Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s Use of Military Force as an Instrument of Foreign Policy in Post-1991 Somalia

Abstract

In the history of politics, states have viewed military intervention as one of their tools of foreign policy. However, many scholars have not agreed on the effectiveness of military means in achieving the foreign policy objectives of states. Like other states, Ethiopia and Kenya have used the military as a means of foreign policy and tested their tools in Somalia practically. However, the effectiveness of their foreign policy tool has not been studied. That is why this article’s main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of Ethiopian and Kenyan foreign policies that used military interventions to achieve their foreign policy goals in terms of outcomes. In doing so, the article used a comparative case study methodology. Besides, the ‘good enough’ approach is the proper theoretical lens that is used in this article to comprehend Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operational outcomes. The analysis comes to the conclusion that both Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s military deployments in Somalia generally failed to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Accordingly, the findings reveal that using hard power as a tool of foreign policy without combining soft power is largely unsuccessful, as indicated by Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s military engagement in Somalia.

Keywords

Effectiveness military intervention Ethiopia Kenya Somalia

Introduction

Military intervention is a pervasive feature of international politics, and many states recognise it as a means of projecting state power. However, it is a more costly and risky foreign policy instrument than non-military strategies and instruments of foreign policy (Peksen, 2012, p. 558). Like diplomacy, economic sanctions and propaganda, the military instrument of power has traditionally been accepted as one of the major instruments of the foreign policy of states. Many scholars contend that states have used the military to support their diplomacy from the classical period to modern times, whereas some scholars believe that the value of military power has declined in recent times (Bojang, 2018, p. 2; Du Plessis, 2003, p. 2). According to the literature, the instrumentality of military capabilities continues to become a dominant norm in the foreign policymaking of both conventional powers and African states to remedy the diverse peace and security challenges of the continent (de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2018, p. 19). More importantly, political, economic and social instability, and the war on terror in Africa after the Cold War, resulted in new waves of intervention. For de Oliveira and Verhoeven (2018, p. 19), African states have recognised intervention, whether by Africans or non-Africans, as a mainstream instrument in the continent’s international relations. Consequently, the continent is the subject of two-thirds of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussions on armed conflict and is the site of more ongoing UN peacekeeping operations and unilateral military interventions than the remaining world regions combined (de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2018, p. 19).

From 1960 to 2015, there were more than 450 military forays into Africa. During the 1960s, African states repeatedly sent soldiers into their neighbours’ countries, and the frequency of these intra-African military that forays into the continent has increased over time. Many nations, including Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Uganda, Zaire and South Africa, have openly intervened militarily in other African nations via the deployment of soldiers (Kisangani & Pickering, 2022). The Horn of Africa states are not an exception to this increasing trend of military intervention in their neighbouring countries. The countries of the Horn of Africa have, in fact, been using military intervention as a tool of foreign policy, and the idea that military intervention should only be used as a last resort is becoming divisive (Schmidt, 2013). Even the principle of non-unilateral military intervention in the sovereign states of other states has become contentious. Notwithstanding this rising trend of intra-African intervention, much remained to be known about the successes and failures of intra-African interventions. This study, therefore, explores these issues, focusing on the military intervention of Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia. The study aims to explore the commonalities as well as differences between Ethiopia and Kenya concerning the successes behind their military intrusion in Somalia. Therefore, the goals of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operations were employed in this study to evaluate the effectiveness of their forays.

Debates and Contexts

In military studies, the concept of military success is debatable. It also remains without an agreed-upon definition or a shared understanding of its impact (Düsterhöft & Gerlach, 2013, p. 18). Regan (1996) believed that to make ‘success’ operational, it is indispensable first to understand what is meant by the term. Then it will be possible to evaluate alternative strategies available to decision-makers. Therefore, it will certainly not be easy to gauge ‘success’ without first acknowledging the existence of epistemological problems. The fact that the specific meaning of ‘success’ depends on the objectives of the intervening states in the target state is essential to the process of attempting to assess the efforts of these states in achieving their intervention goals. Scholars have proposed various definitions and benchmarks to explain success and determine if a particular type of operation is more effective than another.

Most scholars consider the term ‘success’ in terms of the objective of a measure to be achieved, so it links the result of a process to its original aims. Success is used to refer to the goal attainment of a measure. It relates the outcome of a process to its original goals. An intervention is effective if the outcomes match the goals (Mearsheimer, 1983). Sherman (2009) considers that any intervention is said to be effective if the outcomes match the goals and that measuring the success of an intervention requires clear and quantified objectives. Bratt (1996) adopted the same approach by comparing mission outcomes with mandates. For De Carvalho and Aune (2010), success is whether outcomes are defined and met, while other authors, such as Ratner (1995) and Sambanis (2000), consider success as the measurement of operating performance relative to goals. It is about achieving the goals of the intervention, which are defined beforehand, both in the short term (defeating the opponent) and in the long term (creating durable security). Success includes the extent to which an intervention objective has been achieved and the unintended consequences of such activities during the planning stage of intervention (Vincent, 1974, p. 269). Success should not include only the extent to which the intervention’s goals have been accomplished but also the unexpected and unplanned consequences of such activities. Thus, it is not possible to measure all aspects of intervention activity (Peksen & Lounsbery, 2014, p. 250).

The interventionists’ success can cover a variety of outcomes, from the total achievement of the interveners’ objectives (for instance, the military defeat of the insurgents) to establishing a settled political system compatible with their interests. In this case, failure covers outcomes ranging from the outright defeat of the interventionists to the inability of the intervening powers to achieve their initial objectives (Hughes, 2015, p. 200). Thus, success or failure is determined from the vantage point of the objectives of interveners (Peksen & Lounsbery, 2014). Outcomes are thus a primary factor in evaluating the success of the intervening state. From these perspectives, the success of any military intervention can be determined by matching the goals of the mission (as specified in its mandate) with the extent to which they have been accomplished on the ground.

Besides, success is not only measured by the outcomes. Gutner and Thompson (2010, p. 237) maintain that ‘studying outcomes alone does not allow us to evaluate the contingent and relative nature of performance’. Some scholars, such as Lipson (2010) and Gutner and Thompson (2010), considered internal processes and outcomes simultaneously in their analysis of success in the security field. The success analysis should not focus only on the outcomes of the mission; the process is also vital in defining the success of any intervention. Pre-planning and good management of operations will lead to the effective fulfilment of any mission objectives. Therefore, intervention success might be theorised, calculated or measured at both the level of internal processes and outcomes.

For this article, the effectiveness of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interventions is understood as an outcome, because measuring the internal processes is measuring the means, not the outcomes. Military success is the goal attainment of a measure; it relates the outcome of a process to its original goals. It is measured against the stated objectives of the intervening state, such as whether the intervening state secured its border against terrorist groups and illegal immigrants, captured the areas controlled by the enemy, reduced rebel violence, prevented the economic and military sources of the enemy, and undermined the fighting capacity of the enemy.

Regarding the context of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s invasion, in many respects, it seemed to satisfy their regional and domestic calls for swift action against a long-brewing menace. Sea piracy or Robbery by pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, terrorist activities in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region, kidnappings of tourists and charity workers, and a significant flood of refugees fleeing drought-caused starvation to Ethiopia and Kenya have all been attributed to Somalia’s instability and spillover effect on the neighbouring countries, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya (Kisangani & Pickering, 2022). In addition to their genuine need to defend their country’s territorial sovereignty, Kenya’s decision to invade Somalia may also have been a means by which the government could rally support in the lead up to politically transformative elections in the spring of 2013, demonstrating that key government leaders could take the necessary measures to defend the country. Overall, Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interventions in Somalia were carried out in the context of defending their territorial integrity and sovereignty by defeating al-Shabaab, securing their borders from different threats, creating a buffer zone and dismantling their regional enemies. Thus, the effectiveness of both states’ interventions in Somalia was measured in relation to these stated objectives.

Theoretical Approach

For this study, to determine the success of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s intrusions, I adopted the ‘good enough’ approach (De Coning & Romita, 2009; Meharg, 2009). The ‘good enough’ approach focuses on what can be accomplished in military operations rather than what is desirable. In other words, evaluating the success of intervention should not be done by comparing it with an ideal state of peace (which assumes no armed conflict or enemies after intervention) or to an ideal manner of conflict resolution (e.g., the settlement of long-standing animosities). Interventions aimed at resolving conflicts may eventually be judged on the basis of ‘good enough’ rather than absolute success or failure criteria (Ross, 2000). Perhaps the concept of ‘good enough’ should be used to evaluate intervention successes in relative degrees rather than the absolute concepts of success and failure (De Coning & Romita, 2009).

Hence, determining the extent to which Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s goals succeeded or failed is complex and specifying a code has unavoidable subjectivity. So, to reduce these difficulties, the article opted for a classification of success involving three categories. First, success refers to the objective that was fully or largely achieved. Second, ‘partial success’ means that the objective was partly or largely achieved—when some goals are achieved and other goals fail. Finally, failure refers to an objective that was not achieved to any substantial degree (Kavanagh et al., 1999, p. 42). So, in this article, success or failure is measured in relation to the stated objectives of the intervening power, such as ‘eliminating (if possible) or defeating (substantially weakening) al-Shabaab as a threat for the region’, that is, establishing a buffer zone and disrupting regional anti-Ethiopian alliances over a short or long period of time.

Methodological Approach

The study used a qualitative comparative case study research design to achieve its goals and answer its research questions. The article has attempted to address the success of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interventions in achieving their goals through detailed comparative case studies by conducting two case studies: Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interventions in Somalia. A comparative case study research design was used under a qualitative approach using cross-case comparison and within-case analysis. This method was used in this study since it is not limited in terms of descriptive or explanatory goals. Therefore, it was helpful for a deeper analysis using the similarities or differences between Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interventions. The comparison was mainly focused on their success of intrusion between the intervening states. In doing so, the article is based on different sources of information, including primary sources of data, such as reports, parliament resolutions to authorise the intervention and key informant interviews. The key informants include government officials, researchers, policymakers, military planners, defense officials and ambassadors. The selection of the key informants was based on their information regarding the subject of this study or through purposive sampling. Moreover, some informants are named and others are anonymous based on their consent. Besides primary sources, the article also used secondary sources of data, such as archives, scholarly writings, online databases, books and news.

Findings of the Study

Did the ENDF and KDF Capture al-Shabaab-Controlled Territories, Undermining Its Ability?

In military studies, capturing enemy-controlled territory is a key variable in determining the success of the operation of an intervening power. In this regard, one of the criteria for measuring the effectiveness of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operations in Somalia is whether the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) or the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) captured al-Shabaab-controlled territories or not. According to Bamfo (2010, p. 64), in the aftermath of Ethiopia’s withdrawal, al-Shabaab has proven capable of gaining and retaining territory, cementing its position in the lower Shabelle region, extending further into the Bay and Gedo districts, and capturing Baidoa. Furthermore, a second radical Islamist group, Hizbul Islam, has formed an alliance with al-Shabaab. The group appears to control large territories in Somalia’s southwest, except for some portions of southern Mogadishu. Islamist terrorists controlled nearly as much territory as they could before Ethiopia’s incursion in late 2008 (Menkhaus, 2009, p. 7). Thus, President Ahmed called on the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments to intervene or else risk Somalia’s collapsing into jihadism (Holzer & Georg-Sebastian, 2009, p. 227). Immediately, not sure whether because of the call from the president or not, in 2011, both Ethiopia and Kenya intervened. Accordingly, Ethiopia opened an operation in 2011 to capture al-Shabaab-controlled areas and immediately controlled the south-central towns of Beletweyen on 31 December 2011 and Baidoa (Bay) in February 2012. Besides, following collaborative efforts by the Somali National Army (SNA), ENDF and the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the group lost substantial territory (Andrew & Nathan, 2016, p. 40). Moreover, due to changing internal and external dynamics, notably the 2013 purge of al-Shabaab senior officials, the death of its prominent leader in 2014 and the emergence of contending jihadist groups such as Hizbul Islam and, later, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), the militant group experienced significant infighting (Andrew & Nathan, 2016, p. 40).

However, gradually, al-Shabaab became strong and controlled several territories in Somalia. Thus, Ethiopian forces entered Somalia for the third time and advanced on al-Shabaab positions in the Bay, Bakool and Hiran regions. However, with the departure of Ethiopian troops in 2016, al-Shabaab had a better chance of regaining control of territory it had previously lost. As of October 2018, al-Shabaab controlled large areas of Somalia’s southern and central regions and an enclave in northern Somalia (Barnett, 2018). Therefore, in terms of capturing al-Shabaab-controlled areas, the ENDF was largely failed.

Furthermore, undermining the enemies’ ability to emerge as a threat to the intervening state is another variable for measuring outcomes. In this regard, although the ENDF was able to defeat the Islamic Union (al-Ittihad al-Islamiya) and the Islamic Courts Union (Ittihad al-Mahakim al-Islamiya) in its 1996 and 2006 interventions in Somalia, it was not able to halt the proliferation of several insurgent groups across Somalia, such as al-Shabaab, Raas Kamboni, Hizbul al-Islam, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat and al Furqaan (Harnisch, 2010, p. 11; Menkhaus, 2009, p. 2; Shinn, 2006, p. 206). According to Wise (2011, p. 4), the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia fuelled the development of al-Shabaab’s ideology, recruitment strategy, operational strategy and partnerships, transforming the group from a small, relatively insignificant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country. According to the GTD report, 1796 incidents involving al-Shabaab occurred after Ethiopia’s intervention. According to the study, al-Shabaab attacks have increased across Somalia, including parts of northern Somalia such as Bossaso, Galkayo, Garowe and other locations (Enos et al., 2017, pp. 1–3). Furthermore, al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to ‘melt readily into the population’ and gain support from a variety of Somali communities. Al-Shabaab recruits a large number of ground warriors from marginalised and outcast minority clans. Al-Shabaab continues to perform as a ‘shadow government’ in Somalia and has demonstrated resilience and adaptability (Humud, 2016). Al-Shabaab is currently the country’s most radical, resilient and militarily capable jihadist force (Bacon, 2018). In general, Ethiopia failed to contain and pre-empt the insurgency that their occupation predictably triggered, and they were forced to withdraw with their main objectives unmet.

Like Ethiopia, the Kenyan government intervened in Somalia with the objective of clearing al-Shabaab from southern Somalia and neutralising the security threat it posed (Shay, 2014, p. 141). In this regard, the initial weeks of the offensive were successful, and liberated considerable territory for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to eventually administer for itself, with some 17 towns and 95,000 km² reclaimed from al-Shabaab by December 2011 (Shay, 2014, p. 142). Within days of the offensive’s beginning, al-Shabaab was routed from its most economically valuable stronghold and forced to withdraw back into the bush (Shay, 2014, p. 141). This contributed to the decrease of insurgent violence in the months and years following the operation, particularly after the fall of Kismayo (Levs & Yan, 2015). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2018), the Kenyan military and their allies scored hard-won successes against al-Shabaab, and violence decreased in the years that followed, from 1,045 deaths in 2013 to 309 deaths in 2015.

However, several findings suggest that al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out attacks has not been diminished due to the loss of territory. It has threatened Kenya with severe retaliation for its incursion. It continues to attack civilians, the Somali government, AMISOM forces and international targets. Al-Shabaab increased the frequency of terrorist strikes in Kenya following Kenya’s operation and AMISOM’s attack (Levs & Yan, 2015). On 11 July 2010, during the FIFA World Cup final, the organisation launched its first strike outside of Somalia. Seventy-four people were killed in suicide attacks at a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, by the gang in 2010 (Bryden, February 2014). In 2011, al-Shabaab terrorists invaded Kenya’s Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013, resulting in a four-day siege that killed at least 67 people. Al-Shabaab militants stormed Kenya’s Garissa University College in April 2015, killing at least 148 people, and the Nairobi hotel siege in 2019 killed 14 people (Karimi et al., 2013). On 1 April 2018, using two suicide car bombs, al-Shabaab militants attacked a base of Ugandan peacekeeping forces in the town of Bulamarer and killed 46 people (Burke, 2018). Moreover, al-Shabaab has recently carried out different attacks in Mogadishu: 29 people were killed in a hotel siege in 2017, 512 people were killed in truck bombings in 2017, and 82 people were killed in truck bombings in 2019. In January 2016, insurgents attacked a Kenyan AMISOM base, killing over 100 soldiers in one of the mission’s bloodiest attacks since its establishment in 2007 (Oladipo, 2016). In 2017, al-Shabaab detonated two truck bombs in downtown Mogadishu, killing over 500 civilians in what many Somalis consider their country’s 9/11 (Sullivan, 2017). All these figures show that like Ethiopia, Kenya and its allies were unable to completely defeat al-Shabaab (and insurgent violence continues to be a severe problem for Somalia’s and Kenya’s governments even today after the Kenyan operation). In other words, both states’ operations in Somalia were unable to reduce rebel violence and territorial control. Still, al-Shabaab remained and continued as a severe threat to Kenya and the Horn of Africa (Oluoch, 2017, p. 98).

Did Ethiopia and Kenya Secure Their Borders from Somalia’s Threats?

Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s other objectives in Somalia’s intrusion was to secure their border with Somalia. Creating a buffer zone includes pushing out enemies from the occupied area, creating local alliances along the border and preventing the flow of refugees, cross-border raids, smuggling and terrorist attacks (Keating, 2012, p. 20). In doing so, Ethiopia, like Kenya, sought to cultivate and maintain local Somali allies along its porous border with Somalia to secure its border. Based on its immediate and underlying security concerns in the Somalia conflict, Ethiopia uses a number of tactics to advance its national security and interests, including forming bilateral alliances with major parties (Tase, 2011). In terms of security and politics, Ethiopia supports and engages with the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland. Ethiopia has a border with both of these countries, which helps to alleviate Ethiopia’s concerns about the situation in Somalia. It also equips its troops in areas under their command to deal with national security concerns. Ethiopia maintains close ties with several of Somalia’s most powerful warlords, giving them military assistance in their struggle against Islamists (Wezeman, 2010). After the conflict with Eritrea in 2000 and its inability to rely on Assab Port, Ethiopia’s alliance with Somaliland helped it solve its economic and security issues (Keating, 2012, p. 18).

Ethiopian security worries concerning the Somali borderlands are being addressed by emerging clan-based ministates. Despite the threat posed by al-Shabaab, Ethiopia continues to employ the ministates as security buffer zones. Ethiopia’s security defenders include Puntland, Southwest, Hirshabelle, Jubaland and Galmudug. If those ministates fail to contain al-Shabaab, Ethiopian forces would attack as they did in Puntland in early 2016 when al-Shabaab fighters opened a new front in Gara’ad. The Ethiopian government ordered artillery forces to attack al-Shabaab’s new defense posts in the Suud Mountains as Puntland forces felt overwhelmed by al-Shabaab, with whom they had been fighting for three days (Ingiriis, 2018, p. 14).

Like the maintenance of local Somali allies, the other mechanism that Ethiopia and Kenya used to secure their borders was to prevent the flow of refugees. Following Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operations, there was a massive displacement of Somalis into Kenya and Ethiopia; around 113,500 new arrivals were registered in the Dadaab camps between January and August 2011. In Ethiopia, which had been hosting about 40,000 refugees in two camps near Dolo Ado during 2009–2010, approximately 100,000 new arrivals were recorded. Smaller numbers were being sheltered in camps near the city of Jijiga in the east (Hammond, 2014, p. 64). This means that both Ethiopia and Kenya were unable to fully prevent the flow of refugees from Somalia into their respective countries. The presence of Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya has heightened tensions and created ethnic militants in these countries’ Somali-populated areas. Furthermore, the economic impact of hosting refugees is considerable in these countries. However, the intervention prevented the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) from posing a threat to the Somali region’s administration and population in terms of humanitarian aid distribution and other day-to-day activities (Ingiriis, 2018, p. 14).

Similar to Ethiopia, one of the objectives of Kenya’s engagement in Somalia was to establish an independent territory along its border that would act as a buffer state to keep Somali militancy from spilling into Kenya (Anderson & McKnight, 2015, p. 15). Kenya was, of course, surprisingly quiet for years in the face of spillovers from Somalia’s decades-long conflict (Menkhaus, 2012). Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya did not attempt to influence Somali political developments in its favour by supporting local militias along the border to create a buffer zone. Kenya has similarly eschewed operations against armed groups across its borders. As the cost of the Somali crisis escalated, the Kenyan government became more proactive (Menkhaus, 2012). From 2002 to 2004, Kenya backed a long-running Somali peace process that culminated in the formation of the TFG. Kenya went on to become a key diplomatic partner of the TFG, provoking al-Shabaab’s wrath (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2008). Kenya had permitted an Ethiopian military attack against al-Shabaab to pass across its territory into the border town of Bulo Hawa. Thus, according to Kenyan Somalis, al-Shabaab violence has reportedly augmented in Kenya as a result of the move (Menkhaus, 2012).

In response to the TFG’s poor performance and al-Shabaab’s dominance of the Jubaland border areas, Kenya devised a plan to establish a friendlier buffer zone around its borders. In Somalia, Kenya was imitating Ethiopia’s ‘containment’ strategy.¹ In doing so, Kenya has formed partnerships with anti-Shabaab armed groups. Several of these Somali factions were urged by the Kenyan government to join the ‘Joint Task Force’ led by Kenyan soldiers in the Jubba region. According to a KDF official, the Ras Kamboni militia was one of Kenya’s allies. The Jubaland project, which included training about 2,500 troops and creating an administrative system, was led by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed Gandhi. Before becoming the president of Jubaland (Azania), he served as the TFG’s defense minister (Menkhaus, 2012). Throughout 2011, at least six Somali allies attempted to engage with Kenya, including Ras Kamboni, the TFG, the self-declared Azania ‘regional administration’, the Isiolo militia, the Al-Sunna Wal Jamma militia and several Gedo clan groupings (ICG, 2012).

Thus, in April 2011, an autonomous state named Azania was declared in the border region of Jubaland, giving Kenya a willing partner in this endeavour (Muhumed, 2011). However, later on, the project failed and worked in favour of al-Shabaab (Atta-Asamoah, 2015a, 2015b). Jubaland’s policy failed due to clan division and people’s identification with their clans. There has been friction between Kenyan security forces and al-Shabaab along the borders of north-eastern Kenya since the Jubaland project (Hummod, 2011). In the process of building a buffer zone, the KDF liberated the port city of Kismaayo in late September 2012, which served as an economic base for al-Shabaab militants. However, the operation was marred by a number of issues in addition to its success. On 15 January, Defense Minister Yusuf Haji stated that the KDF had achieved their goal of establishing a buffer zone in southern Somalia and that they would only proceed to Kismaayo with international assistance. ‘We believe we have accomplished our goal of driving al-Shabaab away from our borders and establishing a buffer zone’ (Binnie, 2012). However, according to some accounts, despite the KDF’s relatively seamless occupation of Jubaland, traditional territorial control has proven inadequate for detecting and interdicting militants. The problem is that the KDF pushed through to Kismaayo and did not pacify its territory (Bahadur, 1 June 2014). An interview with a Kenyan informant shows that even though Kenyan troops have helped liberate towns and cities in southern Somalia, pushing out al-Shabaab from the city of Kismayo—its bastion and major revenue base—which now serves as the headquarters of Jubaland, one of the five semi-autonomous federal member states, the operation was unable to disarm al-Shabaab and establish a buffer zone for a long period of time.²

However, even success within Kenya’s sector and area of responsibility under AMISOM (Sector 2) has been limited. Today, the Juba Valley serves as al-Shabaab’s headquarters. The group controls Buale, Saakow and Jilib, all major towns in the Middle Juba region of Somalia. The latter, Jilib, serves as the de facto al-Shabaab headquarters. The Kenyan military and its allies in the Jubaland government control only the islands of a few towns that are disconnected from each other and besieged and isolated by al-Shabaab. The militants control the hinterland and major access roads, and it is difficult for both civilians and government officials to move between liberated towns (Binnie, 2012). For instance, Dobley, Afmadow and Kismayo are not accessible by road, and Jubaland government officials intending to move between these towns have to fly to their destination.³

Furthermore, the flow of refugees, cross-border rides and smuggling somehow also continued into Kenya. Al-Shabaab’s most successful cross-border expansion has continued into Kenya. At present, ethnic Somalis make up 2% of the population, and Muslims make up 12%. There are also more than 959,000 Somali refugees. The group attracts a sizable number of foreign fighters and successfully recruits Somalis from the diaspora (Binnie, 2012). During and after Kenya’s intervention, the enormous influx of refugees is causing a social and economic crisis in Kenya, with al-Shabaab militias infiltrating the camps disguised as refugees. Al-Shabaab members entered Kenya as refugees and used refugee camps as bases for planning and launching attacks on Kenyan soil. Therefore, even though there was strict control over the flow of refugees and effective screening of them to distinguish al-Shabaab members from genuine refugees, al-Shabaab continued to commit various attacks inside Somalia (UN High Commission for Refugees, 2011).

Besides, the initial purpose of the foray—preventing al-Shabaab’s incursions into Kenya—has not been achieved. According to Anderson and McKnight (2014, p. 15), the retaliatory attacks of al-Shabaab continued. Every year, Kenya experiences dozens of attacks along its northeastern border and in Lamu County (Menkhaus, 2012). Al-Shabaab also reactivated its dormant cells in Kenya and launched multiple attacks in well-known places such as Nairobi and Mombasa, garnering considerable attention from the general public and the international media. The attacks target both security forces and civilians, claiming dozens of lives. For instance, by June 2014, it was estimated conservatively that there had been more than 80 such attacks in Kenya since the invasion. Assessments suggest that the attacks are not diminishing but becoming increasingly costly in terms of lives lost. Al-Shabaab’s ‘reinvention’ may have very serious implications for Kenya (Anderson & McKnight, 2014, p. 15). This is an enemy that increasingly uses images of Muslim economic deprivation, political marginalisation and social oppression to call its followers to arms. Like Ethiopia, the Kenyan government’s behaviour, especially its security forces’ behaviour towards the country’s Muslim population, in both the past and present, provides fertile ground in which al-Shabaab and Al-Hijra can sow the seeds of further dissent and disaffection. Kenya is making matters worse by alienating and victimising the Muslim population. These actions are only likely to prolong and deepen the struggle that lies ahead (Anderson & McKnight, 2014, p. 26).

Kenya entered the conflict without truly understanding the possible effects of its intervention on regional political dynamics, particularly in Jubaland, and is now entangled in the intricate clan conflicts of Somalia. There have been tense relations between the two nations, particularly under President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s administration. This is mostly attributed to differences over Kenya’s military involvement in Jubaland, its support for Jubaland regional leader Ahmed Madobe and the long-running maritime dispute between the two countries, on which the International Court of Justice ruled in October 2021. The two nations have cut diplomatic ties two times as a result of the deteriorating relations between them. The Gedo crisis of 2020–2021 is evidence that Jubaland’s internal clan politics have entangled Kenya. Kenya allegedly supported and provided refuge to dissident Abdirashid Janan during the fighting between Jubaland forces and federal government troops in the Gedo town of Bula Hawo. As a result, Janan allegedly had a base in Mandera, inside Kenyan territory, from which he could gather militias to launch attacks against the troops supported by Mogadishu stationed in Bula Hawo.⁴

Comparing Achievements of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s Intervention in Somalia

Because of the various influencing factors and the nebulous nature of military success, determining the achievement of military interventions is challenging. However, military success might be evaluated in the light of whether the intervening countries achieved their stated objectives or not. In this regard, Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s intrusions into Somalia were assessed in terms of their objectives of intervention. Both states have had some successes as well as some setbacks. Although the invasions by Ethiopia and Kenya were successful in weakening al-Shabaab and controlling some of the areas it occupied, they were unable to destroy the group or the ideology it upholds. Following their operations, the group suffered from severe internal strife, losing a significant amount of territory and its main source of income. Al-Shabaab did, however, grow stronger over time and emerged to control a number of regions in Somalia, which demonstrates its resilience and adaptability. Ethiopia, in contrast to Kenya, was able to secure its border from al-Shabaab’s attack. Ethiopia was able to accomplish this by establishing clan-based ministates, utilising strong intelligence, preventing the flow of refugees and weakening its internal enemies that had relations with al-Shabaab. So unlike Kenya, Ethiopia was relatively successful in denying a foothold for al-Shabaab in Ethiopian territory.

In contrast to Ethiopia, al-Shabaab’s attack in Kenya was frequent and deadly. Al-Shabaab increased the frequency of terrorist strikes in Kenya following Kenya’s operation. This showed Kenya’s poor intelligence, its inability to prevent the flow of refugees and its inability to secure its border with Somalia. The operations of both states are causing high levels of casualties among their troops as well as high levels of civilian deaths and displacement. This, in turn, contributed to creating a favourable environment for al-Shabaab to meltdown among the people and increase its resistance capacity. Furthermore, both countries’ operations failed to reduce the economic and military sources of al-Shabaab as well as the proliferation of several terrorist groups and networks. The operations of both states were deepening the quagmire in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, even though they played a key role in containing al-Shabaab and helping to establish a transitional government in Somalia. Ethiopia was a little bit more successful than Kenya (US DoJ, 2009). The TFG’s ability to eventually acquire the necessary skills to successfully negotiate a challenging political transition and win over interest groups that had supported al-Shabaab but were becoming increasingly disillusioned by the militants’ rising radicalism was the most significant development during Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s interventions. The key factor in avoiding Kenya’s intervention from failing, like that of Ethiopia, was the central government’s increasing capacity.

Overall, the two states’ primary intervention strategies were always doomed to largely fail since they were primarily motivated by concerns for state security rather than human security. The idea of pursuing state security in a way that has minimal bearing on human security at home and abroad was a major reason for failure, which suggests that the factors of success and failure go beyond operational issues of planning and strategising.

Conclusion

This article examined the success of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operations in relation to their outcomes. Ethiopia’s intervention outcomes are measured by its stated objectives, such as defeating al-Shabaab, securing its border and disrupting anti-Ethiopian regional alliances. The ENDF was successful for a short period of time in capturing enemy-controlled territories, but gradually, al-Shabaab became strong and controlled many areas, causing many attacks and establishing many networks. Ethiopia was relatively successful in securing its border with Somalia against terrorist attacks and massive refugee flows, as well as in undermining internal opponents such as the ONLF and OLF. But it failed to prevent al-Shabaab’s financial support and troops training, backing and breaking its network with local, regional and international entities. Like Ethiopia, Kenya’s intervention outcomes are determined by variables, such as defeating al-Shabaab and capturing the areas it controlled, and establishing a buffer zone. Kenya’s operation was initially successful in weakening al-Shabaab’s operations, capturing al-Shabaab-controlled areas, liberating Kismayo and establishing a buffer zone for a short period of time, even though it failed later on. Soon after the operation began, it was unable to stop retaliatory attacks, block the economic and military sources of support, and stop the proliferation of several terrorist groups and networks. The operations were deepening the quagmire in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Overall, Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s operations largely failed to meet the stated goals of their interventions due to various reasons.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to those who helped us improve this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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