Locating the Evolving Vietnam–India Security Partnership in Hanoi’s Hedging Strategy with Major Powers: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis

I. Introduction

Often labelled as a time-tested strategic partnership, Vietnam’s security relations with India have been continuously deepening and broadening since the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, a comprehensive and in-depth foreign policy analysis and theoretical explanation for Vietnam’s consistency in seeking to strengthen security ties with India remains limited and redundant. Furthermore, while attempts were also recently made to incorporate Vietnam’s perspective in forging close security ties with India, they remain restricted in their ability to explain the nuances involved in the motivations, constraints, speed and nature of the evolving security partnership between Vietnam and India in the context of Hanoi’s decision-making against the backdrop of a broader timeline of assessment. While numerous authoritative academic publications have already established that Vietnam has been utilizing a hedging strategy vis-à-vis major powers since the Cold War (Hiep, 2013; Marston, 2023; Tran & Sato, 2018; Vu et al., 2020;), there remains a significant gap in theorizing how India fits within this calculation.

While structural factors, such as the USA–Soviet Union–China triangle of the Cold War and the USA–China power competition of the twenty-first century, have served as essential and undeniable catalysts for Vietnam to strengthen security ties with India, this explanation alone lacks the depth to comprehend the timing, nature and processes behind the continuously strengthening security partnership between Hanoi and New Delhi, mainly from Vietnam’s perspective. Additionally, a primarily rational, utility-maximizing, and quantitative model for hedging cannot adequately explain why India’s significance as a security partner of Vietnam continues to grow at a faster pace than other materially powerful states like South Korea, Japan and Australia, which Hanoi benefits more from in terms of economics and arms sales. Accordingly, this article seeks to explain and decipher the interrelationship between Hanoi’s evolving foreign policy towards India and the Southeast Asian state’s overarching hedging strategy vis-à-vis the major powers since the Cold War by utilizing the theory of neoclassical realism to better calculate the complex interactions between structural and sub-state elements. A neoclassical realist approach can aptly explain how Vietnam’s evolving security ties with India go beyond a primarily utility-maximizing model, but rather, stronger ties with New Delhi are aimed at complementing Hanoi’s vision of securing a balance between the ideas of self-reliance and multi-alignment, without falling deeper into the intensifying structural power competition between the USA and China.

In this context, there is a stark absence in existing contemporary literature regarding the incorporation of neoclassical realism to comprehensively decipher Vietnam’s foreign policy approach towards India—particularly in the security realm—against the backdrop of its broader hedging strategies. This article thus argues that while the structural distribution of material power remains an undeniable element in Hanoi’s willingness to forge close security ties with New Delhi, it cannot exclusively explain its evolution amid the political fluctuations that have been taking place in the international geopolitical landscape since the mid-twentieth century. Hence, by using neoclassical realism as the lens of analysis, this article seeks to theorize the reason behind Vietnam’s interest to deepen and broaden its security ties with India at a notable pace since the beginning of the twenty-first century within its overarching hedging strategy in ways that go beyond a largely utility-maximizing approach. Additionally, this article also argues that for Hanoi, strengthening security ties with New Delhi will serve as a crucial strategic buffer amid the USA–China power competition in order not to compromise the Southeast Asian state’s efforts to hedge between both structural forces at a time when their strategic rivalry continues to intensify.

The Section I will explore existing theoretical literature on the security relationship between Vietnam and India. Doing so will set the parameters on the theoretical gaps and limitations in explaining Hanoi’s foreign policy decision-making towards forging strong security ties with New Delhi as Vietnam tries to hedge with major powers. Section II seeks to rectify the gaps in the existing literature by incorporating the theory of neoclassical realism to better explain the motivations behind Vietnam’s hedging strategies, allowing a more in-depth assessment of Hanoi’s interests to deepen security relations with New Delhi. Based on the independent and intervening variables of neoclassical realism, Section III seeks to outline the empirical data surrounding Vietnam’s relations with structural forces since the Cold War, while Section IV intends to provide a theoretical explanation of the motivations and challenges faced by Hanoi in its hedging strategy with these major powers. Section V will provide a systematic outline of the trends in Vietnam–India security relations since the late 1990s by providing a theoretical context for Hanoi’s foreign policy. Furthermore, by drawing on the analyses of the previous sections, the last section aims to theoretically explain why India has been one of the most preferred security partners of Vietnam based on neoclassical realism.

II. The Theoretical Limitations of Existing Literature on Vietnam–India Security Ties

The security relationship between Vietnam and India is frequently seen from either an India-centric lens or a product of the international distribution of material power and the broader utility-maximizing interests of states. Such views reflect a neorealist approach, which assumes that inter-state relations are the product of the direct or indirect shifts in the anarchic international structure (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30). Additionally, neorealists also assume that states, being unitary and utility-maximizing, constantly calculate the degree of relative material power they have vis-à-vis each other (Grieco, 1988; Waltz, 1979). Therefore, given the structure-centric analysis of the neorealist approach, sub-state factors such as culture, ideology and regime type rarely matter in assessing a state’s foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 77). The theory also often holds that small states are primarily subjected to the whims of powerful states and are left with minimal options—small states may either align with another strong state to balance against a challenging state or bandwagon with the challenging state (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979, p. 126, 168).

For instance, Jha noted that while close ties with the Soviet Union fostered close and time-tested ties between Hanoi and New Delhi, the evolutions in post-Cold War structural geopolitical dynamics ‘have forced’ Vietnam to forge closer strategic relations with India (Jha, 2008, p. 1085). Similarly, because of Southeast Asia’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculations amidst the post-Cold War power vacuum, New Delhi has also been motivated to deepen cooperation with Vietnam (Jha, 2008, pp. 1085, 1096). The author also suggested that India must endeavour to deepen relations with Vietnam to open more economic opportunities for its growth (Jha, 2008, p. 1093).

Another authoritative publication on the growing strategic ties between India and Vietnam came from Brewster (2009). His work, however, sought to reflect the strengthening of the security partnership from India’s perspective. Additionally, the major premise of this work also delved greatly into the structural power dynamics of the Western Pacific. Accordingly, two structural motivations were behind the deepening strategic partnership between New Delhi and Hanoi. First, the rise of China served as a disruptor in the regional balance of power and thus necessitated a balancing measure between both states to address Beijing’s expanding assertiveness in the Western Pacific. Second, forging more robust ties with a key Southeast Asian state such as Vietnam will allow India to maximize its chances of more effectively projecting power in Indochina and the greater Southeast Asian region.

Vo (2017) also used the structural dynamics to explain the motivations for Hanoi and New Delhi to strengthen defence relations, particularly in maritime security. According to the author, the assertive rise of China continues to bring about significant challenges towards maintaining peace and stability in both the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Such manoeuvres come directly at the expense of Indian and Vietnamese national interests, sovereignty and sovereign rights. More importantly, Beijing’s disregard of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling, invalidating China’s expansive claims and regional exclusionary policies in the South China, illustrates how hard power remains pivotal in engaging in the international political system. Therefore, the structural shifts brought by China’s rise and expanding power projection capabilities in both critical oceans serve as necessary motivations for India and Vietnam to enhance the scope of their security cooperation at sea.

Similarly, Jha and Vinh (2020), despite providing a significant academic contribution towards the evolving defence partnership between India and Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific, stop short of providing theoretical context on the decision-making process that explains Vietnam’s continuous prioritization of its strategic relationship with India in a pace much faster than other regional powers that offer Hanoi more material benefits. Instead, the chapters are organized to illustrate the preponderance of systemic geopolitical trends in the region, along with India’s major power goals. The book also provides descriptive analyses of the material benefits and opportunities in store for both states as they seek to cement their strategic partnership in the region. Such benefits include economic gains and the enhancement of defence capabilities. More importantly, as a testament to the influence of structural and material forces, two major sections of the publication were dedicated to the role of the USA and China in shaping the defence partnership between Hanoi and New Delhi.

Therefore, such contributions need to problematize the intervening variables affecting Hanoi’s decision to strengthen its ties with India since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, such analyses fail to take account of the wider regional context of Vietnam. Hanoi had the opportunity to deepen its security ties with other Western Pacific powers at a similar pace to maximize those very material gains. Hence, what makes India a special partner? Furthermore, such analyses give the impression that the strengthening India–Vietnam security partnership is given due to the opportunities and constraints provided by the USA–China power competition.

Vinh (2020), however, reorients the discussion on the evolving Vietnam–India security partnership by contributing towards the literature gap in the context of Hanoi’s foreign policy perception towards India. While the publication adds a recalibrated takeaway from the dominant India-centric approach, it seems to follow a similar theoretical pattern by suggesting that Vietnam’s desire to forge strong ties with India is based on a largely utility-maximizing model, in order to gain economically and strengthen defence capabilities (Vinh, 2020, pp. 7–9). However, it is essential to note that the author made attempts, despite doing so briefly in passing, to explain that due to Vietnam being unwilling to take sides against China, it must evaluate how it seeks to strengthen its strategic partnership with India, particularly in defence cooperation (Vinh, 2020, pp. 9–10). Unfortunately, the article stops short of problematizing such a dilemma by utilizing theory.

Dar (2021), however, sought to fill this gap by incorporating the hedging framework to explain the India–Vietnam–China triangle better. Accordingly, the central premise of the publication was to demonstrate how both Vietnam and India do not show signs of either balancing or bandwagoning vis-à-vis China’s growing assertion. While the author rightfully acknowledged the diverse dimensions of hedging, the publication centred on explaining hedging as a mixture of contradictory policies that represents a middle option between balancing and bandwagoning vis-à-vis a threatening power (Dar, 2021, p. 4). In this context, the author also tries to explain how power asymmetry, geography and national strategic culture serve as primary factors for Vietnam and India to hedge China by simultaneously forging close strategic relations (Dar, 2021, pp. 10–13).

While this contribution adds a more nuanced take beyond the primarily structural, utility-maximizing and India-centric angles, while also seeking to problematize the Vietnam–India security partnership beyond balancing or bandwagoning, the scope and depth of both structural and domestic variables remain limited to provide a theoretically nuanced take on how Vietnam’s decision to hedge between structural forces since the Cold War has catalysed stronger bilateral security ties with India. Instead, it focused on illustrating how Hanoi and New Delhi share complementary positions towards the challenges faced due to an increasingly assertive China with expanding material capabilities. Nevertheless, despite its limitations, the article adds significant dynamism to the literature on Vietnam and India security relations, thus serving as a stepping stone for a more profound and comprehensive theoretical assessment of the strengthening bilateral security partnership.

III. A Neoclassical Realist Lens for Foreign Policy Decision-making

Dar’s (2021) incorporation of strategic culture to explain Vietnam’s hedging strategy is vital given that it leverages the importance of domestic variables to explain state foreign policy. However, it still needs to forward a theoretical equation that comprehensively incorporates both structural and sub-structural opportunities and challenges that can properly explain the evolution of Hanoi’s decision-making process towards India as a crucial component of its hedging strategy. This, unfortunately, results in a largely descriptive rather than a theoretical analysis.

In addition, while the importance of strategic culture was mentioned, it still needed an in-depth and historical examination, which would have done more justice to the importance of domestic perception in foreign policy analysis. Consequently, by focusing more on the material aspect of the Vietnam–China–India triangle, the discussion eventually placed more emphasis on the traditional conceptualization of hedging, which is defined by a utility-maximizing and risk-driven model that problematizes the balance between economics and security (Chung, 2004; Kuik, 2016, p. 500; Lim & Mukherjee, 2019). However, the traditional understanding of hedging lacks the ability to explain how domestic factors can motivate states to hedge in a way that is not driven by rational and utility maximizing interests.

Utilizing the neoclassical realist theoretical lens will, therefore, be crucial to add more nuance towards explaining Vietnam’s evolving security partnership with India, along with Hanoi’s broader foreign policy decision-making vis-à-vis major powers since the Cold War. Like other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam’s relationship with the dominant structural forces can be classified based on an amalgamation of strategies that represent hedging rather than balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality (Dar, 2021). However, unlike the traditional conceptualization of hedging, this article will utilize a more conventional understanding of hedging based on neoclassical realism.

While neoclassical realists give significance to the material international structure as their independent variable, they, however, believe that this is not enough to decipher and understand the foreign policy direction of states, given that there is no direct transmission belt between the international distribution of material power and particular foreign policy decisions of states (Rose, 1998, p. 150). Therefore, to understand the shifts, nature, timing and of state foreign policy vis-à-vis the shifts in the structural distribution of power, neoclassical realists incorporate the role of domestic perception as their intervening variable, given that structure alone cannot directly influence state behaviour (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 60). Accordingly, sub-state variables, such as the perception of elites, act as a filter between the nature of the international structure and particular foreign policy choices of states (Taliafero et al., 2009, p. 3–4). Consequently, perceptions of state leaders and elites do not just exist on their own; rather, they are influenced mainly by broader ideational patterns such as political ideology and strategic culture (Taliafero et al., 2009, p. 3–4).

Neoclassical realists acknowledge neorealism’s general assumptions regarding the primacy of the state in international politics and the undeniable influence of the international distribution of material power; however, when discrepancies occur in state foreign policy, which reflect the lack or absence of a purely materially-calculative and utility-maximizing approach, only through the inclusion of sub-state intervening variables can such anomalies be understood (Rose, 1998, pp. 146–147, 152). Unlike neorealism’s attempts to generalize, neoclassical realists highlight how state leaders and elites may not always interpret the forces of the structure based on a purely utility-maximizing approach due to imperfect knowledge (Holsti & Rosenau, 1979, p. 55–56). Hence, states may not always forge a distinct and clear path despite the influence of structural incentives and constraints (Jervis, 1976). However, such varied options may become significantly limited for a state if the structural environment becomes increasingly competitive and complex. Hence, when the competitive nature of the structure intensifies to a certain point, it may outweigh the flexibility of the intervening variable and may result in the state acting on a primarily structural logic (Smith, 2018, p. 9).

It is also important to emphasize how neoclassical realism’s incorporation of domestic perception should be distinct from other theoretical paradigms, such as constructivism. What sets neoclassical realism apart from such theories that utilize ideas and perceptions is that the former explains the discrepancies in state behaviour by drawing foreign policy outcomes back to the material structure while underscoring the role of intervening variables (Rose, 1998, p. 147). Therefore, neoclassical realism’s utilization of state perception is founded on the concept of cognitivism, which means that ideas and perceptions are incorporated to serve as necessary tools for policy decision-makers to make sense of the complexities of the material world (Rathbun, 2008, p. 316). In this light, when neoclassical realism factors in domestic perception, it aims to explain how structure can be interpreted in varied ways, which results in dynamic foreign policy choices, rather than explaining the changes in norms or identities.

Therefore, in line with the neoclassical realist approach, it will be necessary to not only identify both independent and intervening variables in Vietnam’s foreign policy but also to evaluate how these variables interact with one another in order to illustrate better how India fits in Vietnam’s hedging strategy vis-à-vis the USA, Soviet Union and China during the late twentieth century and the USA and China throughout twenty-first century. Therefore, by reorienting the focus towards both systemic and sub-state elements, neoclassical realism will be able to paint a more holistic and vivid picture of how security and economic interests on one hand and domestic perceptions (such as political ideology, historical experiences and bureaucratic divisions) on the other propel a better understanding of hedging, particularly in the context of Vietnamese foreign policy. More importantly, doing so will also provide a detailed analysis of the evolution and motivations behind Vietnam’s accommodation towards India as a security partner beyond a traditional, material and utility-maximizing lens.

IV. Locating Vietnam Within the Structural Power Dynamics: 1960 to Present

The power competition between the USA and the Soviet Union defined the structural dimensions of the Cold War. In addition, the role of the importance of the Sino-Soviet split, which began in the late 1950s, and the normalization of ties between Washington and Beijing added served as a sub-characteristic of the international structure of the second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, amid the US invasion of Vietnam, Hanoi sought to address this structural reality by strategizing its alignments with China and the Soviet Union in various degrees.

From the early 1950s to the late 1960s, Hanoi forged close ties with China in a way often compared to ‘lips and teeth’ (Womack, 2006, p. 164). Hanoi enjoyed significant material benefits from China during the second Indo-China war (Jian, 1995, p. 359). However, from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, this wariness towards China began to grow, which created significant fault lines in their relations, resulting in a shift in Hanoi’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, eventually resulting in the signing of the 1978 bilateral treaty between Hanoi and Moscow (Morris, 1991a, p. 197). Consequently, as relations between China and Vietnam continued to degrade, a border war between both states erupted in 1979. However, even despite the material benefits gained by Vietnam from its alignment with the Soviet Union and the clear structural threats posed by China, there remained a distinct wariness in Hanoi, which impeded chances of maximizing the utility of the bilateral partnership, to the disappointment of Moscow (Kelemen, 1984, pp. 347–348).

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Vietnam’s changing strategic environment required Hanoi to simultaneously recalibrate its foreign policy against the backdrop of the evolving structural conditions of that period. Along with the normalization of ties with China in 1991, Vietnam also began improving its relations with the USA towards the end of the 1990s. This eventually set the tone for what was to come in the next century. With the advent of the twenty-first century, the international geopolitical landscape became defined by the structural power competition between the USA and China. Since the mid-2000s, China began to expand its assertive strategic designs for the Western Pacific by not only exponentially bolstering its economic and military capabilities but also increasing its ability to project more power in the disputed South China Sea at the expense of the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Southeast Asian claimants, such as Vietnam (Swaine, 2010). China also continues to challenge Vietnam’s security interests in the Indo-China region by decreasing Hanoi’s influence over Cambodia and Laos (Grossman, 2020). This assertiveness from China coincided with Washington’s attempts to check and constrain Beijing’s destabilizing behaviour through a variety of Asia-centric strategies that began under the administration of President Barack Obama (Lieberthal, 2011).

Given the threat posed by China’s rise, Hanoi should have balanced against China with US support based on a largely utility-maximizing logic. While China continues to undermine Vietnam’s territorial integrity and sovereign rights, the USA has been endeavouring to play a more significant role as Southeast Asia’s security provider against revisionist interests; additionally, as of December 2022, the USA has also solidified its place as Vietnam’s top export destination (International Trade Administration, 2022). However, despite repeated clashes with China in the South China Sea, Beijing’s overt provocations and an earnest US that seeks to play a more active role as Vietnam’s security partner, Hanoi continues to prioritize having amiable ties with Beijing, whose status was elevated to a comprehensive strategic partner in 2008 (Kausikan, 2016; MOFA China, 2022; Nguyen, 2023; Thayer, 2010, p. 396).

Therefore, looking at Vietnam’s engagements vis-à-vis the systemic distribution of power during the Cold War and throughout the twenty-first century, it can be seen how Hanoi’s external relations with the major powers cannot be comprehensively explained solely through the unitary, utility-maximizing approach of neorealism, given the discrepancies that have occurred, which do not entirely capture a structure-centric approach. Neorealism’s incorporation of rational choice models such as balancing, bandwagoning and hedging often highlight how states act in neutral material cost–benefit conditions to pursue narrowly-defined national objectives, thus failing to accommodate discrepancies that occur, which lead to unintended results due to foreign policy decisions (Schweller, 2004). In this light, a neoclassical realist assessment will provide a crucial explanation of the nature of these shifts by considering Vietnam’s domestic perceptions.

V. A Neoclassical Realist Approach to Vietnam’s Hedging Policy

Vietnam’s foreign policy amid the international structural shifts has been a mixed bag of strategies that encompass certain degrees of hedging. However, Vietnam’s engagements with China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the USA and China throughout the post-Cold War era reflect motivations much more than just the premise of a rational state quantifying its material gains vis-à-vis the structural power distribution. Therefore, the relevance of sub-state variables such as historical sensitivity, domestic political factionalism and political ideology must be revisited rather than overlooked to better understand Vietnam’s foreign policy decisions since the 1960s.

Southeast Asian states put a premium on political autonomy amid the shifts that continue to take place throughout Asia’s geopolitical landscape (Batabyal, 2004, p. 363; Emmers, 2018, pp. 349–352). To this day, Hanoi’s foreign policy continuously attempts to strike a challenging balance between its twentieth century revolutionist perceptions and its contemporary desire for internationalism (Thu, 2018, p. 125). The concept of self-reliance remains deeply entrenched as a cornerstone of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Southeast Asian state’s foreign policy. A self-reliant foreign policy indicates Hanoi’s desire to maintain political independence, which is seen as a necessity for regime security; consequently, even with the positive momentum towards internationalism and market economy, which ushered the Doi Moi (open door) period, Vietnamese foreign policy remains centred on the belief of self-reliance, along with preserving its socialist post-independence ideology (Hien, 2019). Despite the push towards the liberalization of the Vietnamese economy, state officials have voiced their concerns about the need to prioritize the autonomy and independence of the state (Goodman, 1993, p. 846; Thu, 2018, p. 133).

Additionally, the idea of political and ideological freedom is also deeply engrained in the consciousness of the Vietnamese people. Generations of young Vietnamese have been deeply assimilated with Ho Chi Minh’s famous statement: Khong co gi quy bau hon doc lam tu do (Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom) (Vietnam Plus, 2021). Hence, inter-state engagements, particularly in the security realm policies, are heavily filtered through Vietnam’s unique historical circumstances and political culture.

Given the incorporation of these sub-state perceptions, despite pressures from the structural level, domestic perception often translates structural opportunities and constraints by filtering them through various sub-state elements (such as historical sensitivity, domestic factionalism and political ideology) before translating them into an actual foreign policy.

In the context of the Cold War and the US invasion of Vietnam, Hanoi naturally aligned with China, a fellow communist state with growing material capabilities that was also wary of the preponderance US material power. However, despite the formidable material support from China and the depth of fraternal relations between both sides, Hanoi remained wary of allowing China to deepen its hold on it and its people. As China began to increase its provisions for military support when Chinese troops began to enter North Vietnam, Hanoi had the assumption that China’s aid did not only revolve around military support but a deeper political objective towards the Vietnamese society and Mao Zedong’s promotion of China’s continuous revolution (Jian, 1995, p. 363). Hence, Chinese troops that entered North Vietnam eventually voiced their disappointment towards the restrictions imposed on them by Vietnamese officials (Xian’gen, 1990, pp. 61–72).

The next phase of Hanoi’s China policy developed into a more neutral approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and an eventual deeper alignment with Moscow, leading to its integration into the Soviet Bloc in 1978. From a utility-maximizing point of view, a deeper alignment with the Soviet Union in the 1970s brought by the USA–China détente, Moscow’s large material capabilities, and Hanoi’s desire to expand its material capabilities, seemed logical. However, while the partnership was solidified on paper, Hanoi’s ties with the Soviet Union remained obstructed and challenged until the latter’s dissolution in 1991. While the Soviets provided notable material and political support to North Vietnam with the hope of being able to influence Vietnamese foreign policy considerably, Hanoi, once again, thwarted any potential of directly aligning and balancing with Moscow despite Beijing’s clear threat towards Vietnamese sovereignty—which intensified from border skirmishes since 1973 to a full-blown Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Accordingly, domestic political factions played a critical role in stalling the Soviet Union’s plans of integrating Vietnam deep within its sphere of influence and motivating Hanoi to balance against China with Moscow effectively. A comprehensive study by Vietnam foreign policy expert Stephen J. Morris concluded that while the Soviet Union’s material capabilities were significantly dependent on Hanoi, the presence of political factions that were still quite accommodating to China served as a potent obstacle (Morris, 1999b, p. 39). Given this dominant perception among elites, Hanoi knew it would have to limit specific materially motivated foreign policy goals as it sought to strike a reasonable relationship with Beijing. In addition to domestic factionalism, the fear of compromising the principle of self-reliance by falling deeper into the Soviet sphere of influence added an additional level of restraint in Hanoi’s foreign policy. Given the vastly competitive nature of the major powers during this period, Vietnam was aware that forging deep alignments with any of them would critically compromise Hanoi’s political autonomy.

Eventually, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the normalization of relations with China, and the gradual improvement of ties with the USA, Vietnam’s foreign policy for the twenty-first century was bound to be impacted by new structural dynamics. Accordingly, Vietnam’s geopolitical outlook since the dawn of the twenty-first century has been largely and indirectly shaped by the assertive rise of China and the overarching US–China power competition. While China has positioned itself as a top import source of Vietnam, it continues to increase its provocations against the Southeast Asian state’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, particularly in the South China Sea (The Guardian, 2022; Thu, 2020).

However, Vietnam still chooses to manage ties with Beijing by hedging with the USA. From a utility-maximizing model, hedging is not an optimal option. As the balance of power in the Western Pacific continues to shift in China’s favour, Beijing continues to cement its role as a clear threat against the sovereignty, sovereign rights and security of Southeast Asian states such as Vietnam. On the other hand, the USA has been endeavouring to check China’s revisionist and assertive interests in the region by promoting its role as a security and development partner, along with its allies Japan and Australia, South Korea and the United Kingdom. Economically speaking, the USA has become Vietnam’s largest export destination, while South Korea is its third largest trade partner, and Japan continues to lead foreign direct investments in the Southeast Asian state (Vietnam Plus, 2022).

Additionally, Australia is Vietnam’s seventh largest trade partner and one of the top providers of official development assistance, along with the UK (Nga, 2023). Hence, while China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner vis-à-vis the two-way trade volume, the USA, South Korea and Japan follow closely as second, third and fourth, respectively. Moreover, while most of the Vietnamese arms come from Russia, it has been diversifying its arms procurements from the USA since 2016, when Washington decided to lift its embargo on the Southeast Asian state, while South Korea also places itself as a significant alternative arms supplier (Hiep, 2022).

Hence, Vietnam’s decision to hedge with the USA and China goes against traditional explanations focusing on utility-maximizing models. Such an approach assumes that hedging is only considered pragmatic if the economic benefits received by Vietnam rise proportionally with the security threat that China imposes on its sovereignty and sovereign rights. Therefore, if one material variable outweighs the other, then it can be expected that hedging will not be a favourable strategy any longer; rather, a shift to either balancing or bandwagoning with another power becomes likely (Marston, 2023, p. 7). Hence, an explanation that goes beyond the material structure is necessary to understand the fluidity of Vietnam’s foreign policy.

The level of threat illustrated by China towards the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Vietnam continues to increase and fast outweighs the economic benefits Hanoi is gaining from Beijing. However, Vietnam still chooses to use a multi-faceted hedging strategy with China by not balancing against it with the USA and its allies. The unveiling of the ‘four no’s’ principle by Hanoi also serves as a prudent signalling in order not to provoke China further ¹ . This tolerance towards its assertive neighbour can be understood based on two important sub-state elements.

The first crucial sub-state element in Vietnam’s foreign policy decision-making is the role of political ideology. With only a handful of communist parties in power since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Hanoi is mindful of the impending risks of directly delegitimizing another ruling communist party. Hence, there is a level of political ideological solidarity with Beijing, given that both states share a notable depth of fraternal relations. While Vietnam is aware of the security risks brought by China’s rise, it remains wary and cautious towards deepening its alignment with the USA due to lingering concerns and worries over the divergences in political ideology (Jennings, 2020). Hence, given its limited material capabilities, geography, economic interdependence and political ideological affiliation with China, Vietnam remains reluctant to throw all its strategic eggs in the US basket (Jones & Jenne, 2021, p. 3).

The second important sub-state element is centred on Vietnam’s desire to safeguard its political autonomy vehemently. Vietnam’s ‘four no’s’ principle reflects an apparent disdain for forging alliances or engaging in partnerships that will compromise its sovereignty and freedom while pursuing particular state policies (Viet Nam Government Portal, 2020). The importance of political autonomy remains deeply engraved in Vietnamese strategic thought, especially due to historical experiences, which act as filters for external political engagements. Hence, despite recognizing the China threat during the Cold War, Vietnam avoided falling deeper in its alignment with the Soviet Union due to fears of losing its political autonomy—this was so even when Moscow shared similar political ideologies as Hanoi and had notable material capabilities. Today, a similar wariness towards the dependence on external powers is present. Accordingly, Vietnam’s reluctance to either bandwagon with China or balance against it with the USA represents Hanoi’s understanding of how both powers seek to solidify their respective spheres of influence in the Western Pacific. Therefore, given this assumption, Vietnam maintains a hedging strategy that is motivated beyond the rational and utility-maximizing model of neorealism but a more dynamic and sub-state-motivated approach of neoclassical realism.

However, as the USA–China power competition intensifies, Vietnam may need more options in its utility belt. It is amid this dilemma that the importance of Vietnam’s deepening security ties with India can be understood.

VI. The Evolution of Vietnam–India Security Relations

Security cooperation has maintained its place as a top priority area of coordination between Vietnam and India since the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, even during the last quarter of the Cold War, both states were able to establish cordial and functional relations through economic and development cooperation, given the constrained state of Vietnam’s economy in the post-unification period (Chakraborti, 2002, p. 244). Eventually, as Vietnam’s national economy strengthened along with its Doi Moi reforms, the rise of the twenty-first century served as an opportunity for Vietnam and India to strengthen their strategic partnership in other crucial areas, particularly in defence and security cooperation.

Defence cooperation has constantly been crucial in the bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Hanoi. Both states signed a formal Defence Protocol in 2000, which included the sale of military helicopters, training for Vietnamese military officials and providing equipment for repairing and maintaining Vietnam’s aircraft (Pant, 2018, p. 8). Since then, regular security collaborations were witnessed in intelligence, jungle warfare, counterinsurgency and joint coastguard training; additionally, India also assisted Vietnam with small arms production and repairing its helicopters and aircraft (Pant, 2018, p. 8). Both states also broadened the scope of their cooperation in the maritime domain as early as 2006, when OVL, the overseas arm of India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, signed a production-sharing contract with Vietnam’s PetroVietnam for deepwater exploratory Block-128, which is within the Southeast Asian state’s exclusive economic zone in the highly sensitive and contested South China Sea (The Economic Times, 2019). Additionally, upon Hanoi’s invitation and despite China’s disapproval, India and Vietnam agreed to explore oil and gas jointly in the disputed South China Sea. OVL owns a 45% stake in Block 6.01 (The Economic Times, 2019).

Hanoi and New Delhi reached a crucial milestone in 2007 with the elevation of their bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. This elevation highlighted both sides’ willingness to not only deepen but also broaden their security relationship amid the fluctuations in Asia’s geopolitical landscape brought by the increasingly assertive rise of China and the burgeoning power competition between Washington and Beijing in the Western Pacific. In 2014, India offered Vietnam a USD 100 million concessional line of credit (LoA) for the procurement of defence equipment; moreover, to indicate the deepening convergence of both sides to strengthen their security ties, India provided the Southeast Asian state with a new USD 500 LoA for defence cooperation in 2016 to strengthen Vietnam’s maritime security and territorial defence capabilities (Minh, 2016). This coincided with the further elevation of bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in the same year. ²

To operationalize the newly elevated bilateral partnership, India and Vietnam held their first army-to-army exercise in 2018, called VINBAX (The Economic Times, 2018). In 2022, another milestone was reached when Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh officially handed over 12 high-speed guard boats to Vietnam during his visit to the Southeast Asian state. The guard boats were provided under New Delhi’s USD 100 million defence LoC to Hanoi (Hindustan Times, 2022). Furthermore, the pinnacle of this trip was reached when Singh and his Vietnamese counterpart General Phan Van Giang signed the Joint Vision Statement on India–Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030.

This is important for two reasons. First, considering Vietnam’s sensitivities towards inter-state alignments, it is rare for Hanoi to agree to and sign a strategic vision statement that encompasses beyond five years (Philip, 2022). Second, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was also signed by both defence ministers on mutual logistics support. This MoU opens doors for both states’ militaries to utilize each other’s bases to repair and replenish supplies. This is highly significant given that such an agreement is the first that Vietnam has forged with any state due to its wariness of giving extra-regional powers access to its strategic bases and thus compromising its political autonomy (The Pioneer, 2022). Hence, such an agreement illustrated how Vietnam has managed to accommodate India’s security partnership of this depth amid its ‘four no’s’ principle. Furthermore, as a symbol of its strengthening defence ties with Vietnam, India also gifted its indigenously built missile corvette warship, the INS Kirpan, to the Southeast Asian state in June 2023 to enhance its maritime security capacity amid concerns in the South China Sea (Pradhan, 2023).

VII. A Neoclassical Realist Explanation for the Strengthening Vietnam–India Strategic Partnership

The first two sections illustrated how the role of domestic perception as an intervening variable continues to channel Hanoi’s external relations vis-à-vis the structural shifts in ways that may not reflect a purely rational, utility-maximizing approach, often assumed by neorealism. Given this context, and based on the central analysis of this article, it is necessary to uncover the motivations behind Vietnam’s continuously deepening and broadening defence partnership with India, outlined in the third section. Based on neoclassical realist analysis, the role of structural shifts and the distribution of material power in the Western Pacific has undeniably contributed to a conducive environment for Vietnam and India to strengthen security ties. However, structure alone cannot explain the speed of the deepening and broadening of this bilateral strategic partnership, even without a purely utility-maximizing logic.

After the Sino-Indian border war erupted in October 1962, the bilateral ties between New Delhi and Beijing significantly soured. However, during this period, two major structural factors impeded the improvement of ties between Hanoi and New Delhi. In the aftermath of the border war, Washington provided material support for India’s constrained economy; hence, New Delhi’s statements against US bombings in North Vietnam were significantly restrained (Thakur, 1979, p. 964). Moreover, with the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, India continued forging positive ties with the Soviet Union, while Hanoi gave more preference to China. However, the perceptual shift in North Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s eventually opened doors for both New Delhi and Hanoi to realize the significance of their bilateral relationship.

As Hanoi began to significantly decrease the degree of its alignment with China due to wariness and fears of being subjected to its regional ambitions, North Vietnam began to recalibrate its alignment towards the Soviet Union. Similarly, the normalization of ties between China and the USA and the warming of relations between Washington and Islamabad in the 1970s resulted in the deepening of the India–Soviet Union strategic partnership. These shifts drew Hanoi and New Delhi closer, eventually enhancing security and defence ties as early as 2000. However, more than structure alone is needed to explain the speed at which both states were able to forge a close and functional partnership in critical areas. Two important aspects served as crucial foundations for both states to strengthen their ties in a short period. First, towards the 1970s, India became more vocal on the plight of the Vietnamese at the hands of an imperial power, thus illustrating how New Delhi’s anti-colonial perception aligned well with Hanoi’s disdain for imperialism. Accordingly, as a strong show of support, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in 1971 that ‘I will support the unalienable rights of all peoples, especially those of the Vietnamese people, to national independence and freedom’ (Vietnam Plus, 2022). In 1972, Indian External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh emphasized that ‘The liberation of Bangladesh was a great heroic event. The liberation of Vietnam will be an equally heroic and great event’ (Vietnam Plus, 2022). In 1978, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong not only endorsed India’s nuclear policy, but also assured the closeness of ties between both states (Thakur, 1979, p. 976).

Second, along with Hanoi’s prioritization of self-reliance in its power relations, despite being wary towards China after their border war in the 1970s, Vietnamese policymakers understood how despite India’s similar tensions with China, the South Asian state remained consistent in its unwillingness to take part in any rigid anti-China blocs during this period (Malik, 1995, pp. 317–318; Thakur, 1979, p. 975). This coincided well with Vietnam’s internal dynamics, which has refrained from overtly balancing against China or bandwagoning with it. Furthermore, while its ties with the Soviet Union grew, New Delhi clarified that it would not use its friendly bilateral partnership with Moscow to overrule the chances of forging more functional ties with Beijing (Malik, 1995, p. 317). New Delhi also illustrated a significant understanding of state diversity and respect for various ideological sensitivities despite being a democratic state.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the normalization of ties with China, and the willingness to improve ties with the USA, Vietnam had the opportunity to forge a more comprehensive foreign policy for the twenty-first century. Along with integrating its national economy with the global trade regime through Doi Moi, Hanoi also began to centre its external policy towards multi-alignment to accommodate and maximize ties with the USA and China, which have solidified their roles as defining structural forces in the Western Pacific. Interestingly, together with the shifts of the twenty-first century structural dynamics brought by the unfolding US–China competition, the strengthening of security ties between Hanoi and New Delhi was also witnessed. As empirically illustrated in the previous section, defence and security ties between Vietnam and India have been consistently deepening and broaden since 2000.

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, India’s material capabilities and ability to project power and forge robust economic linkages in Southeast Asia were limited compared to South Korea, Australia and Japan (Limaye, 2003, p. 45). Hence, a sole utility-maximizing model is only partially accurate in understanding the developments in the Vietnam–India security partnership. Instead, while India’s material capabilities were growing in this period, its locus of power and influence was concentrated intensely within South Asia and the greater Indian Ocean region. Hence, it was natural for Hanoi to perceive India as a benign distant power that would not seek to intervene directly in Vietnamese and Southeast Asian affairs (Acharya, 2017, p. 158). Additionally, India’s decades of goodwill in Vietnam during the latter years of the Cold War, steadfast adherence to strategic autonomy vis-à-vis major power relations, and non-interference in domestic affairs aligned well with Hanoi’s political ideology and strategic thought.

Thus, increasing security ties with India, given that it has no vested territorial interests in Southeast Asia, complements Hanoi’s desire to hedge between China and the USA to not fall deep in any restraining alignments. However, neoclassical realism reminds us that when systemic forces become too competitive, they may eventually pressure a state to recalibrate its perception-based hedging policies and succumb to the dictates of the structure by eventually needing to pick a side. This was evident with Cambodia’s eventual bandwagoning with China and the Philippines’ current US-oriented foreign policy (Grossman, 2023; Po & Primiano, 2020). Consequently, for Hanoi, the intensifying US–China power competition coincided with the exponential growth in New Delhi’s material capabilities—India is now the fifth largest economy with the second largest standing army, the largest population and a steadily increasing defence manufacturing capacity—and its desire to play a more significant and more proactive role as a security partner in Southeast Asia. India has also become more vocal towards the concerns of Southeast Asian states like Vietnam in the South China Sea by highlighting the need to keep the disputed maritime territory free from coercive forces, but at the same time, emphasizing the role of peaceful negotiations as a way forward (Saha, 2020).

Moreover, while India continues to face and push back China’s assertiveness along the Line of Actual Control, New Delhi remains committed in its avoidance of bloc politics despite its close strategic ties with the USA (Schuman, 2023). Furthermore, India’s material rise is also complemented with the desire to amplify the voice of the developing world through its active participation in the Group of 20 (G20), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) arrangement, and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) (Singh, 2023).

Given the perceptual reality in Hanoi, it is essential to highlight how Vietnam’s desire to strengthen ties with India in security goes beyond traditional balancing. Amid the structural dimensions of the USA–China power competition, Vietnam refrains from utilizing a purely balancing or bandwagoning strategy, primarily due to the influence of sub-state factors. This kind of decision-making persists up to this very day. Close security ties with India since 2000 complement Vietnam’s desire to continue hedging between the structural dynamics of the USA–China power competition and operationalizing its multi-alignment strategy of forging strategic ties with friendly extra-regional powers. When India sought to play a larger and more prominent role in Southeast Asia by operationalizing the Act East Policy amid its growing material capabilities, Hanoi fully accommodated the idea given its continuously positive perception towards New Delhi’s strict adherence to strategic autonomy and cooperation based on mutual interests and respect for domestic sensitivities affairs (Gill, 2022; Sáng, 2022). These ideals of New Delhi resonate well with Vietnam’s interests. Thus, by deepening security ties with India amid the intensifying US–China competition, Hanoi is confident that it will still be able to balance its interest in self-reliance, while pursuing its overarching foreign policy centred on multi-alignment. Thus, India serves as an alternative security partner that will help Vietnam safeguard its strategic vision while also being able to check China’s assertiveness, when necessary, without the need to indulge deeply within the US bloc to balance Beijing.

In this regard, India’s shared threat perception with Vietnam towards China and the former’s growing military capabilities will be able to help the Southeast Asian state check the spill-over of Chinese assertion without being as controversial as overtly and deeply aligned with Washington and its extended hub-and-spokes alliance system. With the intensifying power competition between the USA and China in the Western Pacific region, strategically cooperating with India as an alternative security partner on area-specific collaborations to enhance military interoperability, army-to-army relations, information-sharing and logistics support will serve as a crucial additional option in its limited strategic utility belt. Additionally, it should be noted that while India is not even a top seven trade partners of Vietnam, in addition to not also being a major arms supplier of the Southeast Asian state, the speed at which both Hanoi and New Delhi achieved several milestones in their security ties vastly outweighs a utility-maximizing premise of security relations based on a neorealist approach.

Accordingly, India has managed to deepen and broaden the scope and nature of its security ties with Vietnam at a much faster pace than Vietnam’s major trade partners and arms suppliers like South Korea and the USA (gaining a comprehensive strategic partnership status only in 2022 and 2023 respectively) and Australia (which is yet to be elevated to such status). In line with this, based on the 2023 State of Southeast Asia survey conducted by the Singapore-based ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, when asked which third party will be more favourable to hedge with amid the intensifying US–China power competition, Vietnamese respondents ³ ranked India second among five states with a rating of 11.8% (ISEAS 2023, p. 38). This is in contrast to other states that invest and trade more with Vietnam such as South Korea, Australia and the United Kingdom, which were ranked at 0%, 4.4% and 1.5%, respectively. More importantly, Vietnam’s positive perception towards India’s role as an alternative partner increased from the previous year. Thus, as long as India’s growing material capabilities go hand-in-hand with New Delhi’s desire to consistently improve its standing as a strategic partner in Southeast Asia, it can be expected that security ties between both states will continue to improve. Accordingly, Hanoi will be able to benefit ⁴ from strengthening its security ties with a rising India without worrying about discrediting its decades-long strategic vision of balancing self-reliance and multi-alignment at a time when the USA–China power competition continues to intensify.

However, while this section seeks to explain the growing momentum behind Vietnam and India security relations, it is equally crucial to highlight how such momentum may eventually slow down. Given that it is unlikely for Vietnam’s decades-long domestic perception to witness a revolutionary change anytime soon, what may challenge or impede the deepening and broadening of the bilateral security partnership between Vietnam and India is if the further intensification of structural forces (in the context of US–China competition) will eventually coincide with a reoriented Indian foreign policy that will stray away from strategic autonomy. Based on the neoclassical realist approach, if pressures from the structure become too intense, then the ability of domestic perception to redirect a state’s foreign policy will be critically limited, thereby resulting in a largely structure-oriented strategy if there are no alternative strategic buffers. Thus, if New Delhi decides to recalibrate its foreign policy priorities at a time when the USA–China power competition continues to exacerbate in the region, Hanoi will find it arduous to continue its desired domestic perception-based hedging strategy, resulting in a potential momentum loss in bilateral security relations.

VIII. Conclusion

While the role of structural forces has been irrefutable in Hanoi’s hedging strategies, they are not enough to determine the nature, motivations, speed and scope of the Southeast Asian state’s security ties with India since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Hence, the need to go beyond a structure-centric and purely utility-maximizing model is necessary to appreciate better the characteristics of the evolving security partnership between Vietnam and India. Neoclassical realism’s incorporation of intervening variables in the form of domestic perception allows for a more comprehensive explanation of why Vietnam has been quick to maximize the utility of its security relations with India, even with limitations in the material aspect of the relationship.

Given Vietnam’s awareness of the structural challenges brought by the USA–China power competition in the twenty-first century, it seeks to forge a foreign policy path that entails checking China’s assertiveness, when necessary, while also not indulging deeply within the US bloc to balance Beijing. India thus serves as a natural partner in this regard due to its growing material capabilities and its adherence to being politically autonomous while emphasizing the importance of inclusivity, non-interference and respect for national sensitivities. For Hanoi, its strengthening ties with New Delhi are aimed at serving as a crucial strategic buffer amid the exacerbating US–China power competition, not to compromise the Southeast Asian state’s efforts to hedge between them effectively.

However, by virtue of neoclassical realism, the nature of structural forces and the consistency of domestic perception play a notable role in determining a state’s foreign policy trajectory. Hence, if the further intensification of the USA–China will eventually coincide with New Delhi’s decision to lessen the momentum of its security engagements in Southeast Asia based on strategic autonomy, then such a scenario will undoubtedly apply critical pressure on Hanoi’s decision-making, particularly at the expense of its desire to not only effectively hedge between the USA and China, but also enhance India’s incorporation as an alternative security buffer. If such a situation will eventually occur, Hanoi will be forced to compromise its domestic perception-motivated foreign policy in exchange for a largely structural-driven strategy. This will simultaneously strain the chances for Hanoi to expand its security ties with India further. Therefore, this opens more opportunities for scholars to understand and theoretically evaluate the changes that may occur in the bilateral security partnership between India and Vietnam by building on the neoclassical realist framework for foreign policy analysis.