Abstract
Energy has become the symbol of 21st-century geopolitics. Asia in this geopolitical game is considered to be the ground zero. As of 2021, at least a quarter of the world’s liquid hydrocarbons are consumed by China, India, Japan and South Korea. Over the next 20 years, 85% of the growth in energy consumption will come from the Indo-Pacific region. According to the World Energy Outlook, China will account for 40% of the growing consumption until 2025, after which India will emerge as the biggest single source of increasing demand. The increase in demand for gas will overtake that for oil and coal combined. Part of the story here is that the Indo-Pacific region will become increasingly reliant on oil from the Middle East and Central Asia. By 2030, 80% of Chinese oil will be imported while 90% in the case of India. But Japan and South Korea will remain 100% dependent on oil imports. Where from these huge amounts of oil and gas will come? The scramble for oil and gas in Central Asia probably is the right answer to the question asked. To materialize the quest for oil and energy, many countries although lately but turned towards Central Asia for sure. With this premise, the present article attempts to contextualize the geopolitics of energy in Central Asia and tries to investigate the nature and contour of the great game while illustrating the unflinching importance of the region for global energy security in general and the Indian energy security in particular.
Introduction
Geopolitics is a word as well as a set of associated ideas. A much-debated term among scholars and in popular writings, geopolitics straddles two disciplines—geography and politics. Initially conceived as a deterministic causal relationship between geography and international relations, over time, geopolitics started to denote the influence of geography on the decision-making power of the state in international relations. Broadly speaking, based on the premise of power and space, geopolitics delves to emphasize the strategic importance of natural resources, their locations, supply routes and checkpoints. The traditional connotation of the term geopolitics denotes, ‘great power competition over access to strategic locations and natural resources’ (Vakulchuk et al., 2020) establishes a well-knit connection between national interest, power politics, strategic thinking and decision-making with geographic space. A nation’s ability to command over physical power, notably through its control over primary energy resources such as oil, shapes not only its economic development but also its security and military strength. As such, the international relations of the nations are profoundly influenced by the distributions of energy resources and control and administration of their supply sources and pipeline networks given the scarce geological distribution of energy resources. That is why just like diplomatic geopolitics, military geopolitics and economic geopolitics, energy geopolitics in modern times has evolved as a much broader and significant dimension of geopolitics.
Energy has long shaped global geopolitics as the driver of growth, a tool for social change, the propeller of the world economy and the key to national and global security and stability. History is evident that each phase of human civilization and the success of every international order are based on energy resources. It should be noted here that coal and steam were at the backdrop of the shining British Empire, while oil (petroleum) has been at the centre of the rise of the Americans to the lexicon of world politics. Although massive fossil fuels deposits like coal have led to Britain’s imperial glory, the richness in oil has allowed the United States and Russia to gain vast geopolitical and economic advantages, whereas the access to other energy resources has allowed other countries of Europe to attain industrialization at an early age. And today many expect that the road to the rise of China to global supremacy will also largely be determined by its quest for energy in Asia, Africa and Latin America, whereas India’s ascendance to the global high-table depends on securing its energy resources and sources of supply. The energy consumption is just not growing in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, in global terms also the rate of consumption is growing manifold in comparison to the Easter years. The US Geological Survey in its study has shown that ‘compared with 60 years ago, the planet is consuming today, in percentage terms, 618 times more oil, 1000 times more gas, 756 times more nickel, 1500 times more bauxite’ (Klare, 2012). A new world energy map dominated by a growing energy consumer market in Asia is evolving as remarked by Professor Mohan Malik (Kaplan, 2014). Robert Kaplan citing the research of Professor Malik writes that ‘Asia has become ground zero for growth as far as consumption of energy is concerned with 85 per cent of the growth in energy consumption in next 20 years will come from Indo-Pacific while at least a quarter of the world’s liquid hydrocarbons already are consumed by China, India, Japan and South Korea’ (Kaplan, 2014).
Although, the secret of 20th-century prosperity is attributed to cheap oil and energy, as we enter into the 21st century, these energy resources continue to be the determining factor of the success of both the developing and developed world but the prospects of known deposits are continuing to drying up. In fact, in the last 40 years, the world’s demand for energy has grown by 95%, while the future energy demand is projected to grow by 90% because of the increasing demand from developing countries like India and China. As per the reports of World Energy Outlook, China will account for 40% of the growing consumption until 2025, while India will emerge as the biggest single source of world energy demand with an increase to 132% whereas demands from China and Brazil will grow by 71% (Kaplan, 2014). Since the availability of hydrocarbons is determined by geology, and the key world energy consumers are not the principal producers, the global politics of energy is therefore shaped mainly by the ‘arc of energy’, stretching from the Gulf region to the Caspian Sea (including Central Asia), through Siberia and the Arctic region to the Russian Far East, Alaska and Canada with nearly 80% of the world’s oil and gas reserves located in this region (Sikri, 2008, p. 2).
Further, the reiteration by the ‘Peak Oil’ theory that Russia is producing at its peak and Saudi Arabia has limited additional short-term capacity and the claims of the ‘Club of Rome Thesis’ cautioning the world community of limited span of non-renewable sources of energy in its paper ‘There are Limits to Growth’ led to the rise of unprecedented energy security concerns among the consumer countries. Besides, the commercial disputes, regional instability, civic unrest and political coups in the Persian Gulf, investors are thoroughly worried about their energy security concerns. Besides, the threats to energy supply, instability in the producing countries, vulnerability of supply routes, piracy and terrorism concerns the countries as nearly 25% of total world oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, about 15% through the strait of Malacca, and more than 5% through Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow strait connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Pascual, 2008, p. 3) further exacerbated the agonies of the countries dependent on Middle Eastern energy. That is why perhaps the global scramble for oil and energy has taken a fast track route all around geopolitical landscapes abundant of energy resources. Central Asia is the latest geographical landscape of world energy discovery with huge energy potentials and a congenial investment environment undoubtedly has invited global attention. The accentuated competition over control and administration of energy sources and their supply routes by the countries like the United States, China, the European Union, Japan, Israel, Iran, Pakistan and India has led to aggressive foreign policy formulations and strategic calculation to which many now call as the New Great Game. This article is a humble attempt in this direction to analyse the energy factor in the geopolitical competition in Central Asia, leading to stiff competition, international rivalries and shifting of Russo-American engagement to Sino-American confrontation and consequently the rise of Chinese hegemony in the heartland region. Further, this article investigates India’s position in this epic quest for oil and energy and examines India’s strategies in Central Asia.
In an endeavour to analyse the energy factor in the geopolitical competition in Central Asia and to map India’s position and strategies in this region, this article has been divided into seven pertinent sections. Section I with the help of geopolitics builds the understanding of energy factor in the geopolitics of Central Asia and the accentuated great power competition in the region. Section II vividly reviews the changing dynamics of geopolitical discourses to provide a complex picture of international relations guided by their geographical settings. The review of the theoretical and empirical works on geopolitics and energy security and ultimately energy geopolitics in this section broadly concerned with the connection of geography, space and the power of the states has set the milieu to draw attention to a new group of states in the heartland region called Central Asia known for their huge natural resource potentials especially oil, gas, coal and uranium and invited a great power engagement to which many call as the new great game. Further, Section III details out the energy resources of the region in statistical terms, and a country-wise analysis has been done to know who has what energy resources in abundance. Section IV deals with the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and its five littoral states which includes Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from Central Asia. Great Power Game in Central Asia is widely discussed in Section V. The accentuated power play in the region and its changing dimension helped us to know at least three different phases of dominance in the energy sector of the region characterized by the Russian dominance in the first phase, the US influence in the second phase and the rise of China in Central Asia in the third phase. Section VI is used to map Indian presence in the energy geopolitics of the region and to chart out India’s bilateral engagements with the Central Asian countries in the energy sector. A comparative analysis of Indian and Chinese involvement in the Central Asian energy sector has been done in Section VII to identify where India missed out in the competition. Section VIII concludes the article.
Overview of the Literature
Overview of geopolitics provides a complex picture and refers to ‘the relation of international political power to the geographical setting’ (Cohen, 1964). Rudolf Kjellen, who coined the term in 1899, described geopolitics as ‘the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in Space’ (Cohen, 2003). Geoffrey Parker defines, ‘Geopolitics as the study of international relations from a spatial or geographical perspective’. John Agnew defined the field as ‘examination of the geographical assumptions, designations and understandings that enter into the making of World politics’. From the above analysis, geopolitics can be explained as a philosophy which ‘seeks to understand, explain and predict international political behaviour, primarily in terms of geographical variables, such as location, size, climate, topography, demography, natural resources and technological development and potential’ (Evans & Newnham, 1998). Importantly, power and space emerged as the two most important elements from the study of classical geopolitics with an assertion to use this space for increasing the power of the state.
Over the years, the discourse of geopolitics from the traditional military domain has been transformed into a more important strategic realm. As such energy resources being a key element of a state’s geography, therefore energy geopolitics analyses, among others, the influence of factors such as the location of energy supply and demand centres, transit routes or energy prices in the foreign policy of states (Campos & Fernandes, 2017). A close look at the geopolitical approaches, as expounded in Mahan’s (1897) analysis of naval power and the importance of technologies, such as steam, to maritime power, Mackinder (1904) ‘Heartland’ concept, Brzezizinski’s (1997) Grand Chessboard, the role of resources have been given due importance in foreign policy formulations. Broadening the scope of the study, the modern concept of geopolitics is closely associated with multiple dimensions like economics and energy which in turn are called Geo-economics and energy geopolitics have come to remain as potential tools of foreign policy and factors that can influence state’s foreign policy outcomes. Advocating energy geopolitics, Shaffer (2009) argues that ‘energy interests, especially under tight international market conditions, affect the mapping of geostrategic interests’ the use of energy resources can be likely to influence politics; also politics can influence the use of them.
However, the concerns regarding energy security have come to the limelight of world politics when two world oil crises in the 1970s exposed the vulnerability of national security largely connected with energy availability. This has invited investigation from the geopolitical thinkers led by Melvin A. Conant. In 1978, Conant in collaboration with Fern Gold has published the masterpiece ‘The Geopolitics of Energy’, emphasizing ‘access to raw materials, especially access to energy as a top priority of international political relations (Conant & Gold, 1978). Energy geopolitics has further gained momentum in the 1990s in the face of growing energy demands and growing scarcity of fossil fuels with the rise of new developing economies due to the end of the cold war, and onset of the new liberal international order has given rise to discourses like new geopolitics of energy. John V. Mitchell, Peter Beck and Michael Grubb captured the global imagination by their writings in 1996 advocating energy geopolitics as ‘new’ (Campos & Fernandes, 2017). Since 2000, much rigorous analyses and devoted researches on global energy have tremendously highlighted the importance of energy geopolitics. Speed (2016), while clarifying the concept of the geopolitics of energy, has pointed out that ‘energy geopolitics refers to the study of national security and international politics in the context of the global energy scene’. The key factors that he has embraced to define the geopolitics of energy are the ‘instability in oil-producing regions due to domestic, regional and international factors, the rise of national oil companies, resource nationalism, reserve depletion among traditional suppliers, and the opening of new sea routes, to name a few’ (Speed, 2016). Oliveira (2015) further contended that, ‘Geopolitics of Energy can be understood as the analysis of all the geopolitical and strategic elements that influence the control of energy reserves, exploration technologies, energy infrastructure, transport and end-use of the energy resources’.
One of the biggest challenges for consuming countries, according to the geopolitics of energy, is access to and control of external energy resources and energy corridors. This challenge is integrated with the security of supply of the states and has implications in the relations among the diverse actors in the energy scenario. Central to the study of energy geopolitics is the concept of energy security. The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as ‘the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price (IEA, 2017)’. Energy security is a global challenge and a priority to the international agenda. The dependence and the effects of excessive consumption of fossil fuels have led to the development of country-wise energy security policy and strategies to ensure timely, affordable and easy availability of energy for all. Responding to the importance of energy security in the national strategy, Winston Churchill answered, ‘Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone’ (Yergin, 2006).
Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia
The region of Central Asia as a single geopolitical entity consists of five former Soviet republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Geographically, the region is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It covers a vast area of approximately 4 million square kilometres almost one-sixth of the size of the former Soviet Union (Kaushik, 1970). It stretches from the seashores of the Caspian Sea and river Volga in the west to China in the east and Russia in the north to Afghanistan and Iran in the south. Because of this unique geographical location, Central Asia after its independence both literally and figuratively changed the map of Asia and subsequently redefined the world politically.
Location wise, Central Asia is the geographic hub of Asia. It is situated at the heart of Eurasia. Located literally on the middle half of the Silk Route, the region is strategically vital to almost every major country on the planet. Central Asia shares a long, 6200 kilometres border with Russia in the north, 3,500 kilometres long borders with China in the east, approximately a border of more than 3,500 kilometres to the west with the Caspian Sea and huge length of the inland border with Iran and Afghanistan in the southwest and the south, respectively (Akiner, 1994).
Central Asia until the disintegration of the Soviet Union largely remained as an unknown landmass to the rest of the world but its internal dynamism coupled with hydrocarbon resources and geostrategic significance put it right back in the global limelight. The energy resources of Central Asia have been one of the major reasons of intense political and commercial competition immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the geopolitical consequence of these vast energy resources has been the accentuated power play in the heartland region to which many calls as the ‘New Great Game’. The latest US Geological Survey of world energy also acknowledged the region as an alternative energy hub. As such, the Central Asian states are blessed with a huge base of hydrocarbons, although gas is the predominant among energy sources. ‘With proven oil reserves estimated to range from 9 to 40 billion barrels and natural gas reserves possibly exceeding 131 trillion cubic feet (tcf) (Patnaik, 2016), Central Asia is in fact poised to become a major world supplier of energy especially in the oil and gas sectors’. The region excites international interests for the opportunities it provides for discovery, production, refining and transportation of oil, gas and other energy resources in enormous quantities. It remains in the global limelight historically because of its promising and underdeveloped reserves of oil, gas, and coal and uranium deposits. The energy potentials of the region are detailed in Table 1.
Energy Resources of Central Asia
Energy Resources of Central Asia
As can be analysed from the table, energy resources are not evenly distributed among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan is the most energy-rich country in the region with rich reserves of oil and coal with significant uranium deposits. It has few gas fields to its credit. Turkmenistan ranks second in terms of energy reserves in the heartland region. Gas is predominant among the energy sources of Ashgabat. Apart from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan also has a fair amount of gas reserves. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two most energy scarce countries as far as oil and gas are concerned. However, both the small states produce a significant amount of hydroelectricity, enabling them to be the net exporters (Table 2).
A country-wise analysis of Central Asia’s energy resource potentials will help us to understand the impeccable importance of the region in world energy geopolitics.
Proportion of Central Asian Resources in Each Country
Kazakhstan
Largest among the Central Asian states by geography, Kazakhstan is also the largest oil producer among them. Out of the 38.284 billion barrels of oil reserves in Central Asia which is estimated to be around 3%–4% of the world oil reserves, the share of Kazakhstan is a phenomenal 31.2 thousand barrels (BP, 2018). A predominantly oil-producing country of the region, Kazakhstan has three main oil reserves in the western part of the country namely, Tengiz, Kachaganak and Kashagan. The annual oil production of Kazakhstan since 2015 ranges between 77 and 79 million tons of oil, while the discovery and development of the Kashagan oil field are expected to raise its production level by 20 million tons per year. The operation in the Kashagan oil field was started in 2013. With 4.8 billion tons of oil reserves and development plans in the pipeline, it is expected that by 2030, oil production in Kazakhstan would increase by 60% (The Opinion, 2018). A close look at the oil production and consumption ratio of Kazakhstan, its export potential can be measured as given in Figure 1.
Its contribution to Central Asian share in the world oil market is well set to scale greater heights in the next 10 years as the development of Kashagan, Kacharganak and Tengiz oil fields will provide 75% of its outputs. Importantly, Kazakhstan is heavily dependent on Russian pipelines Tengiz-Novorossiysk and Airu-Samira for oil transportation. In addition, it has also shown readiness to transport oil to Europe through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Further, the eastern pipeline that connects Kazakhstan with China has unprecedentedly reduced Astana’s dependence on Moscow-regulated pipelines (The Opinion, 2018).
Besides, Kazakhstan also has an estimated natural gas deposit of 3.3 trillion cubic metres (tcm) largely overlapping with its oil fields in the western sector (BP, 2018). The coal reserves of the country are estimated to be around 33.6 billion tons and are concentrated in the central and northern part of the country. Kazakhstan earns the credit to be the biggest coal producer in the region. According to KazAtomoprom, ‘Kazakhstan is the highest possessor of uranium in the region with an estimate of 10,590 to 10,940 kgs’ (KazAtomoprom, 2018). It is planning to build a nuclear plant for processing enriched uranium, but due to lack of necessary technology and financial assistance, the projects are still unclear.
Kyrgyzstan
Unlike some of their Central Asian neighbours, Kyrgyzstan produces only undersized quantities of oil while its main source of energy being hydroelectricity. It has the largest hydroelectricity potential in the Central Asian region. With the help of hydroelectricity power stations, Bishkek generates most of its electricity required (Dorian, 2006). Almost 2,458 square kilometres of the country covered with water including 70% in the lake, 28% from glaciers, almost 2% in rivers and 0.9% as underground water bodies, the country is undoubtedly very rich in hydropower. Naryn Hydropower Plant is the main electricity production plant in Kyrgyzstan. It has the credit to have Toktogul reservoir—the largest water reservoir in Central Asia. Several hydroelectric power stations are planned at the upper reaches of the river, including the HPP building, which is opposed by Uzbekistan, and a small HPP cascade, the construction of which was promised to be financially supported by Russia. It is estimated that Kyrgyzstan currently uses about 10% of its hydro potential, generating 11–15 billion kWh of electricity each year (94% of it is produced at 17 HPP, and 6% in two thermal power stations in Bishkek and Osh) (The Opinion, 2018).
In addition to the rich hydropower potentials, Kyrgyzstan also has few oil and gas reserves to its credit. In 2013, Kirgizgaz was handed over to Gazprom—the Russian gas giant for the development of its natural gas system. As of 2019, Gazprom has invested $550 million for the development, reconstruction and modernization of the Kyrgyz gas system (The Opinion, 2018). When it comes to oil, Kyrgyzstan has very insignificant reserves and largely depends on Russia and other Central Asian republics to meets its oil demands.
Tajikistan
Water is the main energy resource in Tajikistan. It is the second-largest producer of hydroelectricity in the Commonwealth of Independent States possessing more than half of the hydropower resources in Central Asia. Tajikistan has about 4% of the world’s hydroelectricity potential and ranks eighth in the world in terms of production. The Nurek Hydro Power Plant is the largest in Tajikistan and accounts for almost 70% of the electricity production of the country with annual productions of about 11.2 kWh. Nurek HHP is located in the Amu Dary tributary. The country is believed to be using only 5% of its hydropower potential (The Opinion, 2018). The national power company TALCO is responsible for power supply domestically and export to outside countries especially Afghanistan. It is estimated that the company is exporting almost 40% of its electricity to Afghanistan through the help of the Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM). Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan too has very insignificant oil and gas reserves.
Turkmenistan
Natural gas is the main energy resource of Turkmenistan. According to various estimates, with 17.5 to 24.3 tcm of gas reserves, Turkmenistan earns the credit of fourth largest in the world. The British Petroleum estimates, ‘Turkmenistan has 17.5 tcm of proven reserves and a production capacity of 72.4 billion cubic metres’ (BP, 2018). All the major gas fields of Turkmenistan are in the Caspian Sea region and the south-eastern part of the country. It has been stated from various reports that as many as 38 oil, 82 natural gas condensate, 153 natural gas deposits were discovered including 142 on land and 11 on the continental shelf. In 2016, Turkmenistan has increased gas extraction by 9% in comparison to the previous year to 83.8 billion cubic metres. By 2030, the country has set a target to produce four times more than what it is extracting currently up to 230 billion cubic metres per year. To realize its target, Turkmenistan has improved the Galkynysh field and plans to modernize 30 more natural gas deposits. In 2017, the East–West pipeline—the longest regional pipeline network with 773 kilometres was completed to realize the dream of energy diversification mainly for export (The Opinion, 2018). As of now, Turkmenistan transports its gases mainly to China through the Turkmenistan–China main gas pipeline after Russia, Iran and Qatar. While Turkmenistan is keenly interested in natural gas diversification, but several of its pipeline projects like Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) and Trans-Caspian Pipeline are blocked attributing to political reasons.
As far as oil is concerned, Turkmenistan claims to have a reserve of at least 20 billion ton. However, experts doubt the claim and believe that oil reserves may range from 1.5 to 2 billion tons. Although the Lukoil of Russia believes Turkmenistan to have around 400 million tons of oil, British Petroleum estimates the proven oil reserves of Turkmenistan to be roughly 0.6 thousand million barrels and production capacity of about 258 thousand million barrels per day (BP, 2018). In addition to its fossil fuel reserves, Dushanbe also has significant thermal and hydropower potentials to its credit.
Uzbekistan
Natural gas is the main energy resource of Uzbekistan which is estimated to be about 5 tcm. The majority of its gas fields are located in the Fergana Valley region and the south-eastern part of the country. With the help of 12 large gas repositories in the country in the Bukhara and Qashaqdraya and 98 other reserves, Turkmenistan generates around 55–66 billion cubic metres of energy every year (BP, 2018; The Opinion, 2018). However, Uzbekistan could able to export only an undersized amount of natural gas due to its rising domestic consumptions. Lukoil was given contract in 2016 to develop the Uzbek gas fields to expedite the exploration process; however, the depreciation in the natural gas distribution in the country disrupts supply.
Besides, Uzbekistan also produces a huge amount of oil. Almost 70% of its oil production comes from the Bukhara region which has around 60% out of a total of 171 oil and gas wells (BP, 2016). Around 20% of its oil reserves are also concentrated in the Fergana Valley region. In total, the oil reserves of Uzbekistan are estimated to be about 5 billion tons while it has a production capacity of 3.5 million tons. In addition to gas and oil, Uzbekistan too has a very huge base of coal reserves estimated at 5 billion tons. It has projected to produce more than 8.1 million tons of coal by end of 2020 (BP, 2018). Also, Uzbekistan has the second-largest uranium reserves in Central Asia after the Kazakhstan of 150,000 tons (Kulebi, 2008).
Caspian is the largest inland sea on earth. The primary factor that brought world attention to Caspian Basin was the prospect of its large oil and gas deposits found in this region. Consisting of five littoral states such as Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, it accounts for 7% of the total world gas production (CMS, 2018; Dekmejian & Simonain, 2001; Patnaik, 2016). This is much higher than its oil share in total world oil output. Although the Caspian region has a huge energy resource base, there is hardly any consensus among littoral states and outside powers about the exact energy potential of the basin. In 1994 when the ‘Contract of the Century’ was signed between Azerbaijan and a Consortium of eight oil companies in September, the energy resources of the Caspian littoral states were said to be comparable to those of Emirates of Kuwait (Pradhan, 2010). Other estimates on the other hand placed Caspian reserves at par with the massive energy wealth of the Persian Gulf. The energy resources of the Caspian Sea as estimated by the Energy Information Administration of the US Government in 2018 have been delineated in Table 3.
Caspian Basin’s Proved and Probable Reserves
Caspian Basin’s Proved and Probable Reserves
Besides, the energy potential of the Central Asian and Caspian Sea region, two major factors drive global powers to the region in their quest for energy security: domestic concerns that exert pounding influence on the foreign policy-making of a country to which James Rosenau calls as ‘Linkage Politics’ (Rosenau, 1969) and secondly, energy today is something beyond just natural resource; therefore, alternative supply sources are key to energy security to which Daniel Yergin calls as ‘National Security’ (Yergin, 2006). It is that strategic resource that allows the state to enhance its own economic and political power at the cost of its competitors. While the first factor speaks volumes about the natural resources of Central Asian states especially its energy potentials, which on the one hand would help in meeting domestic demands of energy consumers on the other hand would bring adequate economic benefits and international significance to the exporting countries of the region, the second factor talks of a diplomatic rivalry and power play resulting out of the intense competition for greater access and control over energy. For a comprehensive understanding of the regional dynamics and external power play, this section clearly articulates the role of major external players in Central Asian energy geopolitics.
V. The Great Power Game in Central Asia
Several potential regional and external players have attempted to influence the Central Asian countries to control their strategic energy resources and administer the supply routes with their thumping presence in the region including Russia, the United States, China, the European Union, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Japan and others. For that limited country-specific approaches were adopted by countries while few states can influence Central Asian energy geopolitics whereas others remained at the margin due to occasional focus and fluctuating vision towards the region. A close look at the developments in Central Asia affirms us the exhibition of at least three different phases in the energy sector of the region characterized by the Russian dominance in the first phase, the US influence in the second phase and the rise of China in Central Asia in the third phase.
Russia
Centuries of control over the Central Asian region, deep-rooted historical influence and geographical proximity allowed Russia to consider the region as its ‘backyard’ even after their independence. Moscow destined to remain a long-term major geopolitical player in the region given its security and strategic concerns connected with the countries of the region. The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Collective Security Treaty Organisation including its initial military support to the countries of the region and reluctance to allow external military presence in the region particularly of the United States mainly can be seen from Russia’s security perspectives.
Another factor that allows Russia to influence the Central Asian countries is its trade relations with the region. Moscow has been the main trading partner of all the Central Asian countries although with certain fluctuations in trade volumes attributed to its economic crisis at home. Table 4 delineates Russia’s trade with Central Asia.
Russia’s Trade with Central Asia in $ Million
Among the bilateral ties, the energy sector is particularly relevant. Given the role of energy resources in the regional stability and security affairs of the former Soviet space, Moscow has adopted an energy approach to control the countries of the region through energy relations. As the pipeline routes and energy infrastructures in the former Soviet Union were centrally controlled and regulated from Moscow, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Moscow pursued a monopoly over the energy transportation routes and channelized energy imports from Central Asia for external demands in Europe. Gazprom was used to purchase natural gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan at a low price and was sold at a more lucrative price in the European markets. This has just not annoyed the Central Asian countries but also given rise to a conflict of interests between Moscow and others, factoring in declining Russian importance in the region. Although Russia still dominates the export routes in its near abroad, yet new pipelines like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and the Kazakh–China have significantly eroded Moscow’s influence in the region.
The primary threats to Russian energy dominance are coming from the new pipeline routes beyond its control. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline is the greatest success that the west has had in creating an alternative route, a success that the European Union would like to replicate with the Nabucco project. The competition of the Kazakh–Chinese pipeline, the trans-Caspian pipeline proposal, TAPI and a Turkmen–China pipeline have been seriously hampering Russian interests in the region (Trenin, 2007). In 2006, Putin was already attempting to thwart plans for the Nabucco pipeline by proposing a new gas pipeline, the South Stream project that would effectively make Nabucco redundant but fail to avail any positive result (ICG, 2007).
The United States
As for Russia, Central Asia for the United States also holds impeccable strategic significance. However, due to historical reasons, it could not able to engage with the region before 1991. Washington started to develop new policies towards the region through the adoption of the Freedom Support Act in 1992, the Silk Road Strategy in 1999 and viewed the region as strategically vital given its location between America’s geopolitical rivals Russia and China and unstable South Asia (Pradhan, 2019). Initially, the United States also began to focus on the Central Asian energy sector after the US Department of Energy has predicted the potential of the Caspian Sea reserves to be around 200 billion barrels equivalent to that of Saudi Arab; the United States started giving importance to this region (Patnaik, 2016). However, with the United States declaring itself as energy independence in 2014 and given its established ties with other suppliers like Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria, the United States does not need Central Asian energy to supply domestic demand. In fact, the United States has an interest in preventing the Russian monopoly in energy resources that might allow manipulation of prices as OPEC did in 1973, and it has an interest in keeping certain states (like Iran) from earning profits from Central Asian energy.
The US officials have disavowed assertions that US oil policy in Central Asia is driven by a zero-sum game mentality or that the United States is playing a ‘New Great Game’ (Rumer, 2007). Yet the United States has deliberately advocated plans for pipelines routes that would bypass Russia and Iran. Therefore, Washington has supported two different oil pipeline projects from the Caspian Basin: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium running from Kazakhstan, through southern Russia and to the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk which was completed in 2003 and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline completed in 2005 (Rumer, 2007). To sum up, security, energy and democracy have been the hallmarks of the US involvement in Central Asia.
The European Union
The European Union is in favour of Central Asian energy exports to deflect the Russian energy monopoly. Being a net energy importer, Europe was reliant upon energy exports from Russia. Now, with Soviet republics as members, the European Union has the potential to be a major player for Central Asian energy. However, the European Union has only recently begun to harmonize the activities of its member states in the region, creating its first comprehensive Central Asia strategy paper in 2007 (Pradhan, 2019). One of the main projects this article advocates is the construction of the Nabucco pipeline. That gas pipeline project would create a trans-Caspian pipeline link to the existing (BTE) Baku–Erzurum line and then carry gas through Turkey and into Europe. That route would avoid Russia and reducing Europe’s dependency on Russian gas (Cooley, 2008).
China
Although China has historically strong relations with the Central Asian states, the disintegration of the Soviet Union encouraged it to pursue a positive and strategic policy towards the region. Although the regional security concerns of China has driven Beijing close to Central Asia in the initial period through the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the energy security challenges especially after 2013 consolidated China’s objectives to foster positive relations with the region. As such, China’s recent arrival in Central Asian energy geopolitics promises to be one of the most long-term geopolitical shifts since the Western involvement that took root after the Soviet Union. Among most experts, there is an agreement that China views the Central Asian states as important to its security, potential energy partners and potential markets for trade. It was not until 1997 that China began investing in the region’s gas and oil fields on a large scale. China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) announced its intention to provide significant investment, and China seriously began to discuss a Kazakh proposal for an oil pipeline (Yelena, 2012). Projections indicate that the Kazakh–China pipeline can deliver 20 million tons per year (mt/y) of oil or roughly 8% of China’s total oil imports (Pradhan, 2018). Another section to the pipeline was added in 2011 to run west across Kazakhstan, to connect the current origin of the pipeline in Atasuk to fields in Kenkijak (Pradhan, 2015). This route serves both Kazakh and Chinese interests. For Kazakhstan, it will finally be able to ship its oil to its eastern reaches without relying on Russian lines. China, on the other hand, will have its pipeline connected directly to the Caspian Sea basin and the Kenkijak oil field, which the CNPC administrates. Furthermore, China has also turned its attention to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It has pursued plans to access Turkmen natural gas reserves, proposing a pipeline that would transit Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on its way to north-western China. It is hoped that this line might open in 2011 (Pradhan, 2019). In 2005, CNPC also signed a deal with Uzbekneftegaz to invest in 23 different Uzbek oil fields (Zhao, 2007). To sum up, the Chinese agenda is to drive its economy at any cost. As German expert Gunter Knabe said, ‘China needs raw materials and energy and it is trying to get them wherever it can using whatever means it can’ (DW, 2013). Central Asia in its neighbourhood provides Beijing with that opportunity to grasp them by establishing a very cordial relationship with Moscow.
India
India has long been following an autarkic worldview governed by the policy of non-alignment. This has largely pushed India away from a liberal international trading system and thereby marginalized the role of India regarding its much-needed energy security. It is only after the New Economic Policy of 1991 that has invited Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization that India had experienced a boom in its economic growth which in turn has demanded greater access to energy. As of 2020, India is the third-largest energy consumer in the world and is expected to overtake China very soon (BP, 2018). Given this rising trend, India must need to secure its energy supplies as India is heavily reliant on domestic coal and imported oil. As far as India’s international energy relations are concerned, the Middle East region has been the main supplier of its equity oil followed by South America and eastern and southern Africa. The net oil import dependency of India has increased by 43% in 1990 to 71% in 2012 (Raimondi, 2019). In 2017, the country has consumed 25.5 bcm of natural gas largely imported from Japan, China and South Korea (Pradhan, 2019). It is on this premise a favourable relationship with the energy-rich Central Asian countries will provide India with an unmatched opportunity to diversify its supply sources and arrest energy disruptions.
India’s relationships with the Central Asian states are historically deep-rooted and culturally close. But New Delhi could not able to establish its footholds in the region in spite of close historical bonding and geographical proximity. In fact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the emergence of new power politics in the region called ‘New Great Game’ has further alienated India from the region due to lack of economic muscle and political willpower to join the aggressive competition for the epic quest for oil and energy in Central Asia (Joshi, 2003). For decades, India’s focus in the region largely remained poor and dismal. However, in recent years, with the increasing geopolitical and strategic significance of the region for India, New Delhi has directed its foreign policy formulation towards the region.
Kazakhstan
New Delhi has been trying since 1995 to gain a foothold in the hydrocarbon sector of Kazakhstan. But it was only in 2009 that the heads of agreement signed between the OVL (ONGC Videsh Ltd.) and the KMG (KazMunaiGas) (Sachdeva, 2017). This was followed by an exploration contract between India’s Ministry of Oil and Gas and the KMG in 2010. During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in 2011, the much-awaited agreement on energy cooperation was finalized. A package of three agreements—participating share assignment agreement, carry agreement and joint operation agreement—on Satpayev exploration block was signed between OVL and National Company ‘KazMunaiGas’ (KMG) in highly prospective waters of the north-western Caspian Sea (Sajjanhar, 2013, 2016). This agreement assigned 25% participating interests in the Satpayev block which holds estimated reserves of 1.8 billion barrels in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea (Sachdeva, 2017). It was agreed that the Kazakh state oil company will pay about an $80m signature bonus for a 25% stake in Satpayev where oil reserves are estimated to amount to 250MT (Gorst, 2011). During Mr Modi’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2015, drilling was launched and OVL is investing about $400 million in the project, with oil expected to flow by 2020. OVL also bought a 2.7% stake in the Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli oil field in Azerbaijan, along with a 2.4% stake in the associated Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (Sachdeva, 2017).
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is endowed with rich reserves of natural gas, crude oil, potassium and rock salts. It has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world (WEC, 2018). It also has significant reserves of crude oil. For India, Turkmenistan holds important as a premier energy partner in the region. India along with three other countries of the region—Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan—has been working on a gas pipeline project popularly known as the TAPI gas pipeline (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India gas pipeline). In the last decade and a half, there has been much discussion on the $7.6 billion TAPI gas pipeline (Sachdeva, 2011). The project has been marred by uncertainties regarding gas reserves in Turkmenistan, the security situation in Afghanistan and the strained relations between India and Pakistan. Still, all parties are considering the proposal seriously. Again, on 11 December 2010, basic documents between the four countries were signed in Ashgabat in the presence of the Presidents of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan and from India, the then Minister of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Shri Murli Deora (MEA, 2011, 2017). The project has become a victim of regional politics in the region and still is dormant.
Uzbekistan
The Indian public sector company Gas Authority of India (GAIL) has signed an MoU with Uzbekistan’s Uzbekneftegaz for oil and gas exploration and production (Sachdeva, 2017). The GAIL also set up a Liquefied Petroleum Gas plant in western Uzbekistan, mainly for Uzbek consumption (Cutler, 2011). The visit of the Uzbek President in 2011 and the signing of an agreement led OVL prospecting for oil and gas inside its neighbour’s territory in cooperation with Uzbekneftegaz. Bilateral energy cooperation between India and Uzbekistan extends to Afghanistan as well. The two countries have cooperated to supply electricity to Kabul, with Uzbekistan furnishing the power for the transmission network built by India (The Hindu, 2011).
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two most maximum hydropower producing countries in Central Asia. They have set up a regional electricity network known as CASAREM to supply electricity to Afghanistan. India can capitalize on this to extend the supply route up to India to enable India to overcome the frequent power cuts in its northern cities. Since Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are mostly depending on Russia and China for infrastructure development for energy exploration even India can develop collaborations serving their mutual interests (Ministry for Energy and Industry, 2015).
A Comparative Analysis
India is a day late and a dollar too short (Dave, 2016). India’s lack of meaningful engagement with the Central Asian neighbours is a failure of its policy and a missed opportunity that pushes India to the margin behind the two formidable regional players Russia and China. While Russia maintains its regional assertions through energy regulation and trade deals with Central Asian republics, China’s recent rise in Central Asia largely attributed to its chequebook diplomacy and resulted in phenomenal success in the heartland. India despite its Soft-Power, the neutral but positive image could not able to gain a formidable entry into the region. The strategic visions of the United States, Russia and China are clear and well focused to attain strategic leverage, whereas India’s struggle in the region stems from the combination of factors like geographical barriers, domestic preoccupations and lack of vision. An in-depth study of Chinese, Russian and US energy engagements in the region gives us a hint that solid economic relations are giving way to energy relations further. India must learn a bit from its competitors in Central Asia and ramp up its trade and commercial ties with the region. The total bilateral trade of India with the Central Asian countries vis-à-vis China, Russia and the United States has detailed out below in Table 5 to understand India’s economic engagement in the region.
India’s Total Trade with Central Asian States vis-à-vis China, Russia and America in Millions US$
India’s Total Trade with Central Asian States vis-à-vis China, Russia and America in Millions US$
2 Director of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund. Russia’s External Trade by Counterparts. 2017.
3 Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2016. Retrieved June 16, 2017, from
4 Ministry of External Affairs. 2019. Government of India, Foreign Affairs. Bilateral Brief, Kazakhstan_Kyrgyzstan_Tajikisan_Turkmenistan_Uzbekistan.
Central Asia is witnessing a new great game set by Chinese economic pre-eminence, Russia’s geopolitical domination and declining credibility of the United States. India as the proximate neighbour of the region has to carve out a strategic role as a regional power and global actor within the regional parameters. New Delhi’s efforts to become a vital strategic player largely depend on its close bilateral and strategic partnership with the Central Asian region. Although, politically, India is inching forward with its joining in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a member, seeking partnership with Eurasian Economic Union and growing role in BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa), New Delhi is heavily legging behind in economic front (Pradhan, 2019). India needs to boost economic and trade ties with the region as deeper economic cooperation will give rise to coordinated energy cooperation in due course.
As energy resources are at the centre in shaping the geopolitical map of Eurasia, ‘pipelineistan’, a term invented by Escobar remained at the heart of a new great game (Escobar, 2006, p. 42). To be precise, eventual control over the oil and gas deposits as well as the pipeline routes will define the political future of the countries engaged in Central Asia. Undeniably the problems of Central Asian energy exports (oil and gas) are much clearer: they have to come in into a pipeline network world and their coming will undoubtedly change the geopolitical configuration of the region as well as beyond. So, now the question is not how the energy resources will be transported—but the question: who will get the Central Asian energy resources—is perhaps the reason why the new ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia has been going on for nearly three decades. Of the four poles, China and Russia correspond with each other the most, however, covering a variety of regional policies for one important reason: they are pregnant with the vision of multipolarity in world affairs (Walsh, 1993). Oil and gas loom as the cornerstone of their common initiatives, even if they have different or even competing goals in the region (Bates & Oresman, 2003; Jonson & Allison, 2001). By contrast, the European Union expresses greater interest in energy security than how it may be satisfied, intend on including Iran as a potential gas supplier through Caspian pipelines that bypass Russia, a position Washington objects strongly. To perpetuate its hegemony, the United States is strongly motivated to liquidate Russia’s rule in Central Asia, restructure Eurasian space according to own interests preventing China’s or Europe’s rule there, progressively tighten their grips on Central Asian minerals and the pipeline infrastructures, aim at eventually crowding out Russia’s influences and curbing China’s rise.
Coming to India, she neither has any country-specific policy towards the Central Asia region nor any concrete strategy to control the equity oil and gas. It needs to develop that part of its engagement with the region. Additionally, China cannot be ignored while dealing with Central Asia, as it largely factors in the regional trajectory of the region. India needs to include Chinese relevance in its Central Asian policy. India has already paid a price for its inactiveness and lack of broad vision in Kashmir, Tibet, Xinjiang, Myanmar and many more. It should not repeat them in Central Asia. As the Central Asian countries are friendly to India, Russia has always been very supportive to India; being a full member of SCO, now India has the advantage to make an inroad to the energy-rich heartland. What at best India needs is strong political willpower and economic muscle to engage the countries of the region. Besides, India needs to maintain better neighbourly relations, with be it China, Pakistan, Bangladesh or Afghanistan. Since its geopolitical location in South Asia demands this, without its neighbours’ cooperation, it will be hard for India to achieve its foreign policy goals and to ensure its energy security vision.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.