy to meet the climate change and energy transition challenge, and bring all nations in sync with its vision, especially in an era of economic recession and ‘political polarisation’. After assuming the baton from Indonesia, Prime Minister Modi raised questions to himself: ‘Can the G20 go further still? Can we catalyse a fundamental mindset shift, to benefit humanity as a whole?’ (Modi, 2022). He also firmly believes that, if we can break out from the ‘zero-sum mindset’ ‘we can’ go beyond.

While India moved forward to achieve the net-zero emissions goal, the G20 under its leadership seems walked a few steps backwards due to the lack of clear consensus in the ETWG meetings. But India has steered the group with all integrity and should not give up its pursuit of taking along its brethren. The priority for India is to manoeuvre amidst the zero-sum mindset even after its term and not overhype its current presidency and achievements.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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