Geopolitical Imperatives in the Eastern Himalayas: Situating the Hills of Darjeeling

Abstract

Scholarly discourses involving the peripheral regions often look through the binary lenses of ‘identity’ and ‘development’, which are then ascribed as the root causes, leading to the emergence of political movements in these regions. Analogies emanating from such visions entrapped solely on development deficit fall short in dealing with the interplay and intersections of history, geography and politics related to such regions. The analysis concerning the Gorkhaland Movement also seems to be trapped within such an explanatory binary of ‘identity’ and ‘development’. This article attempts to situate the hills of Darjeeling, where the movement is located, into a less discussed framework of geopolitics that not only politicizes the geographies of the Eastern Himalayas but also historicizes the communities and their aspirations as a response to the manoeuvrings by the concerned states. Within such a framework, we shall also discuss how the colonial geopolitics of migration, henceforth, has been succinctly carried forward by the post-colonial state in shaping its notions related to the hills of Darjeeling.

Keywords

Geopolitics ethnicity migration Darjeeling Hills Eastern Himalayas

I. Introduction

In common understanding, geopolitics entails the interplay of geography with politics. Scholarly understandings underpin it as an art of statecraft thriving on geographical features—location, climate, topography, resources, etc. (Kelly, 2006; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). Critics, however, argue that the theories and concepts of classical geopolitics are bounded by a top-down analysis, bypassing other actors such as people, civil society organizations, pressure groups (Dalby & Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992) and ‘social movements’. There is, therefore, an immediate need to concentrate on ‘anti-geopolitics’ (Routledge, 2003) or ‘critical geopolitics’ (Dodds, 2005; Ó Tuathail, 1996) by analysing the social movements, which are often referred as the ‘terrains of resistance’. It is argued, while classical geopolitics is a power game from the perspective of the state, anti-geopolitics challenges the state-centric algorithms of power, consent and hegemony. Studying social movements, thereby, provides an opportunity to challenge state-centric geopolitics (Routledge, 1996). While it is noteworthy that ‘anti-geopolitics’ or ‘critical geopolitics’ is a concept qua conceptualization, it is an approach that challenges classical geopolitics.

Classical geopolitics has rarely been concerned about ‘deterritorialization’—the withering away of the rigidity of territories, in the era of globalization, as classical geopolitical imagination has always been in the trap of ‘securing’ its territory (Dalby & Ó Tuathail, 1996). Researchers focusing on globalization have argued that state territoriality, along with geography, is shrinking as a consequence of ‘deterritorialization’ (Brenner, 1999). Anti-geopolitics questions the state-centric algorithms of power and hegemony, first, by challenging the economic and military power—the material power, of the state and, second, by challenging the ‘imposed’ representation from the top (Routledge, 2003). It thereby enables us to analyse contemporary social movements, which, now a days, transcend the political boundaries of nation states (Routledge, 1996). In this regard, one is reminded of Lefebvre and his castigation of the modern state as a form of violence directed towards space (Brenner, 1999). According to him, each state claims to produce a territorially bounded space wherein homogenization is attempted but ‘the space that it homogenises’ usually ‘has nothing homogenous about it’ (Lefebvre, 1991; cited in Brenner, 1999). This article discusses what influences do ‘the form of violence in the name of the nation state’ have on the Gorkhaland Movement! In other words, the classical geopolitics and anti-geopolitics associated with the movement are analysed within a framework of emerging history.

The literature on Gorkhaland Movement highlighted that the root causes for the sustenance of this struggle in the hills of Darjeeling, for more than a century, had been identity (Chettri, 2013; Golay, 2006; Middleton, 2013; Samanta, 2000; Sarkar, 2010; Subba, 1992; Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018) and development (read as economic interest) (Chakrabarti, 1988; Dasgupta, 1999; Datta, 1991; Lama, 1988; Nanda, 1987). However, there is also a viewpoint suggesting that the geopolitical importance of the nineteenth-century Kalimpong–Lhasa trade route considerably attracted the British towards the hills of Darjeeling (Dasgupta, 1999). Moreover, history of the hills of Darjeeling presents us with a saga of subsequent tagging and untagging with various Himalayan Kingdoms, cutting across political boundaries of the then existing Kingdoms of Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and British India (Saha, 2016) until it was merged with West Bengal in 1955 through the Absorbed Areas Act, 1954 (Saha & Chakraborty, 2017). Additionally, geographies in the hills of Darjeeling and its surrounding states—Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan—have severe geopolitical implications for the individual states, whereas the cultural commonalities of the people in the Eastern Himalayas provide an anti-geopolitical rationale to it as well.

The article, therefore, discusses the interplay of geography and politics in these extended locations and historicizes the embedded social relations in such locations. We argue that apart from the state actors, non-state actors also play an important role in these extended locations. Whenever the latter asserts its autonomous existence by challenging the former, the state recasts its spell through geopolitics so that the autonomy seeking non-state actors are co-opted within the statist apparatus accordingly. With these, the article seeks to address the political efficacies of colonial geopolitics of migration in the post-colonial period in the Eastern Himalayas. Alongside, it also analyses the impact of the Eastern Himalayan geopolitics on the political mobilization in the hills of Darjeeling.

A brief layout of the sections is important here. In Section II, the article traces the history of the hills of Darjeeling and its relation with colonial geopolitics, whereas Section III specifically analyses how the colonial geopolitics of migration shaped the Eastern Himalayas. Section IV deals with the rationale of tacitly maintaining the Indo-Nepal, Indo-Sikkim and Indo-Bhutan borders virtually ‘open’ in the post-colonial period. This will further be added by the interplay of Nepalese migration into Sikkim, its ‘merger’ with India and the ‘ousting’ of Nepalese from Bhutan. While Section IV critically assesses the rationale behind the migration of Nepalese into the Eastern Himalayas, Section V contemporizes the interplay of the Eastern Himalayan geopolitics with the hills of Darjeeling. This section is also sufficed by the contemporary geopolitical tussle over the Doklam plateau, which lies at the tri-junction of Sikkim–Bhutan–China. Finally, Section VI concludes the article.

II. Brief History of the Eastern Himalayas

The hills of Darjeeling bear a contested history of being tagged and untagged to various Himalayan Kingdoms. In the pre-colonial era, Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong remained largely under Sikkim. But, Kalimpong for a considerable period was under Bhutan, after it was wrested from Sikkim in the early eighteenth century (Stiller, 1973; Whelpton, 1991), till a district named Darjeeling was formed by the British in 1868 after annexing Kalimpong from Bhutan in 1865 (Bhanja, 1993). Interestingly, the majority of the pre-colonial Eastern Himalayan Kingdoms were wrested during the 1770s by the Gorkhali army mainly to extend the territories of the Gorkha Kingdom. This expansionist hunger of the Gorkhali army got obstructed by Tibet (China) in the north and by the British in the south. As a result, a non-aggression Treaty of Segauli was signed in 1816 that forced the Gorkhas to ‘cede’ all the occupied territories to the British. In this war, the British had mobilized troops from Sikkim with a promise to restore its territories previously lost to the Gorkhas. British handed the territories, including Darjeeling, to Sikkim by signing the Treaty of Titaliya in 1817. But, to avoid repeated aggression of the Gorkha king, the British decided to return the Terai land to the Gorkha ruler (Chaudhijri, 1960; Stiller, 1973). Concomitantly, the ‘lush green beauty’ (Kar, 2012), ‘potentiality of becoming tea-estate’ and a good living place for the British officials (Datta, 1991; Subba, 1992), apart from ‘geopolitical’ importance of the hills of Darjeeling (Dasgupta, 1999), had tempted the British to acquire it through a deed of grant in 1835 from Sikkim (Aitchison, 1892).

In ancient times, Tibet was also known as Bhot, and hence the migrants from the same were called ‘Bhotias’ (Bhutias). During the early seventeenth century, few Drukpa Lamas from Tibet came as politico-religious ‘refugees’ to the Eastern Himalayas—Sikkim and Bhutan (Dixit, 1992a; Joseph, 1997). The Gelugpa sect of the Mahayana Buddhism then ruled Tibet in an ‘authoritarian’ (Shneiderman, 2010) way against other sects; as a consequence, a section of Kagyupa Drukpa Lamas fled from Tibet (Phuntsho, 2013). After they arrived in the Eastern Himalayas, they enthroned Penchu Namgyal as the ruler in 1614 (Subba, 1992). But, the institutionalized theocratic monarchy was established in 1642 with the establishment of Dharmaraja—the ruler of ‘righteousness’ (Subba, 1985a). Since then, the state of Sikkim and Bhutan identify themselves as ‘Drukpa’ states (Dixit, 1992a; Joseph, 1997). This Tibetan influence in the Eastern Himalayas became more entrenched when the Tibetan Lamas started preaching Buddhism. First, the ‘earliest’ inhabitants in Sikkim—the animism-practising Lepchas (Subba, 1985a)—had fallen prey to this religious ‘conversion’ (Sinha, 1975). In the historical timescale, Bhutias were the second group to settle in Sikkim followed by the Nepalese¹. On the other hand, an ethnic group named Sharchops are regarded as the earliest settlers in Bhutan who along with other ethnic conglomerates—Ngalong and Khengs—constituted the core of Bhutanese Drukpa identity (Rizal, 2004, p. 153).

As mentioned, the British had signed the Treaty of Titaliya with Sikkim in 1817 whose provision (Article III) necessitated the latter to consult the former for any territorial dispute with its neighbouring states (Aitchison, 1892). However, repeated ‘depredation and misconduct of the officers and the subjects of the Maharajah of Sikkim’ (Aitchison, 1892, p. 165) became the bone of contention for the British. In one such occasion, Sikkim had even detained British officials—Dr Campbell and Joseph Hooper—in 1849 on charges of trespassing Sikkimese territories, although they had ‘permission to enter’ (Risley, 1894). Dissatisfied with repeated kidnappings and abduction of Englishmen in Sikkim, the British forced Sikkim to sign the Treaty of Tumlong, 1861, which eventually patronized heavy influx of ‘British subjects’ into Sikkimese territories (Aitchison, 1892; Risley, 1894). As the provision of Article VIII of the Treaty of Tumlong, 1861, had allowed mobility of people from surrounding spaces, the growth of Nepalese population in Sikkim started increasing, creating an imbalance in the ethnic composition in this kingdom (Sinha, 1975). Similarly, the British signed the Treaty of Sinchula with Bhutan in 1865 to avoid repeated kidnappings, ‘plunder’, hostage-taking of British subjects, etc., as was the case with Sikkim. This treaty forced Bhutan to cede the territories in the east, named Duars, to the British. Apart from that, the British had also assumed considerable suzerainty over Bhutan in matters relating to foreign affairs through the Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty (Aitchison, 1892, pp. 189–192).

III. Colonial Geopolitics of Migration in the Eastern Himalayas

It is argued that the British had manifold geopolitical imaginings over the Eastern Himalayas. It varied from developing the hills of Darjeeling for a plantation economy to a base for recruitment for the British army as well as waning down the Tibetan influence in the Eastern Himalayas. These imaginings and their intersectionality became apparent during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

First and the foremost geopolitical imaginings of the British towards the Eastern Himalayas in general, and the hills of Darjeeling in particular, has been geo-economic, as its climate was conducive for the production of finest qualities of tea (Aris, 1979; Rose, 1977; Sarkar, 2010; Subba, 1985b, 1992). The plantation of tea on a commercial scale began from the 1850s onwards, and the industry eventually started attracting British planters in considerable numbers (Dasgupta, 1999). Existing literature suggests, during this time, only the British could acquire patta over land in Darjeeling, and there was hardly any individual land ownership (Sarkar, 2010). During the same time, in the 1860s, Cinchona plantation was also initiated in Mungpoo in the Darjeeling district, after its successful experimentation in the Nilgiri hills had yielded good results (O’Malley, 1907). The colonial motive in patronizing the Cinchona plantation was mainly to supply Quinine so that it could provide cheap remedy from the then malarial epidemic (O’Malley, 1907, p. 124; Sharma, 1997). In 1835, when the British acquired Darjeeling from Sikkim, there was hardly any Nepali household. The hill tract was almost entirely under forest and contained only ‘one hundred Lepchas’,² in 1839 (O’Malley, 1907; Risley, 1894), who were considered to be the ‘original’ settlers in Darjeeling (Subba, 1985a). Lepchas spoke a language of Tibeto-Burman origin and were under the influence of Mahayana Buddhism (Chhetri, 2016; Dasgupta, 1999). This version of Buddhism had been influencing³ the Darjeeling hills since the enthronement of a Lama from Tibet as the ruler of Sikkim during the middle of the seventeenth century (Subba, 1985a, 1992). On the other hand, British mercantilist aspiration embedded in a plantation economy demanded more and more skilled labourers. Hence, streams of Nepalese from Nepal had started pouring into the hills of Darjeeling and its adjoining areas, as the Nepalese were well versed in these labour-intensive work (Sarkar, 2010; Sharma, 1997).

The next important colonial imperative over the Eastern Himalayas was related to the nineteenth-century trade route—the Royal Road to Lhasa, which was under the tutelage of the Kingdom of Sikkim (Bhanja, 1993). Interestingly, the religious patronage of the then Sikkim was Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism. This route, also known as the Kalimpong–Lhasa Road (Dasgupta, 1999), which passed through the Chumbi Valley, provided the shortest route from India to Tibet. While this trade route was under the tutelage of Sikkim, the Chumbi Valley had proximity to Bhutan and was believed to be the territory of Tibet (Aitchison, 1892). This route became geopolitically important to the British after the old trade route to Tibet, which passed through Nepal, remained dysfunctional after the Gorkha upheaval in the late eighteenth century (Aris, 1979; Joseph, 1997; Sinha, 1975). So, in search of an alternative trade route, the British had to mould their geopolitical imaginings over the Eastern Himalayas in such a way so that they could maintain control over the Kalimpong–Lhasa Road. For this to actualize, the British required a way out that could minimize the Tibetan influence, over the Eastern Himalayas, as the region had already been under the control of Bhutias of Mahayana Buddhism since the seventeenth century.

As a way out, the British took recourse of encouraging Nepalese migration from Nepal in the Eastern Himalayas, as they were largely Hinduized by the successive Shah rulers. The rationale for doing so was the apparent religious cross-currents between the Hinduism and the Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism (Risley, 1894). As mentioned earlier, the Lepchas were said to be the earliest settlers in the Eastern Himalayas, followed by the Bhutias and the Nepalese. The British perceived that the Lepcha–Bhutias would hardly escape from the Tibetan influence, as their heritage, religion, language and cultural ties were deeply rooted in Tibetan Buddhist traditions (Dasgupta, 1999). So, Nepalese migration into the Eastern Himalayas appeared to be the best bet for minimizing Tibetan influence in these areas. In other words, as Dr Campbell noted in his diary, ‘the British were keen that the Nepalis should settle in newly acquired land in Darjeeling because they were considered to be the traditional enemy of the “Buddhist Tibetans” and the “Buddhist Bhutias”’ (Dasgupta, 1999, p. 55). Even Risley (1894), a British official opined:

The influx of these [Nepalese] hereditary enemies of Tibet is our surest guarantee against a revival of Tibetan influence. Here also religion will play a leading part. In Sikhim, as in India, Hinduism will assuredly cast out Buddhism, and the praying-wheel of the Lama will give place to the sacrificial implements of the Brahman. The land will follow the creed; the Tibetan proprietors will gradually be dispossessed, and will betake themselves to the petty trade for which they have an undeniable aptitude (Risley, 1894, p. XXI; parentheses added)

Such imaginings had considerably guided British interests over Sikkim, Bhutan, Tibet and the hills of Darjeeling. Moreover, a policy of the British to strengthen colonial India’s northern frontiers against China and Tibet (Verghese, 2004) prompted them to have special interest over Sikkim as it overlapped with China, Nepal, Bhutan and British India. Under such a scenario, what has been the post-colonial geopolitical understanding in the Eastern Himalayas are discussed in the next section.

IV. Post-colonial Geopolitics in the Eastern Himalayas

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, to safeguard the Indian frontiers from Chinese incursion into Tibet, the British negotiated the Anglo-Chinese Convention in 1890 ‘to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet’ (Aitchison, 1892, p. 170). Article II of this Convention articulated the status of Sikkim as ‘protectorate’ state of British India. Earlier, the British, through the 1861 Treaty of Tumlong, had already assumed full suzerainty over Sikkim along with encouraging more and more migration of ‘British subjects’ into Sikkim (Aitchison, 1892). They argued that ‘Sikkim cannot stand by itself, and if we withdrew our support, it must [may] ultimately fall either to Tibet or to Nepal’ (Risley, 1894, p. XV). When the British started their political communications with Sikkim, presence of only two communities were reported, namely the Lepchas who were said to be in close ties with the British and the Tibetans (Bhutias) who were ‘hostile’ to them. Initially, the Gorkha conquest of western Sikkim had marked the beginning of Nepalese migration that was subsequently promoted by the British to tame Tibetan influence in Sikkim (Verghese, 2004, p. 245). The ethnic cleavage had started fomenting after the encouragement of Nepalese migration in Sikkim, which was disfavoured by a section of Lamas ‘who alleged that they do not protect forests, allow their cattle to trespass and, make themselves unpleasant neighbours in various ways’ (Risley, 1894, p. X). Hence, the continued migration of Nepalese Hindu, the hereditary enemy of Tibetans, outbalanced the ethnic composition in Sikkim by outnumbering the Tibetan heritage influenced Lepchas and the Bhutias.

After the Independence of India in 1947, when the ‘Princely States’ were ‘asked’ to join the Union of India, Sikkim opted out from it, and hence, India entered into a Standstill Agreement in 1948 (Datta-Ray, 1984). But it did not stop with the agreement as India’s geopolitical aspirations over the Eastern Himalayas was thought to serve best by negotiating with each country in the region separately. As a result, India was on a spree to sign consecutive treaties with her neighbours. Indo-Bhutan Treaty (1949) and Indo-Sikkim Treaty (1950) were negotiated to take the suzerainty over these Himalayan Kingdoms (Phuntsho, 2013). These subsequent treaties led these theocratic states to apprehend that India could perceive them within its territories. Henceforth, these Drukpa-ruled states categorically asserted their allegiance to Tibetan heritage belonging to Mahayana Buddhism (Chawla, 2019) and tried to retain their Drukpa identities intact. The Indo-Sikkim Treaty was negotiated in 1950, in response to Chinese action to ‘liberate’ Tibet, which reaffirmed Sikkim as a ‘protectorate’ state of India with the residuary powers vested with the Union of India in matters of defence, external relations, communications and customs (Datta-Ray, 1984). These treaties, coupled with the Indo-Nepal Treaty (1950), virtually made the borders defunct and, consequently, patronized heavy cross-border migration in the Eastern Himalayas. The Indian state did not do anything new; it just renegotiated the colonial treaties in the post-colonial period, with its neighbouring states, without changing much (Verghese, 2004).

Immediately after the Independence of India, Sikkim State Congress (SSC) was formed in 1947. The Nepalese-dominated SSC had been demanding sociopolitical reforms such as abolition of landlordism, responsive government, bringing ‘democracy’ with Nepalese representation and even ‘accession’ to India (Datta-Ray, 1984; Phadnis, 1980; Sinha, 1975). As the Nepalese in Sikkim were treated as second-class citizens, there were repeated demands for sociopolitical reforms. No sooner had Nepalese population started increasing in Sikkim under the open borders in the Eastern Himalayas, their reformist agendas got stimulated. These reformist demands of the 1950s, later on, shaped the movement for ‘electoral democracy’ and other sociopolitical reforms in Sikkim in the early 1970s. These occurred with the strong patronage of India, apart from the hard-pressed demands by the struggling Nepalese (Sidhu, 2018). Soon after installing ‘democracy’ in Sikkim, a new Constitution was promulgated on 5 July 1974, with the help of a constitutional adviser from India, which the Chogyal saw as a ‘conspiracy’ to bring about the merger (Verghese, 2004, p. 249). Concomitantly, the Government of India had passed the Thirty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment Act in 1974 that changed the nature of the constitution from ‘unitary’ to ‘federal’ so that Sikkim could become an ‘associate state’ of India. In the same process, during 1975, with a majoritarian ‘referendum’, Sikkim became the 22nd state of the Indian Union (Datta-Ray, 1984; Verghese, 2004).

On the other hand, during the post-Independence consolidation phase, India entered into a standstill agreement with Bhutan without officially signing an Agreement (Rose, 1977; Singh, 1988), as it officially did with Sikkim in 1948 (Verghese, 2004). But, soon after India achieved its Independence in 1947, it had upheld Bhutan’s sovereignty status, however, at the cost of signing a new treaty with India in 1949. This treaty was signed in the wake of growing Chinese incursions in the Eastern Himalayas (Chengappa & Krishnan, 2017), and, thereby, the treaty had re-necessitated Bhutan to be guided by India in the matter of its defence and external affairs (Phuntsho, 2013). Independent India had only continued the status quo by signing this, as British India had already assumed full suzerainty over Bhutan through Article VIII of the 1865 Sinchula Treaty (Aitchison, 1892, p. 191). Provisions of the 1949 treaty also encouraged cross-border migration of people, trade and commerce, as well as equal rights for the subjects living in each other’s territory. With the increase of Nepalese population in Bhutan, the Bhutanese Nepalese became the ‘subject’ of Drukpa Bhutan but failed to secure their ‘citizenship’. Even, cultivation and ownership right over land for the Nepalese were restricted to south Bhutan only (Rose, 1977, p. 111).

Intrigued by such ill-treatments to the Nepalese in Bhutan, a political organization named Bhutan State Congress (BSC) was formed by the Nepalese in 1952 to carry forward the grievances in a more organized way. Since 1954, it had been demanding several sociopolitical reforms in Bhutan such as desertion of feudalism, bringing democracy along with providing civil rights to the Nepalese and even maintaining closer ties with India (Joseph, 1997; Sinha, 1991). Argumentatively, the BSC was following the footsteps of the SSC in demanding sociopolitical reforms and even ‘accession’ to India (Rose, 1977, pp. 110–111). It is said that, even though there were certain ethnic cleavages between the Nepalese and the Bhutias in Bhutan, there was considerable harmony among them as well. However, with the pronouncement of the Sixth Five Year Plan in 1987, the entire ethnopolitics in Bhutan suddenly got derailed and activated fault lines within the erstwhile ethnic harmony. All of a sudden, the initial goal of preserving the minority Drukpa identity seemed to have transformed into the goal of making Bhutan free of ‘illegal immigrants’ in the late 1980s (Dixit, 1992a, 1992b). In the perception of the Drukpa Bhutanese, the Nepalese became the major threat, as they often argued the collapse of erstwhile Drukpa Sikkim under the democratic wave led by the Sikkimese Nepalese. Later on, it fell prey to the Indian geopolitical imaginings over the Eastern Himalayas to become part of India in 1975 (Datta-Ray, 1984; Sinha, 1975). Hence, the Bhutanese became apprehensive over the Nepalese presence in Bhutan and started calling the Drukpas as ‘endangered species’ that ought to be preserved. Even, the Bhutanese authorities officially argued, unless there is a check over the migration into Bhutan, the Drukpa state will soon lose its identity and become a ‘Nepali state’, as it had happened with Sikkim. However, Kanak Mani Dixit, a commentator on the Himalayan politics and the founding editor of Himal Southasian, in a series of articles (Dixit, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c), argued that there was hardly any evidence that the Bhutanese Nepalese were planning to overthrow the monarch.

Thus, if we closely look at the sociopolitical history of the Eastern Himalayas, it seems that the merger of Sikkim in 1975 and the ousting of Nepalese from Bhutan in the early 1990s had a strong relationship with the migration of Nepalese in the said region. Colonial rulers had encouraged migration of the Nepalese in the Eastern Himalayas for their geopolitical imaginings—plantation, British army and the Kalimpong–Lhasa Road. As a consequence, the Nepalese in the Eastern Himalayas, through their reformist struggles, had provided an anti-geopolitical rationale to it. Subsequently, the post-colonial state had been tacitly continuing the same geopolitics to tighten the territoriality in the said region that ultimately brought merger of Sikkim. The merger occurred when the ‘terrains of resistance’ of the Nepalese were co-opted by the Indian state and, thereby, Bhutan became apprehensive about the Nepalese presence in its territory and hence decided to ‘weed’ them out.

V. Eastern Himalayan Geopolitics and the Hills of Darjeeling

While in the earlier section (IV), the rationale behind the migration of the Nepalese into the Eastern Himalayas was dealt with, this section assesses the interplay of the Eastern Himalayan geopolitics on the hills of Darjeeling. It is assumed that the initial seeds of autonomy aspiration in the hills of Darjeeling have been sown as early as in 1907, which has sustained in different forms till contemporary times. One observes several spikes associated with the movements related to autonomy for more than 100 years, for example, consolidation of Gorkha ethnicity, Bhasa Andolan, demand for Gorkhaland, bargaining tribal status. Moreover, it is also sustained by the palliatives provided by the state in the form of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) as well as development boards.

Gorkha Ethnicity Vis-à-Vis Nationality Formation

First of all, let us focus on the mobilization for ‘Gorkha’ ethnicity and the consciousness towards Nepali nationality formation in the hills of Darjeeling. The British used the term ‘Gorkha’ for the Nepalese recruits in the colonial army (Samanta, 2000), which played an important role in shaping the ‘Gorkha’ identity. It is mentioned that the colonial rulers had first noticed the martial qualities of the Gorkhas during the 1815–1816 Anglo-Nepal War. The Gorkhas were used by the British during the 1857 ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ and 1919 Jallianwala Bagh massacre (Subba, 1992). The mercenary role of the Nepalese soldiers motivated the British rulers to recruit them in the British Army (Stiller, 1973). All types of Nepalese recruits were referred to as ‘Gorkha’ in the British Army and their recruitment on a mass scale started during the second half of the nineteenth century with the opening of a recruiting centre in 1902 at Ghoom (Subba, 1992). This was the beginning of ‘martial race’ theory that subsequently became the touchstone of the British policy of encouraging Nepalese migration.

On the other hand, the Kingdom of Nepal became sceptical about allowing its subjects to be recruited in the British Army, as the memories of the 1815–1816 Anglo-Nepal War were still fresh in their mind. As the Gorkhas fought against the Gorkha king, it forced him to prohibit the recruitment of his subjects into the British Army (Dasgupta, 1999; Subba, 1992). As an ‘escape’ route for recruitment, the British encouraged their migration from Nepal to several areas like Shillong, Darjeeling, Dehradun, etc., where they could be recruited directly. This process continued until coming of a new regime in Nepal in 1846 that provided a formal clearance, deferring the earlier prohibition, to recruit them in the British Army (Mansergh & Moon, 1980; cited in Subba, 1992, pp. 57). Darjeeling thereby became an important recruiting centre for the British Army. So, the ‘martial race’ theory ascribed by the British actually highlighted a particular attribute of this population rather than ‘constructing’ an ethnic identity for them. Arguably, ‘ethnic category’ is imposed by others, whereas ‘identity’ refers to ‘self-identification’ (Jenkins, 1994). In this light, one can critically examine Subba’s (1992) understanding that the construct of ‘hill ethnicity’ started in the hills of Darjeeling after the 1920s. As a critique, it can be highlighted, following Jenkins’ categorization, that this was rather the initiation of the construct of Gorkha ethnicity, where ‘martial race’ was one of the ethnic categories.

Interestingly, it is also said that the formation of the ‘Nepali nation’ in the hills of Darjeeling cannot be traced back before 1924, the year when Nepali Sahitya Sammelan was established (Hutt, 1997; Pradhan, 1991). As the aspiration of Nepali nation formation had been centred around securing Indian identity, henceforth, the Nepali-speaking intelligentsia in the hills of Darjeeling had been advocating the importance of Nepali language since the 1920s (Banerjie, 1984; Chettri, 2013; Hutt, 1997; Sarkar, 2015). This was pioneered by Surya Bikram Gewali, Dharnidhar Koirala and Parasmani Pradhan (popularly known as Su-Dha-Pa) through literary imaginings (Chettri, 2013; Sarkar, 2015). To forge the strong sense of ‘Nepali linguistic nationalism’ (Subba, 1992), even the ethnic communities like Limbus, Rai, Yakha, Dewan, Mangars, Tamang, Gurung, Thami, Sunuwar, etc. (Sinha, 2003), were asked to come under the Nepali/Gorkha banner by declaring Nepali as their language in the Census (Sarkar, 2013b, 2015; Subba, 1992). On the other hand, organizations like Indigenous Tribal Lepcha Association (ITLA) (Sadamu, 2017) and All India Tamang Buddhist Association were also formed during the 1920s just when the Nepalis were busy in constructing a Nepali-dominated identity in the hills of Darjeeling.

These organizations were entrusted to safeguard respective cultures of the Lepchas and Buddhist Tamangs as well as to challenge the umbrella ethnicity in the offing (Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018), as the Nepalis had demanded the introduction of Nepali as a medium of instruction in 1926. Particularly, the Lepchas had been very vocal against the umbrella ethnicity called ‘Gorkha’, as they had been identifying themselves as ‘non-Gorkha’, since the formation of ITLA (Sadamu, 2017). With the germination of ethnic cleavages over the term Nepali vis-à-vis Gorkha, Hillmen’s Social Union (HCU) was formed in the 1930s to minimize this cleavage (Chhetri, 2016; Hutt, 1997; Sarkar, 2013a). Arguably, Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalis were said to have embraced Nepali as their lingua franca, with HCU’s efforts, so that a nation formation could have been accomplished (Subba, 1992). A monthly magazine called ‘NEBULA’ (Nepali, Bhutia and Lepcha) had started publishing to foment ethnic consciousness during the 1930s (Pradhan, 1984; Sarkar, 2015) as part of the Nepali Bhasa Andolan (Subba, 1992). Critics argued the NEBULA amalgamation was preached only to subsume the Bhutia–Lepchas into the Nepali-dominated ‘Gorkha’ ethnicity (Das, 2010). So, it seems clear that while the colonial geopolitics of the Nepalese migration in the Eastern Himalayas had contributed in the anti-geopolitical aspirations among the Nepalese in Sikkim and Bhutan, this had contributed in the hills of Darjeeling, the ‘terrains of resistance’ (Routledge, 1996), in the consciousness of nationality formation.

Aspiration of Indian Identity

While the impact of colonial geopolitics of migration did not cease to operate after nationality formation in the hills of Darjeeling, it continued in the post-colonial period as well. The initial consciousness got transformed into an ethnic assertion of Indian nationality. For an accomplished identity within a multilingual nation state, constitutional recognition of the language holds paramount importance. Anti-geopolitical aspiration in Darjeeling, therefore, undertook the task of mobilizing people in the hills in the name of Nepali language and its Constitutional recognition. All India Gorkha League (AIGL) took a leading role in Darjeeling, raising the demand for recognition of the Nepali language since its inception in 1943 (Sarkar, 2013b). Consequently, the task of legitimizing the language was also an aspiration of Sikkimese Nepalese after their state got merged with India in 1975. One of the conditions of Sikkim’s merger with India has been the constitutional recognition of Nepali language. While the demand for linguistic recognition emanating from the hills of Darjeeling fell on deaf years, after Independence, Sikkim’s merger forced its recognition. Although the Nepalese of the Eastern Himalayas, in general, fought for this, the role of Sikkimese Nepalis had an enabling role in this anti-geopolitical enunciation. Ultimately, the Nepali language got its constitutional recognition in 1992, where the then Chief Minister of Sikkim, Narbahadur Bhandari, played a key role (Verghese, 2004).

It is already argued that the migration of diverse people in different times in the Eastern Himalayas paved the way for generating ethnic cleavages among the Lepcha–Bhutias and Nepalese, where the Nepalese seem to be the worst sufferers (Dixit, 1992a). In this geopolitical game, the reformist struggle led by the Nepalese ushered democracy in Sikkim, which was, later on, tactfully ‘utilized’ by the Indian state to usher in the merger (Sidhu, 2018). As a consequence, the Nepalese presence across the Eastern Himalayas was seen with suspicion, and consequently, the Nepalese were expelled from Bhutan in the early 1990s (Hutt, 1996; Sinha, 1995) as well as from other states in Northeast India during the late 1980s (Misra, 1986). Even the mass leader of the Gorkhaland movement, Subhash Ghising, was also said to have been ousted from Kalimpong in the late 1980s over ethnic conflict with Lepcha–Bhutias (Sarkar, 2010). These were the chain of geopolitical incidents that compelled the Nepalis in the hills of Darjeeling to become conscious about their uncertain future in India. Henceforth, to secure their territorial identity in India, the Darjeeling hill dwellers, preferably the Nepalis, had transformed their autonomy aspiration into a full-fledged Gorkhaland state in the late 1980s as part of their anti-geopolitics. However, when the Ghising-led movement had reached its crescendo, the state used its politics of allurement to sign the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) in 1988. After the Ghising-led ‘terrains of resistance’ was eroding fast, a new leader, Bimal Gurung, emerged in the hill politics in the early 2000s. He was also made to sit-in for negotiation with the state, ultimately leading to the formation of GTA in 2012 through an accord (Sarkar, 2013b).

Amidst all, a relatively newer political churning emerged in and around Darjeeling hills in the form of development boards, which are believed to have raised critical questions in terms of the existing ethnic equation. Such political deliberations are post facto geopolitical manoeuvrings by the Government of West Bengal after the DGHC and the GTA failed to live up to the expectations of the hill dwellers. The ruling party in the Government of West Bengal found this as an opportune alibi to make inroads into the hill politics through the creation of several development boards for different communities in 2013. This process has been continuing thereafter as well (Saha, 2016). Off late, the hills of Darjeeling are again in flames, as the Government of West Bengal announced to implement the three-language formula. Protesters in the hills argued it to be a majoritarian dictate by the state to further marginalize their struggle for identity. Nevertheless, the announcement was retracted from the hill, but it was sufficient enough to provide fuel for the launch of a fresh agitation in 2017. Interestingly, just a few months back, the ruling party in the state—the Trinamool Congress (TMC)—made inroads into the local civic election, which was believed to be the reason for fresh agitation (Das, 2017). This time also, the hill leadership was co-opted through the politics of allurement. The Gurung-led Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) got divided into two factions. Binay Tamang and Anit Thapa formed GTA-II, governed by the Tamang faction of GJM, without any fresh mandate, while Gurung was transformed into a pariah.

Ethnic Boundaries Formation in the Hills of Darjeeling

The Gorkha dynasty, in the second half of the eighteenth century, had been unleashing a series of repressive measures over the Buddhist and other non-Hindu communities to ensure domination of the high-caste Hindu Nepalese (Dasgupta, 1999; Subba, 1992). Nepal under Prithvi Narayan Shah had unified and transformed itself into a Hindu Kingdom under the influence of a rigid caste system. For that matter, even the Hindu kings of Nepal replaced all the existing ethnic languages with Nepali (Kraemer, 1999). The caste system in Nepal became more rigid as the economic and political power shifted to the Bahuns (Brahmins). Subsequently, the ‘high-caste’ Brahmins evicted a section of ‘lower castes’ from Nepal, who incidentally served as labourers in the plantation economy of Darjeeling (Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018). Even in 1962, King Mahendra promulgated a new Constitution with the slogan Ekbhasha, Ekbesh, Ekdesh (one language, one form of dress, one country) to create cultural uniformity among the existing groups (Hangen, 2007). All the existing traditional groups from Nepal were accommodated within the caste hierarchy only to declare Nepal as the Hindu Kingdom. Additionally, ethnic groups such as Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Gurung, etc., were subjugated to the extent that they were not even allowed to write their surnames. Hence, in Nepal, the construct of a ‘Hinduized Gorkha’ identity came into existence by replacing almost all the existing traditions of the ethnic groups in Nepal (Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018).

On the other hand, migration of Nepalese in Sikkim fostered ethnic cleavage with the Bhutia-Lepcha (BL). Thereby, the Chogyal had to initiate an ethnic parity system in Sikkim (Verghese, 2004), which was even followed in 1974 Sikkim Assembly election, where BL and Nepalese had an equal share of seats (BL—15, Nepalese—15) (Phadnis, 1980, p. 1245). Additionally, one seat each was reserved for the Sangha and the scheduled castes. But after Sikkim’s merger with the Union of India, this ethnic parity formula started destabilizing. Over the years, Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 (No. 7 of 1979), (which became Act in 1980), reoriented this parity by reserving 12 seats for BL, one for Sangha and two for Scheduled Castes—SCs (Venkatachalliah, 1993); leaving the other 17 seats as general. No seat was reserved for the Nepalis (Phadnis, 1980, p. 1245). Even the Sikkim Legislative election of 1979 was held based on such amendments. This was challenged (Venkatachalliah, 1993) in the Supreme Court of India by R. C. Poudyal in 1993. However, the court dismissed this petition by saying that the provisions of the amendment were not violative of the Constitution of India (Venkatachalliah, 1993).

This parity became more skewed particularly when the Mandal Commission recommended an increase in the reservation of Other Backward Castes (OBCs)⁴ from 27 per cent to 49.5 per cent in the early 1990s (Chhetri, 2017; Verghese, 2004). Before that, the merger of Sikkim had enabled the Lepchas and Bhutias for the Scheduled Tribe (ST) status in 1978 (Verghese, 2004, p. 253), which their counterparts in Darjeeling had been enjoying since the 1950s (Middleton, 2013). Relevantly, the Tamang and Limbu communities were also granted the ST status in 2002 (Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018). All these rubrics of politics had created an ethnic fault line in Darjeeling that, later on, culminated in all-round claims of ST status from all walks of life in the hills of Darjeeling. Such ‘pan-tribal’ cry is manifesting in the form of ‘ethnic revivalism’ (Chhetri, 2017; Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018), which, in a way, is further shaping up an imaginary of the ethnic past to suit individual group’s ethnic claim. Today, every ethnic group in the hills of Darjeeling is under a process of categorically reimagining their history affixed to the geographical location of the erstwhile Himalayan Kingdoms that existed before the unification of Nepal under the Shah dynasty (Chhetri, 2017; Hangen, 2007). Many ethnic groups like Rai, Limbu and Gurung who had their language and script, before the unification of Nepal (Chhetri, 2017; Middleton & Shneiderman, 2008), are thereby busy in ‘rewriting’ their script to claim their ‘primitiveness’ that existed before the Shah dynasty (Chhetri, 2017). Through such practices, they are trying to disassociate themselves from any religion and culture, which could retard their claim of primitiveness. In this trail to revivalism, many ethnic groups in the hills of Darjeeling are tracing their ‘groupness’ to ‘indigenous’ or ‘non-Hindu’ roots in Nepal as the majority of their ancestors were brought to the hills by the British. Even people from ‘high caste’ like the Khas (Chettri, Bahuns, etc.) are also proclaiming themselves as ‘indigenous’ by re-routing their history to the Khaskura-speaking people in Nepal (Chhetri, 2017).

Interestingly, the ‘intelligentsia’ and the political organizations in the hills of Darjeeling earlier discarded the Sixth Schedule proposal since they felt tribal majority provisions should not be implemented in non-tribal majority areas (Saha, 2016; Sarkar, 2013b). But observing the unfolding of events during the 1990s and 2000s, it becomes apparent how various ethnic and ‘sub-ethnic’ communities struggled for their recognition as ST (Middleton & Shneiderman, 2008). It seems that while realizing the provision and importance of the Sixth Schedule status, the Darjeeling dwellers formed the Gorkha Janjati (tribal) Kami Damai Sangh to claim themselves as ‘tribal’. It is thereby observed that the initial ‘politics of identity’ is now getting restricted into the ‘politics of reservation’ only. This process must have been influenced by two major reasons—first, the waning down of the initial phase of the Gorkhaland Movement led by Ghising in the 1980s and subsequent signing of the Accord, resulting in the formation of the DGHC in 1988. Second, the decision of the Government of India to implement the recommendation of the Mandal Commission to uplift the marginal and downtrodden communities by providing reservation (Tamang & Sitlhou, 2018).

Hence, if history becomes an important argument in the construction of identity (Kraemer, 1999), our discussion so far entails that, along with history, the geography of the surroundings of the hills of Darjeeling had a role in fomenting such ethnic boundaries. The earlier existing individual ‘groupness’ (Barth, 1969) of the Rai, Limbus, Gurung, etc., in the Himalayan Kingdom got transformed into single ethnic solidarity of Gorkhaness under the ‘repressive’ regime of the Gorkha King. Even attempts had also been made in the hills of Darjeeling to create a ‘hill ethnicity’ or ‘Nepali ethnicity’ after the 1920s (Subba, 1992), which in a way was an initiation of the construct Gorkhaness. But, the contemporary ‘politics of reservation’ in the hills of Darjeeling and its surrounding areas are raising questions on Gorkhaness itself. The process of bringing in the Nepalese from Nepal, as workers, was part of the geopolitical imaginations (enclave economy, balancing the Tibetan influence on Eastern Himalayas, etc.) of the colonial state. Even the unification of Nepal, with the destruction of several ethnic symbols, was part of the pre-colonial geopolitics.

Whenever the demographic change in the Eastern Himalayas, triggered by the geopolitics of migration, had transposed into ethnic demands, the state used the politics of allurement to nullify their demands. Providing ST status is one such example for which the Nepalis of Sikkim, as well as Darjeeling, have been struggling for. Here, demanding ST status falls within the purview of anti-geopolitics, whereas providing the same by the state is a classic example of geopolitics. Even, rewriting the lost script to bargain ST status is a well-directed anti-geopolitical challenge towards the state. Interestingly, the state does not offer ST status to all the communities, and hence, there are certain communities which feel deprived under such an environment of allurement. Under such circumstances, when a community acquires benefit from the state, other communities start carrying forward such demands for similar allurements. The pending cases for ST status for 11 ‘sub-communities’ within ‘Gorkhas’ is an indication towards such directions.

Doklam Standoff

We further contextualize the contemporary geopolitical tussle in the Eastern Himalayas by dealing with the recent Doklam stand-off, which lies at the tri-junction of Sikkim–Bhutan–China.

Bhutanese herdsmen had been occupying the Doklam plateau as a grazing area for ages. This plateau was ‘never’ a bone of contention for the British and the Chinese in their frequent meetings on border disputes. It was only after the 1962 India–China War, this plateau, abutting a junction between India–Bhutan–China, came under the spotlight. Since then, Bhutan’s sovereignty dictates over Doklam had been rejected many times by China, which perceives the plateau strategically important to secure the Chumbi Valley⁵ (Chengappa & Krishnan, 2017). The geopolitical importance of the nineteenth-century Kalimpong–Lhasa road that carries volumes from Sikkim through Chumbi Valley up to Central Asia (Dasgupta, 1999; Risley, 1894) has already been discussed. China claims India is trespassing into the Bhutanese territory at Doklam violating the Sikkim–Tibet border, ratified by the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention (Aitchison, 1892). The recent conflict seems to have been initiated due to a road project—Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which could provide China near access to the Nathu La pass (Sharan, 2017).

In reality, China geopolitically wants to revive the 2,000-year-old Silk Road through the BRI (Girardi, 2018; Tweed, 2018). It even provides China with a shorthand to the Siliguri Corridor or ‘Chicken’s Neck’, a 27-km-long stretch created in post-partition India, where Bengal got divided between India and Pakistan. This corridor assumes great significance because it connects Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sikkim, Darjeeling hills and the Northeast India with rest of India. The plateau has Nathu La on the west from the Sikkim side and Yadong, China’s military hub, as the nearby city to the Doklam plateau from the Chinese side. This is a serious geopolitical concern for India as Siliguri is just 150 km away from the Bhutanese territory (Sharan, 2017). So, in the geopolitical imaginings of the Indian state, any perceived ‘political threat’, on its borders, might jeopardize its socio-political geographies. It is thereby not an understatement if we mention that the hills of Darjeeling bear a perceived ‘vulnerability’ to the Union of India in light of the Doklam issue as the political, cultural and geographical history of the hills cuts across the political boundaries of Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan only to appear as different slices of a single cake.

VI. Conclusions

The similarities in political histories of the ‘locations’ analysed in the article allow us to treat the entire Eastern Himalayas as a geographical stretch where the autonomy movement in the hills of Darjeeling is embedded in the similar geographical imaginings. The Gorkhaland movement is often visualized through the lenses of ‘identity’ vis-à-vis ‘development’ and occasionally through geopolitics. However, the anti-geopolitical elements associated with the movement and the cultural continuities situated in the Eastern Himalayas are less highlighted. In other words, along with the interplay of geography and politics, the intersectionalities of cultural continuities in bounded territories are also important in understanding this movement. The article argues that whenever the non-state actors pose a serious challenge to the state through their autonomy aspirations, the state recasts its spell in such a way that these autonomy-seeking non-state actors are co-opted accordingly.

Second, there is a strong relationship between history and geography of the surroundings of the hills of Darjeeling in shaping the territory identified as Darjeeling today. The British, at first, considered the hills as recruiting centres for the Gorkhas and, later on, encouraged the migration of Nepalese as labourers into the plantation economy. Thus, they kept a watchful eye on the Tibetan influence in the Eastern Himalayas, through encouraging the migration of Hinduized Nepalese, so that they could control the Kalimpong–Lhasa trade route.

Third, the contemporary ‘politics of reservation’, in the surrounding geography of the hills of Darjeeling, is raising questions on Gorkhaness. The earlier existing individual ‘groupness’ of the Rai, Limbus, Gurung, etc., in the Himalayan Kingdom got transformed into single ethnic solidarity of Gorkhaness under the ‘repressive’ regime of the Gorkha ruler. This Gorkhaness is creating fissures in the wake of the formation of several development boards as well as the ‘politics of reservation’ in the hills of Darjeeling. The process of bringing in the Nepalese from Nepal as workers was part of the geopolitical imaginings (enclave economy, balancing the Tibetan influence on Eastern Himalayas etc.) of the colonial state. However, when this demographic change transposed into ethnic conflict or later ethnic demands (anti-geopolitics), the state has unfolded the politics of allurement (geopolitics) to nullify the demands. Providing ST status is one such example for which the Nepalis of Sikkim, as well as Darjeeling, have been struggling for. Here, demanding ST status comes under anti-geopolitics, whereas providing the same by the state is a classic example of geopolitics. Even, rewriting the lost script to bargain ST status is a well-directed anti-geopolitical challenge towards the state.

Fourth, if we closely look at the socio-political history of the Eastern Himalayas, it seems, the merger of Sikkim in 1975 and the ousting of the Nepalese from Bhutan in the early 1990s had a strong relationship with the migration of the Nepalese in the said region. Colonial rulers had geopolitically encouraged migration of the Nepalese in the Eastern Himalayas for their geopolitical imaginings—plantation, the British Army and the Kalimpong–Lhasa Road. As a consequence, the Nepalese in the Eastern Himalayas, through their reformist struggles, had provided an anti-geopolitical rationale to it. Subsequently, the post-colonial state did just continue the same geopolitics that ultimately resulted in the merger of Sikkim. The merger occurred when the anti-geopolitical struggles of the Nepalese were co-opted by the Indian state, and thereby, Bhutan became apprehensive about the Nepalese presence in its territory and hence decided to weed them out. In other words, although the anti-geopolitics had been challenging the geopolitics of the colonial and post-colonial states in the Eastern Himalayas, their struggles get swayed away by the geopolitical manoeuvrings of the respective states. Nepalis¹ were also expelled from Northeast India in the late 1980s.

Fifth, This was the chain of geopolitical incidents that compelled the Nepalis in the hills of Darjeeling to become conscious about their future in India. Henceforth, to secure their territorial identity in India, the Darjeeling hill dwellers, preferably the Nepalis, had transformed their autonomy claim into a full-fledged Gorkhaland state in the late 1980s as part of their anti-geopolitics. Interestingly, there was hardly any demand for a state in the name of Gorkhaland before this moment, although, there were several occasions, since 1907, in the history of Darjeeling, where the demand for separation from Bengal/West Bengal had been raised. We argue that the demand for a state in the name of ‘Gorkha’ was raised only in the 1980s. The demand for a Gorkhasthan in the late 1940s was more an expression of attaining sovereignty, whereas the demand for Gorkhaland is imagined within the territorial boundary of the Indian Union. Concomitantly, under the politics, mainly tracing to Sikkim and its merger, Darjeeling Nepalis got the recognition of the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India in 1992. In doing so, such deliberations in the form of ‘terrains of resistance’ are an expression of continuous interactions with the state through contestations and negotiations, which is a challenge to the geopolitics that fizzles out beyond a point. Thus, the Gorkhaland movement seems to be entrapped in the geopolitics of the Eastern Himalayas.

Finally, our discussion entails the continuance of geopolitics, understood as the manoeuvring by the state in the contemporary era, for example, Doklam, and the unabated anti-geopolitics manifested through peoples’ movement for autonomy and identity, for example, Gorkhaland, as the pointers towards the continuing dyad between state manoeuvrings and people’s resistance.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

This paper is an outcome of a PhD work, which has been supported by the UGC through its SRF (Senior Research Fellowship) scheme.

Notes

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