Navigating East: Exploring Northeast India’s Perspective on the Look (Act) East Policy

Introduction

The conversation about India’s Look (Act) East policy and Northeast India has been going on for more than two decades without much credible evidence of significant change in the region. The rationale that relates the two phenomena ‘Northeast’ and ‘Act East’ is that one complements the other. The success of the Look (Act) East Policy owes, to a great extent, to Northeast India for a number of reasons. One important reason is that Northeast is the bridge to India’s overland outreach to the East and Southeast Asia. ‘There existed sea routes by which seafarers returned to China from the neighbourhood of Kamrupa in the seventh century a.d. Besides this waterway there was also a land route to China, through the northern mountains of Assam’ (Barua, 1951, pp. 98–99). Northeast India’s long-standing cultural and civilisational ties with Southeast Asia also create a natural interface between the two regions. Most of Northeast India’s important hill and plain tribes, including the Khasi, Mizo (Lushai), Naga, Meiteis, Tai-Khamti, Tai-Phake, Tai-Turung, Tai-Khamyang, Kuki, Hmar, Chakma and Tai-Ahom, hail from Southeast Asia or Southwest China and are broadly of Mongoloid stock. J. P. Mills called Northeast India ‘one of the great migration routes of mankind’ (Hazarika, 2017, p. 234). This is evident in the ethnic composition of Northeast India. A large number of indigenous tribal communities settled in the region are people ‘who migrated to Northeast India many centuries ago from countries like Mongolia, Burma, Tibet, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Therefore, the region can better be called a “Mongoloid India” and culturally it is a part of Southeast Asia’ (Das, 2015, p. 44). Thus, geographical contiguity in conjunction with cultural proximity brought Northeast India to the centre stage of the Look (Act) East Policy. There are also traditional routes of land connection between the two geographical areas that, if revitalised, have the potential to strengthen ties and enhance trade and commerce. For example, the Stillwell road was constructed under the leadership of American General Joseph Stilwell in the early 1940s for the defence of Burma from Japanese forces. The road begins in Ledo in Assam and stretches up to Kunming, a city of south-western province of Yunnan in China, spanning 1,736 km. The resumption of this road will increase trade and interaction between the people. But even prior to that there existed routes of communication between Northeast India and its eastern neighbours. The Southern Silk Route, one of the least known overland routes, was about 2,000 km long and connected East and Northeast India to Yunnan Province of China via Myanmar. This route existed before the Central Asian Silk Route gained popularity. This trade route between Northeast India and China was identified in the early third century bce. Chaolung Sukaphaa, the first Ahom King, entered the plains of Assam in 1228 ad followed by migration of a number of Tribes in Assam and other parts of Northeast India, from Mong Mao (the present-day Yunan province of China) via this route.

Thus, the historical link between Northeast India and the Yunnan province of southwest China is also centuries old, although now India is reticent to open up Northeast India to southwest China given the two nations’ bilateral relations. Nevertheless, historical clues in available literature suggest that there exists a profound and enduring bond that underlines the importance of Northeast India in regard to India’s Look (Act) East Policy. The objective of the Look (Act) East policy is also to reinvigorate this enduring historical bond and geographical contiguity to find an overland connection to India’s east while integrating Northeast India with Southeast Asia and mainland India simultaneously. So far, there are not enough visible signs of reciprocal advantage acquired through the Look (Act) East Policy. Nevertheless, the policy holds substantial promise for Northeast India. An objective assessment suggests that the policy has a fair chance of success, and there has been progress in implementation, albeit not up to the expectations of the people as of now.

Methodology

The primary objective of the present study is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the Look (Act) East Policy within the distinctive context of Northeast India. This involves an examination of the current state of the policy and its potential implications for the region. More specifically, the study aims to identify the difficulty of Northeast India in aligning with the policy’s vision and the perception held by the people regarding the prospect of the policy for the North Eastern Region (NER). To achieve this goal, a number of sources were consulted. Primary data were collected from NF Railways of Tripura, S. M. Mukherjee Port of Kolkata and Act East Policy Affairs (AEPA) Department of Guwahati with a structured questionnaire. The inputs of academicians, journalists, policymakers and people living in proximity to various project sites were also taken into account. Secondary data were collected from books, articles, government websites and newspaper reports.

Background

The early 1990s marked a strategic shift in India’s foreign policy with the introduction of the Look East Policy (LEP). India’s historical rapport with its eastern counterparts, including major Asian nations such as China and Japan, had not been sufficiently strong until the 1990s. Till that period, India had been heavily reliant on the Soviet Union for its external needs. As Mazumdar writes ‘In one stroke, India lost its most significant strategic partner and reliable source of financial aid and military hardware, as well as preferential access to markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’ (Mazumdar, 2021, p. 357). This visible leaning of India’s foreign policy has not only kept it socio-culturally disconnected from the nearby east but also isolated it from the economic growth of East Asia.

However, neither side made any significant effort towards transforming this seamless relationship into a long-term one. The result had been a decline in India’s influence in the region. The ‘Look East’ Policy, introduced in 1992, thus aimed to restructure India’s domestic economy and forge new economic alliances overseas, particularly with the ‘economic tigers’ of Southeast Asia. The objective was to address the challenges of globalisation and to adapt to the international economic order that emerged following the Cold War. PM Narashima Rao in his visit to Singapore in 1994 said

…the Asia-Pacific could be the springboard for our leap into the global marketplace. I am happy to have had this opportunity to enunciate my belief in this vision of a new relationship between India and Asia-Pacific from Singapore, which I consider the geographic and symbolic centre of the Asia-Pacific. I trust this vision will be realized and that the next century will be a century of partnership for us all. (Murthy, 2009, p. 38)

The LEP thus effectively leveraged the opportunity to augment India’s relations with Southeast Asia and establish itself as a formidable power in Asia.

The initial focus of the policy was on building ties with the ASEAN member states, but over time, the development of Northeast India also became a key priority of India’s ‘Look East’ strategy. Northeast India, in fact, appeared in the blueprint of the policy a decade later.

Thus, Northeast India was recognised as a thriving space to interlink the economies of the two regions by the turn of the millennium. It was lauded as a step towards liberating the region from its stigma as a peripheral region. Pranab Mukherjee, India’s former External Affairs Minister, remarked that the Northeast is poised to benefit from India’s growing relations with Southeast Asia as the process of globalisation has shown how cross-border market access can uplift people from poverty and economic backwardness and bring prosperity. ‘He argued that “geography is opportunity” and therefore regions in India like the Northeast have enormous possibilities to exploit their geographical contexts and bring significant benefits to populations residing in those regions in a much more direct and participative manner than before’ (Goswami, 2009, p. 6).

The turn of the century thus saw a drive to establish connectivity between Northeast India and the outside world. The result has been the launching of numerous bilateral and multilateral connectivity projects, such as the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, the Moreh–Tamu–Kalewa Road, the Trans-Asian Highway, the India–Myanmar rail linkages, the Kaladan Multi-modal Transport Transit Project, the Stillwell Road, the Myanmar–India–Bangladesh gas or oil pipeline, the Tamanthi Hydroelectricity Project, the optical fibre network between Northeast India and Southeast Asia. Most of these initiatives, although set in motion more than two decades back, are yet to see the light of the day. In fact, the expectations generated around the LEP have reaped dividends more in academic writing and intellectual discourse rather than transforming Northeast India from a periphery to a vibrant gateway of Southeast Asia. However, the lost expectations were rekindled when PM Narendra Modi renamed the LEP to the ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP) as part of his muscular foreign policy move. ‘One of the major objectives of the Look East, now rechristened as Act East Policy, of India is to develop the geographically and economically isolated region of Northeast India by economically integrating it with the neighbouring regions of South Asia through neoliberal economic intervention’ (Patgiri & Gogoi, 2022, p. 24). The failure of the LEP in connecting and creating a vibrant market in Northeast India necessitated a renewed focus on the state of affairs in the region and reinforcement in aligning Northeast India with the objectives of the policy. The decision to rename the policy was an attempt in this direction.

The rechristened ‘Act East Policy’ is a continuation of the policy that has completed more than three decades of its existence. Interestingly, the renaming, which brought much aspiration for the NER, is about to complete its tenth year. A decade of existence is sufficient to make an impartial evaluation of the outcome of the policy on the intended beneficiaries. Could the renaming of the policy accomplish the unfinished agenda of the LEP? Unlike the LEP, would the ‘Act East’ be able to live up to the expectations of the people of Northeast? How did this change in name bring advantages to the residents of Northeast India? The present study will try to find an answer to the questions posed on the basis of the primary data collected.

Look (Act) East and Northeast: Reality on the Ground

As mentioned, there exist some well-known infrastructure projects associated with the Look (Act) East Policy that have been in the process of construction for more than two decades. However, upon seeking information about the status of the aforementioned projects, the details provided have not been particularly encouraging. The majority of India’s initiatives related to commerce, connectivity, capacity-building and culture, often referred to as the 4Cs, continued to be referred to as either ‘anticipated’ or ‘continuing’ after the extension of several deadlines. For example, the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway project was conceptualised in the year 2002. Since then, this Trilateral Highway project has faced many delays and deadlines. The project aims to establish an important strategic route, but multiple targets for its operationalisation have been postponed a number of times. The initial deadline for rendering the project functional was 2015, later extended to 2019. Presently, a fresh deadline has been set for the year 2027. In 2023, media reports indicated that ‘About 70 percent of construction work on the ambitious India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway has been completed. The Highway will connect Moreh in Manipur, India with Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar’ (The Indian Express, 2023). However, the empirical evidence indicates that while the construction of the highway has been completed up to Khudengthabi village, situated 10 km away from Moreh, there exists a 5-km segment that has not been finished in Boneyard village, under the jurisdiction of Machi subdivision. The completion of this particular section is contingent upon relocating local villagers which may take an indefinite time. ¹

The much delayed Kaladan Muti-modal Transport Transit project saw a green light after the first cargo ship reached the Sitwee Port in May 2023 after a span of 15 years.

The mere inauguration of the port has not established an alternative route for the Northeast region as the process of exchange of goods and traffic through the said waterway is held up due to complex custom procedures, multiple checkpoints and lack of depth of water in numerous areas along the sea route. ² However, it is expected that the Kaladan sea route, once functional, will unlock tremendous economic activity in the Bay of Bengal region and serve as a bridge for trade and commerce between South Asia and Southeast Asia. However, the transportation of goods to Northeast India using this sea route warrants the completion of the bridge between Paletwa Township in the Chin State of Myanmar and Zorinpui in Mizoram, which is currently under construction. Unless the construction of the Zorinpui Bridge is completed, the carrying of goods from the mainland India to the states of the Northeast will remain difficult and dependent on the Chieken’s Neck corridor. ³ The Rhi–Tiddim Road that connects Zokhawthar LCS from the Myanmar side is a kutcha road from Kalemyo to Tiddim which can be plied only in the dry season. A stretch of 4–5 km between the Indian border at Zawkhathar and Rhi town in Myanmar needs upgradation to connect Zawkhathar in Mizoram with Mandalay in Myanmar.

As Northeast India is surrounded by porous borders with illegal trade through various border routes, a persistent issue of concern, setting up border haats to legitimise unlawful trade was also an important agenda of the Look (Act) East Policy. But the number of border haats has not developed at an expected pace. There are altogether four functional border haats, two each in Meghalaya and Tripura. In Meghalaya, Kalaichar (between West Gharo Hills and Kurigram of Bangladesh) and Balat (between East Khasi Hills and Sunamganj of Bangladesh) are currently operational and four new border haats, namely, Bholaganj (East Khasi Hills), Nalikata (South West Khasi Hills), Shibbari (South Garo Hills) and Ryngku (East Khasi Hills) in Meghalaya are under implementation. In Tripura, two border haats, namely, Srinagar–Chhagalnaiya and Kamalasagar–Tarapur, are functioning smoothly and have contributed not only in boosting the local economy but also in strengthening people-to-people ties between the two countries. These border haats were reopened after a closure of three years in 2023 amidst more demands for border haats in Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Assam. Border haats were built and operationalised under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Mode of Operation signed between India and Bangladesh on 23 October 2010. In light of the growing demand of the local inhabitants for haats on both sides of the border, the GOI and its counterpart in Bangladesh revised the MOU in 2017, and in December 2022, the reopening of border haats figured prominently in India and Bangladesh’s bilateral discussion. As a consequence, two haats as mentioned above were reopened in Tripura in 2023. ‘According to Article 1 of the Mode of Operation, both nations had set up haat management committees to regulate border trade in their respective areas’ (Verma, 2023, p. 22). Given the Look (Act) East policy’s pledge to regularise informal trade via legal channels, as well as Bangladesh’s need for border trade, the two nations are negotiating for additional border haats in Northeast India.

None of the aforementioned projects, which were identified by the AEPA Department of Guwahati as major undertakings within the ambit of the policy delivered the expected results as of now for the people of Northeast India. The outcome of the projects in the development of the region is still anticipated. But the silver lining is that the pace of construction and supervision of the projects has improved slowly and steadily in the last decade. The establishment of the AEPA Department of Guwahati in 2017 by the then Chief Minister of Assam, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal, was also a major initiative to accelerate the pace of realisation of the Look (Act) East Policy. It was set up with the avowed purpose of making Assam and other Northeastern states the key engines of the success of the policy. Most of the key information relating to the present study was also collected from the AEPA Department, although the office did not have exhaustive data about the status of completion of every project (AEPA, 2023). As a result, information relating to certain other projects, such as the Agartala–Akhaura rail link, Kaladan project and so on, was collected from other sources. The Agartala–Akhaura rail link was flagged off by PM Narendra Modi and his Bangladesh counterpart in a virtual meeting on 1 November 2023. The deal for the construction of 17.7 km rail link started in 2010 during the visit of the PM of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina to India. This rail link will reduce the journey time between Kolkata and the Northeast, particularly Agartala, to 10–12 hours, which is more than 31 hours now. Once the incomplete stretch in Bangladesh is completed, the railway connection between Kolkata and Northeast India will get a new lease of life. As part of the Agartala–Akhaura railway link, Sabroom town in the southernmost part of Tripura on the bank of the Feni River on the India–Bangladesh border was also connected to set up a special economic zone (SEZ) just 2 km from Sabroom railway station. The SEZ is now under construction. There are plans to connect Tripura’s Jahar Nagar with Myanmar via a rail link and the preparation of maps for connecting the two places is ready. ⁴

There is also a significant increase in internal connectivity in Northeast India, which may enable the region to reap dividends and contribute to the success of the policy in the course of time. A transformative endeavour is under way to expand a few important highways to connect cross-border townships/economic hubs along with some Greenfield road projects. These include (a) Sutarkandi to Moreh road via Karimganj, Silchar, Lakhipur, Jiribam and Imphal, Panchgram to Zorinpui (as part of the Express Highway 1) on the Indo-Burmese border via Hailakandi; (b) Aizwal and Tuipang, Hailkandi (as part of Express Highway 2) to Bangladesh border (extending to Chittagong port) via Agartala, Sebroom and Feni river bridge; (c) Guwahati to Dawki in Bangladesh border extending to Sylhet via Jowai and Shillong; (d) Numaligarh (on Guwahati–Dibrugarh NH) to Moreh via Golaghat, Bokajan and Dimapur, Tinsukia to Nampui (on Phangsau Pass on Indo-Burmese border extending along the Stillwell road) via Margherita, Ledo, Lekhapani, Jagun and Jairampur. ⁵

There are two major rivers in the Northeast, the Brahmaputra and the Barak, which flow through Assam. River Brahmaputra connects West Bengal via Bangladesh while the river Barak connects Assam with Bangladesh via the Meghna River. The GOI has identified 18 national waterways for development. Four out of these are in the state of Assam. Out of these 18 waterways, only NW2 extends through Jamuna (i.e., Brahmaputra in Bangladesh), Padma and Meghna, and NW16 extends through Kushiara and Meghna and comes under the ambit of the Look (Act) East Policy. Protocol routes for these two waterways were identified in 2019 and as per the data received from the AEPA Department, the dredging of the routes is on currently. The other two important waterways in Assam are NW57 (Banthai Goan Tinal–Chandrapur in Kopili River) and NH31 (Morongi–Numaligarh in Dhansiri River). The Kopili River is an interstate river in Northeast India that runs through Meghalaya and Assam. It is the major south bank tributary of the Brahmaputra in Assam. The Dhansiri River flows through the Golaghat district of Assam and Chumoukedima and Dimapur districts of Nagaland. It originates in Nagaland’s Laisang mountain. It runs approximately 352 km (219 miles) from south to north before entering the Brahmaputra on its south bank. These rivers have tremendous potential in terms of navigation, irrigation and power generation. An amount of ₹11,260 million was allocated to the development of four waterways projects in the Northeast, namely, the Brahmaputra (NW2), the Barak (NW16), the Dhansiri (NW31) and the Kopili (NW57) to leverage the waterways for strategic improvement of ties with neighbouring countries (Singh, 2023a). The construction of the long-pending Bogibeel bridge in 2018 was also a step in this direction. It not only reduced the journey time between Assam and Delhi by 172 km. The bridge also has immense economic and strategic importance for Northeast India and for facilitating waterways transportation of goods through the rail network.

Besides, a number of rail link constructions are underway with an eye on the strategic and security concerns of Northeast India.

As part of the Bharat Mala ⁶ and Assam Mala ⁷ initiatives, the central and state governments are collaborating to construct roadways that link the Northeast region through Assam. In the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh, the GOI is constructing the Arunachal Frontier Highway, which is set to cover the entire area of the Mac Mohan Line. This project is expected to incur an estimated expenditure of around ₹400 billion and has been described by reliable sources as one of India’s biggest and toughest road-building projects. Furthermore, there is ongoing four-laning of a few important roads connecting cross-border townships/economic hubs and some Greenfield road projects. Similar attempts have been undertaken to promote air connectivity in Northeast India under the revised version of the policy. For example, the project ‘UDAN International’ was launched in 2014 to connect the Northeast with BBIN and ASEAN countries. Under the auspices of the UDAN, two flights, viz., Guwahati–Dhaka and Guwahati–Bangkok, were introduced in 2018. But both flights were discontinued on account of economic unviability following the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, DRUK AIR operates a few direct flights from Guwahati to Southeast Asia. ⁸ But this has nothing to do with UDAN International. The downside is that ‘… despite at least six attempts to connect Guwahati with six international destinations—Dhaka, Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Yangon and Kathmandu—the scheme could not attract any takers. A couple of operators that were roped in also backed out quoting low demand and non-viability issues’ (The Assam Tribune, 2023). Thus, air connectivity between Northeast India and Southeast Asia has yet to see any significant progress. Nonetheless, considerable strides are being made to improve aviation infrastructure in the NER, both as part of the Look (Act) East Policy and beyond.

In fact, many of the goals appear to have been accomplished with commendable efficiency after the policy’s transition to the ‘Act East’ version. This naturally raises questions about the potential of the NER to keep up with the pace of rapid infrastructural development and its ability to promote trade, tourism and business within the region. Information collected from the AEPA Department indicates that industries in the Northeast are yet not viable to capture markets in neighbouring countries. Industries that are moderately developed in the region include tea, fertiliser, petroleum, paper and cement, and most of these industries are located in Assam. However, some important joint initiatives have been taken by the central and state governments, such as Advantage Assam Meet (2018), the First Global Investors’ Summit (2018), Ambassadors Meet (2019) and Indo-Bangladesh Stakeholders’ Meet (2019), to create a business ambience in Northeast India and attract investors from mainland India and nearby countries. However, due to the outbreak of the COVID pandemic, the pro-business drive of the government suffered a setback and the region still lacks investors willing to invest in its abundant natural resources, fertile agricultural land, mineral wealth and cultural diversity. As per the records of the department, no FDI is known to have come to Northeast India under the aegis of the Look (Act) East Policy with the exception of Japanese investments initiated through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In 2017, Japan launched the Bay of Bengal–North East India Industrial Value Chain (BBIN-IVIC) to promote trade and business in the region.

According to the AEPA Department, certain community tourism initiatives and home-stay (Amar Alohi) schemes demonstrating the commonality of cultures with countries like Thailand, Laos Myanmar and Bangladesh have been launched in the last few years to attract visitors, mostly from surrounding countries. However, unlike many other parts of the country, Northeast India has yet to see a surge in tourism. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the improvement in internal connectivity in Northeast India would be accompanied by similar progress in other areas such as industry, agriculture and tourism in order to prepare the region for take-off under the Look (Act) East Policy.

Perspectives from the Northeast: Possibilities and Problems

As mentioned, the development model from India’s Look (Act) East Policy holds immense potential for Northeast India. However, in order to unlock the potential and reap the rewards, the region warrants revamping in areas of infrastructure, trade, agriculture, tourism and business. This requires addressing infrastructural bottlenecks and creating a favourable environment for industrial activity and private investment in the region. The self-sufficiency of the states of Northeast India is critical to the success of India’s Look (Act) Policy. Northeast India first emerged in the policy’s blueprint in 2003, and it was underlined as the second phase of the policy. From then until the year 2014, there was lacklustre development. Various infrastructure projects continually missed their dates, and there was little drive to capitalise on the region’s vast potential for industry and agricultural modernisation. It was believed by many that as India and Southeast Asia connections improved steadily during the period of the LEP, Northeast India lost its significance and the government’s strategy of overland outreach to Southeast Asia would reduce the region to a mere commercial corridor between India and its Southeast Asian neighbours. There was concern that improved road connectivity with South East Asia would bring in drugs, illegal migrants, diseases, arms and so on, thereby further complicating the situation in the Northeast (Chong, 2018, p. 39). People perceived the LEP as a policy dictated by the central government in which the development of the region was not envisaged from within. The reincarnation of the LEP in the guise of the Look (Act) East Policy has no doubt revived the hopes and aspirations of the people. There was a thrust to complete various incomplete projects related to infrastructure, tourism and skilled manpower within the region.

Following the policy’s rebranding to ‘Act East’ in 2014, a strong emphasis has been placed on fixing Northeast India’s internal connectivity issues. As a consequence, a number of remote areas and capital cities in the region gained access to decent connection. These include Barak Valley in Assam, the capitals of Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and Manipur. These areas were linked by rails after converting meter gauge to broad gauge. The inauguration of Tunnel No. 15 connecting Menguzuma and Zuzba stations in Nagaland marks a major step in terms of internal connectivity. ‘…Breakthrough of Tunnel number 15 between Menguzuma and Zubza station that measures 160 meters in length got done recently. This achievement is considered a major step ahead for connecting Kohima with rest of the nation through Indian Railways network’ (Singh, 2023b). To promote tourism in the NER, the Indian Railways has also launched a tourist train called Bharat Gaurav that covers 11 destinations of Northeast India, viz., Guwahati, Sivasagar, Furkating and Kaziranga in Assam, Unakoti, Agartala and Udaipur in Tripura, Dimapur and Kohima in Nagaland and Shillong and Cherapunji in Meghalaya (Outlook, 2023). Further, the proposed two-lane road from Meluri in Nagaland’s Phek district to Avangku on the Myanmar border will provide convenient access to tourists once built. While the attempt to connect Northeast India to Southeast Asia by air has yet to achieve significant results, the air connectivity within the region has improved under the aegis of the ‘Act East’. The construction of Greenfield airports at Pakyong in Sikkim (September 2018), Rupsi in Dhubri (May 2021) and Donyi Polo in Hollongi near Itanagar (November 2022) were completed in a short period of time despite the challenges posed by the COVID pandemic.

The Northeast continues to lag behind in industrialisation. It is often cited as one major flaw that undermines the promise of the policy for the Northeast region. Industrialisation in the area continues to be slow due to poor capital creation, insufficient infrastructure, investment risk, threat of insurgency and a lack of market. However, the area has tremendous potential for industrialisation due to its abundance of forest resources, minerals, petrochemical products and fertile agricultural land. The states in Northeast India are not identical in terms of their infrastructure, resources, geography, law and order situation and development. Thus, taking into account the region’s inherent diversity and the needs of the locals, the government has designed and implemented the policy for the promotion of micro, medium and small scale (MSME) industries in the Northeast Region and Sikkim. The governments’ objective is to provide a foundation for the development of the region and to empower indigenous people in the economic sector. ‘…the DoNER Ministry launched the “MDoNER Data Analytics Dashboard” and “Poorvottar Sampark Setu” portal in a bid to monitor the developmental activities of central government ministries and departments in the northeast’ (The Statesman, 2023). In a significant development, TATA group’s newly proposed semiconductor plant in Jagiroad, Assam, was approved by the Union Cabinet on 29 February 2024. Assam was chosen as the preferred site for the plant as the state has come up with a competitive semiconductor policy. Besides, Assam is pollution free and close to semiconductor packaging and testing hubs in countries like Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore. This is Assam’s largest-ever private investment. ‘Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma said the ₹270 billion semiconductor plant approved for the state by the Union Cabinet on Thursday will be a game-changer for the economy of the entire North East region’ (Business Standard, 2024).

Tourism in the Northeast is also a priority of the government. To place the region on the tourism map of India, the government is improving existing tourist facilities, increasing budgets, promoting adventure sports and renovating historical monuments. Data from the Ministry of Tourism show that 11.845 million domestic and 0.104 million foreign tourists visited Northeast in the year 2022 (Swarajya, 2023). Since 2014, there has also been a major drive to restore law and order and put an end to the insurgency in Northeast India. The insurgency in Northeast India was widely seen as a barrier to the LEP’s success. In August 2019, the government signed an agreement with the National Liberation Front (NLFT) of Tripura, following which 88 cadres of NFLT surrendered. In January 2020, an agreement was signed with the representative of Bru Migrants for the permanent settlement of Bru (Reang) families in Tripura. In the same year, the government signed a memorandum of settlement with Bodo insurgent groups in Assam after which 1,615 cadres of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) surrendered. In April, the Karbi Accord was signed to end the decades-old crisis in Karbi Anglong in Assam. In 2022, the Adivasi Peace Accord was signed. On 27 April 2023, a tripartite memorandum of settlement between the GOI, the Assam government and representatives of the Dimasa National Liberation Army/Dimasa Peoples’ Supreme Council (DNLA/DPSC) was signed in Delhi to rehabilitate the surrendered cadres. In December 2023, the central government, Assam government and pro-talks faction of the ULFA signed a tripartite agreement. The government’s effort to reach out to various estranged groups and terrorist organisations yielded dividends for Northeast India. The law and order situation in the region has improved considerably with a reported ‘70 per cent reduction in insurgency incidents and an 80 per cent drop in civilian deaths in the Northeast in 2019 compared to 2013’ (The Economic Times, 2023).

The above slew of developments post-renaming of the policy has undoubtedly influenced the perception of NER residents in a positive way. The resurgence of hope, which had faded due to the repeated failures of different LEP projects, appears to have been rekindled in light of the advancements made in the region in the past decade. Individuals from diverse backgrounds appear to hold an optimistic view about the progress of the revised policy and its potential implications in the region. ⁹ People are most optimistic about the progress achieved in connecting the Northeast within and with the rest of India. They consider that progress in intra-state and interstate connectivity is critical to integrating Northeast India into the Look (Act) East Policy’s goals. Connectivity is also crucial to preserve the Northeast’s security, accelerate trade and propel FDI flow into the region. The government’s focus on skill development is also well-received, as it is believed to bring the youth of Northeast India at par with their counterparts in the rest of India. There is also high expectation from the tourism sector, which has the potential to create a large number of jobs in this part of India. The tourism industry provides employment opportunities in the form of hotels, restaurants, transportation and allied businesses. Both the state governments and the central government are earning revenue from the surge in the tourism industry in the NER. ‘Tourism as a growing industry has contributed 6.23 percent to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and provided 8.78 percent of total employment’ (Laskar, 2020, p. 761). It is expected that 0.15 million new direct jobs and an equal number of indirect jobs would be generated in Northeast India from the tourism sector. The tourism development will solve the increasing unemployment problem in the region, create consumer markets, encourage start-ups and generate revenues for the state (The Sentinel, 2022). People also feel that the government’s efforts to develop small-scale and medium-scale industries would not only incentivise the growth of industries to begin with but would also create the possibilities for the development of indigenous industries of Northeast India.

Thus, the prevailing perception of the people is that there has been considerable progress in the region, particularly in the connectivity sector, under the new vision of the ‘Act East’. If this momentum of development is sustained, Northeast India will soon emerge as a pivotal trade and business hub. However, there is also a sense of disappointment and apprehension. The disappointment stems from the delay in completing crucial infrastructure projects, with no clear government roadmap until now for their accomplishment, while apprehension is about the resurrection of insurgency and deteriorating law and order problems in Northeast India. The recent ethnic clash in Manipur serves as a reminder that all is not well and the region may see a return of the insurgency and conflict that has afflicted it for decades. In such a scenario, the fear is that connectivity routes may allow terrorist groups to smuggle arms, ammunition and drugs from nearby countries. It is also apprehended that the opening of the Stillwell Road may turn Northeast India into a dumping ground for Chinese products. A major issue of concern for people is also the state of affairs in Myanmar. Keeping in view the political instability in the country and its proximity to China, opinion is tilted towards focusing on air connectivity rather than investing in infrastructure for overland connection with Southeast Asian nations. Many people believe that the Inner Line permit system, the sixth schedule status, special provisions for different states of the NER under Article 371A and 371C, ¹⁰ and some similar measures are antithetical to economic growth, development and governance of the region. Thus, the perception of the inhabitants of the region may best be explained as a combination of optimism, uncertainty and procrastination. To keep hope alive, it is imperative to expedite current efforts towards development with a specific focus on exploring the strength of the states of the NER. It is essential for the government both at the centre and in the states to lay out a clear roadmap for the completion of vital infrastructure projects and rebuild the confidence of the people which suffered a serious setback following the recent incident in Manipur. Besides, the government ought to unveil its strategy to establish linkage with the NER considering the existing political uncertainty and insurgency in Myanmar. By addressing these significant concerns, the government may fulfil the long-standing aspirations of the people of the NER and promote prosperity in the region.

Conclusion

The ‘Look East Policy’, as it is commonly referred to, was conceptualised originally to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War compulsions of world politics. It would not, therefore, be an exaggeration to state that the policy was more a response to the systemic changes in international politics in the early 90s rather than an attempt to forge deep ties with India’s south-eastern neighbours via its Northeast. But the renamed Look (Act) East policy is a planned strategy for directing India’s foreign policy in pursuit of its national interests. It is a realistic policy approach to address security issues and facilitate the amalgamation of the relatively undeveloped NER to the Indian mainland, thus positioning it as a strategic gateway to Southeast Asia. The successful integration of this strategically significant region will not only contribute to India’s overall growth but also enhance its geopolitical standing and foster stronger relationships within the whole of the Indo-Pacific region. However, to what extent this will happen depends on the extent to which the GOI, the governments of the states of Northeast India, and how policymakers recognise the specific needs and concerns of the region and harness its potential towards integrating the region into the thriving economies of Southeast Asia. To avoid repeating the LEP’s history, it is imperative to translate the prevailing momentum surrounding the ‘Act East’ into substantive and tangible outcomes as quickly as possible.