Reinvigoration of BIMSTEC and India’s Economic,Strategic and Security Concerns

Abstract

This article contends that India’s efforts for the reinvigoration of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) are the result of an amalgam of its Act East and Neighbourhood First policies’ objectives. Since 2014, India has been trying to rejuvenate the BIMSTEC to exploit the untapped trade opportunities, promote energy and food security and also boost the development of its North Eastern region by enhancing infrastructural connectivity with South East Asian countries and promoting greater economic integration in the Bay of Bengal region. Its strategic interests and security concerns, especially to build the pressure on Pakistan, counter China’s forays into its strategic backyard and ensure the security of the North Eastern region, have also resurged India’s interests in the revival of BIMSTEC. Like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there are some hurdles in the way of BIMSTEC, for instance its image of an India-dominated bloc, India’s bilateral differences with other BIMSTEC countries from South Asia, especially with Bangladesh and Nepal, and bilateral disputes between other member countries, particularly Bangladesh and Myanmar and Thailand and Myanmar.

Keywords

BIMSTEC SAARC India Pakistan trade opportunities strategic interests security concerns

I. Introduction

Amidst the complex global security environment, in the post–Cold War era, the global community has witnessed the surfacing of a variety of international organizations in geographically contiguous areas which are termed as ‘regional organizations’ (ROs) in International Relations (IR). Most of the ROs were established originally for economic cooperation, and have now gradually added strategic and security cooperation as a significant ingredient in their structural–functional arrangement. These groupings have been not only influencing the domestic and foreign policy of the member states but also turning into a vital instrument for pursuing their strategic and security-related foreign policy agenda. Great powers and aspiring-to-be-great powers often prefer bilateralism to multilateralism. They consider the former a characteristic of the powerful and regard the latter a privilege of the weak (Sidhu, 2014). Yet, contrary to this, the recorded human history reveals that multilateral alliances and regional groupings have offered states a constructive alleyway to emerge as a great power. Furthermore, the great powers, as the history of IR indicates, have established such ROs to promote their values and interests. Even in the contemporary period, the existing great power, United States, and the emerging great power, China, are giving importance to ROs along with bilateralism to achieve their strategic and security interests. Through multilateral cooperation, therefore, these groupings are assisting not only the powerful but also the small and weak states in dealing with new strategic and security threats which are simply beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle unilaterally (Evans, 2013; Mackenzie, 2010). The new structural–functional arrangement of multipurpose ROs renovates them into a momentous apparatus for achieving the strategic and security goals of the member states within a particular region or beyond it.

The dynamics of India’s foreign policy in the post-Cold war period signify that, apart from economic significance, New Delhi has also acknowledged the strategic and security relevance of ROs. That is why, for the advancement of its foreign policy objectives within and beyond the regional boundaries, it has been actively obtaining the membership of different ROs or associating with them in one or the other way. It has, also, vigorously involved in sowing and reinvigorating the various ROs to advance its strategic and security interests. New Delhi has intensified its efforts for regional collaboration by redefining its regional borders and shifting the focus of its foreign policy from South Asia to South East Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and beyond. Subsequently, this approach has fostered India’s way for the formation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), also known as the Bay of Bengal Community (BOMCOM) in 1997 and Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC) in 2000, as India and Thailand had been a driving force behind the creation of IORARC and BIMSTEC.

Earlier, the BIMSTEC had not been an effective or a result-oriented organization. However, 2014 onwards, various developments occurred in the regional politics of South Asia. On the one hand, India announced its ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP), and, on the other, the failure of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to sign the SAARC–Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA), abandonment of India’s proposal of the SAARC satellite project and, the suspension of the 19th SAARC Summit in 2016 after due to Uri attacks discouraged the regional cooperation among the South Asian states within the framework of SAARC. As a result of these developments, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi’s interest has been resurged for the reinvigoration of BIMSTEC (Bhattacharjee, 2018; Jacob, 2016). India had invited the members of this grouping to participate in the BRICS–BIMSTEC Outreach Summit and the Leaders’ Retreat in Goa on 15–16 October 2016, and again on 30 May 2019 to attend the oathtaking ceremony of the newly elected government in New Delhi. In fact, the BRICS–BIMSTEC Outreach Summit was the ‘first big push’ by India to reinvigorate the BIMSTEC (Dutta, 2019). Hence, the present article discusses: (a) how and why BIMSTEC was formed and what were the reasons behind its non-performance; (b) which activities and developments indicate the revival of BIMSTEC; (c) what strategic and security interests and concerns of India, apart from economic ones, are involved in the revival of BIMSTEC; and (d) what problems are there in the way to make the BIMSTEC a more vibrant and result-oriented entity.

The article is based on two hypotheses: first, India’s strategic and security concerns, apart from economic benefits, have resurged New Delhi’s interest to reinvigorate the BIMSTEC; and second, bilateral problems that have made the SAARC dysfunctional and perceptions related to BIMSTEC becoming an India-dominated organization, along with other bilateral disputes between the member countries, could spoil India’s efforts for BIMSTEC’s rejuvenation.

The article is descriptive and explorative, the main argument of which is developed on the basis of official documents and reports of the BIMSTEC and members countries, speeches and statements made by the leaders of BIMSTEC countries and other studies conducted by different scholars on the diverse aspects of this matter. Apart from this, news and reports published by digital and non-digital sources have also been utilized to understand India’s resurged interest in the reinvigoration of BIMSTEC.

This article is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the conceptual context, research questions, hypotheses and research methodology of the article. The second section provides a description of the historical context and objectives of the formation of BIMSTEC and its non-performance before the resurged interest of India in its revival. The third section deals with the different activities and developments related to BIMSTEC, especially 2014 onwards, which indicate towards its gradual reinvigoration. The fourth section analyses the rationale behind India’s resurged keenness in reinvigorating the BIMSTEC, including its economic, strategic and security interests and concerns in the Bay of Bengal region. The fifth section explains the bilateral problems between the member countries which may derail the revival of BIMSTEC. The last section contains the conclusion of the study.

II. BIMSTEC: Formation and Underperformance

Apart from Thailand, India has been the leading proponent of the formation of the BIMSTEC to boost the connectivity between the countries of South Asia and South East Asia while building the ‘Bay of Bengal Community’. It comprises seven countries—Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal—located on the littoral and adjacent areas of the Bay of Bengal (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019). Its creation was the result of a synthesis of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) and Thailand’s ‘Look West Policy’ (LWP) to connect South Asian and South East Asian regions. New Delhi was keen on the establishment of the BIMSTEC to enhance connectivity of India with South East Asian countries as a part of the LEP which was upgraded to the AEP in 2014. For Thailand, it provides an opportunity to achieve the objective of the LWP. It also offers an opportunity for smaller countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal to develop connectivity with South East Asian countries which have emerged as a hub of major economic activities at the global level. Moreover, the inclusion of major regional powers—India and Thailand—also reduces the fear of dominance by one big power among the smaller neighbouring countries (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

Initially, the BIMSTEC was established on 6 June 1997 through Bangkok Declaration, as a sub-regional group of four countries, called Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC), and later, during the Special Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, it was expanded as Myanmar joined it on 22 December 1997, renaming the group as ‘BIMST-EC’. During the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, on 8 February 2004, two other South Asian countries—Nepal and Bhutan—also entered into the grouping; it was renamed as ‘the BIMSTEC’, converting it into a new regional community which brought together approximately 1.5 billion people that constitute 22 per cent population of the globe along with an amalgamated GDP of $2.7 trillion (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019; Pant, 2018). Its formation was aimed to create a conductive atmosphere for rapid economic growth, accelerate the social progress and promote cooperation among its member countries. The BIMSTEC identified 14 areas for multilateral cooperation, giving each member country a responsibility to lead the organization in specific areas. For instance, India leads in the areas of Transport and Communication, Tourism, Environment and Natural Disaster Management and Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime; Bangladesh in Trade and Investment; Myanmar in Energy and Agriculture; Sri Lanka in Technology; Thailand in Fisheries, People-to-People Contact and Public Health; Nepal in Poverty Alleviation; and Bhutan in cultural areas (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019a.). Now, the BIMSTEC has a comprehensive agenda for the promotion of multilateral economic cooperation within the Bay of Bengal region and for building the capacity of its member countries to handle the various strategic and security issues.

Although the BIMSTEC was formed in 1997, it was not much active or effective till 2014. In fact, it did not receive sufficient attention from its member countries. All the BIMSTEC countries are also a member of either the SAARC or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These groupings have been more active and were given more importance by the respective member countries than BIMSTEC. All the member countries have had economic and strategic interests in the security and prosperity of the Bay of Bengal region, but none of them has been pursuing the BIMSTEC agenda actively. Hence, there was no regularity in its activities. For instance, the BIMSTEC Summit is the highest policymaking body of its institutional mechanism. It should be convened once in every 2 years as per the decision of the Sixth BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting held in Thailand on 8 February 2004. But since its formation, only four summits of its highest policymaking body have taken place. The First Summit took place in Bangkok, Thailand, on 31 July 2004 after 7 years; the Second Summit was held after 4 years on 13 November 2008 in New Delhi, India; the Third Summit was held 6 years later on 4 March 2014 in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar; and the Fourth Summit was concluded in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 30–31 August 2018 (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019). It took 17 years to establish its permanent secretariat in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on 13 September 2014. Negotiation for the BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) had been started in Phuket, Thailand, on 4 February 2004 for the progressive elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on all trade products, progressive liberalization of trade in services, creation of an open and competitive investment regime to facilitate and encourage investment within the BIMSTEC countries and the establishment of simplified customs procedures and arrangements by all the member countries (Banik, 2006). This initiative is also yet to be finalized and implemented, even after 16 years. The Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking was signed by the BIMSTEC countries on 11 December 2009 in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, but its ratification process has also not been completed.

These delays in the implementation of different initiatives of the BIMSTEC, in the past, had resulted in the underperformance of this grouping. There were a variety of reasons for the inactivity of this grouping. First, the East Asian financial crisis and its adverse impacts on the South East Asian countries, and second, to some extent, bilateral political conflicts and domestic turmoil, especially in South Asian countries, were responsible for the underperformance of the BIMSTEC. Thailand was the main support of its formation along with India, but it had lost its initial enthusiasm to work with this formation as it had suffered a serious financial blow due to the East Asian economic crisis soon after the establishment of this grouping. India gave more preference to the SAARC to make it a vibrant organization. The renewed hostilities between India and Pakistan and the escalation of the civil war in Sri Lanka reinforced the traditional image of South Asia as a perennially squabbling region. This situation also eroded the interest of Thailand in the BIMSTEC (Batra, 2010). Moreover, Bangladesh and Myanmar also suffered from political instability. Protectionist strategies of the South Asian countries also made it difficult to achieve free trade area within the BIMSTEC largely due to the persisting fear psychosis in some countries like Bangladesh that the benefits of the FTA would be limited to India only. These apprehensions generated a trust deficit among the member countries, blighting the prospects of greater economic cooperation in the region. The grouping also suffered from the absence of political will, lack of regular summits, delay in the establishment of a permanent secretariat, dominance of individual interests of states and bureaucratic labyrinth which delayed the implementation of planned activities of the BIMSTEC, due to which it did not perform as per the expectation like other regional groupings around the globe (Agarwal & Mukherjee, 2007; Batra, 2010; Kelegama, 2001; Kundu, 2014).

III. BIMSTEC’s Reinvigoration

However, 2014 onwards, due to the amalgam of its Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP) and AEP objectives, the reinvigoration of BIMSTEC has emerged high on the agenda of India’s foreign policy. Subsequently, New Delhi has taken various positive initiatives in collaboration with other BIMSTEC countries to advance the regional cooperation in the Bay of Bengal region. India convened the first-ever BRICS–BIMSTEC Outreach Summit and Leaders’ Retreat in Goa in 2016 in which BIMSTEC leaders agreed to infuse new energy and rejuvenate the BIMSTEC by taking concrete actions on the various projects, including the BIMSTEC framework agreement on Transit, Trans-shipment and Movement of Vehicular Traffic, BIMSTEC Trade Facilitation Agreement, BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement, establishment of a BIMSTEC Center for Technology Transfer, BIMSTEC Energy Trade cooperation and Annual Meeting of National Security Chiefs (NSCs), and ensuring closer cooperation in Disaster Management (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016a, 2016b). As a result of this, the First BIMSTEC Annual Disaster Management Exercise was held in New Delhi, India, on 10–13 October 2017. The exercise consisted of three components including tabletop exercise (TTX), field training exercises (FTXs) on earthquakes and floods and an after action review (AAR) (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b).

After the Outreach Summit, the Fourth BIMSTEC Summit was organized in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 30–31 August 2018, which reaffirmed the member countries’ commitment to make the grouping ‘dynamic’, ‘effective’ and ‘result-oriented’. Member countries have agreed for cooperation to enhance trade and investment, exchange agricultural technology, fight against terrorism, reduce the impacts of climate change and streamline the visa obtaining process for BIMSTEC member countries. Therefore, the Summit decided to establish a BIMSTEC Permanent Working Committee and a BIMSTEC Development Fund (BDF), enhance the efforts for the BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement and BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement and revitalize the BIMSTEC Business Forum (BBF) and BIMSTEC Economic Forum (BEF) (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2018).

The BIMSTEC Working Group on Customs Cooperation (BWGCC) met for the first time in New Delhi, India, on 10–11 May 2018, reviewed the progress related to customs cooperation and finalized the draft of the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters for BIMSTEC Free Trade Area for submission to the 21st Meeting of the BIMSTEC Trade Negotiating Committee. The BIMSTEC Transport and Connectivity Working Group (BTCWG) which was launched in 2016 organized a Workshop on BIMSTEC Master Plan on Transport Connectivity in Bangkok, Thailand, on 17–18 September 2018 to chart out the strategy for transport connectivity in the region (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b).

The First Meeting of the NSCs of the BIMSTEC countries was held in New Delhi on 21 March 2017, resulting in the establishment of a Tack 1.5 BIMSTEC Security Dialogue Forum for promoting the security dialogue among the BIMSTEC strategic community. It observed the concerns related to the emerging trends in cyberspace having security implications and decided to deepen cooperation among the respective cyber institutions through a joint forum on cyber security. India offered 100 scholarships towards capacity building and enhancement in the security-related areas (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017a). The First Track 1.5 BIMSTEC Security Dialogue Forum was convened at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi on 22 September 2017. The Second Meeting was held at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) in Dhaka on 30–31 July 2019 to deliberate on and deal with security threats to the BIMSTEC countries in a collective manner.

Prior to this, the Second Meeting of the NSCs of the BIMSTEC countries was also organized in Dhaka on 28 March 2018. The Third Meeting of the NSCs was hosted by Thailand in Bangkok on 21 March 2019. In these meetings, the NSCs agreed to adopt a holistic approach to cope with conventional and non-conventional security threats in the region and to pool the collective resources to enhance the capacities in training, equipment and sharing of experience to deal with the emerging threats in a better way (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b, 2019c).

The First BIMSTEC Multinational Military Field Training Exercise of BIMSTEC countries ‘MILEX-18’ was also held in Aundh, Pune, India, during 10–16 September 2018. Five officers and 25 other ranks from each country had participated in the exercise. Nevertheless, Nepal and Thailand had sent only their observers to participate in the joint military exercise. This exercise was conducted to evolve an institutionalized military forum for regional security cooperation (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b, 2019c). Apart from this, a conclave of army chiefs of the BIMSTEC countries was also organized by India on 16 September 2018. The Dialogue of BIMSTEC Think Tank on Regional Security was convened in Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, India, on 13–14 November 2018. The BIMSTEC Workshop on Regional Cyber Security Cooperation was also held in New Delhi, India, on 5–7 December 2018, in which a roadmap was proposed for BIMSTEC cyber security cooperation (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b).

The Fourth Meeting of the BIMSTEC Sub-Group on Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals was held in Yangon, Myanmar, on 12 September 2016. The BIMSTEC Sub-Group on Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals organized its fifth meeting in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 23 May 2018 and reviewed the progress made in the respective areas. The Eighth Meeting of the BIMSTEC Sub-Group on Legal and Law Enforcement Issues was held in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 29–30 October 2018 and negotiated the BIMSTEC Convention Against Trafficking in Persons. Moreover, India is pushing for BIMSTEC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters for the early signing, ratification and implementation to enable the member countries to take appropriate steps to locate, freeze and forfeit or confiscate any funds meant for criminal acts in the territory of BIMSTEC countries. The BIMSTEC Sub-Group on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (SGAML-CFT) also organized its 10th meeting in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 19–20 November 2018, where it finalized the modalities for developing an action plan to prevent the Illicit Flow of Funds (IFF) among the BIMSTEC countries (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b). The 11th meeting of this sub-group was held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 3–4 September 2019 to finalize an action plan to prevent IFF among the BIMSTEC countries.

The First Meeting of the BIMSTEC Expert Group on Energy (EGME) was organized in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, on 28–29 March 2019. The EGME, after extensive deliberations, finalized the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection Coordination Committee (BGICC) and proposed to explore possibilities of organizing the First Meeting of the Governing Board of the BIMSTEC Energy Centre (BEC) (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019c). Expansion of the connectivity is a key priority of the BIMSTEC. Therefore, the First BIMSTEC Conclave of Ports was also held at Vishakhapatnam on 7–8 November 2019 to boost the maritime interaction and port-led connectivity initiatives among the member states. During the Conclave of Ports, three memorandums of understanding (MoUs) were signed between the Post Trusts of Chennai, Vishakhapatnam and Kolkata of India and Ranong Port Authority of Thailand to enhance the connectivity between India’s East Coast ports and Thailand’s West Coast ports and strengthen the economic partnership. These would reduce the sea travel between India and Thailand from 10–15 days to 7 days only (Chaudhury, 2019).

These activities of the BIMSTEC indicate the reinvigoration of the grouping, as now it is working actively to implement its diversified agenda. The BIMSTEC’s list of concluded events and its Calendar of Activites 2019 relating to forthcoming events, from 7 September 2014 to 31 December 2019, reveal that it has organized in total 172 events out of which two events were concluded in 2014, 18 in 2015, 23 in 2016, 28 in 2017, 25 in 2018 and 76 in 2019 (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019b, 2019c). Thus, a rapid increase in the activities of the BIMSTEC in different fields has been observed only after the BRICS–BIMSTEC Outreach Summit and Leaders’ Retreat in 2016 organized by India in Goa in 2016, which also indicates New Delhi’s role in its reinvigoration. Now, the organization has also become more significant for other BIMSTEC members as Sri Lanka has focused more on the new initiatives related to BIMSTEC. Nepal and Bhutan, the two Himalayan countries, are also seeing the BIMSTEC as a welcome opportunity to diversify their trade routes. Further, Bangladesh is looking to improve its relations with South East Asia and Thailand is keen for closer ties with South Asia, for which it is working with the BIMSTEC to improve networking and connectivity in the region (Wagner & Tripathi, 2018).

IV. Resurgence of India’s Interest in BIMSTEC

Prior to 2014, as mentioned earlier, India, as part of its NFP, had been more interested in the SAARC as, in 2014, during the oathtaking ceremony of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi invited all the SAARC leaders to attend the ceremony to boost its relations in its neighbourhood. However, the failure of the SAARC countries to sign the SAARC–MVA during the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu, Nepal, in November 2014, and terrorist attacks on the Pathankot airbase in January 2016 and the Uri military camp forced India to rethink its strategy about the regional cooperation vis-à-vis the SAARC. Now, India refused to join the 19th SAARC Summit to be organized in Islamabad, Pakistan, and responded to the Uri attacks through surgical strikes by its army entering deep inside Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) against the launching pads of Pakistan’s terrorist activities against India. Amidst these developments, as India had already launched the AEP in 2014, the BIMSTEC emerged as a ‘natural platform’ for India to implement AEP and NFP simultaneously. Thus, the shift in India’s policy towards the BIMSTEC has resulted from its diverse economic, strategic and security interests and concerns.

Economic Interests and Concerns

Dysfunctional SAARC

In spite of India’s efforts for promoting regional cooperation in South Asia, a dysfunctional SAARC forced India to look for alternative entities for regional cooperation. The political distrust between India and Pakistan and the obstructionist attitude of Pakistan in the SAARC summits and need for consensus for decision-making within the organization never allowed the group to make any concrete achievement and be an effective instrument of regional cooperation. India had given most-favoured nations (MFN) status to Pakistan in 1996 but Pakistan never reciprocated the same (Ramachandran, 2019). The SAARC members singed the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004, which came into effect in 2006, but even then intra-regional trade and economic cooperation among the eight South Asian countries accounts for only 5 per cent of its total trade, whereas it accounts for 50 per cent of the total trade in East Asia and the Pacific, 25 per cent in South East Asia and 22 per cent in sub-Saharan African regions (World Bank, 2019). The total intra-regional trade of South Asia could be worth $67 billion rather than the actual trade of $23 billion only. Its intra-regional trade as a share of regional GDP accounts for 1 per cent only in South Asia. Contrary to this, it accounts for 2.6 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa and 11 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific, irrespective of the relatively small size of their economies. Currently, bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is merely worth $2 billion, and without trade barriers, it could be $37 billion (Kathuria & Mathur, 2018). Therefore, in 2014, during the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi, New Delhi had invited the leaders of the SAARC countries to strengthen its relations with the SAARC countries and enhance greater economic cooperation in the region. Prime Minister Modi then visited Bhutan in June 2014, Nepal in August 2014 and Pakistan in December 2015 as a part of India’s NFP to boost regional cooperation. However, Pakistan spoiled India’s attempts to achieve this objective (Ramachandran, 2019). Pakistan vetoed the SAARC–MVA during the 18th SAARC Summit at Kathmandu, Nepal, on 26–27 November 2014 and the SAARC Satellite project in 2016. Thus, India assessed the potential of the SAARC and missed opportunities offered by the grouping to be due to the obstructionist approach of Pakistan (Roy, 2018). Thereafter, in the 18th SAARC Summit, Prime Minister Modi reiterated that opportunities offered by the regional cooperation must be realized. It could be through the SAARC and also outside it (Modi, 2014).

Apart from its obstructionist approach, Pakistan’s continuous support to cross-border terrorism against India also made the SAARC a defunct entity. India invited the SAARC leaders including Pakistan to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi in 2014. In December 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited Pakistan unexpectedly, which raised the hopes of a renewed rapprochement. However, these hopes were shattered with the Uri terrorist attack in September 2016 as India declined to attend the 19th SAARC Summit to be hosted by Islamabad and other members of the grouping supported India’s stand on this matter. Therefore, Pakistan abandoned neither its obstructionist approach in the SAARC nor cross-border terrorism against India (Muni & Mishra, 2019). Hence, two big issues observed with the SAARC have a direct connection with Pakistan. As Pakistan drags its feet on trade and connectivity agreements and continues to remain the ‘fountainhead of terrorism’ in the region, the SAARC cannot make any significant development in the context of regional cooperation (Editorials, 2019). In the past, India has spent more of its energy and political capital to make the SAARC a result-oriented organization, but as these two problems made the SAARC dysfunctional, New Delhi started looking for alternative regional frameworks beyond the SAARC. After the Uri attacks, India categorically conveyed to Pakistan that terrorism and dialogue cannot go together. Bilateral dialogue was suspended between the two countries, which further shattered the hopes for any positive developments regarding the SAARC. Hence, India began to reinvigorate the BIMSTEC as it automatically excludes Pakistan due to its geographical position (Muni & Mishra, 2019). Hence, when India hosted the BRICS Summit in 2016, it preferred the BIMSTEC over the SAARC for an outreach summit (Gupta, 2018). Therefore, unlike the first swearing-in ceremony of 2014, India invited the BIMSTEC countries’ leaders in the second swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi on 30 May 2019. India, as Minister of External Affairs S. Jayashankar has stated, sees energy, mindset and possibility for greater regional cooperation in the BIMSTEC (Xavier & Sinha, 2020). That is why a pivot shift—from working for a dysfunctional SAARC to reinvigorate the BIMSTEC—has occurred in India’s foreign policy, and moreover, India’s non-participation in the SAARC has also shifted the attention of major Asian countries towards the BIMSTEC for trade and investment (Rahman & Grewal, 2017).

BIMSTEC’s Economic Benefits

Untapped Trade Opportunities

If a dysfunctional SAARC forced India to look for an alternative regional framework, the BIMSTEC’s potential economic benefits were a key reason in the resurgence of India’s interests in its rejuvenation. Irrespective of global financial crises, all member countries sustained average annual economic growth rates between 3.4 and 7.5 per cent from 2012 to 2016 (Xavier, 2018). The average of economic growth, in the last 5 years, has been recorded 6.5 per cent (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2019). Although India’s trade with the BIMSTEC countries has grown at a rate of 10.4 per cent annually, the BIMSTEC as a regional community contributes only 3.7 per cent of the total world trade. Moreover, intra-BIMSTEC trade has grown at a low rate of 0.62 per cent annually. The low level of intra-regional trade had been largely an outcome of the absence of trade connectivity and free trade agreements. India has understood the untapped potential of the BIMSTEC’s trade connectivity and visualized the BIMSTEC’s FTA as a vital alternative to enhance economic integration of the region. Therefore, during the Fourth BIMSTEC Summit, India emphasized expediting the finalization of BIMSTEC FTA (Desai, 2018). The Asian Development Bank is the development partner of this regional grouping and has initiated three major projects—Kaladan Multimodal Project, Asian Trilateral Highway and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN)—which would facilitate the rapid trans-border movement of goods and vehicles within the BIMSTEC countries and would lead to greater trade and economic cooperation in the region. The Kaladan Multimodal project seeks to link India and Myanmar as it is envisaged to connect Kolkata to Sittwe port in Myanmar and Mizoram by river and road. The Asian Trilateral Highway is supposed to connect India and Thailand through Myanmar as it would start from Moreh in Manipur, India, to Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar. This would establish connectivity between India and South East Asian countries. The BBIN Pact signed in 2015 is expected to promote the trans-border movement of goods and vehicles among the parties concerned (Roche, 2016). The engagement of India with the BIMSTEC countries could be rewarding as the absence of Pakistan or strained India–Pakistan relations will not be there to repeatedly trip up the BIMSTEC as happened repeatedly in the case of the SAARC.

Energy and Food Security

Apart from trade, the Bay of Bengal region also offers economic opportunities in other areas as it has massive untapped natural resources including huge reserves of gas, oil and other seabed minerals (Xavier, 2018). Energy security is critical for economic development as it is directly related to the economic security of a country. The BIMSTEC provides an opportunity to the member countries for joint exploration of untapped energy resources, collaborative investment in energy sector development and cross-border trade and movement in energy sector development within the region. Energy-hungry India views Myanmar as a potential energy source. Earlier, Myanmar was producing oil and gas for domestic consumption only, but later on, new gas and oil deposits were discovered in Myanmar. Hence, it became an exporter of energy sources in the region and invited the largest foreign investments in the oil and gas industry. Myanmar had offered Indian oil companies a $116 million refinery upgrading project, gas field and diesel purchase orders. India was also interested in the huge gas deposits found by Korean company Daewoo International in Myanmar in 2004 (Yahya, 2005). The discovery of new gas and oil reserves in Myanmar is beneficial for India to diversify its near dependence on the Middle East for its oil and gas needs. India is also amenable to purchasing electricity from Myanmar in the North West region, and Myanmar is also looking to favourably sell its surplus electricity to India. Bangladesh also possesses large gas reserves, whereas Nepal and Bhutan have an untapped potential of hydropower (Batra, 2010). Since India, along with Sri Lanka and Thailand, is a major energy importer, its collaboration with them through joint development could be beneficial for it as well as for the producer countries. Apart from energy sources, the Bay of Bengal region could also be helpful to boost food security in the BIMSTEC countries. The nutrient input from the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers ensures that bay's waters can contain the larger fishing stocks (Xavier, 2018). The revival of regional connectivity could be useful for around 300 million people of India residing in the four coastal states—Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal—that are adjacent to the Bay of Bengal (Xavier, 2018). Thus, the BIMSTEC could make a positive contribution to India’s energy and food security.

North East Region and Development Concerns

India’s development concerns vis-à-vis its North Eastern region (NER) have also resurged its interest in the BIMSTEC. The BIMSTEC provides New Delhi an opportunity to deal with the issue of underdevelopment of the NER, whereas the NER serves as a gateway for India to international markets in South East Asia (Patgiri & Hazarika, 2016; Sarma, 2018; Ziipao, 2018). India’s states of this region—Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim—share international boundaries with Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan, which are the part of the BIMSTEC. Hence, India’s main objective within the BIMSTEC is the development and prosperity of these North Eastern states. The BIMSTEC, as India’s Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh had stated in 2014, could be a ‘game changer’ for the overall development of the NER (Bhattacharjee, 2014). As Myanmar shares a 1,643-km border with four North Eastern states—Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh—it is crucial to India’s economic engagement with South East Asian countries. Prior to British colonialism, several trade routes existed between India and South East Asian countries. But these routes were disrupted by the narrow business and imperial approach of the Britishers, partition of 1947 and India’s import substitution economy which deprived the NER of its natural markets in the South East Asian countries (Haokip, 2015).

In the post-Independence period, due to the underdeveloped roads and other transportation infrastructures along with the lack of trade facilitations, limited industrialization and communication bottlenecks had not only isolated the NER but also discouraged domestic and foreign investments to boost the economy of this region (Pukhrem, 2019; Saikia, 2016). Hence, formal bilateral border trade between India and Myanmar was started in 1994 through the designated custom posts at Moreh in Manipur to Tamu in Myanmar, and Zokhawthar in Mizoram to Rih in Myanmar. In 2003, India made the NER an indispensable element of the LEP (Bhattacharjee, 2014). Re-establishing the connectivity of India’s landlocked NER with South East Asian countries would lead to the development of this region and enhance the welfare prospects of approximately 45 million people of India living in this region, which accounts for around 4 per cent of its population and 8 per cent of the total landmass of the country and contributes 2.5 per cent to India’s GDP (Xavier, 2018). The region has rich mineral resources and hydropower potential of 50,000 MW, approximately, natural gas reserves of 190 billion cubic meters (BCM), coal reserves of more than 900 million tonnes (MT) and oil reserves of at least 500 MT, along with massive reserves of limestone of around 5,000 MT. After that, numerous new possibilities have emerged for India–Myanmar cooperation. The extension of the Indo–Myanmar Friendship Road could connect Mandalay with the Asian Highway. Assam and Manipur possess modern medical facilities and could be possible destinations for medical tourists from Myanmar. The development of the NER largely depends on the level of its connectivity with the markets of the fast-developing South East Asian countries (Batra, 2010; Xavier, 2018). However, there was a lack of cross-border physical connectivity, which was a major obstacle to expanding trade and investment between India’s NER and South East Asian countries (Bhattacharjee, 2014). The Kaladan Multimodal project, the Asian Trilateral Highway and the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Initiative can boost the all around development of the NER (Kundu, 2014; Saran, 2019).

Strategic and Security Interests and Concerns

India’s Strategic Backyard and China’s Forays

The geo-strategic environment has also changed in the region. On the one hand, the US has announced its Indo-Pacific strategy, and, on the other, China has increased its assertive activities in the region. Beijing considers the region as its own strategic periphery. This changed environment has generated new strategic and security concerns for India while fostering New Delhi’s interest in the reinvigoration of BIMSTEC. The Bay of Bengal, the largest bay in the world, connects the Indian and Pacific oceans and occupies a key position in the global economic system as 25 per cent trade of the globe occurs through it. The bay operates as a strategic channel to the Malacca Strait which is a prime trade route for China. It is critical for China for its access to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, it is the strategic backyard of India, and New Delhi considers it as its own sphere of influence as it is crucial for its maritime security (Dutta, 2019; Xavier, 2018). In the mid-2000s, Beijing realized that its dependence on the Malacca Strait as a primary conduit for energy supplies could leave China vulnerable to ‘economic coercion’ in a conflict situation with the United States. Thus, it started to focus on the security of sea lanes stretching from the North Arabian Sea to the Malacca Strait and invest in infrastructure development to sustain the alternative trade routes. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the proposed Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor are meant to resolve China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’, facilitate the development of its Western provinces and help the Chinese industries to obtain access to new markets. Therefore, it has been making huge efforts to fund infrastructure projects and foster the connectivity throughout South, Central and South East Asia to enhance its connectivity to the Indian Ocean, through Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Hence, it has undertaken various infrastructure projects in the BIMSTEC countries except India and Bhutan and increased its influence on and presence in India’s neighbourhood. Funding in the name of infrastructure projects in its neighbourhood has resulted in debt burdens and forced India’s neighbours to hand over their assets to Beijing, as Sri Lanka did in the context of its Hambantota sea port. Beijing’s loan practices could create an ‘unsustainable debt burden’ for India’s neighbouring countries, making them more amenable to Chinese ‘suasion and coercion’ (Yang, 2018). Such developments in its neighbouring countries have worried India as these debt traps could also culminate in the Bay of Bengal and other Indian littoral states handing over their port infrastructures to China.

Myanmar is geo-strategically important to India as it lies parallel to the North Eastern states of India and parts of Bangladesh, including sharing an important border with China. Moreover, Myanmar is also strategically located along the Bay of Bengal and is situated astride India’s trade routes of the South Eastern Sea near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. China’s presence in Myanmar is already visible as it has built a road from Kunming in China to Mandalay in Myanmar, and China is developing Kunming as a regional energy and transportation hub. China has built logistical facilities for its navy on the South Western coast of Myanmar. Although Myanmar had invited India to build the Tamu to Kaleva road that runs parallel to the Kunming to Lashio to Mandalay roads, the development of Kyaukptu port in Myanmar could result in China’s naval vessels docking there to ensure its larger presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean (Gupta, 2018; Ramachandran, 2019; Yahya, 2005). As a whole, the growing overlap between India’s strategic backyard and China’s strategic periphery creates a threat to India’s strategic interests. Hence, New Delhi is trying to counter Beijing’s forays into its strategic backyard at the global level by increasing its strategic cooperation with Washington and Tokyo; it has entered into logistics pacts with the United States, France and Singapore and is also working with the United States, Australia and Japan to revive the ‘Quad’ due to Beijing’s power projection in the Indo–Pacific region (Yang, 2018). At the regional level, the BIMSTEC is the only grouping that connects India’s strategic peripheries, and its revival allows New Delhi an opportunity to push a constructive agenda to counter China’s growing influence in the region with its own connectivity projects (Desai, 2017; Wagner, 2006). New Delhi is seeking to establish alternative East-to-West connectivity between South and South East Asia across the Bay of Bengal. India has also put a hold on the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) corridor. Thus, the BIMSTEC is strategically significant for India as New Delhi’s robust relations with it would give India an extra advantage in the Bay of Bengal region vis-à-vis China (Desai, 2018; Dutta, 2019; Yahya, 2005).

Building Pressure on Pakistan

India’s intensified engagement with BIMSTEC is also seen as a move to isolate Pakistan and build pressure on it to end its support for terrorist activities in India. Pakistan-based terrorist organizations have carried out various terrorist attacks on Indian soil, including the attack on India’s Parliament on 13 December 2001, the Bombay terrorist attacks on 26–29 November 2008, the attack on Pathankot Air Force Station on 2 January 2016, the attack on an Indian Army camp at Uri on 18 September 2016 and the attack on India’s paramilitary forces at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, which deteriorated India–Pakistan relations continuously. After the Uri attack, India not only boycotted the SAARC summit to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan, but also invited the BIMSTEC countries to the BRICS outreach summit in Goa in 2016. As Pakistan is not a part of the BIMSTEC, this invitation to the BIMSTEC countries was considered as an Indian attempt to isolate Pakistan diplomatically in South Asia. India succeeded in convincing the BIMSTEC countries about the terrorism being spread by Pakistan. In the BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat 2016, its leaders indirectly condemned the Uri terrorist attacks in the strongest terms, stating them as the ‘barbaric terror attacks in the region’ and reiterated to ‘…identify, hold accountable and take strong measures against States who encourage, support and finance terrorism, provide sanctuary to terrorists and terror groups, and falsely extol their virtues. There should be no glorification of terrorists as martyrs’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016a; Xavier & Sinha, 2020, p. 35).

India again succeeded in including ‘fighting against terrorism’ as a main point in the agenda of the Fourth BIMSTEC Summit August 2018 as the BIMSTEC countries in the Summit Document re-emphasized the identification of various state and non-state entities that supported terrorism and holding them accountable for the same (BIMSTEC Secretariat, 2018). These initiatives have not only isolated Pakistan in South Asia for the time being but also infused new life into the BIMSTEC (Desai, 2018). When the Modi government boycotted the SAARC Summit in November 2016 in Islamabad, other SAARC countries, especially Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka, also refused to participate in the summit. In 2017, in a message on the 20th anniversary of its formation, Prime Minister Modi had declared the BIMSTEC a natural platform to implement India’s key priorities of NFP and AEP (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017b). Therefore, when citing the ‘cross-border terrorist attacks’ as a reason India announced its decision to boycott the SAARC Summit 2016 to be held Islamabad, Pakistan, other SAARC countries, especially Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives, also declared their inability to participate in the summit. Bangladesh stated that the environment is not conducive to the successful hosting of the SAARC summit in Islamabad. While reaffirming its strong commitment to strengthen the regional cooperation through the SAARC, Bhutan also stated that the recent escalation of terrorism in the region had seriously compromised the environment for the successful holding of the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad. Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and, later on, Maldives also condemned the international terrorism and pulled out of the forthcoming SAARC summit (Bhattacherjee, 2016). Subsequently, the summit was cancelled and Pakistan stood isolated in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal region (Dutta, 2019). Apart from the BIMSTEC, India is using the events of other groupings to isolate Pakistan and put pressure on it to abandon the support to terrorism by making cross-border terrorism a major issue in events. This was also observed from the Meeting of Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 13–14 June 2019.

Security Issues in North East India

India also faces strategic vulnerability and national security concerns in its NER. The Kaladan Multimodal project, the Asian Trilateral Highway and the BBIN initiative could also assist India in reducing its strategic vulnerability and dealing with national security concerns in this region (Kundu, 2014; Saran, 2019; Yahya, 2005). Currently, the NER is connected with mainland India through its narrow 22-km ‘Siliguri Corridor’, also known as the ‘chicken neck’ and ‘strategic vulnerability’ of India. On the one hand, China makes its territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, and on the other, numerous militant organizations are fighting for autonomy and also, in a few cases, independence from the Indian states. These militant organizations have their connections with some Chinese elements. In addition to it, small arms infiltration and drug trafficking are also areas of serious security concerns in North East India related to Myanmar, as India has a 1,643-km-long border with Myanmar in the region which is inhabited by various trans-border ethnic communities. The porous border gives easy access to cheap weapons and safe sanctuary for North Eastern militant organizations in Myanmar (Kundu, 2014, p. 209). Militant organizations like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (NSCN-K), Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), Chin National Front (CNF), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have their camps inside Myanmar’s territory. Besides, the Arakan Army, a militant group in Myanmar, has also, reportedly, established its camps along the Mizoram border, raising security concerns for both countries. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) which provides training to the Arakan Army in the Kachin state of Myanmar adjoining China has also readied around 3,000 cadres. Many of them have, reportedly, moved to the areas adjoining the Lawngtlai district of Mizoram and could target the Kaladan project (Bhalla, 2019). Therefore, curbing the insurgency, small arms proliferation and drug trafficking became an urgent requirement for India. Due to the existing security scenario in the region, India needs cooperation from the BIMSTEC countries, especially Myanmar. Maritime surveillance was also required in Bay of Bengal as the militant organizations are using its sea lanes to transport drugs and weapons (Kaul, 2006). India has raised its concerns with Myanmar related to militant organizations operating from its territory against India and is also engaged in anti-insurgency operations in collaboration with Myanmar. In 2019, ‘Operation Sunrise-1’ and ‘Operation Sunrise-2’ were launched to bust the camps of militant groups, especially KLO, NSCN-K, ULFA and NDFB in the NER (Press Trust of India, 2019). India and Myanmar have signed a standard operating procedure for Indo–Myanmar Coordinated Patrols.

V. Obstacles in the Way of Revival

India is making efforts for the revival of the BIMSTEC and many constructive initiatives have been taken in this direction by it in collaboration with other member countries. However, there are some obstacles in the way of its revival.

Even though any serious rivalry does not prevail among the BIMSTEC countries, there are some bilateral and trilateral tensions at times which could spoil India’s efforts for its revival. Out of seven members of the BIMSTEC, five are the SAARC countries which have a trust deficit vis-à-vis India. India’s geographical, economic and military dominance in the region creates a sense of insecurity among its smaller neighbouring countries. Among the BIMSTEC countries, India has a positive trade balance with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. India had given tariff concessions to the textile sector of Bangladesh in 2011. It has also given three lines of credit (LoC) to Bangladesh for infrastructure development, especially for the digging of the inland waterway and the construction of Akhaura–Agartala Rail link and India–Bangladesh friendly pipeline. Bangladesh had allowed India in 2018 to use Chittagong and Mongla ports for goods movement to and from India (High Commission of India, 2019). Both countries have also made robust their security cooperation. In 4–16 February 2020, military exercise ‘Sampriti-IX’ was concluded at Umroi, Meghalaya (Panda, 2020). Earlier, Bangladesh had alleged that India supported the Shanti Bahini from Chittagong Hill Tracts and India had also criticized Bangladesh for assisting various insurgent groups in its NER. Since 2008, Bangladesh has handed over many Indian insurgents—especially Ranjan Daimary, Founder Chief of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), in May 2010 and Anup Chetia, General Secretary of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), in November 2015—to India and eliminated their camps from its territory. In spite of this, India–Bangladesh relations have often been disturbed by border firing as India had started the border fencing project to stop illegal migration, cattle smuggling and militants. Issues of illegal migration and fake currency from Bangladesh to India have been persisting over a long period and often disturb the India–Bangladesh relations (Kundu, 2014). Besides, India–Sri Lanka relations have also deteriorated many times because of the Tamil issues in Sri Lanka and the illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) by Indian fishermen in the Palk Strait and Gulf of Manar (Fernando, 2019). India had voted against Sri Lanka on a Resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in 2009, 2012 and 2013 for probing the alleged war crimes by Sri Lanka against the Tamil minority, but abstained from voting on the resolution at the UNHRC in 2014.

Moreover, India–Nepal relations are also disturbed due to cross-border drugs and weapons smuggling. Besides, Nepal is not satisfied with the existing arrangement of sharing of the common river system with India. Kathmandu accuses India of getting more relative gains than Nepal (Jha, 2013; Kundu, 2014). Besides, when Nepal promulgated its constitution in September 2015, India tried to influence it to accommodate the demands of Madhesi and supported the blockade of goods’ supply, particularly fuel, which soured relations between the two countries. Nepal withdrew from the first-ever BIMSTEC military exercise ‘MILEX-18’ organized by India on 10–17 September 2018. Kathmandu argued that it would neither join any military alliance nor deviate from its foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Moreover, it refused to endorse India’s agenda on security matters in the BIMSTEC. It also declined to attend the conclave of army chiefs of the BIMSTEC countries organized by India on 16 September 2018. On the contrary, Kathmandu conducted a joint military exercise with China, ‘the Sagarmatha Friendship-2’, on 17–28 September 2018 in Chengdu, Sichuan Province of China, and signed Transit and Transportation Agreement with China as, after its blockade of 2015, it was looking for alternative sea access routes. China granted access to its four seaports—Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang—and three dry ports—Lanzhou, Lhasa and Xigatse—to Nepal, reducing its dependence on India (Eyben, 2018). Nepal is trying to revive the SAARC. It has argued that the BIMSTEC cannot replace it and should not be promoted at the cost of the SAARC (Parashar, 2019).

Apart from this, bilateral disputes also exist between other BIMSTEC countries. The Myanmar–Thailand relationship suffers as Myanmar accuses Thailand of supporting the violent ethnic groups—Karen National Union (KNU) and Shan State Army (SSA)—against the Myanmar government. Myanmar has deployed forces and weapons across the border of Thailand, causing resentment within Thailand. The problem of refugees and other migrants from Myanmar to Thailand and drug trafficking from Myanmar to Thailand also have many times soured the relations of the two countries. In addition to this, tension also exists in Bangladesh–Myanmar relations, primarily on the demarcation of maritime boundaries and illegal migration of Rohingyas from Rakhine Province of Myanmar to Bangladesh. Bangladesh wants to demarcate the maritime boundaries with Myanmar to obtain equal rights over maritime resources including oil, gas and marine species. Both countries had moved the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) that gave its decision in March 2012, which was accepted by both the parties (Balaram, 2012; Kundu, 2014). Besides, in recent years, the move from Myanmar to procure missiles, grenades, rocket launchers and other heavy weapons to strengthen its armed forces has also created uneasiness in the mind of Bangladeshi authorities. Myanmar had also raised its apprehensions about the acquisition of submarines, warplanes and other modern weapons by Bangladesh. In addition to this, due to state-sponsored genocide and ethnic cleansing, many Rohingyas have fled from Myanmar to South Asia and South East Asia (Alam, 2018; Islam, 2019). At least 1.1 million Rohingyas are residing in camps located near Cox’s Bazar highway, parallel to the Naf River which is the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. The influx of Rohingyas has not only put a burden on its scarce resources but is also viewed as a potential source of instability in Bangladesh (Dussich, 2018; Rahman, 2010; Yasmin & Akther, 2019). Bangladesh had blamed these refugees for the Ramu Violence of 2012 in Cox Bazar District in which Buddhist temples, monasteries and houses had been targeted. They are also accused of displacing the indigenous people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and importing the narcotic drug Yaba, also known as Yama (Rahaman, 2017). In 2019, Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina had viewed Rohingyas as a huge security threat to the entire South Asian region. Bangladesh has urged the neighbouring countries and regional organizations including the BIMSTEC to put pressure on Myanmar to take the Rohingyas back to their homeland. More than 40,000 Rohingyas are currently residing in India and are considered as a security threat (Yhome, 2018). Therefore, New Delhi has taken up the issue of Rohingyas with Myanmar. Bangladesh and Myanmar are a ‘crucial land-bridge’ between South Asian and South East Asian regions. The trilateral highway project from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand through Myanmar has already been delayed due to some issues raised by Myanmar.

Besides, the BIMSTEC countries are negotiating for an FTA without achieving any success, due to differences between the two leading members, India and Thailand, over market access. New Delhi is emphasizing on easing the rules on the movement of professionals, whereas Bangkok is seeking to relax the foreign investment rules for its retailers. Other BIMSTEC countries are stressing for an FTA to utilize the potential benefits of regional integration. However, India–Thailand differences are delaying the FTA among BIMSTEC countries (Kongrut, 2020). Adding to bilateral differences, an upsurge in ultra-nationalism, jingoism, cross-border terrorism and competition for scarce resources in the region also make regional cooperation difficult within the BIMSTEC countries (Balachandran, 2017).

VI. Conclusion

It can be argued that earlier, the BIMSTEC had been an underperforming grouping due to the lack of political will, institutional infrastructures, dominance of individual interests of the member countries and bureaucratic entanglements. These problems had delayed the execution of planned activities of the BIMSTEC in the context of regional cooperation. But now it has India’s attention for its reinvigoration, as it could allow India to promote and achieve objectives of its NFP and AEP. Earlier, India had been investing its political capital more to promote regional cooperation through the SAARC and had invited the SAARC leaders to the swearing-in ceremony of the Modi government in 2014, in tune with its NFP. However, first in the Kathmandu Summit in 2014 and then after the Pathankot and Uri attacks in 2016, it realized that due to Pakistan’s obstructionist approach and its support to cross-border terrorism against India, it is difficult to promote regional cooperation through the SAARC. Thus, a dysfunctional SAARC, India’s desire for greater regional economic integration, economic opportunities, especially untapped trade opportunities, vast untapped natural resources of the NER and India’s quest for energy and food security, and scope for the development and welfare of India’s Eastern coastal areas and the NER, being offered by the greater connectivity with South and South East Asian regions through the BIMSTEC, have emerged as key factors behind India’s resurged interests in the BIMSTEC’s revival. China’s forays into India’s strategic backyard, New Delhi’s strategy of building pressure on and isolating Pakistan and security concerns, particularly in the NER, vis-à-vis state and non-state actors are also seen the major factors behind the sudden resurgence of India’s interest in the revival of the BIMSTEC.

Connectivity is crucial for the development and security of the NER of India as it would promote greater integration of the region with its mainland and also reduce the strategic vulnerability of India in this region. Since 2014, BIMSTEC activities in diverse fields to promote cooperation have been increased under the informal leadership of India and various initiatives taken by it. Nevertheless, like the impression of the BIMSTEC as ‘an India-dominated bloc’, a problem that India has also faced in the SAARC, its differences with and the over-dependence of the BIMSTEC countries on China are the major impediments for the revival and success of this organization. Nepal’s increasing closeness with China, its differences with India and desire to revive the SAARC, arguing that the BIMSTEC cannot replace the SAARC, could spoil India’s attempts for the rejuvenation of the BIMSTEC. The India–Thailand differences over FTA are a major hurdle in its effective revival. These two countries are the regional powers and have more responsibility to take initiatives and build consensus in the grouping. Other member countries also have some bilateral differences on border demarcation, drug trafficking and cross-border illegal migration, especially of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh, Thailand, India and other BIMSTEC countries. These differences, if not resolved amicably, can discourage cooperation within the Bay of Bengal region and derail the BIMSTEC’s revival process initiated by India.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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