Abstract
In recent years, the West African sub-region has been faced with a wave of terrorism, resulting in the death of hundreds of people, destruction of public and private properties, and the displacement of millions. In response, states and multilateral institutions within and outside the sub-region have developed and introduced different mechanisms to address the issue. This article, however, investigates the experience of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in counterterrorism in West Africa. The idea is not to go over the role of ECOWAS with a fine-tooth comb but to focus attention on the themes that have emanated from its different efforts to address the problem. Specifically, it examines the kind of issues and challenges ECOWAS has faced in the current international political environment and the factors that influenced its ability to respond effectively to these issues and challenges.
Introduction
Terrorism, 1 defined by Kofi Anan as ‘any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or international organization to do something or not to do something’ (cited in Imobighe 2009, 15), has become rampant in recent years in West Africa. This is in view of the fact that a number of groups in the sub-region has increasingly resorted to the use of the markers of terrorism (or terrorist acts), enunciated by international instruments such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999 and ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism of 2013, namely ‘terrorist bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, hostage-taking, hijacking, mass murder, wanton assassinations, piracy and acts of sabotage of public and private properties, as well as the torching and desecration of religious and sacred places’ (ECOWAS 2013a, 2–3).
Based on their activities and relationship with well-known international terrorist networks, notable terrorist groups in the sub-region include Boko Haram and Ansaru in northern Nigeria, and Ansar Dine (or Ansar Eddine), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), 2 as well as al-Mourabitoun and Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), AQIM affiliates, all in Mali. These groups have, at times without number, perpetrated premeditated violent attacks on people, state officials and state infrastructure, government institutions and national and multi-national organisations, thereby undermining the peace, security and stability of the sub-region. Consequently, state and non-state actors in the sub-region, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in collaboration with local and foreign actors (state and non-state), such as the USA, France, African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), have developed and introduced different strategies to counter and combat the problem. This raises the need to investigate how each and all of these actors have responded.
However, ECOWAS’s response to terrorism in the sub-region is the focus of this study. The idea is not to go over the role of ECOWAS with a fine-tooth comb. Rather, the issues to which the organisation has responded, the challenges it has confronted in the current international political environment and the factors that influenced its ability to respond effectively to the challenges will be the focus of attention. The study relies on the content analysis of secondary data, sourced from scholarly peer-reviewed journals and books, Internet materials and official publications of ECOWAS and its agencies and those of other relevant multilateral institutions involved in counterterrorism in the sub-region such as the UN and AU. There are three sections in the article, apart from the introduction and conclusion. The first is the analysis of terrorism in West Africa, focusing on the manifestations of the phenomenon in Nigeria and Mali, the two most affected states in the sub-region. The second section examines ECOWAS’s counterterrorism strategies. The third focuses on the issues and challenges ECOWAS has confronted in the current international political climate and the factors that influenced its ability to respond.
Terrorism in West Africa: Nigeria and Mali as Case Studies
West Africa is made up of independent, sovereign countries—Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. A number of these countries have in recent years experienced terrorist attacks in which lives were lost and private and public properties destroyed. Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, for example, experienced terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2016. While Hotel Splendid and Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, were attacked by terrorists in November 2015, the Radisson Blue Hotel in Bamako, Mali, the tourist beach of Grand-Bassam near Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, and mosques in Maiduguri, Nigeria, were attacked at different times by terrorists between January and March 2016 (The Punch 2016).
However, the phenomenon of terrorism is more pronounced in Nigeria and Mali than any other country in the sub-region, as both countries are homes to some of the notorious terrorist groups in the world. While Nigeria is home to Boko Haram, Mali houses AQIM, Ansar Dine, MOJWA, known by its French acronym Mouvement pour l’unicite et le jihad en Afrique de l’Quest (MUJAO), and al-Mourabitoun, which has links with AQIM (Bøas 2009; George 2012; United Nations [UN] 2012). These groups are by far the most deadly terrorist groups in the sub-region, as their violent activities have had devastating effects on the sociopolitical, economic and corporate existence of the countries where they are situated, as well as in some of the adjoining countries. This section therefore examines in some more detail the phenomenon of terrorism in both Nigeria and Mali.
Terrorism in Nigeria: Boko Haram in Perspective
Although there are many sources of insecurity in Nigeria, Boko Haram is by far the principal terror-fomenting group in the country. This is underscored by the kinds of activities that the group has engaged in and the damages it has engendered. For example, Boko Haram’s primary goal was the disintegration of the Nigerian state and anything not Islamic (Agbiboa 2015, 9). Being guided by radical Islam, which considers Western education, democracy and Western values as corrupt and evil, the group attempted to create an Islamic Sharia-driven caliphate in the northeast of Nigeria, in violation of the constitutionally enshrined secularity of the country. In pursuance of the agenda, armed attacks were launched, in the first instance, against state security officials and public infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and government offices in the northeast, particularly Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (Akanji 2015).
The violent attacks were later extended to civilians and private properties, including houses, farms and farmsteads, churches, mosques and palaces of traditional rulers in the states in the northeast, as well as in Abuja and Nasarawa, Kaduna, Kano and Bauchi states, all of which are outside the remit of the north-east geopolitical zone of the country. In the process, heinous crimes, such as decapitation and incineration of people, rape and kidnapping, were committed, and millions of people were displaced internally and across the borders to neighbouring countries (Agbiboa 2015; Akanji 2015). Women and girls were the most affected by the activities of Boko Haram, as several of them were kidnapped, raped, forced into marriage with warlords, sold into sex slavery and prostitution, used as human shield against attacks by government forces and used as bomb carriers (Akanji 2015).
The ruthlessness of the Boko Haram undermined socio-economic, political and cultural activities and interactions in the northeast of Nigeria. For example, there was no electricity in Maiduguri, Borno State’s capital, for almost 2 years before 2016 (ibid.). Similarly, there was disruption of educational activities in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions in Borno State, as schools were closed because of incessant attacks by Boko Haram (Agbiboa 2015; Akanji 2015). In one of such attacks in May, 2014, over 200 schoolgirls of Chibok Government Secondary School, Borno State, were abducted (Akanji 2015). Likewise, over 100 schoolgirls were kidnapped by Boko Haram from Dapchi Girls Secondary School, Yobe state, on 19 February 2018 (PM News 2018). Furthermore, the airport in Borno State was closed for many months, and the only highway leading in and out of the state capital was closed because of Boko Haram (Idris 2015).
In addition, violence by Boko Haram undermined traditional institutions in the northeast, as palaces of emirs (traditional rulers) were attacked at various times, and some of the emirs were forced into exile. For instance, five emirs in Borno State and two in Yobe State were forced into exile when Boko Haram attacked and seized their domains in 2014 (Idris 2014). The traditional rulers were the Shehu of Dikwa, Muhammad Ibn Shehu Masta; Emir of Gwoza, Muhammadu Ibn Mustapha Idrissa Timta (who was killed by Boko Haram while on the way to Gombe for a funeral); Emir of Bama, Kyari Ibn Ibrahim El-Kanemi; Emir of Askira, Abubakar Ibn Muhammad Askirama; and Emir of Uba, Ali Ibn Ismaíla Mamza (ibid.). In order to curb the activities of Boko Haram, the federal government of Nigeria imposed a 3-month state of emergency on the three most affected states: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in 2013 but later extended it by 6 months. Despite the state of emergency, under which the government deployed the full weight of the military to the affected states, terrorism continued and deepened as more and more deadly violent attacks were perpetrated by Boko Haram (Akanji 2015, 2016).
Besides, some of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries, particularly Niger, Chad and Cameron, have experienced armed attacks by Boko Haram. In Cameron, for instance, Boko Haram kidnapped civilians, foreign tourists and missionaries in the border regions of the country in 2015 (AU 2015a), carried out 60 suicide attacks in the far region of the country in 2017 (Vanguard 2018a) and killed a number of people, including five in Ashigashiya town in February 2018 (Vanguard 2018b). Also, different places in N’djamena, Republic of Chad and the Gueskerou area of Diffa Province, Niger Republic, were attacked in June 2015 by Boko Haram, resulting in varying degrees of casualties, including 20 deaths in N’djamena (ECOWAS Info 2015) and 38 deaths, mostly women and children, and more than 100 homes destroyed in the Gueskerou area (ECOWAS 2015).
The activities of Boko Haram, particularly the mindless mass killing of people, destruction of properties and its determination to dismember Nigeria have compelled the Nigerian state to develop a counterterrorism framework that comprises hard (military), soft (non-military, including dialogue, negotiation) and legal strategies. In addition, Nigeria and other member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Benin Republic have responded to the trans-national and regional threats of terrorism by Boko Haram with the deployment of a military force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).
Mali and the Problem of Terrorism: Evolution, Character and Consequences
Terrorism in Mali is closely linked to radical Islamic groups. Although Islam is the dominant religion in Mali, the spread of radical Islamic groups in the country was made possible by four interrelated factors (Bossuyt 2016; George 2012). The first was chronic poverty and food shortage, caused by the government’s poor management of the economy and increasing desertification in the country (George 2012). This, over a period of time, created a group of disgruntled, unemployed youth that were vulnerable to religious manipulation and radicalisation (Bøas 2009). The second was the age-long agitations for internal self-determination, dating back to 1962, by the Tuareg of the Azawad in northern Mali, which organised and agitated at different times under different names, including, in the 1960s, as the National Movement for the Azawad (MNA); in the 1990s, as the Azawad People’s Movement (MPA); and in the 2000s, as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, known in French as Mouvement national pour la liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) by the time the Arabs in the region had joined the struggle (Douglas-Bowers 2013; George 2012).
However, continued insensitivity from the government to complaints of neglect and marginalisation, heightened by increasing poverty, unemployment and desertification in the north, transformed the Tuareg’s agitations for internal self-determination in the 1960s–1980s into violent rebellion for the independence of Azawad in the 1990s (Bøas 2009; Bossuyt 2016; George 2012). After military solutions to the rebellion had failed, the government and the rebels signed a number of peace treaties, including the Tamanrasset Peace Accord (1991) and the National Peace Pact (1992), which emphasised the de-militarisation of the region and the de-mobilisation and integration of rebel fighters into the Malian military (Douglas-Bowers 2013; George 2012). The government’s failure to implement the peace accords however led to the resurgence of the rebellion in 2006, which continued until 2012 (Bossuyt 2016; George 2012).
The third and fourth factors, respectively, were the return of the Tuareg who had served as mercenaries to President Muammar Gadaffi during the February–October 2011 Arab Springs in Libya and the inflow of heavy weaponry through them into the north of Mali (Adetula 2015, 19; Fessy 2012; George 2012). The returnee Tuareg rebel fighters and some radical Islamists capitalised on the country’s poor socio-economic conditions to infiltrate its northern region. This escalated the rebellion in the north, as the Tuareg fighters were boosted by the influx of heavy weapons and support from radical Islamists, particularly the Ansar Dine Islamist group (Adetula 2015; Arieff 2013; Fessy 2012). Consequently, the conflict between government forces and Tuareg fighters under the platform of MNLA intensified, particularly between January and March 2012, leading to the death of some Malian soldiers and the capturing of towns such as Menaka, Aguelhok and Tessalit in the region of Azawad by the MNLA (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).
The success of the Ansar Dine-supported MNLA in the January–March 2012 rebellion was blamed on low morale in the Malian military, in addition to lack of adequate equipment, caused by corruption and inefficiency in the government (Arieff 2013; George 2012). As a result, a group of soldiers, under the banner of National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), led by Captain Amadaou Sanogo, toppled the government of President Amadou Toumani Touré on 22 March 2012 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013, 5). The coup, however, engendered a leadership cum political crisis in the government and the military, as it was unclear for a couple of days who was in charge of the government of the country because there was wrangling among the coup plotters who were mostly junior officers (Arieff 2013). This gave an opportunity for the MNLA, supported by Ansar Dine, to overrun the whole of the northern part of the country by 5 April 2012, take control of several ancient and important cities such as Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Douentza, and afterwards declare the independence of Azawad (George 2012; Thurston and Lebovich 2013).
Beyond the ushering in of the independence of Azawad, the emergence of the MNLA in 2012 engendered more problems for Mali, as it provoked inter-group crises which threatened the peace of the country. This was as a result of the rift between the MNLA and the Ansar Dine Islamist group over whether Azawad should be governed as an Islamic caliphate or as a secular state (Arieff 2013; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). While the MNLA opposed the idea of Azawad becoming an Islamic state, Ansar Dine supported it. This fractured relations between the two groups and resulted in both parting ways (ibid.). A further implication of this was the rise of terrorism in the north of the country, as there was a proliferation of armed radical Islamist groups, with some, such as MOJWA/MUJAO, having links to the AQIM, an international terrorist group (Thurston and Lebovich 2013; UN 2012). In addition, there was further balkanisation of northern Mali, as MNLA’s influence and control was limited by Ansar Dine and MOJWA/MUJAO to only a small portion of the north, while they shared the larger part between themselves (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).
Hence, the radical Islamists, albeit terrorists, imposed strict Islamic rule on the territories under their control and perpetrated human rights and humanitarian abuses, including the use of children as soldiers under the guise of implementing Sharia law and promoting Islam (IRIN News 2013). Also, the groups embarked on a systematic destruction of some of Mali’s ancient Islamic manuscripts and mosques in the territories under their control on the ground that they are un-Islamic (ibid.; Komne 2013). In July 2012, the terrorists destroyed the ancient mosque in Timbuktu, and in 2013, thousands of ancient Islamic manuscripts at the Ahmed Baba Institutes were burnt (Komne 2013). The brutality of the terrorist cum radical Islamist groups in the territories under their control and continued hostilities between them and government forces created a refugee problem, both for the country and for the West African sub-region. By February 2013, for instance, about 377,000 people had been displaced, including 150,000 who sought refuge across Mali’s borders (Daniel 2013). In addition, the activities of terrorists disrupted farming and supply and distribution of food by aid agencies, thereby fuelling food shortages in the country and the Sahel region (Arieff 2013).
Besides, the instability in Mali turned it into a breeding ground for trans-national terrorist organisations and violent extremist groups, some of whom exported terrorism to its neighbours, especially Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, by way of cross-border violent attacks on civilians, expatriates, police and military outposts. Burkina Faso, for instance, experienced series of cross-border armed attacks by Mali-linked terrorist groups in 2016, 2017 and 2018. While the al-Mourabitoun, an AQIM affiliate with links to Mali, carried out deadly attacks on a luxury hotel and café in Ouagadougou, killing scores of people, on 15 January 2016 (Bluy et al. 2016), the Ansar-ul-Islam lil-ichad wal jihad, a Mali-based al-Qaeda-affiliated religious group, attacked a Burkina Faso military post near its border with Mali, killing 12 soldiers, in December 2016 (Buchanan 2017; Reuters 2016). Deadly attacks by terrorist groups were also perpetrated in Burkina Faso in August 2017, which resulted in the deaths of 19 people (Inks 2017), and in March 2018 (Perez-Pena and Barry 2018).
The humanitarian and human rights consequences of terrorism in northern Mali, like in northeast Nigeria, and the trans-national and regional nature and impacts of terrorism in the two countries attracted the attention of global, regional and sub-regional multilateral actors/institutions. The next section, however, focuses on how ECOWAS as an institution has responded to terrorism in the sub-region and the issues and challenges it has faced.
ECOWAS Counterterrorism Initiatives in West Africa: Critical Themes/Issues
Although ECOWAS is an inter-governmental multilateral institution established to promote economic integration and development, its mandate and latitude of operations have over the years expanded to include security concerns, including counterterrorism. This is because peace, security and stability are essential ingredients for effective regional integration and socio-economic development. To this end, ECOWAS has developed a number of binding instruments, including conventions and protocols, on conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution; peacekeeping, combating of corruption, combating of small arms and light weapons; and prevention of drug abuse, illicit drug trafficking and organised crimes, most of which are also applicable to terrorism. 3
On combating terrorism, ECOWAS, as an institution, has collaborated with state and non-state actors regionally and internationally. Regionally, ECOWAS has been a platform for collaborations for member states to develop and implement counter- terrorism measures. In 2006, for instance, heads of state and governments of the member states of ECOWAS deliberated on the rising cases of terrorism and money laundering in the region and directed all member states to enact laws to accommodate the revised Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and relevant international instruments on AML/CFT (GIABA 2006, 22).
Internationally, ECOWAS has a relationship on terrorism and related issues with development partners such as the UN, EU, African Union (AU), World Bank and many countries within and outside of Africa. For example, ECOWAS entered into a multi-year (2015–2019) security and development agreement with the US government in 2015. The agreement focused on strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing trade and investment as well as peace and security, including Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (ECOWAS 2016a). Similarly, ECOWAS is a regional partner of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), a committee created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) to enhance the ability of UN member states to prevent terrorist acts within and outside their borders, and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), established to implement CTC’s policy decisions and conduct expert assessments of UN member states on counterterrorism (UN 2015). In line with the partnership, ECOWAS has developed a number of measures, including the establishment of counterterrorism institutions and instruments.
A notable counterterrorism institution established by ECOWAS is the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA). ECOWAS established GIABA on 10 December 1999, as an institution to combat money laundering but expanded its mandate to include combating terrorism financing in 2006 in view of the growing terrorism in the region and the role that illicit money (money laundered) plays in fostering it. Thus, GIABA was mandated to ensure that member states of ECOWAS recognise, adopt and implement international AML/CFT measures for the purpose of ensuring the security, integrity and stability of the region’s financial system (GIABA 2015, 13). GIABA’s mandate also includes provision of technical assistance to ECOWAS member states in the area of institutional and regulatory frameworks as well as good governance; organising self-evaluation exercises for member states as well as peer evaluations with a view to promote the effectiveness and compliance of national regimes with international standards; and coordinating and promoting regional and international cooperation (ibid., 14).
From its yearly reports, there is abundant evidence to show that GIABA has assisted ECOWAS member states to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF) measures; provided technical assistance to them in areas such as policy development, training, capacity building, mentoring, study tours, equipment and advisory services; and undertaken country assessment to determine the level of each member state’s compliance with AML/CFT, particularly the FATF standards (GIABA 2006, 2015). As of 2015, for example, all member states of ECOWAS have been assessed by GIABA and placed on follow-up process, which involved regular monitoring, collection of up-to-date information on compliance and exerting of pressures on countries that fail to make progress in addressing the deficiencies in their AML/CFT measures (GIABA 2015, 40). The effects of these efforts by GIABA have been tremendous, including the ratification and domestication of UN treaties on terrorism by some ECOWAS member states, such as Sierra Leone, which ratified in 2014 the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and its additional protocols, being one of the deficiencies recognised by the Mutual Evaluation process of GIABA (ibid.). In addition, in 2013, the Parliament of Sierra Leone passed into law the country’s Terrorism Prevention (Freezing of International Terrorist Funds and Other Related Measures) Regulations, as a way of domesticating and implementing the UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 1373 (GIABA 2015, 50).
Also, GIABA’s efforts have led to the enactment of counterterrorism legislations and establishment of institutions on counterterrorism by all countries in the region (ibid., 8). For example, in Guinea, Law No. L/2014/010/AN on Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) was promulgated in 2014; and Decree Nos. D/049/ PRG/SGG and D/050/PRG/SGG, which established the Inter-Ministerial Committee responsible for monitoring the AML/CFT regime of the country and mapping out the mission, organisation and functioning of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), in accordance with Article 23 of the AML Law were promulgated in April 2015 (ibid., 41). Nigeria has also criminalised money laundering and terrorism with the enactment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013.
Apart from GIABA, which focuses on combating terrorism financing, ECOWAS has also conceived some other counterterrorism mechanisms. These include ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Bureau (ECOCTB); ECOWAS Arrest Warrant (ECOWARRANT); ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks (ECOLIST); ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Training Centre; and Counter-Terrorism Technical Assistance Directory (ECOWAS 2013a, 6). These mechanisms were created in February 2013 through the adoption of the ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, which contained ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. The ECOWAS Declaration was hinged on giving effect to regional, continental and international counterterrorism instruments and to provide a common operational framework for actions to prevent terrorism in West Africa, in addition to being predicated on the assumption that a terrorist threat to one is a threat to all in the region (ECOWAS 2013a, 6; 2013b, 14).
The idea behind the counterterrorism mechanisms of the ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism was to combat terrorism through a three-pronged approach to prevent, pursue and reconstruct. Under the first pillar (the prevent pillar) of the approach, member states of ECOWAS are expected to prevent terrorism by, among other things, eliminating the socio-economic and political conditions, such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities, which engender the rise of terrorists. Similarly, and to achieve the second pillar of the approach, ECOWARRANT, ECOCTB and ECOLIST were approved for establishment so as to enable member states of ECOWAS to cooperate in giving and obtaining evidence on terrorists in other member states, create a databank of terrorist activities, trends and developments, draw up names of individual terrorists and terrorist networks and exchange information and intelligence on terrorist activities among others.
The mechanisms are however expected to function with and be assisted by other institutions in the region, including GIABA, on combating terrorist financing—ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and West Africa Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) for information gathering to predict and detect terrorist activities and the ECOWAS Court of Justice for the enforcement of the rights of the victims of terrorism. As part of the third aspect of the approach, the ECOWAS Declaration expects member states to heal the wounds of terrorism by providing psychosocial and medical support to victims of terrorism and to promote people’s trust and confidence in the government.
Furthermore, ECOWAS has been in the forefront of drawing global attention to terrorism in the sub-region and in seeking international actions against it. This has been in a number of ways, including by regular open condemnations, through press releases, of terrorist activities whenever they occur in the region, such as in the case of the 15 January 2016 terrorist attacks on Splendid Hotel and Cappuccino coffee shop in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which claimed many lives (ECOWAS 2016b). ECOWAS also condemned attacks in June 2015 by Boko Haram on targets in N’djamena, Republic of Chad, in which 20 people died and several others were wounded (ECOWAS Info 2015) and the attacks of 17 June 2015 by the same group on the Gueskerou area of Diffa Province of Niger Republic, in which about 38 people died, mostly women and children, and several others wounded and more than a hundred homes set ablaze (ECOWAS 2015). Another way is by facilitating the inclusion of terrorism in the sub-region on the agenda of major global and regional multilateral actors. For example, on 12 January 2015, ECOWAS requested the AU Peace and Security Council to include an item on terrorism by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region on the agenda of the AU summit slated for the year (AU 2015a, 2). Consequently, terrorism by Boko Haram was included on the agenda of the 25th AU Summit, held in Johannesburg in June 2015, with the result that the summit, among other things, endorsed efforts by member countries of the LCBC and Benin Republic to operationalise the MNJTF that was established to combat Boko Haram (AU 2015b, 6).
In addition, apart from developing legal and institutional counterterrorism structures, ECOWAS has been a platform for collective actions by states in West Africa against terrorism in the region. In the case of Mali, for instance, ECOWAS played a key role in combating the rise of terrorism in the country after the military coup and political crisis of 2012. In the first place, ECOWAS condemned the military seizure of power, rejected the CNRDR of Captain Amadou Sanogo as the authentic government and mediated a transitional government with an interim president (ECOWAS 2012a). ECOWAS equally rejected the MNLA rebellion in the north of the country and contributed the sum of US$3 million towards addressing the humanitarian consequences of the rebellion (ibid., 4). Furthermore, ECOWAS threatened a military action by proposing an ECOWAS Standby Force Mission in Mali (MICEMA) when Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO started their barbaric acts of terrorism in the north, with a push towards the south, thereby worsening the security, humanitarian and human rights situation in the country (ECOWAS 2012b, 5). Also, ECOWAS cooperated with the AU and other partners in 2013 to form, mobilise and deploy the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), a UN-authorised military force in conformity with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (ECOWAS 2012c; Maru 2013). Similarly, ECOWAS collaborated with the AU, UN and other major partners to mobilise and deploy the UN-authorised Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which replaced AFISMA. Likewise, ECOWAS has demonstrated interest in the challenges faced by the Sahel countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania by developing an ECOWAS Sahel strategy, which aimed at finding solutions to cross-border terrorism and developmental challenges in the area (PanaPress 2015). The ECOWAS Sahel strategy has however achieved little, in that threats of terrorism in the area have continued, thereby necessitating the formation by the Group of Five Sahel States (the G5 Sahel) of the G5 Sahel Force (also known as Force conjointe du G5 Sahel – ‘FC-G5S’), a UN/AU-endorsed cross-border joint military force to combat terrorism and trans-national organised crime (UNSC 2017).
Constraints to ECOWAS’s Counterterrorism Efforts in West Africa
As active, pragmatic and proactive as ECOWAS has been in the fight against terrorism in the West African sub-region, its efforts have been constrained and limited by two factors. The first is the lack of willingness and commitment or better put the lacklustre approach of the organisation and its member states to implement counterterrorism decisions and legally binding instruments. This is in the sense that though ECOWAS as an institution is a platform for states in the region to deliberate, articulate and develop ways of combating regional challenges, member states of the organisation have often failed to fully cooperate with one another and with the institution to achieve the goal. For example, a number of the member states of ECOWAS, namely Nigeria, Guinea, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone, defaulted in the submission of their 2015 annual country reports to GIABA (2015), thus hindering the assessment of the state of terrorism financing and money laundering in them as well as the possible areas of technical assistance they could have received from GIABA.
Similarly, financial constraints, arising from the failure of member states to honour their financial commitments to ECOWAS, have limited the capacity of its institutions, including those on counterterrorism, to perform optimally. The implementation of some of the activities of GIABA between 2011 and 2014, for example, fell below the optimal (66.36%) level, due to shortage of funds that all ECOWAS institutions experienced at the time (ibid., 96). The level of achievement that GIABA even had at the time, though below the optimal level, was largely due to financial assistance it received from development partners, particularly the African Development Bank (AfDB; ibid.). Also, not all ECOWAS member countries have ratified, signed or acceded to relevant binding international legal instruments on counterterrorism. For example, though a majority (13 out of 15) of the member states have ratified the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as of 2017 (AU 2017), only 7 of the 18 UN and universal instruments on counterterrorism have been ratified by all the states in the region (ECOWAS 2013a, 21). 4
In the same vein, ECOWAS member states have provided irregular reports to the CTC and even fewer reports per UNSC Resolution 1624, a resolution designed to improve border security and encourage member countries to submit updates to the CTC (Warren 2012). The implications of this are two. The first is that the defaulting states have failed to develop national mechanisms to implement the instruments and the second is that the situation has undermined ECOWAS’s efforts to develop region-wide mechanisms to implement the instruments. In addition, ECOWAS itself has been slow and lethargic in implementing its own counterterrorism decisions. This reflects in the fact that the mechanisms (and the entire strategy) approved for creation and implementation by the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism of 2013 have not been fully functional, contrary to the stipulation that they should be operational within 6 months from the date, 28 February 2013, of the adoption of the document. This, it is argued, is ‘owing to lack of dedicated resources for its implementation’ (UN 2016, 38).
The second challenge ECOWAS has confronted in its bid to combat terrorism in the sub-region has been the character of the international political environment, particularly as it relates to the high-stake politics and struggles involving the AU and UN, contributing to the undermining of its initiatives. The general character of the international system, as defined by the UN Charter, is that regional and sub-regional organisations must seek the approval of the UNSC before undertaking the use of force. Chapter VIII, Article 53, of the Charter stipulates that ‘…no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council …’ (UNSC 1945, 11). This is further reinforced by Article 54 of the same Chapter VIII of the Charter, which states that ‘the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (ibid.). These provisions have often created legitimacy problems for enforcement actions unilaterally or collectively undertaken by regional and sub-regional organisations, most of whom only secured the approval of the UN retroactively.
Also, although sub-regional organisations are part of the security architecture of the AU, their activities in the realm of security are coordinated by the Peace and Security Council and chairperson of the Commission of the Union. Specifically, Article 16(3) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union stipulates that regional mechanisms (inclusive of sub-regional bodies) should ‘keep the Peace and Security Council fully and continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these activities are closely harmonised and coordinated with the activities of the Peace and Security Council’ (AU 2002). By this, unilateral military interventions by sub-regional organisations are foreclosed, as the organisations have to subject their activities in the field of security to the Peace and Security Council—an organ responsible for recommending military interventions and the modalities of such interventions to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union (ibid.), which has the power to authorise such actions.
However, deference to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and relevant provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU hampered ECOWAS’s response to terrorism in Mali. For instance, ECOWAS’s Heads of State and Government directed in March 2012 that the sub-regional standby force be put in readiness for deployment to Mali to, among other things, combat terrorism and criminality in the country and thereafter sought the support of the AU and authorisation of the UNSC (ECOWAS 2012d). Yet, disagreement among AU member states over the chairmanship of the continental organisation delayed its consideration of the ECOWAS proposal until July, when a new chairperson of the Commission of the Union was appointed. This was because such considerations in the AU are only made, and approval given, by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU, after recommendation from the Peace and Security Council working in conjunction with the chairperson of the Commission of the Union. Consequently, the appointment of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in July 2012, as the new chairperson, showed the AU taking the lead in addressing the security problem in Mali, in line with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. This, however, involved the jettisoning of the ECOWAS-proposed military intervention for an AFISMA, which despite being a product of AU-ECOWAS collaborations, was largely a continental initiative.
Also, UN’s attitude to the idea of an ECOWAS force in Mali, in terms of its tacit refusal to accede to the request by ECOWAS and AU for an authorization of MICEMA on the ground that it needed to ‘further examine the request …’ (UNSC 2012a, 4), contributed to why the force was not constituted and deployed and its replacement with AFISMA. The UNSC’s demand for detailed information on the ECOWAS military initiative was in spite of it being informed of the pledges by ECOWAS member states to provide 3,000 troops and that ‘the Committee of ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff, together with experts and military planners from the UN, EU and bilateral partners were carrying out a technical assessment and fine-tuning of the strategy and operational plan of the Mission’ (ECOWAS 2012d). The action by the UNSC had two serious implications: it delayed the authorisation of the ECOWAS force and allowed the entire ECOWAS military initiative in Mali to be replaced in December 2012 with AFISMA, a continental initiative.
In the same vein, although AFISMA was authorised by the UN through UNSC Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012, the world body delayed in doing so, as requests for the authorisation were made at different times in September and October 2012 by the Malian transitional authorities, ECOWAS and the AU (UN 2012; UNSC 2012b). Also, when the UN eventually did authorise AFISMA, it made no concrete plans for its funding. While the UN enjoined its member states and international organisations to ‘provide financial support and contributions in kind to AFISMA’, it on its part indicated interest to consider providing voluntary and UN-funded logistics support packages only after the AU, ECOWAS and Malian authorities have developed and refined options (UN 2012). This prompted the AU to, on 21 December 2012, a day after the UNSC resolution 2085 was passed, restate its and ECOWAS’s request for ‘rapid implementation of a logistic support package funded by statutory contributions from the UN budget’ (AU 2012), a request that was never granted. As a result, it was difficult to operationalise AFISMA, as it could not be immediately constituted and deployed.
This contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in Mali, as elements of Ansar Dine and MUJAO, with support of AQIM, became emboldened to increase and extend their terror activities to the south and west of the country, capturing in the process the towns of Diabaly and Konna, about 680 km from the county’s capital, Bamako, in January 2013 (UN n.d.). The increased activities of the terrorists, as a result of the delay in the deployment of AFISMA, compelled France, at the instance of the Malian transitional government, to militarily intervene under the banner of Operation Serval, aimed at combating the terrorists’ southward offensives (UN 2013). The deployment of French forces in the country, however, spurred African states, particularly, the Republic of Chad and eight ECOWAS member states, namely, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, with some financial and logistical support from France, the EU, the USA and the UK, to deploy AFISMA by contributing troops and bearing the costs of their troops (ECOWAS 2013c).
Furthermore, barely 6 months into its operation, AFISMA was replaced by the UN with a MINUSMA, through UNSC Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. This was at the instance of the AU, ECOWAS and the Malian transitional authorities, which sought to stabilise and restore the authority and sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory. Consequently, in July 2013 AFISMA transferred its authority to MINUSMA (AU 2013a). However, the manner in which the UN transformed AFISMA to MINUSMA undermined AU and ECOWAS, as the transformation was without the adequate involvement of the AU and ECOWAS, particularly ‘…in the drafting and consultation process that led to the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution…’ (AU 2013b). The AU Peace and Security Council expressed the continent’s objections to the UN action through the Communiqué of its 371st meeting on 25 April 2013. In the communiqué, the Peace and Security Council stated categorically that the step taken by the UN was ‘not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’ (ibid.). Similarly, the AU Peace and Security Council pointed out that Resolution 2100 failed to ‘adequately take into account the foundation laid by African stakeholders … and the concerns formally expressed by the AU and ECOWAS and the proposals they constructively made to facilitate a coordinated international support…’ (ibid.). The exclusion of the AU and ECOWAS from the process leading to the transformation of AFISMA to MINUSMA was an indication of UN’s lack of faith in the ability of the AU/ECOWAS to contribute to the process of finding a solution to the problem of terrorism in Mali.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that ECOWAS has responded to terrorism in West Africa in different ways. However, as much as its efforts have been shown to have yielded some positive results, it has also revealed the lack of political will and absence of commitment by its member states to implement and enforce decisions on counterterrorism, as well as the role of the international political environment in its counterterrorism initiatives. The fact, however, that terrorism in the sub-region has not ceased, as evidenced by continued attacks, though mostly on soft targets, by Boko Haram in Nigeria’s northeast (The Nation 2017) and the series of terrorist attacks in Mali, including attacks in 2015 by AQIM on the Radisson Blue Hotel and in 2017 on the Le Campement Kangaba resort, east of Bamako (Council on Foreign Relations 2017), and in Burkina Faso in March 2018 (Perez-Pena and Barry 2018), means that ECOWAS needs to redouble its efforts, show more commitment to the fight against terrorism and the UN and AU must give priority attention to sub-regional counterterrorism initiatives.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.