The Predicament of Security: Tracing Two Years of Taliban Rule

Introduction

On 15 August 2021, Taliban marched its forces of radicalism, Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and ethno-fascism and took control of Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. Two decades of American war (2001–2021) could not sustain the democratic government, finally leading to the reinstatement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.

More than 1.6 million Afghans have fled the country since the takeover of Taliban in 2021 (UNHCR, 2023). Afghanistan has been engulfed in a severe humanitarian crisis with more than 3.2 million Afghans being internally displaced (UNHCR, 2023). In 2023, at least 8.2 million Afghan refugees were hosted across 103 countries, making it the third-largest displaced population in the world (UNHCR, 2023). The poorest country in Asia (UNDP, 2021), Afghanistan has been afflicted with glaring poverty, with 97% of the country’s population living below the poverty line (UN Afghanistan, 2022). Today, Afghanistan has gone off the radar of the international community as the Russia–Ukraine conflict has occupied the centre stage (Gossman, 2023).

The paper is an attempt to assess the overall security situation in Afghanistan after the two years of Taliban rule and its larger implications in the Asian region. The paper highlights the deteriorating internal security situation that is bolstering Pashtunisation in Afghanistan and causing the forced displacement of non-Pashtuns. The implications of this grim development in India’s neighbourhood have severely impacted the peace and security of the Central Asian Region (CAR), Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan. The victory of the Taliban has resuscitated myriad terrorist groups who want to establish Islamic Caliphate in neighbouring countries, therefore leading to the gradual Talibanisation of the Asian region. The paper also delves into how the departure of foreign forces has created a power vacuum in Afghanistan that has led to the revival of a New Great Game with the addition of regional actors.

Exacerbation of the Security Situation in Afghanistan: Tracing Terror, Trauma and Tremors

Amidst the spectre of the looming humanitarian crisis caused by the four decades of unending conflict, Western Afghanistan was stuck with a devastating earthquake in October 2023 that killed 1,400 people (Unicef.org).

All this is when the country has been struggling hard to meet its essential needs with regard to food, health, nutrition and shelter. In 2023, 28.3 million Afghans, which constituted two thirds of the population, were in dire need of immediate humanitarian assistance (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2023). Food insecurity has been severe. Over 17 million Afghans faced acute hunger in 2023, including 6 million at the critical level of food insecurity—a mere step away from the throes of famine (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2023). One in three Afghans was unaware of how to secure their next meal in 2023 (Relief Web, 2023). Inaccessibility to food has catapulted malnutrition to a record high in Afghanistan. Child malnutrition stands at critical levels where 1 million children have been malnourished and 2.3 million have been suffering from moderate acute malnutrition (ANI, 2023). More than 90% of the population has been reeling under stark poverty, with over half of Afghans dependent on humanitarian aid (International Rescue Committee, 2023). The fragile economy of the country has deeply impacted 80% of women and children (IRC, 2023). Child labour has been on the rise as women-headed households sent their children to work and earn money so that they could at least buy food. Child marriage and the selling of underage girls into marriage have become rampant as Afghan families are facing economic hardships, and they are left with little money to arrange food for themselves. Girls as young as nine years old are also sold into marriage so as to seek their protection from conflict, settle disputes or improve relations with rival families (Huang, 2022). Afghanistan’s economy has also been reeling under severe depression. From 11.70%in 2020, the unemployment rate has spiked to 13.30% in 2021. GDP has further dwindled by 3.6% in 2022 (UNDP, 2023). The per capita income plummeted to a staggering 30% between 2020 and 2022, making Afghanistan the country with the lowest per capita income in the world (UNDP, 2023).

As Afghanistan witnesses the collapse of humanity and the state governance structure, it has become a fertile ground for extremism, terrorism and regional instability embroiling not only itself but also the Asian region at large. Approximately 7 billion dollars of military equipment has been abandoned by American forces after they departed in August 2021 (Kaufman, 2022). The military equipment includes aircraft, air-to-ground munitions, military vehicles, weapons, communication equipment and other military materials that the United States transported to Afghanistan as part of its mission to bring in democracy. In a report submitted by the US Department of Defense to the Congress, it mentions that there are no plans to retrieve or destroy the military equipment (Kaufman, 2022). These weapons are being illegally transported and sold secondhand to Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) or Lashakar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Kashmir valley, which has been a source of revenue for the Taliban (Lateef, 2022; Sputnik India, 2023). A terrorist attack carried out by a militant group in Kashmir named Jammu and Kashmir Freedom Fighters on 13 May 2023 on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims has claimed that they used sticky bombs. The use of sticky bombs is a new phenomenon in Kashmir, and they were regularly used by militants in Afghanistan to attack NATO forces (Lateef, 2022). Weapons carrying American stamps have also been found by Indian military officials (Lateef, 2022). This is a serious development and does not augur well for India as militants, now boosted by the victory of an extremist group in India’s neighbourhood, intend to incite separatist elements and disrupt the law and order, therefore threatening the territorial integrity and national security of India.

At the same time, there has been a conspicuous normative change. The madrassas ¹ situated in Akhora Khatak and Haqqania, located 60 miles away from the Afghan border near Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s capital Peshawar, provided a training ground for Taliban for waging Jihad. ² In the 1980s, they were trained to defeat the USSR and in the 2000s to oust the Americans from Afghanistan. Today, these madrassas are upbeat about the significant positions of authority attained by Taliban fighters. Earlier dubbed as the ‘University of Jihad’ by critics, these madrassas now proudly claim themselves to be the ‘University of the Taliban Cabinet’ (Independent, 2022).

Bolstered by the victory of the Taliban, terrorists operating in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan aim to seize political power and establish Islamic Emirate in other countries. The closest ally of the Afghan Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has increased terrorist attacks in Pakistan. TTP is the largest militant organisation operating in Pakistan with an objective of establishing a pure Islamic Emirate in Pakistan and purging the society from modern Western influence.

Contrary to the widespread belief that the Taliban would contain the TTP fighters to foster relative peace. TTP has rather shifted its focus in acquiring political power in Pakistan as happened in Afghanistan by orchestrating a surge in terrorist activities. TTP claimed attacks have more than tripled between 2020 and 2022, with the monthly attack average escalating from 14.5 in 2020 to 23.5 in 2021 and 45.8 in 2022 ³ (Sayed & Hamming, 2023). In 2021 alone, there were 294 attacks, an increase of 56% since 2020 with 45 attacks in December (Ghosh, 2022a). Pakistan responded to the intensified terror attacks by TTP by expelling undocumented immigrants by 1 November 2023. Pakistan currently hosts 4 million Afghan refugees and migrants amongst whom 1.7 million are undocumented (Shahid, 2023).

The Dismal State of Afghan Refugees

Four decades of constant war, political instability and turmoil, fragile state of economy and poverty haves made Afghan refugees the third-largest displaced population in the world after Syrian and Ukrainian refugees (UNHCR, July 2023). The collapse of democracy in Afghanistan and its takeover by the Taliban in 2021 have further caused 1.6 million Afghans to flee the country in order to secure their freedom and safety and prevent themselves from chronic hunger (Paimani & Noorzai, 2023). Around 8.2 million Afghans have been residing in neighbouring countries, of which a majority of them are in Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR, July 2023). Iran has around 3 million Afghan refugees, of which 2.6 million are undocumented and 0.6 million are Afghan passport holders (UNHCR, Iran). Since August 2021, around 1 million Afghan refugees have crossed over to Iran (UNHCR, Iran). But these refugees face an unpredictable and bleak future in Iran as many face a constant threat of deportation and difficulty in accessing basic provisions that include education, healthcare and employment. From September to December 2023, Iran had deported around 345,000 Afghans (Gul, 2023). The reasons for deportation by Iran are not hard to find. A combination of factors including dwindling foreign assistance, domestic turbulence and competition over resources contributed to their expulsion. In August 2023, some 46,000 Afghans returned voluntarily and 43,000 due to lack of proper documentation (Kotokey, 2023). Another significant reason for their return to Afghanistan is the discriminatory refugee policy pursued by Iran that favours Afghan Shias over other ethnic groups. This discrimination further aggravates the state of living of Afghan refugees. Though the difficulty levels mount for non-Shia Afghans, it is all the more complex for Hazara Afghan Shias. The latter are strategically used by Iran where they are made to voluntarily join or are coerced into military grouping in exchange for their survival in Iran. These Hazara Afghan Shias join the ‘The Fatemiyoun Army’ to protect Iran’s interests in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan (Hasan, 2021). The Taliban has accused Iran of causing instability in Afghanistan by mobilising Fatemiyouns against them after the departure of US forces (Hasan, 2021).

A similar fate is shared by Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Grappling with its own economic crisis, political turmoil, protests and popular resistance against the government, poverty, violence and high unemployment rate, Pakistan is unable to keep its doors open for the 4.4 million Afghan refugees (Al Jazeera, 2023). Since the announcement of expulsion of Afghan refugees on 15 September 2023, Afghanistan has reported a daily arrival of 9,000–10,000 Afghans as compared to an average of 300 Afghans per day before the announcement (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2023). An estimated 0.2 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since 1 November 2023 (Khaliq, 2023).

There are myriad reasons for the expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. The predominant reason has been the escalation in terrorist attacks by TTP. To salvage the image of the government and to combat the menace of terrorism in the country, Pakistan announced the deportation of nearly 2 million undocumented Afghan migrants (Fahrney, 2023). Many of the expelled Afghans who have been living in Pakistan for long with proper documentation have also been uprooted. Their small businesses and properties have been usurped by Pakistan (Hussain, 2023). The other reason is that the ethnic Pashtuns who form the majority of Afghan refugees are considered a threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Pakistan wants to prevent the strengthening of Pashtun’s secessionist demand for Pashtunistan (Fahrney, 2023).

The decline of foreign financial assistance has also been considered as one of the reasons for their expulsion (Zaman, 2023). Launched in 2023, the Regional Response Plan intended to support 7.3 million Afghan refugees residing in five neighbouring countries—Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—has received only 15.4% funding out of the $613 million to address their requirements (International Rescue Committee, 2023). The World Food Programme and the World Health Organization do not have sufficient financial resources to execute humanitarian assistance programmes for Afghanistan (Schifrin & Warsi, 2023). The freezing of 7 billion dollars of Afghan funds by America has reduced the Afghan economy to shambles (Ghosh, 2022b), making it difficult to provide for the Afghans. Another noteworthy reason for the forced displacement of Pakistan–Afghan refugees is to relocate them to Northern and North-eastern Afghanistan, which is home to a majority of non-Pashtuns (Shakib, 2023).

Afghanisation of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is home to an ethnically diverse population that is composed of 42% Pashtuns, 27% of Tajiks form the second largest ethnic group in the country, 9% of Hazaras and Uzbeks each, Aimak is 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2% and others form 4% (Mirza, 2022). Post the advent of the Taliban, attacks on religious and ethnic minorities have increased (Amnesty International, 2022; Religious Freedom Institute, 2022). Religious and civil liberties of Hindus, Sikhs, Bahai’s, Christians, Ahmadis and Shi’ite Muslims have been dealt a severe blow under the Taliban (Negah & Siddique, 2023). Non-Pashtuns have been repeatedly persecuted (Siddique, 2022). Taliban are an Islamo-fascist and ethno-nationalist group. Their objective is to establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and impose their interpretation of Sharia rule in the country. Extremist elements within Pashtuns consider non-Pashtuns a threat to their objective of achieving Pashtun dominance and an impediment in attaining the centralised hold over the governance structure by Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Talibans, who are largely Pashtuns, harbour malicious designs of purging Afghanistan from non-Pashtuns and establishing the reign of Pashtuns in Afghan society. This is termed as Pashtunisation. This assertion of social divide and social polarisation underlines a larger trend towards the Pashtunisation of Afghanistan. The phenomenon of Pashtunisation is not new. The conflict-ridden country has been marred by constant assaults of Pashtunisation by previous rulers.

Various strategies have been deployed for centuries to make the country an abode of Pashtuns to such an extent that entire Afghanistan becomes synonymous with only one dominant ethnic tribe. This process is also christened as Afghanisation. Afghanisation subsumes all the other ethnic and religious identities under a dominant ethnicity, that is, Pashtuns. It has had severe repercussions, leading to the displacement and extermination of non-Pashtuns over the centuries. During the eighteenth century, the Durrani Pashtun Empire (1747–1880) engaged in conflicts against the weak Turkic empires in Northern Afghanistan. Prominently known as ‘Iron Amir’, Abdur Rahman Khan sustained his rule by colluding with British colonisers and accepting political support, annual cash subsidies and British weaponry in exchange. This caused significant distrust among the northern non-Pashtun communities, leading to the refusal to accept his rule and subsequent rebellions during the 1880s that Abdur Rahman suppressed through direct force and administrative, cultural and linguistic violence (Shahrani, 2018). To create a Pashtun-centric Afghanistan, many communities of Pashtuns were moved from South to especially North-western province of Turkestan province, which is today’s Faryab, Jawzjan, Balk, Saripul and Samangan provinces. Abdul Rahman Durrani’s Pashtun Maldar were relocated from Kandahar to Turkistan, Qataghan and Badakshan, areas predominantly inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other minorities, where they were given prime pasture and farmland. Ghilzai Pashtun Kuchi nomadic herders were also relocated to these areas. King Amanullah, the grandson of Amir Abdur Rahman, who ruled from 1919 to 1929 along with his father-in-law Mahmood Tarzi, continued with their biased policies towards non-Pashtuns and created Pashtun-centred Afghan nationalism. They also initiated cultural and demographic hegemony in Turkistan, Qataghan and Badakshan provinces, disarming the populace in 1921 and passing the Nizamnamayee Naqileen ba Samiti Qataghan Act in 1923 that gave land and tax benefits exclusively to Pashtuns. Half an acre or four acres of irrigated land were given to every Pashtun male and female member of the family above seven years of age at a nominal price along with preferential tax benefits in Qataghan province. These preferential policies persisted from the 1930s to the 1950s, leading to an erasure of the history of non-Pashtuns, demolition of historic monuments and historical manuscripts, renaming of the local places and division of the non-Pashtun Afghan provinces of Turkistan, Qataghan and Badakshan into nine new administrative units—Faryab, Jawzjan, Saripul, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakshan—to undermine the common identities of Turkestani and Qataghani. These preferential policies continued till the communist coup of 1978. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Central Government’s control enfeebled in the peripheral regions and Northern Afghanistan causing non-Pashtuns to arm and organise themselves to resist Soviet occupation. Pakistan-based Jihadi parties supplied weapons and logistical support to Pashtuns to defend against non-Pashtuns and resist Soviet occupation. Lands vacated by Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan of Badakshan and Takhar were taken by Tajik and Uzbek neighbours. However, the Pashtuns settled in ‘pockets’ in the north provided a fertile ground for the extremist forces of the Taliban to gain control in Afghanistan. During the Taliban rule in 1997, the Pashtuns who fled during Soviet occupation returned from Pakistan along with new Taliban soldiers. Non-Pashtuns were once again subjected to brutal torture, violence and killings that furthered tensions and acts of revenge in the n region (Shahrani, 2018).

Since the takeover by the Taliban in August 2021, the ethno-nationalist and extremist group has continued with the discriminatory policy of Pashtunisation by cleansing society through brutal means of executions, persecutions of non-Pashtuns or by deploying fear-mongering, forcibly displacing non-Pashtuns from Northern and North-eastern Afghanistan or relocating Pashtuns in the non-Pashtuns strongholds.

Suspicions have been cast over the building of the Queshtapa Canal project in Northern Afghanistan (Seerat, 2023). Non-Pashtuns fear that the development is another malicious attempt by the Taliban to facilitate the alteration of ethnic demography in the region. Spanning from Kaldar district in Balk province to Andhoy district in Faryab province, the building of the 285-km-long canal aims to divert the water of the Amu Darya river to the arid plains of Northern Afghanistan. The project intends to irrigate 500,000 hectares of land in Balkh, Jawzjan and Faryab provinces, which will boost the agricultural productivity of Afghanistan and foster food self-sufficiency in the country. It will also spur employment generation, hence contributing substantially to the weak economy of the country. However, Qushtapa Canal has been strategically exploited by the Taliban who seek to gradually drive out the population of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras and other minorities and resettle Pashtuns even Pakistani Pashtuns in the Northern and North-eastern Afghanistan (Seerat, 2023). Therefore, the announcement by Pakistan to oust Afghan refugees by 1 November 2023 has to be read in this light.

Another strategy deployed by the Taliban to alter the ethnic demography of non-Pashtuns is to permit the free movement of Kuchis (Seerat, 2023). Supported by the Central Government, Kuchis are the Pashtun nomads who travel and stay anywhere in Afghanistan. They often travel to North, settle freely on lands and seek share from the land of local inhabitants for their resettlement. This has escalated conflicts between Kuchis and non-Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan. Over 1,000 ethnic Uzbeks and Turkmen have been forcibly displaced from their homes and farmland in Darzab and Qushtepa where they have been living for hundreds of years (Siddique, 2021). More than 20,000 acres of land have been seized from the families and distributed to Taliban supporters and Pashtun nomads as part of collective punishment meted out by the Taliban on ethnic minorities for supporting the US-backed government (Siddique, 2021). In early October 2021, hundreds of Hazara Shias were expelled from both Southern Helmand and the Northern Balkh provinces (Siddique, 2021). In late September 2021, hundreds of Hazara families were abruptly asked to vacate their homes and farms in three provinces of Daikund, Uruzgan and Kandahar with insufficient notice and no opportunity to show their legal claims over land (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The Pashtuns who supported the democratic, republic government have also been displaced. A staggering 4 million Afghans have been displaced within the country (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Besides causing grave human rights violations of Afghans, the dangers of Pashtunisation not only will remain confined to the country but also will spill over to the Asian region at large (will be dealt with in detail in the next section). It will further fall into the grip of radicalism and terrorism that will stoke more instability and hinder development goals. Two important developments will substantiate the above arguments. The decision to resettle new Taliban soldiers from Pakistan or the TTP members into non-Pashtun areas of Northern Afghanistan does not bode well.

Formed in 2007, TTP is an alliance of militant networks that seeks to overthrow the Pakistan government and establish an Islamic Caliphate in the country. There was an agreement between Pakistan and the Taliban to move TTP members from the Afghan provinces of Khost and Kunnar that are close to Afghan–Pakistan border (Rahmati, 2023). Approximately 72,000 refugees have been living there (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2019). Taliban has agreed to allocate land to TTP, whereas Pakistan will fund agricultural tools and resettlement supplies (Rahmati, 2023). Relocation of TTP members in Northern Afghanistan will Waziristanise Afghanistan that will become a fertile ground to launch terrorist activities in the CAR, China and Russia (Seerat, 2023). Waziristan is a place in Pakistan that has been a hotbed of terrorism and provided sanctuary to Taliban and Al Qaeda during the two decades of American war. The second concern has been the intensified efforts by the Taliban to open religious schools in northern provinces, particularly in Tajik-majority provinces that were prominent for waging resistance war by the National Resistance Front under Ahmad Massoud against the extremist group. Punjsheer now has 56 newly built religious schools, 299 in Takhar and 320 in Badakshan (Seerat, 2023; TV, 2023). As the Taliban suppresses and exterminates the forces of opposition and installs its allies in the non-Pashtun areas, it opens doors for the further Talibanisation of Afghanistan and the Asian region at large.

Talibanisation Across the Asian Region

As the Taliban was advancing in 2021, the control of the five districts—KufAb, Khwahan, Maimay, Nusay and Shekay (Fazliddin, 2021), which are in Badakshan province (Tajik majority province), located in North-eastern Afghanistan—was handed over to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Tajikistan (TTT) fighters. TTT is a Tajik Islamist movement that is related to AlQaeda and is based in Badakshan province of Afghanistan. TTT has emerged as a front-runner in the five districts of Badakshan province bordering Tajikistan to secure the interests and strengthen the control of the Taliban in North-eastern Afghanistan. Some of the disgruntled youths of the Tajiks and Uzbeks have also fallen to the intoxicating ideology of the Taliban and have joined them in conducting terrorist activities. This Taliban-supported group TTT is also acting as a bulwark against the anti-Taliban group called the National Resistance Forces (NRF), and the other groups that are in opposition to the rule and interests of the Taliban. NRF led by Ahmad Massoud is an anti-Taliban insurgent group that has the objective of draining the strength of the enemy in the short run and also harbours a long-term vision to establish a federal, decentralised and democratic Republic in Afghanistan by dismantling the Pashtun dominance and devolving the powers to ethnic minorities (Shekhawat, 2023). Some of the opposition groups that have emerged after the takeover by the Taliban are Afghanistan Freedom Front, which has a presence in all 34 provinces, and the Afghanistan Islamic National and Liberation Movement, which fights for former security officers killed by the Taliban.

Post 2021, TTT stood at the Afghan–Tajik border and obstructed Afghan National Defence Security Forces (ANDSF) from fleeing the country, resorting to lethal force against them. Approximately 200 Tajik Islamists have been engaged in combat against the ANDSF and US-led security forces since 2015–2016 (Ramachandran, 2023). Fearing potential civil unrest in the country over the discontentment and suppression of various ethnic groups, the Taliban has provided the group with the latest weapons, communication equipment, vehicles and combat gear. TTT fighters have set aside their ethnic identity and are pursuing a larger goal of establishing an Islamic Emirate not only in Afghanistan but also across the CAR. The primary goal of TTT is to overthrow the secular government in Tajikistan and implement Islamic rule in the country. Though TTT is not a recent occurrence in Afghanistan, they have been existing under the name of Jamaat Ansarullah (Ramachandran, 2023). But bolstered by the victory of the Taliban, TTT has re-emerged and has collaborated with the Taliban to facilitate the takeover of Islamic rule in the CAR that includes Afghan bordering states Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and also spreading terror in nearby Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Under the leadership of Muhammad Sharipov aka Mahdi Arsalan, TTT can be traced back to the Al Qaida–affiliated Jamaat Ansarullah that has been engaged in armed insurgency since 2006. TTT comprises second-generation fighters from Jamaat Ansarullah. The presence of TTT in Shahri Buzurg district of Badakshan province that lies on the border of Afghanistan–Tajikistan has strained relations between the two countries to such an extent that Tajikistan has not recognised the Taliban Government. Apart from TTT, Tajikistan has another significant reason to fear the increasing presence of terrorist groups near its border. Gorno Badakshan province in the Tajik region is currently volatile as the inhabitants are demanding secession from Tajikistan. The presence of TTT on its borders will further fuel the violent protests in Gorno Badakshan province.

The shifting geopolitics has unsettled both China and Russia. Russia holds significant interests in Tajikistan as it aligns with Russia’s lebensraum (vital space) and blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad) policies that seek to expand its military, political and economic influence in the country. Russia perceives the situation as a proxy war by the United States where the latter has opened another warfront in Northern Afghanistan by withdrawing American forces so as to counter and weaken Russia by involving it in multiple conflicts. The hegemony of the United States can be sustained by keeping the Asian region in a perpetual state of war and entangling superpowers China and Russia in managing these crises. Badakshan in North-eastern Afghanistan has emerged as a new focal point for terrorist groups where TTT has found its new abode, and the region is becoming a perfect launching pad for various terrorist groups, viz., Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan that aims to impose Sharia rule and establish Islamic Emirate in Uzbekistan. It also maintained relations with the Taliban in the 1990s. Also, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), based in Xinjiang province in northwest China, has posed immense security risks as the extremist group seeks to carve out a separatist East Turkestan state from parts of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Xianjing Uighur Autonomous Region (Xu et al., 2014). This has escalated militarisation of the region. In Tajikistan, the Russian Federation maintains its 201st military base in Dushanbe and has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to protect the Afghan–Tajik border from the menace of terrorism. Additionally, China has also increased its military presence in the Wakhan corridor that links Afghanistan to Xinjiang. China has pledged 8.5 million US dollars to finance the construction of a military base in Gorno Badakshan province to enhance the security of Tajikistan’s borders.

India has heightened concerns due to its long and painful history of enduring terrorist attacks perpetrated by JeM and LeT. Formed in 2000, JeM is a Pakistan-based Jihadist terrorist group that is active in Kashmir, whose objective is to separate Kashmir from India and merge into Pakistan. LeT, founded in 1990, is a Sunni Muslim militant insurgent group that aims to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India and merge it with Pakistan. These terror groups have now established their presence in Afghanistan to launch further attacks on Indian soil and jeopardise rule of order in the larger Asian region. The situation has been further exacerbated by the escalation of violent attacks by Islamic State of Khorasan-Province (ISKP). ISKP that has been a collective of defectors from Al Qaeda, TTP and former Taliban fighters, targets ethnic and religious minority groups (Human Rights Watch, 2022) on the one hand and, on the other hand, recruits disgruntled youth from ethnic minorities (NDTV World, 2023) (Webber & Velle, 2022). One of the reasons for the contradiction in ISKP’s strategy and vision is to create disunity within their communities. Also, to show minorities as terrorists that will denigrate the image of resistance forces (read NRF and others) as they are depicted as a beacon of democracy, freedom and decentralisation. Iran, which borders Afghanistan, too would not be spared. And the deadliest attack on 3 January 2024 by ISIS-K in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution has already killed around 100 and wounded 294, including children (Hafezi et al., 2024).

Therefore, the process Talibanisation has not halted in North and North-eastern Afghanistan but has further incited radical and terrorist elements in the CAR, China, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and India. The narrative that is been circulated is that the ‘US can be defeated’ (Ao, 2021). These insecurity tremors are also being felt in far Southeast Asian countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines, which have a history of radicalism (Ao, 2021).

The Great Game Gets Bigger

The Great Game is far from over. Rather it has become bigger with the involvement of regional actors. Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan holds immense geostrategic and geopolitical significance. Flanked by Pakistan in the south and east, Iran in the west, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in the North and China in the far North East, Afghanistan is also prominent for being the land of routes as it opens up a gateway to the Central, South and West Asian region. For this reason, in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Afghanistan became the battlefield between two colonial powers British and Czarist Russia who wanted to hold sway over the country to preserve their colonial interests in the Asian region.

Cut to the twenty-first century. The Great Game has become bigger with the addition of regional actors China, Iran, India and Pakistan. However, the departure of American presence from the neighbourhood of China does assuage the American threat to the Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the Asian region. However, China and Iran are wary of the increasing extremism and terrorism.

Iran does not want its country to succumb to the Sunni/Salafi terrorist organisations, given that the Taliban is a Sunni Islamist nationalist group. Secondly, Iran wants to protect Shia Hazaras, a small in ethnic minority Afghanistan from persecution with which it has historical and cultural ties.

China wants to prevent the spillover of terrorism to its Xinjiang Region that will further incite Uighyurs militants from ETIM group to carry out terrorist attacks and demand a separate State from China. Secondly, China wants to preserve its economic interests in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is a major component of the Belt and Road Initiative, and any instability in Afghanistan will hinder its development. Thirdly, China also has its eyes set on the significant mineral resources that is lithium and copper in Afghanistan. But despite China’s active engagement with the Taliban where it became the first country to send an ambassador to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover and invited the latter to be part of the Belt and Road forum in Beijing in October 2023 (Noorzai, 2023), not much headway has been made. China is wary of investing in a conflict-prone country as stability and security are an important prerequisite for development (Al Jazeera, 2022; Noorzai, 2023;). The relations between the two are fraught with constant insecurity dilemmas (Sorenson, 2007) where the weak and volatile domestic affairs in the Afghan state are causes of tension in the larger region.

Though India, China and Russia share a common concern regarding the spread of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from Afghanistan, there has not been a concerted effort. The solution to Afghanistan has been overridden by their geopolitical interests.

Russia skipped inviting India to an extended troika held in Qatar on 11 August 2021 that saw the presence of the United States, China, Pakistan and Russia to discuss the peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict (The Diplomatic Insight, 2021). India strongly opposes the forceful imposition of regime change and has underlined an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled democratic government. Whereas Russia sees Ashraf Ghani, former Afghan president (2014–2021) during American occupation as a US proxy.

Pakistan, though convulsed by the rising terror attacks in its own country, is directing all its efforts in keeping India out of Afghanistan and maintaining its own proxy status in the conflict-ridden country. China does not want to appear to be party to India’s engagement with Afghanistan due to its proximity to its all-weather ally Pakistan. For this reason, China cited ‘scheduling reasons’ and did not participate in India’s security dialogue on Afghanistan on 10 November 2021 but just a day after on 11 November attended Pakistan’s Troika Plus meet (Press Trust of India, 2021).

Conclusion

Global South, despite its deep-rooted differences and disagreements in many realms, has at the least, started to unite the larger Asian region under a common nomenclature and a common identity. Forty years of protracted conflict in Afghanistan not only have marred the development of the Asian region but its impact has also been felt globally with the rise of terror networks. The regional countries need to move beyond the narrow concept of conflict management. The need is to dive deeper into conflict resolution and aim for a larger goal of peacebuilding for Afghanistan. Regional cooperation needs to be forged at various multilateral and regional foras such as UN, SCO and SAARC. Peace in Afghanistan is a common public good that is beneficial for Asia. Looking solely at the narrow-vested interests has not only exacerbated the conflict in Afghanistan but has also held hostage the peace and development in their own countries and also of the larger Asian region. Pakistan’s proxy war against India by backing the Taliban will not augur well for itself too. Pakistan in the past has suffered from the secessionist demand for larger Pashtunistan or greater autonomy for Pashtuns particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Fostering a Pashtun-dominated extremist group might end up becoming a Frankenstein monster for itself. It might incite secessionism leading to another partition of Pakistan which the country (read: Pakistan military) might not be ready for.

China and Russia’s narrow approach to engage economically with the Taliban is like applying a band aid to deeply ingrained injury. Post two years of Taliban, India now needs to shed its ‘wait and watch’ approach. It needs to ramp up its defence preparedness on the borders and actively engage in Afghanistan in various regional and multilateral foras.

Terrorism has no religion and country, and it impacts unevenly and unfairly to anyone and everyone. Fostering terrorism to checkmate the opponent country will not reap dividends in the long run. A consensus that condemns terrorism is the need of the hour. A concerted and potent action is lacking and that is what Global South should aim for.