Regional Organizations and States in International Relations: A Study of India’s Approach Towards Regional Organizations

I. Introduction

International organizations (IOs)—global organizations (GOs) and regional organizations (ROs)—reverberate the presence of a constant search for security, peace and development in the comity of nations. The ROs are termed as ‘political constructs’ of the sovereign states and are a key component of the global order (McCormick, 1979; Powers & Goertz, 2011). Objective logics of geography, culture and history have guided the comity of nations in defining the regions and creating ROs in different parts of the globe; yet, subjective perceptions and preferences of the ruling elite also drive the creation of ROs and the participation of the countries in the respective ROs (Bailes & Cottey, 2006). The ROs articulate the ‘common interests’ of member countries and are used by them either as instruments of cooperation or as exclusion of other states (Nolte, 2016, p. 2). The creation of the ROs also relies on the nature of the polity of regional states, ‘choices’ of the governing elites of these states and their commitment to build the common regional political institutions (Herz, 2014, p. 237). Regional powers can be the main driver behind the formation of ROs, while small powers can also take the initiative in this direction to hedge and bind the major regional powers strategically (Nolte, 2016, p. 7). The ROs can overlap in the context of membership and mandate, and thus, states can attain membership in multiple ROs. The efficacy of ROs in the developed world is also not ‘apolitical’ or ‘sovereignty-neutral’ as some level of authority is delegated by member countries to the concerned ROs for making the common binding decisions (Borzel, 2013, p. 508; Kelley, 2010, p. 28). That is why national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs are a matter of lower primacy for the member countries of the ROs in the developed world (Keohane, 2002). Convergence of preferences of the regional states and their willingness to associate with the ROs even at the cost of lessening the sovereignty stimulate deeper cooperation among the regional countries (Kelley, 2010). But member countries of ROs, in the developing world, want to preserve their sovereignty and are not keen to create institutions with supranational authority (Severino, 2006). Thus, the ROs, created in the developing world, are ‘inclusive’, ‘non-hierarchical’ and strengthen the sovereignty of states rather than weakening it. Moreover, ROs’ membership offers a better shield against the potential rapacious moves of the regional powers as the members of such organizations are bound by the principle of non-interference and respect for each other’s sovereignty, and decisions in such ROs are taken unanimously (Zyck, 2013, p. 10). High degree of the protection of national sovereignty and divergence of ‘preferences’, ‘capacities’ and ‘beliefs’ often thwart regional cooperation among the regional states (Kelley, 2010, pp. 2, 9).

The ROs convert ‘foes into friends’ by offering plenty of interaction opportunities that trigger cooperation among the member states, encourage them to settle the disputes peacefully rather than fighting physically and reduce the possibility of war with neighbouring states (Deutsch et al., 1957; Katzenstein, 2003). The ROs, formed with general objectives, also keep significant dimensions of regional security cooperation to deal with non-traditional security threats faced by the member countries. Hence, diverse utilities of ROs, especially of economic, political, strategic and security contexts, have encouraged the states of the developing world to pursue a ‘conscious policy programme’ to construct and join the ROs in international relations (IR) (Bailes & Cottey, 2006, p. 199). Thus, the ROs are a significant tool for advancing countries’ strategic and security interests apart from the economic ones in the foreign policy arenas (McCormick, 1979).

Although the ROs were formed first in the ancient times and also existed in the medieval period, these became a constant feature of IR in the modern era. Significant developments in IR, for instance, the emergence of Westphalian system, disturbance of power balance in Europe caused by Napoleon Bonaparte and emergence of the Concert of Europe laid the solid foundations of many new ROs—both military and non-military—in different regions of the globe. Two waves—old and new—of regionalism during the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period, respectively, triggered the process of regional integration (Karns et al., 2015). The Second World War, the Cold War and decolonization also resulted into the formation of various ROs, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Arab League and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in different parts of the globe. But, as the Cold War period was marked by hostile bipolar confrontations, it did not allow autonomous growth of regionalism, regional integration and the ROs in the broader global context because of its ‘political necessity of building alliances’ with superpowers, and the superpowers’ requirement to shape their ‘spheres of influence’ in accordance with their own economic, political and military objectives (Barbieri, 2019, p. 425). However, the end of the Cold War, the absence of East–West confrontation, velocity of globalization, rise of Asia-Pacific and export-oriented development strategies in the Third World countries fostered a more decentralized international system and boosted the process of regional integration in the post-Cold War era. The new structural–functional arrangement of multipurpose ROs have renovated them into a momentous apparatus for achieving the national, regional and global security goals of the member states within a particular region or beyond it. These groupings have assisted, not only the weak states but also powerful ones, in dealing with new strategic and security challenges that are beyond the individual capabilities of states to tackle. Therefore, India is trying to achieve its foreign policy objectives by associating with the creation, enlargement and reinvigoration of different ROs in Europe, Africa and also Asia (McCormick, 1979). This approach of India has paved its way for the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC). In different capacities, India has also associated itself with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), European Union (EU) and many other ROs, created by other regional states, in varied parts of the globe. It has adopted a rational approach to related ROs so that its craving of promoting national interests can be achieved by New Delhi in the diverse foreign policy arenas. Therefore, in the contemporary world, out of 6,000 IOs, India possesses multiple levels of association with more than 2,000 IOs, majority of which are ROs (Unnikrishanan & Purushothaman, 2019).

Hence, the present article describes (a) India’s approach towards the ROs in the historical and contemporary contexts; (b) circumstances which have shaped India’s approach with regard to the creation of different ROs and participation of India in such organizations; and (c) what foreign policy objectives have shaped India’s involvement in creating or joining the different ROs? The study is based on three hypotheses—(a) India’s policy towards the creation and joining of different ROs has been shaped by the politico-strategic environment and security concerns that have emerged due to the Cold War and post-Cold War politics; (b) in the post-Cold War period, India is using the ROs as key instruments to achieve the objectives of foreign policy frameworks towards different regions, especially South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific region (IPR); and (c) India is using its active participation in the ROs as a significant method to attain itself the status of and recognition as a global power.

The study is descriptive and exploratory in nature. The main argument of the study is built on the basis of the content analysis method using various digital and non-digital sources available in the form of official documents and reports and speeches and statements of the governing elites, along with different books, articles and opinions of the strategic analysts and columns published in various magazines and newspapers.

The study is divided into five sections. Section I contains the conceptual context, research questions, hypotheses, research methodology and organization of the study. Section II provides the historical context of India’s approach towards the ROs. This focuses on the Cold War politics that has shaped India’s policy in this context of ROs. Section III deals with the post-Cold War era’s approach of India with regard to the ROs. Section IV explains the politico-strategic and security context of India’s participation in the different ROs. The findings of the study have been summarized in Section V.

II. India and the Regional Organizations: Historical Context

India intensified its efforts for regional collaboration by redefining its regional borders and shifting the focus of its foreign policy from South Asia to Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and West Asia and further beyond in the post-Cold War era and especially in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, its policy and behaviour towards regionalism were initially influenced and shaped by the Cold War politics. India was not against regionalism, but its conception of ‘region’ was much broader, which encompasses the whole Asian continent (Yhome & Maini, 2017, p. 150). Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India tried to mobilize the Afro-Asian countries to achieve greater democratization in IR and free access to available resources and opportunities for the politically weak and economically poor Third World countries (Muni, 1991). Nehru conceived the non-alignment policy in September 1946 to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another. India, under the leadership of Nehru, convened the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947 sowing the Asian Relations Organization (ARO) with its headquarters in New Delhi. The Colombo Plan of 1951 provided an appropriate platform, as Nehru stressed, for close cooperation among the Afro-Asian countries, which culminated into the Afro-Asian Nations’ Conference at Bandung in 1955 and the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. As the Cold War was brought to the doorsteps of India due to the US-Pakistan military alliance in 1954, India, in its broader Asian context, considered regional cooperation as an important aspect of its foreign policy and, thus, did not enter into formal alliances or security arrangements.

Despite a shared history and strong common cultural bonds, India and other South Asian countries—especially Pakistan and Sri Lanka—have unstable and conflictual relations with one another due to the existence of various unresolved bilateral issues (Ahmed, 2012; Akhter, 2016). India’s bilateral conflicts with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue and Sri Lanka on the question of Tamil citizenship along with the threat perceptions of small countries of South Asia regarding India’s hegemony in the region hindered the development of a common approach for regional cooperation in South Asia. Pakistan had allied itself with the USA against the Soviet Union and was a part of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (1955). In the late 1970s, when General Zia-Ur-Rahman, the military dictator of Bangladesh, first put forward the idea of the formation of a regional organization in South Asia, India had shown its reluctance to join any regional multilateral assemblage of countries in South Asia. India was cagey with regard to the decision-making procedure to be adopted in the new regional grouping as the principle of majority could have gone against its interests (Dash, 2008, p. 87). The Cold War politics also added to India’s fretfulness regarding the proposed grouping as it had a close relationship with the Soviet Union, and New Delhi had been considering Zia-Ur-Rahman to be associated with the Western countries. Therefore, it was also apprehensive that the regional entity could be an American instrument to defy the Soviet influence in South Asia. Besides, the grouping might also have led to Asia’s own Cold War by creating pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet apertures in the Asian countries (Murthy, 2022). As New Delhi had close strategic and economic ties with Moscow, in such a situation, a pro-US grouping and Cold War among Asian countries would have gone against India’s national interests (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

In spite of these trepidations, India, along with Pakistan, agreed to join the grouping of South Asian states, because of the changed regional security scenario due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, growing demand for a regional organization in smaller neighbouring countries and ensuring adoption of the unanimity in decision-making process, exclusion of bilateral and contentious issues from deliberations and acceptance of cooperation based on respect of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference in internal affairs as the core principles of the working procedure of RO (Muni, 1985). The origin of SAARC in 1985 stoked a new episode of regionalism in South Asia. It had raised high expectations for economic and cultural cooperation among the South Asian countries. However, such expectations were never fulfilled as bilateral disputes, including the Kashmir issue, and fear of smaller economies that Indian capital and lower-priced goods might flood their markets if they were to liberalize their economies impeded the development of regionalism in SAARC (Singh, 2018). Moreover, India’s bilateral disputes with other South Asian countries and its asymmetry in terms of size, resources, technology, and economic and military capabilities have also created a sense of insecurity among the smaller countries of the region. These countries have different levels of development and security challenges having no agreed consensus on the removal of mutual differences and achieving the regional cooperation (Singh, 2010). Consequently, India’s initiatives are often misconstrued and characterized as ‘hegemonic’ by these countries (Bajpai, 1999). Due to these hurdles, SAARC neither resulted in greater trade nor greater security (Zhao, 2006). India’s efforts for promoting regional cooperation in South Asia through SAARC did not make any concrete achievement. SAARC members signed the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1993 and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004, but even then, intra-regional trade and economic cooperation among the eight South Asian countries accounts for only 5% of its total trade. The intra-regional trade also comprised only 1% of its regional gross development product (GDP) of South Asia (Kathuria & Mathur, 2018). In 2007, Afghanistan was also admitted as the eighth member to the SAARC. But the expansion of SAARC with the entry of Kabul never encouraged regional cooperation among the South Asian countries.

In contrast to South Asia, India’s policy with regard to regional collaboration in Southeast Asia emerged at a rapid pace with the formation of ASEAN in 1967. In the 1960s, Southeast Asian countries had offered ASEAN’s membership to India. However, these countries had a pro-Western strategic outlook and had been a part of the SEATO. Hence, India viewed the creation of ASEAN as a measure of the USA to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia (Wagner, 2006). Moreover, the ASEAN countries had been pursuing the export-oriented strategy, whereas India had been working on the import substitution policy. India had a democratic political system based on the Western traditions, whereas Southeast Asian countries had a variety of authoritarian regimes. Besides, India’s friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971, its stand on the Vietnam War, recognition of Heng Samrin’s regime in Cambodia, ‘selective silence’ over Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, strong criticism of the US presence in Diego Garcia, nuclear explosions of 1974 and military modernization in the 1980s created more crevices in its already tense relationship with ASEAN countries (Desai, 2017). India was viewed as ‘a surrogate of the Soviet Union’ and perceived as ‘a threat to regional stability’ in Southeast Asia (Baru, 2001, p. 13). Thus, New Delhi missed opportunities for regional cooperation with its extended neighbourhood (Desai, 2017). India’s ambitions for regional cooperation in South Asia, Southeast Asia or anywhere else were hampered by the Cold War politics.

Hence, India’s yearning for regionalism was overpowered by bilateralism in South Asia and Southeast Asia, as geopolitically, it was also contained in South Asia by the Cold War politics. Its divergent interests, preferences, capacities and beliefs with other regional and non-regional states restricted its association with the ROs at multiple levels. India’s proximity with the Soviet Union had led to its containment in the region by the USA and China with the assistance of Pakistan (Chattopadhyay, 2013). Yet, it participated actively in the GOs, which can be observed from its engagements in the United Nations (UN), NAM and Group of Seventy Seven (G-77).

III. India and the Regional Organizations in the Post-Cold War Era

With the end of Cold War politics in 1991, various structural changes like disintegration of the Soviet Union, rise of parallel forces of globalization and regionalization, rise of China, occurrence of Asian financial crisis and the 9/11 attacks ended India’s dilemma towards the ROs. The break-up of the Soviet Union deprived it of a reliable strategic and defence partner. It was already facing a crisis in credibility in South Asia as its neighbouring countries had been perceiving interventionist and hegemonistic tendencies in its behaviour. Its non-alignment policy had become insignificant, and it was facing isolation in IR. It faced a high degree of political instability at the domestic level. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it lost its major trading partner and source of cheap imported oil. Subsequently, it forced India to purchase oil at inflated market prices because of the Gulf War. This plagued the Indian economy with high fiscal deficits and low foreign exchange reserves, leading to the balance of payment crisis that it faced in 1991. This situation compelled India to change its economic policy and also reshape its approach towards its engagement with ROs. India under the leadership of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao brought fundamental changes in economic policy. Broader consensus was built among the political parties of India for the continuity of economic changes. Its new economic policy opened the way for foreign trade and investment. Market reforms brought India much closer to the international mainstream community (Acharya, 2006; Desai, 2017; Wagner, 2006).

India continued its efforts to promote regional cooperation through SAARC with little success, but at the same time, New Delhi redefined its regional borders and started looking for regional collaboration beyond the South Asian region. Now, it also shifted the focus of its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, East Asia and Central Asia and beyond further. India’s Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Southeast Asian countries and formulated India’s Look East policy (LEP), leading to the rise of special relations with ASEAN, as first it became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992 and Full Dialogue Partner in 1995. It obtained full membership of the ARF in 1996 (Desai, 2017). The ASEAN made it a Full Dialogue Partner due to its far-sighted calculation regarding the politico-strategic convergence, acceleration of economic relations and complementarities in the unexploited areas (Baru, 2007). India’s new economic policy not only offered ASEAN countries new investment opportunities, but strategically, they regarded India as a possible counterweight against China whose territorial claims in the South China Sea have raised apprehensions about Beijing’s expansionist ambitions. That is why ASEAN countries did not regard India’s nuclear tests of 1998 as a threat. ASEAN countries have accepted India as a ‘balancing power’ vis-à-vis China (Wagner, 2006, p. 54). China’s territorial claims and assertive activities in the South China Sea and attempts to encircle India within South Asia have made Beijing a common strategic rival and security threat for India and ASEAN countries compelling New Delhi to engage with ASEAN vigorously (Desai, 2017). India has neither any territorial dispute with ASEAN countries nor is India perceived as a threat by any Southeast Asian country. Due to India’s politico-strategic considerations with regard to its engagement with the Southeast Asian region, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has upgraded India’s LEP into Act East policy (AEP). Hence, its engagement with ASEAN, ARF and EAS not only make it a major political and economic player but also gives it a certain global status (Unnikrishanan & Purushotaman, 2019).

Apart from its engagement with ASEAN, India’s other approach was the creation of new regional organizations that linked India and individual Southeast Asian countries. This strategy became oblivious with the formation of the IORA (1997) and BIMSTEC (1997) and MGC (2000). The IORA was formed as countries of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) have been facing numerous traditional and non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, piracy, human smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in wildlife, weapons smuggling, unlawful exploitation of marine resources and climate change (Indian Ocean Rim Association, 2020). India considers the IOR as its sphere of influence and supports the wide range of activities of the IORA from renewable energy and blue economy to maritime safety and security (MSS) (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019). In the wake of China’s increasing naval power, India is advancing its maritime interests as a key player in the IPR. It has carried out the trilateral annual Malabar naval exercises with the US and Japanese navies since 1992. It has also conducted the multilateral annual Milan naval exercise since 1995.

As the Cold War politics ended, it also removed the mistrust of India towards the Western countries and convergence of various preferences and beliefs occurred with the European countries. Thus, India started to move closer to the USA and EU in the post-Cold War era, developed its relationship with the EU in 1993 and became its strategic partner in 2004. India is the ninth largest trading partner of the EU, while the EU is the largest regional trading partner and the biggest Indian foreign investor. The EU invested US$470 billion in India in 2021, which was 17.31% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) received by India from different sources (Ministry of External Affairs, 2021). Thus, between 2000 and 2021, the EU invested around US$88 billion in India. India and the EU are also negotiating for signing a free trade agreement (FTA) (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022). India aims to counter Chinese influence in Eurasia and wants to attain the status of global power. Hence, it has emerged as a ‘key natural partner’ of the EU in maritime security and is collaborating with the EU in counter-piracy activities in the Indian Ocean. In February 2021, it has also initiated a maritime security dialogue with the EU and conducted its first joint naval exercise ‘Operation Atalanta’ with EU’s Naval Force-Somalia (EUNAVFOR) in the Gulf of Aden. In February 2022, during the second EU-India Maritime Dialogue, the EU has expressed its interest in deepening engagement and reinforcing its partnership with India as it sees India as a reliable partner for maritime security in the IPR (Solana, 2014, p. 1; Ministry of External Affairs, 2022; EU Naval Force-Somalia, 2022).

Thus, in the post-Cold War era, geopolitically, in the context of its participation in the ROs, India is no longer confined to the South Asian region as it had been during the Cold War period. Its presence can be observed globally in the different ROs especially ASEAN, EAS and EU along with the GOs particularly the UN.

IV. Emerging Politico-Strategic and Security Environment in the Twenty-First Century

Rapidly emerging politico-strategic and security environment has also influenced India’s behaviour related to the ROs in the twenty-first century. India is projecting itself as a global power and striving to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, it is facing opposition especially from China having a nexus with Pakistan. The political and security scenario in India’s neighbourhood has changed drastically as its neighbouring countries, on the one hand, are drifting away from New Delhi and, on the other, building closer ties with Beijing, posing a direct strategic and security dilemma for India in the region. With the rapid expansion of China’s economic and military capabilities, the balance of power has been shifted in favour of Beijing in the IPR. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, which contains the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Digital Silk Road (DSR), China has invested heavily in the development of roads, railways, airports, seaports and power plants in Asia, Africa and Europe (Ghiasy & Krishnamurthy, 2021). Besides this, Beijing has pursued an assertive policy of territorial encroachment and expansionism towards its neighbours in South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. It has recently been involved in various military stand-offs with India including Doklam and Galwan and created artificial islands in the South China Sea and militarized it by developing permanent military structures to strengthen its illegal maritime claims against the other Southeast Asian countries (Bell, 2021). It has enacted Coast Guard Law (CCGL) and Maritime Traffic Safety Law (MTSL) in 2021, which threaten the freedom of navigation and free sea trade for other countries in the South China Sea (Wong, 2021). China’s increasing influence in the IPR in general and India’s strategic backyard—the Indian Ocean—and South Asia in particular have caused a major strategic and security dilemma for India (Kumar, 2020). Moreover, various non-traditional security concerns having trans-border linkages have also emerged in the form of trans-national organized crime, illegal migration, drug trafficking, weapons’ smuggling, piracy, cybercrime, climate change and other natural disasters. Several powerful non-state actors (NSAs) are involved in the trans-border criminal activities. The NSAs operate through organized transnational networks and even possess some level of direct or indirect support from states. Some of the threats posed by natural disasters have resulted from environmental degradation.

These politico-strategic challenges and security concerns are required to be addressed through collaborative bilateral, regional and global response. Hence, India is involved in bilateral and multilateral cooperation to deal with the emerging strategic and security challenges. India has signed a Bilateral Agreement for Naval Cooperation with Singapore in 2018, which has allowed the Indian naval ships to get the logistical support, including refuelling rights and access at Changi Naval Base in Singapore. The presence of India’s naval force in Changi Naval Base in Singapore can assist New Delhi significantly in countering China’s expansionist objectives in the Indian Ocean. Changi Naval Base constitutes a strategic point in India’s ‘Necklace of Diamonds’, also comprising Chabahar Port in Iran, Duqm Port in Oman and the Assumption Islands in Seychelles, which New Delhi has been creating for countering China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy (EurAsian Times Desks, 2020). In addition to Singapore, India is cooperating with Japan in the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which is termed as an alternative to China’s BRI. It has also conducted joint naval exercises with the USA and developed a joint strategic vision for the IPR. Australia is another important strategic partner of India in this region as India, Japan, Australia and the USA have revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which is an informal grouping of these four democratic maritime powers that focuses on the IPR. The IPR has become the hub of global geopolitics in the twenty-first century. India, in its Indo-Pacific vision (IPV) emphasizes on a ‘free, inclusive and rule-based’ region and talks of the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). After the reinvigoration of Quad grouping in 2017, India has been cooperating in it with Australia, Japan and the USA to ensure a rule-based order, freedom of navigation and a liberal trading system and offer alternative debt financing for the Indo-Pacific countries. The Quad countries also consult and cooperate on contemporary global security problems. Beijing opposes the existence of Quad terming it as an ‘Asian NATO’ and perceives it as a US strategic tool to encircle China (Deshpande, 2021). To implement its IPR vision, India has further intensified its activities in the IPR through different regional and inter-regional frameworks such as ASEAN, ARF, Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), EAS, IORA and MGC. It had agreed to be the ‘Strategic Partners’ of ASEAN in 2012 and ‘Development Partner’ of Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) in 2019 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020, p. 214). India is also part of BRICS, an informal grouping of five countries without a Charter, in which India cooperates with Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa for strengthening the economies of member countries through this platform. BRICS allows India to modulate its rivalry with China as happened even during the Doklam stand-off. India had remained engaged with China through the BRICS during the whole period of impasse. It also strengthens its strategic ties with Russia, assists in rebalancing China and promoting its politico-strategic agenda of revision in the UN structure to get a permanent seat in the UNSC and enhance its status in global politics (Stephen, 2016).

Apart from these moves, India has tried to boost regional cooperation in South Asia and beyond. Due to its Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP), it made huge political investment to make SAARC a result-oriented organization; yet, it proved a futile exercise because of its bilateral tensions with Pakistan (Chaturvedi et al., 2017). In 2014, India had invited the leaders of SAARC countries in the oath-taking ceremony of the new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. However, New Delhi did not receive any positive response from Pakistan as it obstructed India’s connectivity-related initiatives in the SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in 2014. Despite India’s efforts, SAARC failed to sign the SAARC Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) in 2014 and the SAARC satellite project in 2016. Nineteenth SAARC Summit, which had to be hosted by Pakistan in Islamabad on 15–19 November 2016, was also cancelled as India declined to participate because of the Uri terrorist attack on 18 September 2016. The Uri attacks discouraged the cooperation in SAARC making it a defunct entity. However, when the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic started, India organized a virtual conference of SAARC leaders on 15 March 2020, offered a voluntary contribution of US$10 million to the SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Response Fund, participated in a virtual conference of health professionals of all SAARC countries on 26 March 2020 and also hosted a virtual conference of SAARC countries’ trade officials in April 2020 to discuss the impacts of COVID-19 on intra-regional trade in South Asia. Besides this, India also started a COVID-19 Information Exchange Platform ‘COINEX’ in May 2020 and extended foreign currency swap support to SAARC countries, especially Maldives (US$150 million) and Bhutan (US$200 million) (Ministry of External Affairs, 2021). Nevertheless, India’s efforts of reviving the SAARC have been overshadowed and discouraged by the recent developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s obstructionist approach in the SAARC. In August 2021, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan administration. Many leaders of the new Taliban regime are designated as terrorists under the UNSC resolution 1267. Moreover, the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan is considered as a non-inclusive government by India and other South Asian countries, except Pakistan. The regime in Afghanistan has caused a strategic and security threat, including the spillover of terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling and human trafficking to the neighbouring countries. The SAARC countries, except Pakistan, have not recognized the new Taliban regime, and not agreed upon its representation and participation of Afghanistan in SAARC. In September 2021, Pakistan had insisted on allowing the new Taliban regime to participate in the meeting of SAARC foreign ministers. But India and other SAARC countries had rejected the proposal of Pakistan as the permission of participation would have been a de facto recognition to the new Taliban regime from the SAARC countries. Hence, in the absence of consensus among the member countries, the summit was cancelled, while continuing to make SAARC a dysfunctional body (Bhattecherjee, 2021). Despite the deadlock in SAARC, India has promoted the regional cooperation through the sub-regional structure of countries of Eastern South Asia, that is, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) and signed BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) in June 2015. With the passage of time, the scope and pace of the activities of BBIN have been increased significantly.

After the Uri Attack, due to the dysfunctionality of the SAARC, New Delhi has shown more interest in the revival of the BIMSTEC as it could be instrumental for India in making larger gains in the economic, politico-strategic and security matters (Singh, 2018). Through BIMSTEC, India had intended to strengthen its links with neighbouring countries like Myanmar and Thailand. However, initially, this organization also suffered from similar problems and limitations of absence of economic complementarities like other organizations in the developing countries (Wagner, 2006, p. 54). Thus, India could not make successful attempts for the promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Yet again, after the EAS in Myanmar in November 2014, India relaunched its LEP as ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP) by expanding its scope and objectives. It, apart from economic cooperation, incorporated the cultural, strategic and security-related ties with its extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result of this policy, India upgraded its relations to strategic partnership with Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and established close connections with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, it engaged actively with ROs such as ASEAN, ARF, Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), BIMSTEC, EAS, IORA and MGC. Through the AEP, New Delhi is keen to enhance connectivity to its underdeveloped North-East region with other countries in its neighbourhood through Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, the India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway Project, Rhi-Tiddim Road Project, East–West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and Border Haats (Pant & Dev, 2017; Press Information Bureau, 2015). In 2016, India had organized BRICS–BIMSTEC Outreach Summit in Goa and, in 2019, during the oath-taking ceremony of Modi government, again, it had invited the BIMSTEC leaders conveying its political will to the other members for working towards the regional cooperation in the Bay of Bengal region. India and other BIMSTEC countries have signed the convention to combat international terrorism, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking and are negotiating for the free trade agreement (FTA) to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers on all trade products and facilitate the investment within the BIMSTEC countries (Kumar, 2020). On the other hand, India has already signed the FTA with ASEAN in 2003 and the Agreement on Trade in Goods in 2009. The ASEAN–India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) has also been created after the implementation of the ASEAN–India Agreements on Trade in Services and Investments in 2015. ASEAN has emerged as the third largest foreign investor in India, after the USA and EU. India’s export to ASEAN economies has increased from US$23 billion in 2010 to US$36 billion in 2018 (Indo-Asian News Service, 2019).

As part of its ‘Look North Policy’ (LNP) of the 1990s and ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ (CCAP) of 2012, India has been promoting its ties with the Central Asian countries at bilateral and multilateral levels as these ties can provide India access to the region’s hydrocarbon resources, assist to counter Pakistan’s Islamic agenda against India, check on the drug trafficking and weapons’ proliferation, promote India’s economic interests and garner the political support for New Delhi’s emerging global power status and permanent membership in the UNSC (Pradhan, 2015). India gained the ‘Observer Status’ of SCO in 2005 and became full-fledged member in 2017 with Russia’s support. China also managed the entry for its ‘all-weather friend’ Pakistan. The SCO gives India a ‘formal and structured’ entry into Central Asia, which it perceives a part of its extended neighbourhood. The SCO is focusing on regional cooperation on non-traditional security threats, military cooperation and intelligence-sharing making counterterrorism its priority along with a moderate goal of resolving border concerns as it has adopted a fight against three evils—terrorism, separatism and extremism—as its basic mantra (Roy, 2019). India has main objectives of economic cooperation, connectivity and counterterrorism, which sit well with SCO’s main goal of working together against the ‘three evils’. New Delhi wants access to intelligence and information from the Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS), Tashkent based counterterrorism body of the SCO. Moreover, a stable Afghanistan is also in India’s interest, and RATS provides access to non-Pakistan centred counterterrorism information. Connectivity is crucial for India’s CCAP as it is necessary for energy cooperation to get access to major gas and oil exploration projects in the Central Asian region (CAR). Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the development of India’s relations with Central Asian countries was constrained by a lack of overland access because of political and security reasons. Now, to a large extent, that has been remedied by its association with the SCO. Its member countries occupy the huge land mass adjacent to India’s extended neighbourhood where India has both economic and security imperatives. It provides India a structured forum to use it strategically for bringing down China’s overarching influence over the SCO (The Hindu Net Desk, 2017). Currently, the Sino-US rivalry, the US-Russia conflict and US-Iran hostility have also affected India’s foreign policy, particularly its oil imports from Iran and defence purchases like S-400 from Russia. While Washington’s stance against Islamabad after the Pulwama attack was evidence of its support to New Delhi, India has had a strained relationship with China after the Doklam stand-off, followed by attempts to reset relations in Wuhan and Qingdao Summits. The Sino-India relations have been further soured by China’s territorial expansionism in the Ladakh sector in 2020. In these circumstances, the SCO can assist to bring down its tension with China and promote cooperation between the two Asian neighbours. The main purpose of India’s strategy at the SCO is not to counter China but rather to promote economic cooperation with the Central Asian countries and get the benefit from the security framework. Hence, it is to India’s advantage to keep all options uncluttered in terms of partnerships and cooperation in Central Asia (Gupta & Chatterjee, 2015; Roy, 2019). Its membership bolsters India’s status as a major pan-Asian player. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, in June 2020, the SCO had recognized India’s responsible behaviour as a major power as it had supplied medicines to 133 countries in the fight against COVID-19 due to which the SCO had called India as the ‘pharmacy of the world’ (Press Trust of India, 2020). India is critical of China’s BRI project as its China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and violates India’s territorial sovereignty and integrity. Hence, in June 2018, in the Qingdao Summit of SCO, India had not endorsed the BRI project. Hence, in the meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of the government in November 2021, New Delhi asserted that all the connectivity initiatives should be based on ‘consultative’, ‘transparent’ and ‘participatory’ approach and in conformity to the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Besides this, India had also proposed to incorporate the Chabahar port in the broader framework of International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) for greater regional connectivity (Bhattecherjee, 2021a). Recently, some Western countries have criticized India for its neutral position on Russia’s Ukraine War as New Delhi has refrained from criticizing Russia and also abstained from voting on resolutions on Ukraine War in the UN (Press Trust of India, 2022). However, these criticisms are unlikely to affect India’s participation and cooperation with the EU and Quad as the EU and the US also need India’s cooperation and assistance in dealing with various strategic and security threats in the Indo-Pacific.

V. Conclusion

To conclude, the ROs have substantive impacts on the foreign policy behaviour of member countries, yet these organizations are also a significant tool for respective countries for advancing their agenda in diverse foreign policy arenas. The ROs are a significant mechanism for India to promote its national interests at regional and global levels. Time to time, understanding the dynamics of its surroundings and keeping the regional and global developments in view, India’s governing elite has ensured the country’s participation in the ROs. In fact, with passage of time, its involvement in terms of quantity and quality in the ROs’ affairs has increased rapidly. Its policy with regard to the ROs has been influenced by the Cold War and post-Cold War developments. During the Cold War era, India initially showed its reluctance to the formation of SAARC due to its divergent preferences and beliefs vis-à-vis its small regional neighbours. Nevertheless, it agreed for its formation when its concerns were addressed in the SAARC Charter by adopting the principle of unanimity for decision-making in the Organization. India also had divergent preferences and beliefs vis-à-vis Southeast Asian countries. These countries had been associated with the US military alliances, while India was pursuing the non-alignment policy and avoiding the joining of any military alliance. That is why it declined to associate with the ASEAN during the Cold War era. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union not only brought some significant changes in IR but also in India’s preferences and beliefs related to its foreign policy. The Cold War politics constrained India’s association with ROs; however, the post-Cold War politics compelled as well as facilitated its association with ROs at multiple levels. It started to associate itself even with the ROs beyond South Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Europe.

The politico-strategic and security environment in the twenty-first century has been changing drastically due to the rise of China. A shift in the balance of power has occurred in favour of China in the IPR. China’s assertive activities in the South and East China Seas threaten the freedom of navigation and free sea trade of other countries. Its expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean and infrastructural development projects in the South Asian countries have increased its influence in India’s strategic backyard. Many neighbouring countries of India are getting closer to Beijing, and several non-traditional security threats have emerged in different regions. In this prevailing scenario, the ROs, especially SAARC, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, SCO, EU and even Quad and BRICS are the key mechanism for India to achieve the goals of NFP, LEP, AEP, LNP, CCAP and IPV frameworks of its foreign policy related to South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and the globe. Apart from economic, strategic and security cooperation, the ROs bolster India’s image and status in the international community. This could facilitate New Delhi to be recognized as a major player in the Asian and global affairs. India’s regional cooperation, especially in SAARC and to some extent BIMSTEC, has been hindered as its bilateral conflicts with other member countries have often derailed the cooperation among member countries through these forums. India’s cooperation in SAARC has not only been hindered but sometimes become impossible. Irrespective of these derailments, India has achieved some cooperation through the sub-regional structure of BBIN as it has signed the MVA and also increased its activities in other areas such as power, transport and infrastructure. Besides, due to the dysfunctionality of SAARC, New Delhi is involved in the reinvigoration of BIMSTEC as it offers various economic, strategic and security opportunities for India.

Hence, like most of the other developing countries, India has adopted sovereignty and security-focused approach towards regionalism in the post-colonial era, during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. In accordance with this approach, developing countries, including India, do not compromise with their sovereignty and territorial integrity for economic cooperation in the ROs. If these countries’ participation in any RO poses any security threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity, but at the same time, also provides other economic opportunities, these states prefer to avoid their participation in that RO. Hence, security and sovereignty weigh heavily in developing countries, including India’s approach towards regionalism. But where there is no threat to their sovereignty and security in the participation of any RO, these countries participate actively in such regional forums. India is cooperating with other ROs, especially the ASEAN, ARF, EAS, IORA and EU, without any serious hurdles as it does not have any divergence of preferences and beliefs or any territorial disputes and strategic rivalry with member countries of those ROs. In fact, the convergence of interests with the countries of different regions, particularly Southeast Asia, Europe and IPR, has facilitated India’s association with different ROs created in the respective regions. Economic opportunities offered by India, its democratic polity and emergence of various non-traditional security threats and its rise as a substantial player in strategic and security matters at the regional and global level and the politico-strategic environment emerged owing to the rise of China and its assertive behaviour have promoted the value of India in the eyes of other regional states of different parts of the globe. India shares a common vision of an open, free and rule-based region on the IPR with Asian and European countries. These countries see India as a major player in this region. All these have influenced India’s policy regarding its association with the multiple ROs, especially the ASEAN, ARF, EAS, IORA and EU. Hence, cooperation in these regional frameworks is neither hindered nor impossible for India. India has the convergence of preferences and beliefs with countries associated with these ROs at different levels. Moreover, it does not have any politico-strategic rivalry or territorial disputes with the member countries of these ROs. Hence, these countries individually and collectively through these ROs recognize India’s status as a major power in global affairs and support its claims for permanent membership of the UNSC and NSG. In a way, Cold War politics, post-Cold War politics and the emerging politico-strategic and security environment have created a divergence as well as convergence of preferences and beliefs with other regional and non-regional countries while shaping India’s policy with regard to its participation in the different ROs. Amidst the ongoing war of Russia against Ukraine, some Western countries have questioned India’s neutral position on the issue, including its absence from voting in the UN and purchase of Russian oil, but this is unlikely to impact New Delhi’s approach towards ROs, especially the EU and Quad, due to India’s strategic relevance for these countries in the Indo-Pacific.