Sudan: Rethinking the Conflict Between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

Introduction

Sudan, occupying an expansive 1,882,000 square kilometres, ranks as the third largest nation in Africa, housing a population of approximately 43.85 million people. Despite its vast size, Sudan is characterised by a relatively low population density. Positioned at the intersection of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, Sudan spans across the Red Sea region. It shares its borders with seven neighbouring nations, including Libya and Egypt to the north, Chad to the west, the Central African Republic to the southwest, South Sudan to the south, Ethiopia to the southeast and Eritrea to the east (fsdafrica, 2022). Nevertheless, Sudan stands as one of the globe’s most impoverished nations. Despite its abundance of natural riches such as gold, oil and fertile terrain, prolonged periods of political turbulence and unrest have impeded progress and exacerbated social disparities within Sudan. According to the World Bank, Sudan’s GDP per capita (PPP) stood at $1,330 in 2021, positioning it among the planet’s poorest countries. Nonetheless, this figure obscures notable internal divergences. For instance, urban centres like Khartoum typically enjoy greater prosperity compared to rural areas grappling with inadequate infrastructure and restricted access to essential amenities (SAPA, 2024). Moreover, Sudan’s recent economic restructuring endeavours and the relaxation of certain sanctions provide rays of optimism. Projections suggest a GDP growth rate of 4.1% in 2022, signalling possibilities for advancement. Additionally, global allies are engaging in collaborative ventures aimed at rebuilding initiatives and injecting investments into vital domains such as agriculture and renewable energy (SAPA, 2024).

However, a power struggle between the Sudanese military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has resulted in a crisis that continues to afflict Khartoum and various regions of Sudan. Following years of prolonged tension, Sudan descended into a conflict of significant magnitude in mid-April 2023, as clashes erupted between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. The violence initially erupted in the capital city of Khartoum on April 15 and swiftly escalated to encompass other areas throughout the nation (Tounsel, 2023).

Nevertheless, Khartoum has become a battleground marked by intense combat, while reports indicate severe violent clashes and extensive bombardments in the broader regions of Darfur and Kordofan. These confrontations have inflicted widespread damage on crucial infrastructure and facilities, including water and healthcare services, leading to the collapse of banking and financial systems, frequent power outages, disruptions in telecommunications and widespread looting. Humanitarian needs have surged, with nearly 25 million individuals now requiring aid in Sudan. Since the onset of the conflict, over 6.7 million people have been displaced, seeking refuge elsewhere for safety. Approximately 5.9 million individuals reside in Al Jazirah State, considered Sudan’s breadbasket, with 700,000 inhabitants in Wad Medani alone. Among them, more than 270,000 individuals in the city are in dire need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2024). Since April 15, close to half a million individuals have sought refuge in Al Jazirah State, of whom 86,400 are currently residing in Wad Medani. Between October 2023 and February 2024, approximately 1.9 million people in the state are experiencing crisis levels (IPC 3) or higher in terms of food security, with 179,000 individuals in Medani specifically, as per the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). The state is supported by 57 humanitarian organisations, comprising 25 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), 21 national non-governmental organisations and six United Nations (UN) agencies. Since the beginning of this year, humanitarian groups have provided assistance to 730,000 individuals in the state through food aid, water, sanitation, hygiene (WASH) services, healthcare and other humanitarian initiatives (OCHA, 2024).

Moreover, a significant number of individuals lost their lives, and hundreds sustained injuries during the violence that erupted in Khartoum and other parts of Sudan. Disputes over the integration of RSF paramilitaries into the Sudanese army sparked the conflict, exacerbated by RSF deployments without the army’s consent. There have long been suspicions that the RSF harbours intentions to control Sudan’s economic assets, particularly its gold mines. These circumstances have raised concerns about the potential outbreak of a civil war and the possibility of intervention by neighbouring countries. The planned establishment of a power-sharing government, aimed at facilitating democratic elections and potentially unlocking billions of dollars in foreign aid, has been derailed by the ongoing bloodshed. Western nations, along with Russia and China, with vested interests in Sudan’s invaluable natural resources and its strategically significant Red Sea coastline, closely monitor progress towards these objectives. Although the actual number of casualties is believed to be much higher, the UN has documented at least 604 fatalities and nearly 5,100 injuries. The Sudan Doctors Syndicate, responsible for tracking civilian deaths, reported 487 fatalities. The violence has forced tens of thousands of individuals to flee across Sudan’s borders, posing a threat to the fragile region stretching from the Sahel to the Red Sea.

Furthermore, other nations have initiated the evacuation of their citizens and diplomats from Sudan. Tounsel (2023) observes that these recent developments are detrimental to Sudan’s stability and the prospects for a transition to democracy. This article utilises the Protracted Social Conflict Theory to elucidate the origins of the ongoing conflict between the RSF and the SAF.

Methodology

The study employed a content analysis method to examine secondary data and relevant literature pertaining to the subject under investigation. Specifically, it utilised reports from government and non-governmental organisations, journal articles, online sources, committee reports and expert findings. These sources underwent thorough interrogation and critical analysis to establish valid conclusions, drawing from existing literature. Given the study’s focus on extensively reviewing research on the longstanding political crisis in Sudan, it is expected to significantly contribute to enriching the discourse, shedding light on the issue and fostering comprehension. This, in turn, can assist stakeholders in devising appropriate measures to restore Sudan to a sustainable path toward better times.

Conceptual Underpinning: Protracted Social Conflict Theory

Edward Azar introduced the Protracted Social Conflict Theory to characterise conflicts stemming from prolonged and sometimes violent struggles among ethnic groups to fulfil fundamental needs such as security, acceptance, recognition, representation in political institutions and economic liberties (Azar, 1990). Azar (1990) posited that ethnic groups pursue these needs by coalescing into identity groups centred around shared interests. In protracted social conflicts, ethnic groups often harbour deep-seated animosity rooted in race, religion, ethnicity and culture. These identity-driven conflicts are primarily fuelled by an underlying fear of annihilation, which intensifies in vulnerable groups haunted by the spectre of suppression or persecution. Typically, ethnic-based divisions and associated threats stem from the dominance of government institutions and structures by a single ethnic group or a coalition of elites who restrict access to opportunities and the means to meet the basic human needs of the rest of the populace (Azar, 1990). According to the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, four conditions primarily precipitate violent conflict. These conditions encompass the deprivation of human needs, the role of the government, international linkages and the communal aspect. In the conflict in Sudan, the four main underlying causes of protracted social conflict were evident.

One of the factors contributing to the conflict was the communal dimension, which served as a focal point for tensions. According to this perspective, the conflict in Sudan has been intensified by longstanding animosities and grievances among various ethnic and tribal factions. The strife has been influenced by historical divisions based on ethnicity and tribal affiliations. As observed by the International Crisis Group (2024a), the conflict has laid bare profound divisions and tensions between different ethnic and tribal groups in Sudan, with each side garnering support and loyalties from their respective communities. Similarly, the Rift Valley Institute (2024a) underscores that the SAF and the RSF have manipulated communal identities and grievances to rally support and enlist fighters, thereby worsening existing tensions and further dividing communities. Additionally, in Sudan, specific communities or social groups have experienced feelings of being marginalised and excluded from both power structures and the distribution of resources. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identifies that these sentiments stem from historical grievances and perceptions of marginalisation among different communities, which have been exacerbated by ongoing political and economic instability (UNDP, 2024a). The Enough Project, an advocacy group, affirms that the conflict has been sustained by longstanding grievances and a sense of injustice felt by marginalised communities, who have thrown their support behind either the SAF or RSF in hopes of achieving better representation and resource access (Enough Project, 2024a). Both the SAF and RSF have garnered support and recruited fighters along communal lines, as highlighted by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which notes a significant degree of communal mobilisation in the conflict, utilising existing social networks and communal bonds for recruitment (ACLED, 2024a). Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) report emphasises that the conflict has taken on a communal dimension, with various communities and ethnic groups aligning themselves with either the SAF or RSF, thereby deepening divisions and perpetuating the cycle of violence (United Nations Security Council, 2024a).

The second precondition discussed is the deprivation of basic human needs. The continuing armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF in Sudan has caused significant deprivation of essential human needs, leading to an increase in poverty levels and the destruction of living environments. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2024) states that ‘The conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis, with widespread violence affecting civilians, forcing mass displacement and limiting access to basic services and humanitarian aid.’ This conflict has disrupted livelihoods and economic activities, resulting in a rise in poverty levels. According to the World Bank, ‘The conflict has exacerbated the already dire economic situation in Sudan, with the poverty rate expected to increase from 14.7% in 2022 to 18.1% in 2023’ (World Bank, 2024). The UNDP highlights that the ongoing conflict in Sudan has resulted in widespread disruptions to markets, supply chains and access to essential goods and services, further aggravating the already dire levels of poverty and food insecurity prevalent in the country (UNDP, 2024b). Furthermore, the conflict has inflicted significant damage to infrastructure and habitats, particularly in urban areas. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) states that ‘The heavy fighting in Khartoum and other cities has led to the destruction of buildings, homes, and critical infrastructure, displacing thousands of people and causing harm to the urban environment’ (UNEP, 2024). The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN, 2024) cautions that the conflict has also affected natural habitats, leading to reports of harm to protected areas and wildlife populations due to the indiscriminate use of weapons and the influx of displaced individuals into these regions. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that essential services, such as healthcare, clean water and sanitation, have been severely disrupted by the conflict, endangering millions of people with potential disease outbreaks and malnutrition (ICRC, 2024). Furthermore, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) highlights the profound toll on children, with many deprived of educational opportunities, healthcare access and safe living conditions, jeopardising their future well-being.

The third prerequisite pertains to the involvement of the government, with the Sudanese government, particularly through the SAF and the RSF, playing a substantial role in the conflict. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the current leader of the SAF, hails from the Nubian ethnic group, historically predominant within Sudan’s military apparatus (International Crisis Group, 2024b). Conversely, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, the leader of the RSF, hails from the Arab Rizeigat ethnic group, which has traditionally faced marginalisation and exclusion from Sudan’s power structures (Rift Valley Institute, 2024b). While the SAF comprise soldiers from diverse ethnic backgrounds such as Nubians, Baggara Arabs and other groups from central and northern regions (ACLED, 2024b), the RSF trace their origins to the Janjaweed militias, initially formed from Arab nomadic tribes, particularly the Rizeigat, during the Darfur conflict (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Both factions have reportedly garnered support and recruited fighters along ethnic lines, exploiting existing grievances and perceptions of marginalisation within different communities (UNDP, 2024a). According to the International Crisis Group, the conflict has assumed an ethnic dimension, with the SAF drawing support from non-Arab groups, while the RSF has enlisted Arab tribal militias (International Crisis Group, 2024c). The conflict has been driven by longstanding grievances and a sense of injustice among marginalised ethnic groups, notably those aligned with the RSF, historically deprived of power and resource access (Enough Project, 2024a). The Enough Project underscores that the RSF has capitalised on the grievances of Arab nomadic tribes, who have rallied behind Hemedti in pursuit of greater representation and resource access (Enough Project, 2024b).

Finally, one of the crucial factors in the Sudanese conflict is its international connections. The dispute involving the SAF and the RSF has attracted worldwide attention and intervention. The RSF, labelled as a paramilitary organisation, has been significantly involved in the conflict, functioning as border guards and participating in the Yemen war alongside Saudi Arabia (Al Jazeera, 2023). Its participation has escalated violence and instability, prompting the SAF to classify it as a rebel faction. Furthermore, foreign military influence, notably from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Wagner Group, has become intertwined in the conflict, intensifying the underlying tensions within Sudan’s crisis (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). These international ties complicate the situation further and carry the potential to disrupt peace in neighbouring countries (Center for Preventive Action, 2023).

For example, the mobilisation of Arab tribal militias by the RSF, especially the Rizeigat group with transnational connections, raises worries about armed groups and fighters potentially crossing into neighbouring nations like Chad, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (Rift Valley Institute, 2024b). These neighbouring countries might need to bolster border security, ramp up surveillance, and improve collaboration to prevent violence from spilling over and uphold stability in border areas (UNSC, 2024b). Moreover, the ethnic aspects of the conflict, with the SAF garnering support from non-Arab factions and the RSF rallying Arab tribal militias, could exacerbate existing ethnic tensions and rivalries among related ethnic communities residing across borders in neighbouring nations (International Crisis Group, 2024c). The International Crisis Group cautions that failure to contain the conflict’s ethnic dimensions might spark clashes among related ethnic groups in Chad, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, further destabilising the region (International Crisis Group, 2024). Additionally, the ongoing violence and turmoil in Sudan have displaced hundreds of thousands of individuals, with many seeking refuge in neighbouring countries such as Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt (UNHCR, 2024). The arrival of Sudanese refugees has strained resources and posed humanitarian challenges in host communities, necessitating increased assistance, housing and support from international organisations and donor nations (UNHCR, 2024). Furthermore, the Sudan conflict presents a significant peril to regional stability, potentially disrupting trade routes, worsening food insecurity and providing fertile ground for the proliferation of extremist groups and criminal networks (African Union, 2024a). The African Union (AU) has voiced concerns that the unending violence and instability in Sudan could undermine efforts to foster peace, security and development across the entire region, necessitating a coordinated regional response (African Union, 2024b).

Who Are the RSF and SAF?

According to Wikipedia (as of 2023), the SAF are the country’s armed forces. Their estimated numbers fluctuate depending on the source (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), but they are made up of regular soldiers and militias that support the government. The SAF has participated in several conflicts, such as the Sudanese Civil War, the Darfur conflict and the conflict between Sudan and the SPLM-N (Wikipedia, 2023). In particular, from Iran and Iraq, they have also gotten assistance from foreign military experts and specialists (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997). The SAF and RSF have recently agreed to ceasefires to end urban combat.

In contrast, the RSF sprang from the Janjaweed militia, charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in the western Sudanese province of Darfur. Rights organisations claim that starting in the early 2000s, the RSF began robbing, pillaging and burning towns. A law establishing the RSF as a legitimate autonomous security force was passed in 2017. Furthermore, it supported Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, in suppressing a rebellion during his presidency. Although the Sudanese military possessed formidable heavy weaponry and a proficient air force at the time, it lacked the necessary agility to combat effectively in Darfur’s arid regions and rural areas. By employing horses, camels and 4 × 4 trucks armed with mounted guns, the Janjaweed and, subsequently, the RSF ruthlessly targeted both insurgent strongholds and peaceful communities. According to Cameron Hudson, an African peace and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, their actions significantly influenced the course of the conflict, ultimately bolstering the Bashir regime. During the 2010s, the militia underwent a metamorphosis and became the more structured and organised RSF, a swift response unit. Bashir rewarded the group financially, leading to the enrichment and empowerment of its commanders. The RSF was dispatched beyond Darfur to handle tribal violence along Sudan’s borders, effectively enforcing Khartoum’s control over rural areas. According to Hudson, Sudan’s traditional military elite looked down on the RSF as uneducated herdsmen. In 2019, Bashir was removed from power following civilian protests. The military and RSF staged a coup two years later before handing power to a civilian-led government under international pressure in late 2022. However, the arrangement appears to have deteriorated, setting the scene for the Saturday clashes. According to experts, the formal military, which includes an air force, is better equipped to safeguard fixed positions, giving Sudan an advantage. Since the RSF has primarily fought in rural areas, its members are not well-equipped for warfare in more urban settings like Khartoum, as observed by Rosenzweig-Ziff (2023).

According to Roland Marchal, a sociologist at Sciences Po University in Paris and an expert on civil wars in Africa, the RSF is estimated by experts and Western officials to have between 70,000 and 150,000 fighters, including former military and intelligence officers. General Hamdan has been attempting to broaden his support base by recruiting more fighters from the east and north of the country in recent months and has strengthened his ties with foreign powers, such as visiting Russia at the beginning of the war in Ukraine and partnering with the Wagner mercenary group to mine for gold in Sudan. The RSF has also deployed troops in Yemen to serve Saudi Arabia’s interests and Libya for the UAE. However, the group lacks the military’s firepower, as they do not have planes, for example. Additionally, while RSF fighters are accustomed to operating in rural areas, they are not as well-equipped for combat in urban centres like Khartoum (Associated Press, 2023a).

Why Are the Sudanese Military and Paramilitary Forces at Odds with Each Other?

International news organisations have focused heavily on the most recent outbreak of political violence in Khartoum, with many of them attributing it to a conflict of interests between Generals El-Burhan and Hemedti. However, it would be more accurate to see this standoff as the conclusion of a protracted institutional rivalry between Sudan’s state security organisations rather than as a personal dispute between two high-ranking military leaders. The controversial ‘Al-Ingaz’ (Salvation) regime, a Military-Islamist government that exercised authoritarian power, sought to overthrow the governments of its neighbours, provided a safe haven for Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and brutally put down numerous uprisings, ruled Sudan from 1989 to 2019 (Verhoeven, 2023). The International Criminal Court charged long-serving President Omar al-Bashir with war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Darfur region in 2009.

The RSF, a paramilitary organisation primarily made up of tribal militias from Western Sudan, was one security service Bashir tried to strengthen during his last years in power in an effort to keep his grip on power. The origins of the current crisis, however, can be traced to April 2019, when Bashir was deposed by military generals in the wake of a widespread revolt against his totalitarian government. Civilians persisted in protesting for democratic elections and the installation of a civilian government, notwithstanding Bashir’s ouster. As a result, the military and demonstrators reached a power-sharing arrangement in which the Sovereignty Council, which consists of military officers and civilians, would govern Sudan until elections were held at the end of 2023. In August of that year, Abdalla Hamdok was named Prime Minister for the interim period. In October 2021, the military ousted Hamdok’s administration, and General Burhan assumed de facto control of the nation. Sadly, the new arrangement was only temporary. Burhan’s partner in the military coup, Dagalo, the vice-president of the ruling council, assumed the position of second in command. Burhan declared that the military would be in charge until elections in July 2023 (Chauhan 2023). The current hostility is the result of a disagreement between Burhan and Dagalo about the best authority to oversee the integration of the RSF, which is led by Dagalo, into the armed forces. While Burhan and Dagalo disagree on how the 10,000-member RSF should be assimilated into the army, they agree on who should oversee the procedure. Alind Chauhan reported in 2023 that Dagalo also wanted to delay the integration for ten years, but the army said it would happen within the next two years.

What Countries Have a Vested Interest in Sudan and Why?

First and foremost, the fact that Sudan shares borders with seven other African nations—Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Eritrea and South Sudan—makes the country’s protracted conflict a major source of concern for its surrounding governments. Given that these surrounding nations are already struggling with their own internal crises, many observers worry that the battle between the military and RSF in Sudan may spread to them, causing the entire area to become unstable. According to Alan Boswell of the International Crisis Group, ‘What occurs in Sudan will not stay in Sudan…’. The countries most in danger from potential spillover are Chad and South Sudan (Associated Press, 2023b). However, it seems more likely that there will be serious outside intervention the longer the violence continues. The continued violence in Sudan could worsen the situation in Chad, which has a history of coups and is currently dealing with a serious refugee crisis. According to DW, refugees from the western Sudanese regions under dispute have already left for Chad. In the meantime, South Sudan, founded in 2011 and has seen horrific civil wars, remains unsteady. Egypt, which has a good relationship with Sudan’s military and sees it as an ally against Ethiopia, is keeping a careful eye on the situation there, according to the AP. Due to its ambitious hydroelectric dam project, which could affect the flow of the Nile River, Ethiopia, a landlocked nation, has been at odds with both Egypt and Sudan. Additionally, four states have a stake in the conflict: the UAE, Russia, Israel, China and Western nations (Chauhan, 2023). Beginning with South Sudan, which broke away from Sudan and stole 75% of Khartoum’s oil reserves, Sudan now has fewer sources of revenue. Sudan looked for foreign investors to assist its economy in order to combat this, notably the UAE. The UAE recognised the potential in Sudan’s agricultural industry and made significant investments in the nation’s fertile land along the Nile River. The UAE also took advantage of this chance to strengthen its ties with RSF leader Dagalo and broaden its sphere of influence in the Horn of Africa. In exchange for providing z Yemen, Dagalo received a sizeable sum of money, which he used to bolster his paramilitary forces. The NYT reports that numerous UAE diplomats tried to avert the clash after this caused a wedge between the Sudanese military and RSF. The NYT claimed that the UAE was experiencing ‘buyer’s remorse’.

Russia has taken an interest in Sudan, mainly because of the development of a naval station in Port Sudan that can house up to 300 troops and four ships on one of the world’s busiest and most contested maritime routes. According to a report from the BBC, Moscow and Sudan’s military administration, which took control of the country in a coup in 2021, are close to finishing their accord. The Wagner organisation from Russia also has a foothold in Sudan, with reports claiming ownership of the nation’s gold and uranium deposits and the supply of mercenaries to Darfur, a difficult region. In pursuit of its goal to mobilise other Arab and Muslim nations to form a political and military alliance against its nemesis Iran, Israel has reached out to Sudan for support. Consequently, in 2020, the two nations struck a normalisation deal and three years later, they officially established diplomatic relations. Additionally, last year, representatives from Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, visited Sudan to hold discussions with security officials, including Dagalo, who offered to cooperate on counterterrorism and intelligence matters, per the New York Times (Chauhan, 2023).

According to Patey and Olander (2021), China continues to be an important economic partner for Sudan. China is one of Sudan’s largest commercial partners and a notable investor in a number of industries, including mining. There are many Chinese people working in Beijing’s infrastructure and service industries as well as the still-functioning oil industry. Chinese businesses will need to take action to maintain stability until the situation improves if the civil disturbance in Sudan worsens, and China will likely prioritise protecting its citizens. Sudan is a situation to watch, even though Beijing’s interests may not be as high as they once were. China’s foreign policy decision-makers continue to place a high priority on protecting its residents abroad. Sudan has historically drawn fierce African power rivalries due to its strategic location in the Horn of Africa, close to the oil-rich Gulf region. I do believe that this won’t be as important right now, though. The interests of the United States, China, Russia and France all share a desire for stability in Sudan. Although geopolitics can thwart these mutual ambitions, Washington and Beijing have the same objectives in Sudan. The exodus from Africa also worries the Europeans, and they want things to settle down quickly. The Red Sea has been discussed as a potential location for a Russian military station, but instability will not help Moscow’s aspirations. Monitoring the activities of regional players in the Gulf is crucial in addition to great power competition. The UAE and other Gulf governments have stepped in to support Sudanese political and military figures, comparable to China’s prior position, as China ceases to be the principal economic partner of Sudan due to the decrease in oil prices. Exporters from Sudan heavily rely on the UAE as a global gold market. Even though regional players may not provide the same financial and political support as China formerly did, they continue to support the demands of Sudan’s political elites in order to further their domestic goals. One to watch in the region is Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey (Patey & Olander, 2021). Following a months-long rebellion against Bashir, the West, which includes the United States, rejoiced when he was removed from office in 2019. In addition to supporting Sudan’s democratic transition, it was hoped that this development would help to restrain China’s and Russia’s growing regional influence. Nevertheless, some detractors claim that Washington was sluggish to back a move toward elections, as reported by Reuters. The process was completely halted by the coup of 2021. With so many nations having investments in Sudan, it would seem that any chance of rapid mediation between the two warring generals would be more complicated than the actual conflict (Chauhan, 2023).

The Repercussions of the Ongoing Conflict in Sudan

Telci (2022) claims that the current state of affairs will negatively affect the Horn of Africa. The conflict in Sudan seriously threatens this vast region of East Africa. It has been dealing with several conflicts, including political unrest, insecurity and a serious humanitarian crisis made worse by one of recent memory’s most protracted and severe droughts. Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, which are close by, are keeping a close eye on the situation in Sudan, especially in light of the intensifying international competition for control of the region and major waterways, including the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Given Ethiopia’s proximity to South Sudan and Sudan, the situation there has enormous direct effects on international security. Addis Abeba is a top suspect for the international media due to the two nations’ entwined interests, interdependent problems and political exchanges. Some claim Ethiopia is aiding one of the sides in the Sudanese war due to armed actions in the contentious border region of al-Fashaga that have raised tensions and created an escalation (Horner & Soliman, 2023). Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has refuted claims that his country exploited the situation in neighbouring Sudan by stationing troops in the border region to advance its interests in Sudan (Najimdeen, 2023).

In fact, a Sudanese media outlet even stated that Ethiopia had used the war to its benefit by doing so. Ethiopia’s full recovery is still hampered by the armed conflict in Tigray that lasted from November 2020 to November 2022 (Houreld & Le, 2022). Longstanding ethnic conflicts among Ethiopians and between the federal government and regional states based on ethnicity and language have been exacerbated by the conflict, resulting in a crisis of refugees and displacement that has gone unsolved. Sudan became a destination and transit point for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants from surrounding nations during the Tigray War. In the impoverished areas of eastern Sudan, more than 50,000 Ethiopian refugees were taken in (Mohiedeen, 2022). The turmoil in Sudan has caused some foreigners and Sudanese to seek asylum in Ethiopia, and other nations now depend on Addis Ababa to evacuate their residents; therefore, the situation has now been reversed. This suggests that should the violence continue, Eritrean refugees in Sudan may need to go to another nation (Najimdeen, 2023).

The instability in the Horn of Africa and neighbouring countries such as Sudan hinders their ability to facilitate peace and prevent conflict. This is evident in Ethiopia, where the Tigray War has weakened Addis Ababa’s ability to support Sudan’s fragile transition to democracy, which the government had taken on in 2019 (Ikani, 2023). The Ethiopian government recognises the impact of the Sudanese conflict and has called for peace between the warring parties, noting that it goes against traditional Sudanese values. The ongoing security crisis in the region could worsen if the situation is not addressed promptly. However, the al-Shabab terrorist organisation, still active in Somalia and its neighbouring nations, is the present focus of the country’s new administration, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The situation also demonstrates how dangerous East Africa is, with terrorist insurgencies still raging as far south as Tanzania and Mozambique (Najimdeen, 2023). Since it started being built, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has generated debate. Concern over the project’s potential impact on their own Nile dams and the security of their own citizens has been expressed by Egypt and Sudan. All sides are now particularly interested in the situation in Sudan because Khartoum’s new government’s actions may significantly impact the project and even tip the scales in the conflict. This is particularly true given that some perceive Sudan as more accepting of the idea (Osama al-Saeed, 2023).

The conflict in question will have significant humanitarian, security and economic ramifications for South Sudan. The consequences for the country, which shares a border with Sudan to the north, will extend beyond security concerns and also affect its economic and social fabric. The current crisis is reminiscent of the civil war and turmoil that led to the establishment of the South Sudanese state in 2011 after years of conflict (Vhumbunu, 2018). If the situation is not promptly resolved, it can escalate into a full-fledged war, leading to further fragmentation in Sudan, particularly in light of the ongoing critical situations and longstanding conflicts in Darfur (El-Affendi, 2023). South Sudan’s secession in 2011 brought about the largest economic shock to Sudan, resulting in the loss of over half of its revenue and 95% of its exports, which came from oil revenues.

According to recent reports, South Sudan supplies 170,000 barrels of oil per day to its northern neighbours through a pipeline, which may be disrupted by the ongoing conflict (Goodrich, 2022). In addition to affecting the economy, the fighting in South Sudan has led to many refugees looking for shelter in nearby nations. Due to the fight, almost 2.3 million South Sudanese have left; 800,000 are now living in Sudan. The efforts to provide aid to the millions of people who the internal crisis and civil unrest have displaced will be made more difficult if the fighting spreads to other cities in Sudan and forces the refugees to look for alternative safe havens or make the difficult decision to return home (Najimdeen, 2023).

Sudan’s involvement has also contributed to unrest and security issues in the Central African Republic (CAR). There have been reports of Sudanese internal security agents and former military soldiers giving sanctuary and weapons to organisations connected to CAR rebel bands who have wanted to overthrow the Bangui government since 2013. These assertions were confirmed in January when Hemedti stated that he had helped to stop a coup attempt against the CAR government from taking place in Sudan across the border (Amin, 2023). The Russian Wagner organisation, in charge of the diamond and gold mines on both sides of the border between the CAR and Sudan, has reportedly been linked to Hemedti’s RSF. Some reports have suggested that Wagner may have given the RSF weapons to help them fight the Sudanese army since the start of the Sudan conflict, and opposition forces in the CAR have accused the RSF of supporting Russian mercenaries inside the CAR (Elbagir et al., 2023).

Additionally, the situation may result in political unrest in Chad, a nation that shares many similarities with Sudan regarding its history, culture and interethnic relations. Sudan is a common travel destination for Chadian students, and many Chadian families have connections there. According to UNHCR 2023, Chad is home to almost 400,000 Sudanese refugees. Over 320 Sudanese troops sought asylum in Chad as violence broke out in Sudan, according to the military minister of Chad, Daoud Yaya Brahim (Takadji & Mednick, 2023).

The conflict in Sudan has the potential to exacerbate the prevailing suspicion between Khartoum and N’Djamena, as both sides have previously utilised rebels and armed opposition in the border region for their personal political gain during the reigns of Omar al-Bashir and Idriss Déby. The ongoing conflict in Sudan has sparked inquiries among Sudanese and Chadians regarding the ethnicity of certain Sudanese generals, like Hemedti, and the objectives of his RSF concerning Chadian Arabs. Chad confronts multiple threats, including rebellions and armed gangs along its northern borders with Libya and Sudan. N’Djamena is apprehensive that the instability and insecurity in Sudan could bolster Chadian rebels and armed opposition. Déby, the former president of Chad, was killed in clashes with rebels in the northern region. General Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, his son appointed interim president following his father’s death, is wary of any unfamiliar activities along the country’s borders. The recent escalation of RSF’s presence in the Chad-Sudan border regions, which stretch from the trijunction with Libya in the north to the trijunction with CAR in the South, has caused tensions between the two nations. Consequently, in January, both the Sudanese and Chadian governments held a discussion, during which they agreed to deploy their respective forces along the joint border in West Darfur State to address the situation (Sudan Tribune, 2023).

Furthermore, the illegal migration crisis in Libya has escalated. Sudan and Libya experienced a strained relationship during the reigns of Omar al-Bashir and Muammar Gaddafi. Accusations were traded between the two leaders regarding the smuggling of weapons across the border, intending to increase their influence in each other’s national politics and power struggles. Amidst the Libyan crisis in 2011, Khartoum extended support to the Libyan rebels by providing security and military assistance against the Gaddafi regime. Additionally, they played a crucial role in aiding the National Transitional Council in achieving control. During a joint press conference in Khartoum with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir expressed his support for the Libyan people and their pursuit of change, praising the fall of Gaddafi in 2012. This statement was reported by France24 in 2023, while an earlier report by Ismail Akwei in 2017 highlighted President al-Bashir’s acknowledgement that Sudan had no alternative but to stand behind the aspirations of the Libyan population. In the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan war, numerous Sudanese militants who had fought on different sides of the conflict found their way back to Sudan, intensifying tensions in the western Darfur region.

While the extent of Libya’s involvement in the Sudanese crisis remains uncertain, there are allegations suggesting that Khalifa Haftar, the Commander of the Libyan National Army, may have aided in the preparation of Sudan’s RSF for the ongoing hostilities in the months leading up to the conflict (Burke & Salih, 2023). Another consequence involves humanitarian and migratory concerns, with the potential for exploitation by human traffickers similar to what occurred in Libya. Sudan, which has served as a starting point and transit hub for individuals trying to reach Europe via Libya, could face similar challenges. Additionally, both nations are situated along significant routes for drug and human trafficking activities (Najimdeen, 2023).

Additionally, the presence of foreign actors and external agendas exists. Various accounts of foreign intervention in Sudan indicate that each foreign entity is striving to safeguard its interests within the country, and neighbouring nations might be utilised as a platform to launch operations or exert influence over the conflict, depending on their alliances and support for the factions involved. In the quest to gain control over the Red Sea, the Gulf countries and Turkey are in a power struggle for dominance in the Horn of Africa. This struggle has had observable consequences on various domestic issues within certain countries in the Horn. The economic interests of the Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have led them to involve themselves in the Sudanese situation since 2018. They have supported certain Sudanese military generals and sought to shape the country’s political landscape. For some, the transition from al-Bashir’s rule presents an opportunity to counter perceived Islamist influence and promote stability in the Middle East and North Africa region (Gallopin, 2020). Sudan is poised to become another arena where the West, which initially supported al-Bashir’s removal but was hesitant in backing an election-based transition, finds itself in conflict with Russia. Al-Bashir struck a deal with Russia for Sudan to host a naval base, although the agreement is still pending review. Russia’s influence is rising in the Sahel region, with a presence in the CAR and Libya. Recent statements from the Sudanese army, along with denials from the RSF regarding support from Wagner and reports of Haftar’s involvement—Haftar controls a significant portion of eastern Libya—have contributed to growing distrust between Sudan and neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt, Libya, Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This situation raises concerns about the potential for a protracted conflict in Sudan fuelled by external interests (Najimdeen, 2023).

Conclusions and Recommendations

In conclusion, the complex dynamics within Sudan involving the SAF and the RSF have deep historical roots, intertwined with the authoritarian rule of the ‘Al-Ingaz’ regime led by Omar al-Bashir. The RSF, originating from the Janjaweed militia, underwent transformation and became a formidable paramilitary force, wielding significant influence and power under Bashir’s regime. The recent clashes between the Sudanese military and paramilitary forces, particularly Generals El-Burhan and Hemedti, are not merely personal disputes but manifestations of a protracted institutional rivalry within Sudan’s security apparatus. The involvement of external actors further complicates the situation. Countries such as the UAE, Russia, Israel, China and Western nations have vested interests in Sudan due to geopolitical, economic and strategic considerations. The struggle for dominance in the Horn of Africa has heightened tensions, with various foreign entities supporting different factions within Sudan. The ongoing conflict not only jeopardises the stability of Sudan but also poses significant risks for neighbouring countries such as Chad and South Sudan. The potential spillover effect could lead to regional instability, exacerbating existing crises in surrounding nations. The repercussions of the Sudanese conflict extend beyond the immediate region. The Horn of Africa, already grappling with political unrest, insecurity and humanitarian crises, faces further challenges. Ethiopia, in particular, is closely tied to Sudan’s fate, with concerns about the potential exploitation of the situation along their shared border. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a source of contention between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, adds another layer of complexity to the regional dynamics. The conflict’s impact on South Sudan, a nation born out of Sudan’s secession in 2011, is profound. The disruption of oil supplies, economic repercussions and the influx of refugees pose significant challenges for South Sudan. The CAR is also affected, with reports of Sudanese forces providing support to rebel groups within CAR, leading to increased tensions in the region. Moreover, the involvement of external actors, including Gulf countries, Turkey and Russia, raises concerns about the potential for a protracted conflict fuelled by competing interests. The struggle for control over the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa has turned Sudan into a battleground for global powers.

However, in view of the factors highlighted thus far, it may be recommended that resolving the communal and ethnic rifts in Sudan’s conflict demands a comprehensive strategy that identifies and addresses the underlying factors driving these divisions. Priorities should include advancing inclusivity, ensuring fair resource distribution and guaranteeing equitable political representation. Deploying measures like truth and reconciliation commissions can aid in bridging communal gaps and fostering healing. Furthermore, nurturing dialogue, empathy and mutual respect among various ethnic and communal factions is vital for cultivating enduring peace and stability in Sudan (Kulang & Ogbonna, 2018). Also, the global community holds significant leverage in tackling the communal and ethnic schisms within Sudan’s conflict. This can entail supporting grassroots efforts, fostering dialogue and mediation, tackling the underlying causes of the conflict and delivering humanitarian assistance to affected populations. Nations with sway over the conflicting factions should also utilise their influence to secure a ceasefire and advocate for a peaceful resolution to the conflict (Zambakari, 2023).