Stability and Governability the Benign Effects of Party Dominance in South Africa

Abstract

A tripartite alliance formed by the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions has been ruling the country with wide parliamentarian majorities. The country remains more consensual and politically inclusive than any of the other African countries in the post-independence era. This article examines three performance’s aspects of the party dominance systems: legitimacy, stability and violence. As we are living in a period in which an unprecedented number of countries have completed democratic transitions, it is politically and conceptually important that we understand the specific tasks of crafting democratic consolidation.

Keywords

Democratic consolidation divided societies dominance party system electoral systems ethnic accommodation government stability inclusiveness party systems South Africa

Resume

The focus in democratic studies has shifted from analysing the dynamics of transition to a deeper understanding of the problems of consolidation and state-building, the performance of democratic institutions and the sustainability of party competition in emergent democracies. In order to understand the problems of democratic consolidation, I examine the political stability and ethnic accommodation in the South African party system. Political contests in severely fragmented societies normally driven along hostilities between parties and subsequently can affect negatively the stability of an emergent democracy. Consequently, political stability and ethnic accommodation are two requisite for democratic consolidation in divided societies. The third wave of democratisation offers a fertile territory to re-examine some of these theories in the light of new evidence. In the many newly democratic countries deep ethnic-communal divisions within countries, often aggravated by great socio-economic inequalities, pose a grave threat to the viability and consolidation of democracy. In South Africa in the mid-1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the proposals of constitutional engineering in divided societies were thoroughly debated by politicians and academics alike under an atmosphere of escalation of violence. The emergence of a party dominance system, during the democratic consolidation in South Africa, has moved the debate around the benign bridging effect of this party system in Southern African states to its dangers for the recent democratic projects in this region (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Southall 2005). Recent literature on party dominance in Southern African states has criticised its benign bridging effect because the cases are culturally diverse and divided societies; because the African cases occupy a distinctly peripheral position within the global political economy; because the state-building process in Southern Africa via colonialism is a recent project. Some of the scholars have argued that these ‘weak African structures were imposed onto relatively strong societies, where antecedent ethnic loyalties still exert a countervailing source of identification to the more recent identity of citizenship offered by the modern state’ (Du Toit, 1999, pp. 196–197). Thus, these dominant parties in southern African states are likely to expect to act as ‘bridgeheads to single-party hegemony, either through a sustained period of electoralism, or in the form of elections which amount to pseudodemocracy’ (Du Toit, 1999, pp. 195–221). Much of this literature does alert us to real dangers to democracy, though it is not clear that these can be attributed to the presence or absence of dominant parties (Suttner, 2006, p. 279).

In this light, the party dominance system in South Africa is a valuable case to analyse the variables of legitimacy and effectiveness of this party system and its consequences for democratic consolidation. The South African case reveals that after the establishment of almost pure electoral Proportional Representation (PR) system with a national district in a highly divided society, a predominant party system has emerged and produced benign effects as government stability, legitimacy, inclusiveness and containment of ethnic violence. Likewise, a benign bridge to accommodate secessionist forces that threaten the eve and consolidation of democracies in divided societies. That is, a political device for ethnic accommodation and political stability. By examining different aspects of the performance of the South African political system, the analysis can provide clearer answers to some major descriptive questions raised in the literature on party systems: what type of party systems are in fact associated with inclusiveness, stable and effective government, and the containment of ethnic violence in emergent democracies with high divided societies. By taking as dependent variables of government stability, legitimacy, inclusiveness and political violence; and as independent variables of multipartism system and divided societies.

Literature

The importance of the party system for the achievement of various political process goals has been stressed by influential theorists such as Duverger (1954), Huntington (1968), Neumann (1956), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Sartori (1976) or Laver and Schofield (1990) among others. Party system’s literature has been focused on explanatory variables associated with the rise, maintenance and decline of party dominance systems. Some of the factors that have been said to contribute to one-party dominance are a centrist/median ideological location of the dominant parties (Greene 2008; Ricker, 1976; Sartori, 1976); electoral system arrangements (Cox, 1997); socio-economic coalitions (Pempel, 1990); or catch-all party strategies (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Following Duverger (1954) and Sartori (1976), I allude to the dominant party as one whose ‘influences exceeds all others for a generation or more, and a party whose doctrines, ideas, methods, it’s style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch and whose influence is such that even enemies of the dominant party, even citizens who refuse to give it their vote, acknowledge its superior status and its influences’ (Duverger, 1954, pp. 308–309). A predominant party system that refers to the limiting case of a competitive political system, in which one party outdistance its rival, with the condition that the predominant party can cease, at any moment, to be predominant. As opposed to a hegemonic party system in a non-competitive situation, where alternation cannot occur (Sartori, 1976, p. 49).

One-party dominance has been observed in post-War Japan and Italy (1946–1981), Sweden between 1932 and 1976, West Germany until 1966, Botswana (since 1965), Israel (1948–1977), India under the Congress Party, Malaysia, Taiwan under the rule of the Kuomintang or Mexico under the rule of Partido Revolucionario Institucional.

During the course of the 1990s, regular multiparty elections have become the norm in Sub-Saharan African countries. The emerging modal party system in the region consists of a dominant party surrounded by a large number of small, highly volatile parties (Bratton and Walle, 1994, pp. 298–303). In these countries, a single party has managed to govern alone or as the primary and ongoing partner in coalitions, without interruption, for substantial periods of time ‘despite the free electoral competition, relatively open information systems, respect for civil liberties and the right of free political association’ (Pempel, 1990, p. 2).

In light of the democratic theory’s literature, I refer to democratic consolidation as:

Behaviourally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 6)

Huntington (1968, pp. 409–412) has argued that in democratic societies the ability of the one-party dominant system to perform a benign bridging function is closely tied to both party strength and party system strength. The presence of strong party moderates and channels the participation of newly mobilised groups in such a manner as not to disrupt the system. In contrast to parties institutionalising deep cleavages that lead to polarisation and instability. Strong parties assembled in a party system which produces effective competition, yield a strong party system, linking state and society in a way that contributes to political stability. As a result, the dominant party system produces remarkable stable governments and democratic legitimation. System maintenance, civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness as fundamental features for political stability in a democratic plural society (Lijphart, 2008). However, deep ethnic-communal divisions within countries, great socio-economic inequalities, instability, characterised by unpredictable violence and a lack of communal trust based on national identity, are products and causes of the failure of democracy consolidation (Lijphart, 2008; Reynolds, 1999).

Most scholars in democratic theory and constitutional engineers have agreed that the requisite for political stability in divided societies revolve around the concept of inclusion. Sisk (1995) has stated that ‘power-sharing’, defined as practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society, can potentially reconcile claims for ethnic group self-determination with democratic principles in multi-ethnic states. Przeworski (1991, p. 38) has noted that enduring constitutions are those which ‘reduce the stakes of political battles’. Lijphart (2008, p. 19) has pointed out that hostilities attending the political process may be countered by removing its competitive features as much as possible.¹ Even Horowitz (1985) has conceptualised ethnic accommodation on the premiss of inclusion, although, his constitutional strategies for crafting such inclusion are fundamentally different from the strategies recommended by Lijphart (1977). The tendency of societies driven along a strong ethnic cleavage to develop party systems that escalate the ethnic conflict could obstruct the consolidation of democracy (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291). This, in essence, is the central point of the question to be answered. That is, there is something of a consensus² around the belief that excluding significant minorities from power is a bad thing in a divided society, yet there is no consensus on what structures will generate the required degree of political inclusion. Since majority rule means that political power is concentrated in the hands of the majority, it is essential to determine which political forms, institutions and practices are optimal for concentrating power in the majority’s hands.

In this debate between the advocates of consensus and majoritarian models, it is well recognised by both sides that the desire for representation (as inclusiveness) should be balanced with other concerns such as efficiency of the political system. That is, a balance that not overly concentrate policy-making authority, but at least some decentralisation to subnational levels of government or internally structuring the national legislative should be included (Stoll, 2013, p. 260). Thus, inclusiveness and efficiency are two requirements for achieving political stability in emergent democracies.

Critics to dominance party system have raised their concerns on the fact that this party system facilitates corruption more than other party systems (Cox, 1997, pp. 238–250). At the same time, critics on party dominance systems in African cases, have argued that representing voting blocks is strongly divided societies, and embedded in weak states with a precarious peripheral economic position, cannot be expected to function as benign bridges between society and state (Du Toit, 1999, pp. 193–217). In developing countries with weaker institutions and civil society, a dominant party can curb the access to power, using the control of the state to foster satisfaction of existing supporters, at the same time that disorganised opponents. Consequently, a potential threat for democracy by a dominant party to use the state’s resources and rules to diminish competition in the electoral arena (Chu, 1999, p. 50). That is, a dominance party system that leads to authoritarianism (Southall, 2005).

Reddy (2005, p. 272) argues that the comparison of the Congress Party in India and the ANC in South Africa, permits a questioning of the dominant thread in South African literature that the ANC’s political dominance has negative consequences for democratic consolidation. While the Congress Party is widely praised for developing the democratic system in India (Kothari, 1964, 1970), received view on post-Apartheid South African politics criticises the dominance of the ANC as harmful to the consolidation of democracy (Giliomee, 1995; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999, Lodge, 1999; Southall, 1998).

This article argues that in South Africa the dominant party system has produced a stable and efficient government with the capacity to transform the country. At the same time, a highly inclusive proportional electoral system has reduced ethnic cleavages in a fragmented society, besides increasing the satisfaction of their voters and hence the legitimation of the democratic system. This party system shows unidimensional spatial competition—usually left/right dimension—and as Arian and Barnes (1974, p. 528) predicted ‘unidimensional spatial helps to stabilise governments in an emergent democracy with divided societies are beneficial. Rational choice actor’s strategies will not follow zero-sum and radicalise policies and divisions’. In this instance, if the dominant party system is viewed not as an imperfect two-party system but rather as sui generis, its superiority as a means to stability in fragmented societies becomes clear (Arian and Barnes, 1974, pp. 600–601). In this case study, a large and broad-based dominant party representing a variety of ethnic and socio-economic interests, has ensured better representation and in consequence ethnic accommodation.

Case Study

Lewis (1965, p. 24) has stated that in the post-independence West Africa, the ‘economic differences between provinces of a single state are much wider than is known inside any European country’. In the case of the South Africa post-apartheid, the persistence of socio-economic inequalities, regionalism, race and ethnic conflict inflates the potential for disunity and internal strain. The ruling National Party under the authoritarian regime was a vehicle for minority rule control on a black African majority. Under white minority rule, South Africa had 10 regional governments (former Homelands) with poor resources but a great deal of power (Schlemmer & Møller, 1997). Networks of patronage have been established in the public administrations and trading sectors of these territories. The inevitability of competition for scarce resources, under a new non-racial central government, could mean that the networks and patronage established in the Apartheid era could be mobilised in various forms of regional protest, resistance or lack of cooperation. Consequently, regionalism was a potential source of conflict under the new democratic era. Once activated by frustrations or threats, language or ethnic loyalties can become a very powerful force for dissidence and division in a fragmented society. The threat of a civil war was very present in the negotiation table during and afterwards the democratic transition.

Inclusiveness in the Political System

One of the main concerns during the transition process was the ethnic and racial reconciliation after decades of a regime who foster and institutionalise racial and ethnic segregation. The rise of ethnic violence during the pre-transition and transition period was a threat to the principal political actors. Challenges and concerns moved the political debate in the country to the constitutional engineering’s literature led by two competing views of the best government structures to attenuate racial and ethnic conflict in divided societies and became a debate reflected in the political negotiation dialogue with two competing approaches (Horowitz, 1985, 1991; Lijphart, 1987, 1999)—consensus and majoritarian democracies. Various academic proposals had been put forward as a solution to South Africa’s ethnically and racially divided population.

The literature of ethnic divisions found a positive resonance among the National Party (NP) and NP Government, especially the constitutional arrangements to protect the minorities³ and ethnic groups in a fragmented society, and the theory of Consociational Democracy corresponded to this idea (Mancebo, 2016). On the contrary, the ANC committed itself to a non-racial society and understood by retaining racial identity as an organising feature of the electoral and parliamentary system, and the notion of power-sharing, as just being a mechanism to somehow preserve white privilege (Asmal, 1988, p. 5).

The final reform of the electoral system⁴ enforces inclusiveness, representation, no racial mobilisation and party cohesion that was seen by the political parties as vital to manage the transformation of the country (Mancebo, 2016). Institutions as much inclusive as possible minimise the role of parties based on race or ethnicity.⁵ On 2002, the ANC Government established an Electoral Task Team (ETT) to review the system. After its recommendations, the Government decided not to change the current electoral system to protect its inclusiveness ‘to harness our inclusive political system in the interest of nation-building and national unity’ (Piombo & Nijzink, 2005, p. 76). The party-list system of PR combined with the relatively large electoral districts in South Africa has discouraged ethnic cleavages’ mobilisation.⁶ Ethnicity has remained active in social relations, but passive politically in South Africa. Thus political parties shifted from a predisposition to ethnic mobilisation into a diverse range of strategies. The combination of an inclusive electoral system with a fragmented society, in which no ethnic group constituted more than 22 per cent of the national electorate, have structured party choices. The resulting electoral institutional framework led each of the party leaderships to calculate that the amount of electoral support that its traditional base could deliver was not large enough to keep the organisation as an important player in the national political arena. In this electoral scenario, the parties mobilise large support blocs that were spread out around the country, rather than small, geographically concentrated ethnic groupings. It’s clear that inclusiveness is one of the strengths of the current electoral system.

The prospect of an escalation of politicised ethnicity in the post-Apartheid, after carrying out a pure PR electoral system, has not happened. The ethnic political parties have declined in number and influence in the post-Apartheid era (Piombo, 2004). Moreover, this electoral system has convinced such segmental groups that their interests are being recognised and addressed by the state as a whole (Lijphart, 1977, p. 19). South African voters still perceive the electoral system fair. Last research about the performance of the South African electoral system has shown positive trends on the voter’s attitude. South Africans are generally satisfied with the electoral system and their perception about who represents the parties has shown that the ruling party has still been keeping an inclusive image (Afrobarometer, 2018; Human Science Research Council, 2016; Mattes, 2004).

The Legitimacy of the Political System

Consolidation must go beyond elite pacts and party acceptance of institutions to a more widespread popular belief in the rule of law. When the democratic equilibrium is reached, what Max Weber calls: ‘rational-legal legitimacy’ emerges. Citizens accept the basis of laws and their administration even if they are unhappy with the agents of power at any given time. Lipset (1959) has noted that rational-legal legitimacy is usually based on institutional performance over a number of decades. For fledgeling democracies without an extended period of time to prove to their citizens that constitutional democracy is the only way, Lipset proposes two solutions. First, new democracies should make the promotion of robust judicial independence a priority; and, second, draw up a constitution to provide a basis for legitimacy, to define limits on state power and to ensure political and economic rights. South African Constitution set up a robust independent judicial system, paved the limits on state power through Chapter nine institutions,⁷ likewise ensuring political, economic and cultural rights.

Legitimacy is not only a question of principles or political culture as a culturalist approach defends but of performance as institutional approach advocates. Despite that theorists are divided about the convenience of citizen involvement in politics, participation is seen as essential for a wide number of scholars (Huntington, 1968; Schattschneider, 1942). Lijphart (2008, p. 19) has argued that ‘broad voter participation is crucial in democracies because, although the idea of complete political equality is probably impossible to attain, high voter turnout reduces political inequality’. The legitimacy of the political system, in this case study, is measured by the participation of the citizens in the elections. There are both normative and empirical reasons for thinking that citizen participation in elections seems essential to citizen control of collective policies by government leaders and closely linked to the legitimacy of democracy itself. Low electoral turnout is a serious threat to democracy because politicians primarily serve interests of those who (may) vote for them, and therefore the interest of some citizens who (may) no vote for them are not as well served as those of others, therefore clashing with the normative view that in a democracy each citizen should have equal influence (Dahl, 1989; Lijphart, 1997). For citizen participation, I have collected data on a voting turnout of citizens -of voting age, averaged over elections in the time period covered by the study. Turnout levels are strongly influenced by elections rules and practices. In particular, PR systems tend to have considerably higher levels of turnout than majoritarian systems. Turnout is higher in consensus than in majoritarian democracies, mainly because of the proportionality of their electoral systems.

The average turnout (see Table 1) is high (Rosema, 2007, p. 619). In the first democratic elections the turnout arrived at an overwhelmed 91 per cent. Since then, the turnout has been declined but still keeping at a high level around 70 per cent if we compare it with the African countries turnout average. Despite later events relating to corruption, economic crisis and social unrest that could impact the turnout levels, the recent election in 2019 arrived at 66 per cent, impressive electoral participation. Likewise recent opinion polls on voter’s attitudes corroborate the positive perception of the political system by the South African voters. Asking about the performance of the electoral law South Africans are generally satisfied (Table 2). Satisfied citizens with that system are extremely important for the legitimacy of the political system.

Table 1.

Electoral Turnout During the General Elections Since 1994

General Election	Total Vote Cast	Registered Population	Turn-out (%)
1994	19,726,610	21,700,000^a	90.9
1999	16,228,462	18,172,751	89.3
2004	15,863,558	20,674,923	76.7
2009	17,919,966	23,181,997	77.3
2014	18,654,771	25,388,082	73.5
2019	17,671,616	26,779,025	65.99

Source: Independent Electoral Commission.

Notes: ^a Estimated data, no formal voter registration was implemented. Instead, voters were asked to present identity books as proof of citizenship, and even this requirement was enforced with flexibility. Officials had determined before the election that about 2.5 million people, mostly black Africans, lacked identity books and most of these were given temporary identity papers. For most residents of the Homelands, valid travel documents were accepted as legal identification.

Table 2.

Perceived Freeness and Fairness of the Elections

Fairness of the Elections	2009	2011	2014	2016
Yes (%)	95	94	94	93
Yes with minor problems (%)	2	2	3	3
Not at all (%)	1	1	2	2
Don’t know (%)	2	3	2	2

Source: Human Science Research Council (HSRC) Election Satisfaction Survey 2009, 2011, 2014, 2016.

The election satisfaction surveys conducted by the HSRC and aimed to determine opinions and perceptions of both voters and election observers regarding the freeness and fairness of the electoral process based on an assessment of voter interviews collected on the electoral days. The results (see Table 2) show that the voting public was overwhelming confident that the national, provincial and municipality elections were both free and fair. Both data, turnout as voters satisfaction surveys,⁸ shows that the legitimacy of the political system.

The Fragmentation and the Proportionality of the Party System

An important aspect of the classification of the party system is the degree of competition among political parties. A system is said to be fragmented if it is composed of many elected parties. On the other hand, a system is said to be low fragmented if it is composed of few elected parties (dominant party system) However, because the number of political parties alone doesn’t tell anything on the size distribution of seats, since Duverger (1959) classification in term of two-party and multiparty systems, scholars have tried to give more precise quantification of the number of competing parties and distribution of sizes. The traditional method of measuring party system fragmentation of Laakso and Taagepera’s ‘effective number of elective parties’ (ENP) measure either by vote-share or seat-share (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) remains the most constant used measure of party fragmentation. I use the ENP to measure the degree of fragmentation of the party system in South Africa. To measure the degree of proportionality, I use the Gallagher (1991) index (Lsq index) to test the disproportionality of the party system resulting in the application of the South African PR electoral system.

Thus, the effective number of legislative parties is the easiest to visualise in concrete terms (Table 3), the index ranged from 1.97 to 2.50, directly tells us that there are more than two but definitely less than three major parties, hence South African multiparty system is very low fragmented. The party system is dominated by one party, who faces another large party and only one or two small ones.

Table 3.

Fragmentation and Disproportionality Index in the South African General Elections

National Elections	Lsq Index^a	Eff no Pv^b	Eff no Ps^c
1994	0.37	2.24	2.21
1999	0.3	2.16	2.15
2004	0.31	1.97	1.97
2009	0.32	2.13	2.12
2014	0.35	2.27	2.26
2019	0.47	2.58	2.57

Source: South African Independent Electoral Commission.

Notes: ^a Least squares index: a measure of disproportionality (disparity between vote and shares and seat shares).

^b Effective number of elective parties: a measure of vote fragmentation.

^c Effective number of legislative parties: a measure of seat fragmentation.

The number of parties is closely related to the dimensionality of the party system, the number of issue dimensions that are salient in the party system (Grofman & Taagepera, 1985). In two-party systems (dominant party system), only one issue dimension usually socio-economic or left-right dimensions tend to dominate. In multiparty systems, one or more additional dimensions like religious, cultural–ethnic, urban–rural, or others, is probably present. Hence, towards a two-party system are likely to make the left–right dimension dominant and to squeeze out all other issue dimensions which may be quite important to political and other minorities but reduce the regionalisation of the country and the ethnic conflict. In the South Africa case, the unidimensionality of its dominant party system has reduced the regionalisation of the system as well as the ethnic conflict prominent during the democratic transition.

In terms of disproportionality, the results of five general elections suggest a simple conclusion: it is virtually non-existent (see Table 3). The overall disproportionality scores on Gallagher (1991) index ranged from 0.30 to 0.47, virtually no range at all. Thus, given that South Africa has no legally imposed threshold,⁹ uses PR allocation rules and has a much larger assembly size than either Israel, it may be well the most proportional electoral system in use. South Africa presents one-party dominance system despite its almost perfect proportionality.

In this political scenario of the very low fragmented party system and extreme proportionality of the electoral result, the effects of a highly fragmented multiparty system that ‘can lead to unstable or weak coalitions that are unable to cope with major problems and thereby exaggerate in the eyes of the public and even the political elites the partisan or game aspects of political life’ (Dahl, 1971, p. 122), are attenuated besides the loss of confidence in representative democracy and the willingness to tolerate political conflict. Regarding the unidimensionality of this resulting party system, policies tend to dominate. Without the sustained activation of ethnic cleavages in the political sphere, ethnicity is more likely to remain politically latent, thus ‘preventing local-level tensions from accelerating into national-level political cleavages capable of breeding conflict and large-scale violence’ (Piombo and Njizink, 2005, p. 165). Political parties in South Africa developed in a multipolar direction, rather along purely race-based lines.

The long-term rule contributes to a climate in which such a rule is taken as logical, inevitable and in the nature of things (Sartori, 1976, pp. 336–352). Under such conditions, the dominant party has numerous incentives to become flexible and absorptive in its outreach to individual citizens and social groups. It has strong incentives to move beyond any ideologically cohesive but narrowly based blocs of supporters and to become what has called a ‘catch-all’ party (Kircheimer, 1966). As a result, inclusivity becomes the watchword of the successfully dominant party. The ANC has developed catch-all strategies that facilitate democratic competition about socio-economic issues rather than social identity. With its liberal economic policies to foster good relations with national and foreigner capital and international financial organisations, besides its socio-economic transformation of a society deeply divided by the apartheid legacy, the dominant party acts as catch-all party transcending class divisions. The long alliance with the SACP and COSATU is a successful achievement, where communists and trade unionist are still believing they are free to pursue their interest within the ANC (Friedman, 1999, pp. 106–107). The South African dominant party is a broad church, where advocates of democratic centralism and participatory democracy coexist inside the party and the tripartite alliance (Reddy, 2005; Southall, 2005, p. 66). South African case has proved Arian and Barnes (1974) hypothesis that the dominant party is a much better stabilising mechanism than fragmented parties. Thus far, the dominance of the ANC has at least pursued racial integration and national economic development.

The Performance of the Government: Stability and Effectiveness

With regard to the covariance of government performance, this case study manifests a positive pattern for the consolidation of democracy. If unstable cabinet government translates in poor policy performance, stable cabinet government drives efficient legislative policy. In fragmented multiparty systems, no one party is likely to be able to form a government and therefore coalition governments tend to be weak and unstable (Pennock, 1979, p. 358). The dominant party in South Africa, despite the challenge to transform a liberation movement in clandestinity to a contender party in the new democracy, has reinforced and expanded the basis of its electoral power. In addition, the ANC has followed its own historical project, where a series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give a particular shape to its national political agenda. Hence, its successful execution of the historic project generates more dominance.

Regarding the concern to overly concentrate policy-making authority, South Africa has decentralised the country in nine administrative territories, the Provinces. The Constitution empowers the two chambers of the Parliament—National Assembly and National Council of Provinces—with almost the same decision-making power in the national legislative process.¹⁰ On the other hand, the reasonably disciplined and cohesive parties required to support cabinets in office in high fragmented multiparty parliaments, in a party dominance system does not apply and therefore parties can afford to be much laxer with regard to internal party unity (Kothari, 1964, 1970; Lijphart, 2008; Reddy, 2005). The ANC is the historical product of different ideological transitions, past alliances and supporters from diverse backgrounds, and they are better conceived as sub-cultures relating to their particular experiences, identities, practices of decision-making and conflict management (Reddy, 2005, p. 286). In this case, the ANChas been avoiding strict party discipline (with the exception of the exile period) and embracing internal diversity (Friedman, 1999, p. 106; Reddy, 2005, p. 286), without eroding its dominant bargaining position.

Table 4.

Political Party in the Executive and Legislative Majorities in the National Elections Since 1994

National Election	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Party in the executive	ANC^a	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC
Legislative majority (%)	62.65	66.35	69.69	65.90	62.15	58

Source: South African Independent Electoral Commission.

Note: ^a Government of National Unity under the leadership of ANC.

Table 5.

Bills Passed Since 1994 by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa

5 Years Term	1994–1999	1999–2004	2004–2009	2009–2014	2014–2019
Bills passed	497	335	224	149	129

Source: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.

Table 4 reveals that since the eve of democracy, the dominant party has commanded stable governments and legislative majorities without interruption.¹¹ The measure provides crude indicators of government ability to legislate policy. Comparing to other different types of a political system, where frequent changes in the control of the government or frequent minority government seem likely to make the formation and implementation of effective policy difficult, and often constitute a symbol of poor government performance efficiency to citizens. The stability of the ANC government with wide legislative majorities enables the dominant party to execute the democratic transformation and the consolidation of the democracy. The volume of legislation passed was greatest during the first parliament (1994–1999). The number of bills passed (see Table 5) by the ANC Government shows high levels of efficiency in the formation and implementation of policies during the democratic transformation and consolidation occurred. At that period, the dominant party was able to pass 497 laws required for the democratic political reform. The covariance of government stability and performance efficiency, in the case study, proves the benign effect of the dominant party system. Instead of the poor government performance efficiency of a frequent minority government or changes in the control of the chief executive,¹² the party dominance appears suitable to make the formation and implementation of effective policy.

A Divided Society

In South Africa, despite the ethical and methodological problems of assigning ethnicity (and for that matter race), there is little doubt that the country exhibits the greatest communal diversity on the African continent. Arenstein (1990, p. 14) identifies six nations or segment groups within modern-day in South Africa: Afrikaans, Coloured, English, Indians, Nguni (comprising Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi) and Sotho (Pedi, Tswana and Sotho). In 1994, among the estimated, 40 million South Africa, approximate 21 per cent were Zulu, 17 per cent Xhosa, 10 per cent Tswana, 10 per cent Pedi (north Sotho), 8 per cent Coloured, 8 per cent Afrikaans speaking whites, 6 per cent Sotho (south), 5 per cent English speaking whites, 4 per cent Shangaan (Tsonga), 3 per cent Swazi, 2 per cent Indian, 2 per cent Venda and 1 per cent Ndebele.

But not only the country is divided ethnically and racially but fractures also exist between urban and rural areas and within rural areas, there is a further fracture between commercial agriculture and the former homelands and TBVC territories.¹³ Under white minority rule, South Africa had 10 regional governments (homelands) with a great deal of power. Networks of patronage have been established in the public administrations of these territories. Thus, regionalism was a potential source of conflict where networks and patronage established in the apartheid era would be mobilised in various forms of regional protest, resistance or lack of cooperation with the new status quo.

The Presence of Political Violence

The years prior, during and thereafter the democratic transition, were accompanied by a massive rise of crime on the streets, much of it extremely violent (Howe, 1994, pp. 29–51). The political violence mainly between Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters and ANC supporters, intensified by the National Party Government involvement, as was disclosed by the Goldstone Commission and its findings,¹⁴ envisaged a threat of civil war. Huntington stated that high levels of violence generally undermine transitions; moreover violence can scuttle democratic consolidation even if a successful transition occurs. Even before the influx of weapons and the escalation of violence in 1992, Huntington (1991, pp. 193–194) noted that South Africa was one of the most violent countries in the world in the numbers killed in third-wave countries in the struggle to democratise.

The Minister for Safety and Security in the first democratic cabinet, Sydney Mufamadi, recalls ‘before CODESA¹⁵ the single biggest obstacle to the transition was politically motivated violence’.¹⁶ 21,561 people were killed due to political conflict during the late 1980s and the early 1990s (see Table 4). The escalation of violence coincided with the establishment of Inkatha Freedom Party as a national political party in July 1990. The violence during these years stemmed from intensification in the levels of conflict in the region of KwaZulu Natal (stronghold of the IFP). The years follow the start of the negotiations early 1990 until the election 1994 16,022 South Africans died in politically related incidents (see Table 6).

Table 6.

Political Violence Deaths in South Africa 1984–98 (Data Collected)

Year	Deaths
1984^a	149
1985	879
1986	1298
1987	661
1988	1149
1989	1403
1990	3699
1991	2706
1992	3347
1993	3794
1994	2476
1995	1044
1996	683
1997	470
1998	353

Source: Adapted from Pierre Du Toit (2001, p. 34).

Note: ^a This figure is taken from September to December 1984.

Since the first democratic elections in 1994 the levels of political violence and intimidation have dropped significantly. Since 1994, there have been few incidents of politically motivated violence around elections and the remaining issues resolved around the more technical aspects of electoral administration. Subsequent elections (2009, 2014, 2019) saw far lower rates of violence and intimidation and violence has not been seen as a specific risk to the electoral process in South Africa. The incidents of election-related violence were mostly clashing between supporters of rival political parties and communities who used the elections as a national platform to air their grievances.¹⁷

Conclusions

Citizen participation, government stability and mass violence have been major concerns, explicitly and implicitly, in the debate about strong party systems. The analysis of the impact of these political process goals have in the current party system in South Africa, and how democratic consolidation and stability combine under a divided society, have been the objective of this article. It goes without saying that South Africa is far from being a homogeneous society. In terms of the Gini coefficient of material inequality, it is one of the most polarised societies in terms of income differentials. It is also racially and ethnically divided. Containing violence seems to be a goal mentioned by most party systems theorists, because the activation of frustrations, language loyalties, or threats, can become a very powerful force for dissidence and division in a multi-ethnic society. Dealing with ethnic or racial diversity may strive for constructive participation in national affairs through political parties. At the same time, dealing with ethnic self-expression through political parties may be very problematic in democracy consolidation. For these reasons, many observers of South African society were far from optimistic about its prospects for unity an inter-group harmony in the future, even after the ultra-divisive effects of apartheid have been removed.

In racially and ethnically divided societies, party systems with one-dimensional issue facilitate democratic competition about socio-economic issues rather than social identity. In this case study, the emergence of a dominance party system with a high proportional electoral system has facilitated national integration and constrained secessionist tendencies. South Africa has not experienced ethnic conflict under the post-Apartheid era because the centralised political system populated by small ethnic groups, where mobilising ethnicity has not proven electorally rewarding. This fluidity has prevented the generation of the divisive and exclusionary politics that have destabilised many other transitional polities in third-wave democracies. South Africa’s political actors were faced with the necessity to compete in an expanded electorate where national power was most important and therefore virtually all political parties turned away from ethnic, and even single-racial group mobilisation. Thus, ethnic and political violence has declined notably since the democratic transition period, likewise, secession forces and ethnically motivated violence have been impressively attenuated from the political system in South Africa. Despite the centralisation of the political system, still remains consensual and politically accommodatory.

The prerequisite of managing stability in divided societies is convincing the segmental groups that their interests are being recognised and addressed by the state as a whole. The tripartite alliance in the Government has implemented protective legislation on labour and affirmative action programmes by granting special privileges to depressed sections of the communities, and the firm suppression of all acts of violence, secession and disaffection. All of this has been part of the ANC drive for legitimacy. Thus, the political system has accommodated the divergent interest and demands of the subcultures, likewise have transcended cleavages.

Inclusiveness, no racial mobilisation and party cohesion were seen by the political parties as vital to manage the transformation of the country and to legitimise the new political system. If the desirability of citizen involvement in politics is important to legitimate the emergent democracy, the high turnout and voters satisfaction with the electoral system, shown by this case study, corroborate the hypothesis that party dominance system has benign effects as government stability, legitimacy, inclusiveness and containment of ethnic violence.

Regarding the government stability and efficiency, the South African dominant party, with wide legislative majorities, has been suitable to make the formation and the implementation of effective policy and execute the democratic transformation and the consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, the dominant power of the ANC has not led to authoritarianism because of the free electoral process, the critical pressures exercised by the opposition and because, in general, the party has pursued a broad-based consensus on national politics, to avoid undue strife and to keep a balance of interests. However, the strengthening of the party of consensus entails a corresponding problematic position for the opposition parties.

The resulting dominance party system in South Africa has resolved some of the threats and overcome some of the challenges which arose during the eve of the new democratic dispensation. Thus far, South African political system has rejected any authoritarian model of the party system in order to avoid dissidence and preserve unity. It is dominance on consensual authority and not simply on civil or military power, where ethnic accommodation has been achieved together with political stability. Despite the benign effects of this dominant party system, many challenges menace the quality of South African democracy. Parliamentarian accountability and oversight, likewise corruption in high levels of the Administration jeopardise the political process goals of legitimacy and stability.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

Arenstein

(1990). Multi-nationalism: How many nations in the New South Africa? Indicator South Africa, 7, 12–15.

Arian

, & Barnes

S. H.

(1974). The dominant party system: A neglected model of democratic stability. The Journal of Politics, 36(3), 592–614.

Barkan

(2005). Emerging legislature or rubber stamp? The South African national assembly after ten years of democracy (CSSR Working Paper 134).

Bratton

, & Walle

(1994). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. World Politics, 46(4), 453–489.

Chu

Y. H.

(1999). A born again dominant party? The transformation of the Koumintang and Taiwan’s regime transition. In Giliomee

, & Simkins

C. H.

(Eds.), The awkward embrace: One party domination and democracy (pp. 46–95). Harwood Academic Publishers.

Cox

(1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge University Press.

Dahl

R. A.

(1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press.

Dahl

R. A.

(1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press.

De Jager

, & Du Toit

(2013). Friend or foe? Dominant party systems in Southern Africa: Insights from the developing world. UCT Press.

10.

Du Toit

(1999). Bridge or bridgehead? Comparing the party systems of Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. In Giliomee

, & Simkins

C. H.

(Eds.) The awkward embrace: One party domination and democracy (pp. 193–217). Harwood Academic Publishers.

11.

Du Toit

(2001). South Africa’s brittle peace—The problem of post-settlement violence. Palgrave Macmillan.

12.

Duverger

(1954). Political parties. Wiley.

13.

Friedman

(1999). No easy stroll to dominance: Party dominance, opposition and civil society in South Africa. In Giliomee

, & Simkins

(Eds.), The awkward embrace: One party domination and democracy (pp. 97–127). Harwood Academic Publishers.

14.

Gallager

(1991). Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. Electoral Studies, 10, 33–51.

15.

Giliomee

, & Simkins

(1999). The dominant party regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A comparative assessment. In Giliomee

, & Simkins

(Eds.), The awkward embrace: One party domination and democracy (pp. 1–45). Harwood Academic Publishers.

16.

Greene

(2008). Dominant party strategy and democratisation. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 16–31.

17.

Gurr

T. R.

(1993). Minorities at risk. United States Institute of Peace.

18.

Horowitz

(1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press.

19.

Horowitz

(1991). Democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a divided society. Oxford University Press.

20.

Howe

H. M.

(1994). The South African defence force and political reform. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 32(1), 29–51.

21.

Huntington

S. P.

(1968). Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press.

22.

Huntington

S. P.

(1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press.

23.

Kothari

(1964). The Congress system in India. Asian Survey, 4(12), 937–948.

24.

Kothari

(1970). Continuity and change in India party’s system. Asian Survey, 10(11), 1161–1173.

25.

Laakso

, & Taagepera

(1979). Effective number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 3–27.

26.

Laver

M. J.

, & Schofield

(1990). Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Oxford University Press.

27.

Levitsky

, & Way

L. A.

(2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war. Cambridge University Press.

28.

Lewis

W. A.

(1965). Politics in West Africa. Oxford University Press.

29.

Lijphart

(1977). Democracy in plural societies. Yale University Press.

30.

Lijphart

(1987). Choosing an electoral system for democratic elections in South Africa: An evaluation of the principal options. In Occasional paper, critical choices for South African society. University of Cape Town Institute for the Study of Public Policy.

31.

Liphart

(1991, March 31). Negotiations on a democratic SA still on track, says expert. Sunday Times, p. 5.

32.

Lijphart

(1997). Unequal participation: Democracy’s unresolved dilemma. The American Political Science Review, 91(1), 1–14.

33.

Lijphart

(1997). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. Yale University Press.

34.

Lijphart

(2008). Thinking about democracy. Power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice. Routledge.

35.

Linz

, & Stepan

(1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. John Hopkins University Press.

36.

Lipset

S. M.

(1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53, 69–105.

37.

Lipset

S. M.

, & Rokkan

(1967). Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: An introduction. In Lipset

S. M.

, & Rokkan

(Eds.), Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Free Press.

38.

Mancebo

(2016). La Transformación de los sistemas electorales. El Estudio de Caso de Sudáfrica. Revista Latinoamericana de Política Comparada, 11, 133–56.

39.

Mattes

(2004). Voter information government evaluations and party images 1994–2004. Working paper. Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.

40.

Mattes

, & Southall

(2002). Popular attitudes towards the South African electoral system: Report to the electoral task team. Democracy and Governance, Occasional paper, 1. HSRC Publishers.

41.

Mattes

, & Southall

(2004). Popular attitudes toward the South African electoral system. Democratization, 11(1): 51–76.

42.

Neumann

(1956). Modern political parties. Approaches to comparative politics. University of Chicago Press.

43.

Pempel

T. J.

(1990). Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominant regimes. Cornell University Press.

44.

Pennock

J. R.

(1979). Democratic political theory. Princeton University Press.

45.

Piombo

(2004). Political institutions, social demographics and the decline of ethnic mobilisation in South Africa, 1994–99 (Working paper). Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.

46.

Piombo

, & Nijzink

(2005). Electoral politics in South Africa: Assessing the first democratic decade. Palgrave Macmillan.

47.

Powell

G. B.

(1981). Party systems and political system performance: Voting participation, government stability and mass violence in contemporary democracies. American Political Science Review, 75, 861–879.

48.

Przeworski

(1991). Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press.

49.

Reynolds

(1999). Electoral systems and democratisation in Southern Africa. Oxford University Press.

50.

Rosema

(2007). Low turnout: Threat to democracy or blessing in disguise? Consequences of citizens’ varying tendencies to vote. Electoral Studies, 26(3), 612–623.

51.

Sartori

(1976). Parties and party systems. Cambridge University Press.

52.

Schlemmer

, & Møller

(1997). The shape of South African society and its challenges. Social Indicators Research, 41, 15–50.

53.

Sisk

(1885). Democratisation in South Africa: The elusive social contract. Princeton University Press.

54.

Southall

(1998). The centralisation and fragmentation of South Africa’s dominant party system. African Affairs, 97(389), 443–469.

55.

Southall

(2005). The dominant party debate in South Africa. Afrika Spectrum, 39(1): 61–82.

56.

Schattschneider

E. E.

(1942). Party government. Taylor and Francis.

57.

Stoll

(2013). Changing societies, changing party systems. Cambridge University Press.

58.

Taagepera

, & Grofman

(1985). Rethinking Duverger’s law: Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR systems-parties minus issues equals one. European Journal of Political Research, 13, 341–352.

59.

Taylor

C. H.

, & Hudson

(1973). World handbook of political and social indicators. Yale University Press.