At a time when international politics has become multipolar, middle powers are adopting strategic autonomy on matters of global importance, and the world is witnessing multifaceted challenges due to military conflicts and geopolitical tensions, it is important to understand the ways in which Middle Eastern powers are exerting influence in regional and international arenas. With growing geostrategic tensions, among big powers, the role of middle powers, especially in a strategically important Middle East, becomes significant. This article takes the cases of four Middle Eastern middle powers, namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Türkiye and Egypt, and analyses their international relations through the lens of ‘niche diplomacy’ and argues that these powers have developed niche diplomacy tools to seek influence and status at the regional and international arena. The article offers a novel framework to analyse the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Middle Eastern middle powers that help in deciphering the increasingly complex diplomatic and strategic developments in the region.
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