Rationales,rhetoric and realities: FIFA’s World Cup in South Africa 2010 and Brazil 2014

Abstract

The 2010 FIFA World Cup was heralded by mainstream media outlets, the local organisers, the South African government and FIFA as an unequivocal success. The month-long spectacle saw South Africa take centre stage and host the world’s largest single sporting event. This occurred against a backdrop of rationales and promises made that the event would leave lasting legacies for all, in particular marginalised South Africans. The reality is quite different. In this article we consider the South African World Cup in the build up to Brazil 2014. We argue that the rationales and rhetoric are similar in both countries and suggest the reality for Brazil 2014 will be the same as South Africa 2010 in that the mega-event will be primarily funded by significant public investment, while the primary beneficiaries will be private capital and FIFA.

Keywords

Brazil 2014 development FIFA legacies South Africa 2010 World Cup

Introduction

In this paper we consider the rationales, rhetoric and realities of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa and in Brazil in 2014. We argue that local organising committees, political elites and mainstream media outlets provide a range of rationales that justify the hosting of the sporting mega-event in both countries. These rationales in turn become rhetoric in which the population at large within both countries supports the expenditure of significant amounts of public finances on a month-long spectacle. Dissent and opposition is discouraged and, in certain instances, actively suppressed. We then contend that the reality of the mega-event is markedly different from the original rationales put in place in the first instance.

To comprehend the South African and Brazilian cases through the official discourse, the perspectives of FIFA and of the two countries needs to be considered. FIFA as an international non-governmental organisation generates profit through the worldwide popularity and passion that football mobilises (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). When FIFA’s principle of continental rotation of the World Cups for 2010 and 2014 was adopted, this was framed within the discourse of democratising and spreading the global game to all strata of society; the reality is quite different. South Africa and Brazil hosting the 2010 and 2014 events represent shrewd financial decisions on the basis of FIFA by expanding their consumer markets and guaranteeing significant financial returns for their corporate partners (Jack, 2010: 3). The television and broadcasting rights for 2010 were sold for US$3.2 billion, up 30% from 2006 (Naidoo et al., 2010: 1). According to FIFA’s Financial Report for 2011, the event-related revenue was greater than in 2007 (FIFA, 2012).

Within South African and Brazilian societies, the economic interests are also present, especially considering the business opportunities mega-events provide to economic elites. The FIFA World Cup works as a motivation to ‘urban boosterism’, justifying and accelerating infrastructural investments (Hiller, 2000). Moreover, they are seen as ‘valuable promotional opportunities’ in which Brazil and South Africa, as other countries, are showcased ‘to global audiences and helping to attract tourism and outside investment’ (Horne, 2007: 83). An additional factor to be considered is the current reconfiguration of the global order amongst countries, where an attempt at geopolitical re-balance between North and South is occurring. This balance is particularly marked in terms of economic growth of countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (O’Neill, 2001). Bidding and hosting sport mega-events include the possibility of demonstrating power and challenging their ‘peripheral’ condition via symbolic means (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004).

The South African and Brazilian cases are distinct, yet the discourse surrounding both events is similar. It is apparent that the rationale for hosting such events is guised under the rubric of development and modernity that will supposedly have significant impacts on large sections of society (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004). Considering this scenario, we aim to show how this discourse was constructed and reported by local media during the preparation of South Africa and Brazil to host the FIFA World Cup and how the outcomes of South Africa 2010 can be illustrative in Brazil’s preparation for 2014.

The paper is divided into four sections. In the following section, the theoretical framework is composed of studies on sporting mega-events, international relations and post-colonial theory, in order to subsidise the analysis not only through economic matters, but also political, cultural and social components. The South African and Brazilian cases are presented. Finally, we argue that despite different contexts and environments, the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in the global south provides indicators of how wealth is generated for FIFA and the spending of the significant public funds are primarily used to promote the position of these countries in the international arena.

Theoretical framework

Sporting mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup are treated by states such as Brazil and South Africa as catalysts for social development. This is often viewed through the lens of the expansion of the market in which the sporting framework of emotions and sentiments are governed by the logic of supply and demand. Sporting mega-events more generally, such as the football World Cup, Olympic and Paralympic Summer and Winter Games and the Inter-Continental and Continental competitions, amongst others, play on developmental logic interspersed with sentimentality and emotions. This strategy harnesses social imagery as espoused by political and social elites and large-scale corporations, who are often strategic partners of relevant sports organisations. This is crucial in terms of promotional effectiveness and identity strategy (Burbank et al., 2001; Miah and García, 2012).

Sporting mega-events promote the host states’ projection of a desired national image to the rest of the world. This is coupled with corporate interests that seek to expand the global sports market. For Horne (2007: 92), hosting ‘mega-events are very seductive’ and a desired image is projected by the hosts. In the Brazilian case, a specific Brazilian identity is developed, and in the case of South Africa, an African identity was portrayed. These projections mask contradictions in which small elites are the primary beneficiaries of sports mega-events, particularly in the case of FIFA (Jennings, 2007; Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). We use Roche’s (2000: 1) definition of mega-events in which they can be viewed as ‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance’.

The discourse of development is interspersed with notions of legacies in the public debate, which are used to justify exorbitant costs and expenses related to hosting mega-events in what Nauright (2004: 1334) terms the ‘global sport-media-tourism complex’. These in turn are viewed as the catalyst for urban development (Haferburg, 2011). Political elites and stakeholders reproduce this discourse in the media more generally (Bourdieu, 1997). Society, in turn, begins to accept the discourse of developmental logic of mega-events and resistance to such events is branded as unpatriotic and reactionary. Brazil and South Africa, respectively, use mega-events to highlight economic successes, relative diplomatic importance and ‘soft power’ (Cornelissen, 2010: 3010). The broadcast and print media are crucial in disseminating the desired images through promotional means and the sale of specific endorsed products. These in turn develop feelings of belonging, recognition, distinction and socialisation in the general population (Burbank et al., 2001; Miah and García, 2012). Not only governments, sports authorities and media corporations espouse these ideas, but also they are taken up by non-governmental agencies who see sport through a similar lens in which it serves as a panacea to societal problems and issues. These are inevitably short-termist as structural inequalities and problems remain.

Sports mega-events generate significant profits for commercial investors. Mega-events are central to this sports market and play a significant role in a broader consumer society. This market is not neutral but is permeated with moral values that coincide with the interests of certain sectors of society while marginalising others (Maguire and Young, 2002). This is particularly the case in the FIFA World Cup where the product of football, seen as a universal sport, is only affordable to a small segment of society (Bolsmann, 2012). Those not able to directly consume the product by attending matches, fan parks and purchasing official merchandise experience the mega-event at a distance primarily through the mediums of television and radio. Thus public funds are used to entertain a small, albeit elite, segment of society. Large segments of Brazilian and South African society are directly excluded from the event. Those excluded are included through the mass media of television and radio. Corporate sponsors are attracted to the global reach of television (Horne, 2007). This can be viewed as an attempt to guarantee profitability and domination within a neoliberal model (Bourdieu, 1997, 1998, 2001).

Brazilian and South African organisers have discussed at length the legacies their respective tournaments should leave without stipulating what these may actually be. The assumption emerges that legacies are seen as obvious and do not require explanation or definition (Cashman, 2005). Horne insists it is the duty of academics to critically interrogate the ‘assumptions, beliefs and misrepresentations that are often suppressed [or even] repressed’ (2007: 81). Holger Preuss (2007) warns that measuring mega-events can be complex. He suggests there are concerns ‘measuring “net” legacy rather than “gross” legacy’, whether the legacies are positive or negative and the difficulty of measurement over time (Preuss, 2007: 223). Preuss provides a useful definition of legacy in which ‘irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself’ (2007: 211).

Further issues rise by the recent attempt and insertion of countries different from the axis USA–Western Europe in the mega-events context. Specifically in this case, the perspective of post-colonialism analysis helps to understand the images South Africa and Brazil intend to change or enhance. Despite albeit different history of these countries, they do have colonial legacies of domination and exploitation in common. Both countries have become important regional, continental and increasingly global economic players. Brazil has the eighth largest GDP and South Africa finds itself in position 26. For the purposes of this paper we acknowledge the importance of these economic factors, but contend that we need to consider cultural, political and discursive forms. In this regard, post-colonial studies help us take the analysis forward.

Similarly, Edward Said (2003 [1978]) perceived the ‘Orient’ as managed and produced ontologically and epistemologically through discourses that contrast it to the ‘occident’; we maintain that subaltern power relations remain present in post-colonial states after political independence has been achieved. As post-colonial states become important ‘emerging powers’ due to their increased economic growth, they challenge the hegemonic power or ‘core’ of the USA and Western Europe (Hurrel, 2006; Wallerstein, 1979). Within this context, hosting mega-events provides the platform for these states to enhance their image and perceived power (Cornelissen, 2008, 2010; Cornelissen and Swart, 2006; Cull, 2011; Manzenreiter, 2010). Within this context, the local media becomes a useful source of information on motivations and concerns that Brazilian and South African society raise regarding sporting mega-events. This approach allows us to focus on how the ‘periphery’ sees itself in terms of these events, rather than reinforcing the domination through core hegemonic and naturalised concepts about both countries. The post-colonial criticism permeates this analysis and allows us to offer new insights to understanding sporting mega-events in the global south.

South Africa 2010: dreams, promises and disappointment

Prior to the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February 1990, South African football authorities had met with representatives of the exiled and banned African National Congress (ANC) in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1988 (Alegi and Bolsmann, 2010). From the initial meetings, unity across a range of football bodies in South Africa was encouraged. The maintenance of the sports boycott was affirmed and it was agreed that readmission to FIFA would only take place once apartheid had been abolished. FIFA was kept informed of these developments and met with South African officials in 1989 who ‘unofficially’ backed unity (Alegi and Bolsmann, 2010: 15). During the course of 1990, football officials met on a number of occasions and formed the South African Football Association (SAFA). In September 1991, the SAFA was conditionally readmitted to the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF). In February the following year, the CAF recommended to FIFA that the SAFA be readmitted to the world body. This occurred on 3 July 1992 and South Africa played its first international match four days later in Durban. Later that year, FIFA president João Havelange suggested South Africa could host a future World Cup (Alegi, 2001).

Executive members of the SAFA attended the 1994 World Cup held in the United States and in September of that year wrote to FIFA ‘formerly lodging [their] bid…[as] we are the best qualified country in Africa to host the World Cup’ for the 2006 tournament (FIFA, 1994). Bidding for this edition of the World Cup had not commenced at this stage. The South African officials formally launched their bid to host the 2006 event in 1998. Rival bids were received from Brazil, England, Germany and Morocco. The FIFA executive decided on the 2006 hosts under controversial circumstances in July 2000 (Bolsmann, 2012). The president of the Oceania Football Association, Charles Dempsey, had been instructed by his association to vote for South Africa should England be eliminated. He abstained and Germany beat the South African bid by 12 votes to 11. South African football officials cried foul and sought arbitration. South African president Thabo Mbeki stated: ‘This is a tragic day for Africa…[b]ut, next time we will win’ (Sindane, 2008). The SAFA requested the matter be taken to arbitration and prepared legal papers to challenge the 2006 decision to award Germany the World Cup in the High Court of Zurich (CNN Sports Illustrated, 2000).

In August 2000, FIFA announced the principle of rotation of future World Cups and that Africa would host the 2010 tournament. As a result, the South African authorities dropped their challenge of the 2006 decision. South Africa found itself in prime position to host the 2010 World Cup, but not before it received stiff competition from other African candidates, particularly Morocco, who had already bid for the 1994, 1998 and 2006 tournaments. In the 2006 bid submission to FIFA, the South African officials argued that ‘Africa’s time had come’ (Bolsmann, 2012). In addition, a pan-Africanist rhetoric was evident in the 2006 submission interspersed with stereotypical images of Africa’s wildlife. For Alegi (2001), the 2006 bid primarily increased the country’s international positioning that would encourage international tourism and invoke national pride. In the 2006 and 2010 bid books, the organisers emphasised the pan-Africanism of the bids that was couched in the language of development and modernity. South Africa was portrayed as new and stable democracy with infrastructure capable of hosting the event. Significantly, the South African organisers made it clear that hosting the World Cup in South Africa would offer FIFA financial rewards that could be accumulated in a safe and secure context (Bolsmann, 2012). In the case of the Moroccan and South African bids, both countries projected their respective submissions in relation to being ‘the gateway to Africa’ and ‘true African representatives’ (Cornelissen, 2004). The South African press suggested the submission was a ‘true African’ bid and that benefits would be reaped not only by South Africa but her neighbours too (see, in particular, Sowetan, 14 May 2004). The vote for the 2010 hosts was not a foregone conclusion as imagined by many South Africans. South Africa defeated the Moroccan bid by 14 votes to 10 in May 2004. It was alleged that the four African representatives from the CAF on FIFA’s executive had voted for Morocco rather than South Africa (Sowetan, 14 May 2004). The South African press hailed FIFA’s decision to award the event to the country. The Sowetan (14 May 2004) suggested the decision was a ‘vote of confidence in the ability of South Africans in particular, and Africans in general’. At the same time, the article also warned that the organisers would have to ensure the event was an African spectacle rather than only a South African one (Sowetan, 2004).

A range of commentators raised concerns in hosting the 19th World Cup in South Africa. In 2000, Bobby Charlton, a member of the England 2006 bidding team, suggested the World Cup held in a ‘…country at the wrong time…could be a disaster’ (Observer, 2000). While his German counterpart Franz Beckenbauer raised similar concerns suggesting South African organisation was ‘beset by big problems…African problems’ (BBC, 2006). These concerns were concretised in reference to the levels of crime in South Africa and the slow pace of stadium construction and infrastructural development (see Glanville, 2010; Korth and Rolfes, 2010; Pank, 2008, amongst others). These concerns were compounded when 62 African immigrants and refugees were left dead in xenophobic violence in 2008 (Desai and Vahed, 2010). The attack on the Togolese national team during the African Cup of Nations in Cabinda, Angola, in January 2010 raised further concerns in the British press in particular (Ellis, 2010; Lewis, 2010). In April 2010, the far right-wing leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Eugène Terre’ Blanche, was murdered. British tabloids suggested ‘race war’ had been declared in South Africa (Hughes, 2010). These incidents exacerbated the claims of a potentially unsafe South African World Cup.

Despite these claims, the tournament was heralded as a success. FIFA’s Blatter exclaimed ‘Africa has proven that it can organize a World Cup’ and perceptions of Africa had ‘changed’ (in Ntloko, 2010). The Times of Britain wrote the event ‘has been a triumph for South Africa’ and ‘deliver[ed] one of the slickest tournaments on record’ (The Times, 2010). The Economist (2010) called it a ‘triumph’. The Johannesburg newspaper the Saturday Star (2010) stated that South Africa was ‘a world-class nation’, while The Sunday Independent (2010) wrote that it was ‘one giant leap for Africa’. Makhundu Sefara of The Sunday Independent went as far as stating the event had been ‘Africa’s proudest moment’ (Sefara, 2010). The discourse of the organisers, mainstream press and many social commentators exclaimed in unison that the ‘social legacy’ of the event was a positive one. Social legacies refer to the ‘collective memory’ of a particular sporting mega-event (quoted in Cornelissen et al., 2011a). Yet this can be understood in the context of ‘manufacturing consent’ in which opposition, critique and resistance to sports mega-events are suppressed (see, in particular, Horne, 2007; Lenskyj, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004).

In the build up to 2010, Craig Tanner’s television documentary, Fahrenheit 2010, posed critical questions on resource allocations in the context of extreme social inequality; it was not aired on South African television. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) argued that their job was ‘to promote the World Cup’ and E-TV suggested the documentary was ‘not suitable for a South African audience’ (Moyo, 2010). In Cape Town, homeless people were relocated from the city centre to temporary accommodation in Blikkiesdorp (Smith, 2010). In Nelspruit, the construction of the Mbombela Stadium was completed against the backdrop of corruption, murder and tendering irregularities (McKinley, 2011; Tolsi, 2010).

The cost of infrastructural development and building of stadiums is estimated at US$7.3 billion up from the original estimates of US$330 million in 2003 (Economist, 2010). The construction of five new stadiums and the refurbishment of another five in South Africa were funded primarily from the state, unlike the case of Germany in 2006, where private corporations contributed substantial amounts to the costs of construction (Haferburg, 2011). It is estimated that the South African state spent in excess of R600 billion on larger infrastructural projects, such as transportation and energy supply (Cornelissen et al., 2011). The stadiums remain underutilised in a post-2010 sporting landscape, maintenance costs are on-going and in certain instances the future of facilities is uncertain (Sylvester and Harju, 2010: 6). The consultancy firm Grant Thornton predicted 415,000 new jobs would be created, albeit many temporary (quoted in Cornelissen et al., 2011: 312). Despite the job creation, over 1 million jobs were lost in South Africa in 2009 and 2010 (Sylvester and Harju, 2010: 8). Over 300,000 people visited South Africa during the event, although initial projections estimated over 450,000 people would visit (quoted in Cornelissen et al., 2011: 312). This in turn meant tourist spend was significantly down on original estimates. It is estimated 2010 generated R26billion in tax-free revenue for FIFA, the most profitable World Cup to date (DeIonno, 2010). The month-long event brought about a renewed sense of optimism, while distinct pan-Africanists rhetoric was evident, particularly in the mainstream press, driven often by corporate interests (Bolsmann, 2012). Burawoy notes that the event was ‘a spectacle if ever there was one that absorbed the attention of entire population, masking the real interests at play’ (Burawoy and Von Holdt, 2012: x). Within days of the tournament concluding, state employees, including nurses, police and teachers, embarked on a bitter and protracted public sector strike.

The public sector strike brought the realities of post-apartheid South Africa home. The month-long spectacle exceeded expectations of the local organisers and FIFA. South Africa had pulled off the most ambitious, complex and expensive mega-event ever to be hosted on the African continent. Many South Africans were enthralled in the event, despite the poor performance of the national team. Yet this enthusiasm turned into disappointment in the months that followed the event. South Africans questioned the promises made by the local organisers and FIFA on the legacies the event would leave, the exorbitant costs and allegations of corruption, mismanagement and murder (Cottle et al., 2011). The real socio-economic impacts have been marginal, while the legacies have been minimal. The 2010 World Cup represented an expensive month-long festival paid for by South Africans in which FIFA reaped record profits. The mainstream media saw the festival as an unequivocal success, yet the event was marked by exclusion and marginalisation. Most South Africans and Africans more generally were unable to afford tickets to matches or purchase official merchandise. Over 3 million tickets were sold during 2010, of which only 36,000 went to ‘foreign Africans’ (Alegi and Bolsmann, 2013: 7). Initial sales were restricted to those with Internet and credit card facilities, making the purchase for many working class South Africans very difficult (Fletcher, 2013: 35). Unofficial or ‘fake’ football shirts were readily available across most of South Africa in the build up to and during the month-long event (Fletcher, 2013: 34).

Brazil 2014: expectations, beliefs and critique

In 2003, the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL) requested the FIFA Executive Committee to grant the hosting of the 2014 tournament under their rules of rotation to a South American country. In December 2006, Brazil and Colombia confirmed their interest in hosting the event (FIFA, 2007c), but a few months later, the latter withdrew their bid without providing reasons to FIFA (FIFA, 2007b). Brazil remained the sole candidate and was selected to host the tournament on 30 October 2007 after forwarding the required bid documentation and guarantees to FIFA (FIFA, 2007a). In the same year, FIFA’s rotation principle was abandoned. For FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, ‘the rotation principle has served its purpose and has enabled us to award our most prestigious competition to Africa for the first time’ (FIFA, 2007d).

FIFA’s decision to award the 2014 event to Brazil was met with little surprise in the Brazilian press. Mainstream newspapers and Internet websites highlighted the fact that Brazil would be hosting the tournament for the first time in over 60 years. The hosting of the 2014 event would also provide Brazil with the opportunity of erasing the ‘national trauma’ and painful memories of losing the 1950 final to Uruguay (Folha Online, 2007d; Veja, 2007). The ‘national trauma’ remains present in the Brazilian football memory and was one of the first themes highlighted in the hosting of the tournament. It is remembered not only by the media, but also this emotional memory has been reinforced through the last 30 years by the Brazilian intelligentsia, especially rooted in authors such as DaMatta (1982a, 1982b) and Guedes (2009). It is also present in literacy and sport chronicles (Galeano, 2004; Máximo, 1999; Nogueira et al., 1994; Perdigão, 1986; Rodrigues Filho, 2003). FIFA and Blatter in particular expressed delight at the Brazilian bid. Blatter noted Brazil’s distinguished World Cup history in having won the tournament an unprecedented five times with great players. For Brazilian commentators this illustrious history now meant a greater responsibility as Brazil is hosting the event (Estadão, 2007; Folha Online, 2007a, 2007e; Globo Esporte, 2007).

The former president of the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF), Ricardo Teixeira, emphasised the ‘historical conquest’ and the expectation and promise of a well-organised event. Stadium construction would be funded by private investments, while the tournament would provide visible impacts on the economy, society and tourism (Estadão, 2007; Folha Online, 2007a, 2007f). Former Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, stated the tournament would showcase the capacity of the Brazilian people and the country’s economic power (Folha Online, 2007f; Globo Esporte, 2007). Two years later, the same president successfully bid for a similar ‘unique opportunity’ reinforcing the Brazilian economic and political momentum to host the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Silva, 2009). After these events, Brazil will join Mexico (1968–1970), Germany (1972–1974) and the USA (1994–1996) as a country that hosted these two mega-events within a two-year interval. Considering that the Brazilian sporting governing bodies working on these bidding processes have a history of rivalry instead of partnership (Coelho et al., 2009), the involvement and support of the Brazilian government in both cases reveals its appreciation of the opportunity to enhance its international image and prestige (see Roche, 2000).

For the FIFA World Cup, the expected investments in stadium construction and urban infrastructure were projected to be between US$9 billion (Estadão, 2007) and US$10 billion (Folha Online, 2007c). From this amount, US$1.1 billion would be used to upgrade and build stadiums. Eighteen Brazilian cities showed interest in hosting matches. Fourteen stadiums would be redeveloped, while four new stadiums would be built. In May 2009, it was announced that 12 cities would host the tournament (Globo Esporte, 2007; Estadão, 2007; Folha Online, 2007b, 2009). Since then, 12 stadiums have been prepared to host the matches. Among them, seven are completely new and five are being refurbished (Gecopa, 2013).

The initial euphoria that greeted the decision to award Brazil the right to host the 2014 event was followed by a growing scepticism and systematic and widespread criticism across Brazilian society. Greater media coverage of the criticisms of the Brazilian World Cup took place from 2010 onwards (Bezerra et al., 2011; Ferrari et al., 2011; Mezzaroba et al., 2011). Possibly following the South Africa preparations to host the event in 2010, Brazilian academics started to raise their own concerns. A conference of the Brazilian College of Sport Sciences took place the following year and was an important starting point and forum to discuss these concerns (Colégio Brasileiro de Ciências do Esporte (CBCE), 2011). Political mobilisation began earlier in 2009, when a subcommittee in the national parliament was created to follow, supervise and control the public funding of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The formation of the subcommittee was a result of the perceived passivity of local government with regards to the event and a counter to the powers of the former president of the CBF and the local organising committee, Ricardo Teixeira. The subcommittee has proposed to map the needs and costs of necessary infrastructure. Its composition was made up of a majority of government representatives, although the opposition filled the board of director positions. Public hearings were held with several public and private institutions responsible for the economy, tourism, infrastructure, industry and sport.

A report of these hearings was launched in 2010, in the same year as the presidential election. In Silvio Torres, a member of the opposition party and deputy, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), who had led a series of investigation against Teixeira reported on the findings. Torres stated ‘[…] that neither the Brazilian government nor Brazilian Football Confederation were concerned with formulating a strategic plan to prepare the country for the world’s biggest media event’ (Brasil, 2010: 13). In this sense, the strategic plan would set the rationale and main actions to be done in order to better explore the opportunity of hosting the event. While the report highlighted some of the concerns with the progress of infrastructural developments, it also noted that the decision to host the event was ‘unquestionable, [and a…] smart way to leverage the country’s economy’ (Brasil, 2010: 147–153). Moreover, the report suggested 19 recommendations that included initiatives for operative oversight and transparency on the use of funding and a joint committee among public and private institutions at the levels of the city, state and federation for better organisation (Brasil, 2010).

As a possible consequence, a matrix of responsibilities was created in 2010 that would consider agreements for cost sharing and financing. Initially, investments for stadium construction stood at US$2.7billion. According to the Syndicate of Engineering and Architecture (Sinaenco), US$1.7billion would be funded by the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES), US$0.6 billion by the 12 State Governments, US$212 million by the District and Municipal Governments and US$121 million by the private sector (Sinaenco, 2010). By November 2011, the costs of stadium construction rose to US$3.4billion (Gecopa, 2011). Moreover, the Brazilian government allocated US$7 billion for infrastructural developments such as airport, port and transport construction. In addition, US$2.1 billion will be funded by State Governments, Districts, Municipalities and private concerns (Gecopa, 2011).

According to the Brazilian Government (Brasil, 2012), after the approval of the matrix of responsibilities the works on the first planning cycle were expected to start in 2010. The second planning cycle includes ‘projects of infrastructure support and services’ on security, tourism infrastructure, telecommunications and computer technology, energy and environmental sustainability, and the country’s publicity was to start in 2011. The third cycle, referred to as ‘operation and specific actions’ and including broader infrastructural developments of airport and port operations, transport and urban mobility, energy supply, health, prevention and emergency and temporary structures, was also expected to start in 2011. In all instances, in 2012 the three planning cycles were still being discussed (Brasil, 2012).

The delays in the construction work for 2014 have received widespread national and international media coverage and FIFA have aired their dissatisfaction. Organisations from broader civil society have, however, raised different concerns. The Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics is an initiative of organised social movements, universities and other entities that are represented in a national committee and locally in the 12 host cities. The agenda of the movement consists of nine items that include the following: popular participation in decision making; transparency; access to information for planning, budgeting and execution; labour and humanitarian rights (in relation to evictions, removals and performance of informal workers); social legacies; expansion of social rights; opposition to the amendment of laws, which has been called the ‘state of exception’; and the defence of a broader sporting and cultural politics (Portal Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas, 2012). The protests are visible but remain marginal. Information, protests and complaints are circulated primarily through the Internet by means of social media and the use of critical video.¹ Historically disadvantaged citizens from poor areas, the homeless, informal workers and indigenous people are visible through the protests. The initial euphoria of hosting the event is now being replaced with dissatisfaction and resistance from those directly affected by removals, for example (Romero, 2012).

Conclusion

Post-colonial studies are useful in analysing sports mega-events in the global south as opposed to the manner in which they are understood and enacted in other parts of the world. On the one hand, by considering Brazil and South Africa, both very unequal societies, hosting mega-events highlights this social paradox. On the other, sport mega-events in South Africa and Brazil expose conflicts and concerns related to the commercialisation and dominance of sport governing bodies. Local problems become evident and are highlighted. Yet as mega-events are spread around the world, we need to understand this logic in relation to stakeholder decisions by FIFA and the officials within the host countries themselves.

In the case of FIFA’s decision to grant South Africa the right to host the 2010 World Cup, the local organisers had to counteract the negative press coverage and racist stereotypes of the ability of Africans more generally in hosting the event (Tomlinson et al., 2009, see also Darby, 2002; Jennings, 2007). In addition, South African problems of crime and inequality were extensively reported in the international press, while FIFA and the South African organisers counteracted this reporting by focusing on the developmental goals of the World Cup. When South African social problems were branded, the interest of expanding the FIFA market was not focused. The South African Government stated that the tournament would ‘speed up development and growth in the country’ (quoted in Cornelissen et al., 2011: 305). In the lead up to the decision to award South Africa the right to host the event, Moroccan and South African bid teams emphasised the importance of Africa hosting the event and that the respective countries would be able to showcase the African continent to the European and North American markets (Alegi, 2001; Bolsmann, 2010; Cornelissen, 2004; Cornelissen and Swart, 2006).

In the case of Brazil, there are similarities in the developmental discourse espoused by the local organisers with those used in South Africa’s 2010 bid. The Brazilian organisers focused on the continental dimensions of their campaign in which the country’s emerging economic power is seen as crucial in the ability to host the event. In addition, the investment in infrastructure in Brazil is central. The World Cup’s importance has accelerated urban projects, including the construction of new stadiums and airports (see Andranovich et al., 2001). The Brazilian bid initially suggested private funds would be used to develop stadiums. However, public funding represented 89% of investments in FIFA World Cup arenas (Cruz, 2012). This has raised concerns with the Brazilian public more generally and organisations such as the People’s Committee of the World Cup. The Committee has highlighted the unnecessary public spending on the event and the structural inequalities that are perpetuated and maintained through the funding of the tournament.

A clear division has emerged between those in favour and those against the hosting of the 2014 event. On the one hand, government and representatives of large transnational corporations and companies directly and indirectly show support of the event. Their discourse is based on the ideas of unconditional development as the main consequence of the event. On the other hand, academics and printed mainstream press and television have posed questions in terms of the allocation of public investments. Mega-events on the scale of the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games are new phenomena in Brazilian society. The Pan American Games (2007) raised concerns on social spending and mega-events (see Curi et al., 2011). Yet, academic work that effectively analyses this and considers social movements needs to still take place. With rare exceptions, this situation has been the root but at the same time the gap presented by members of the ‘scientific and academic intelligentsia’, as opposed to official discourse or voices (Marchi et al., in press).

The comparison of South Africa and Brazil allows us to identify three main themes. Firstly, the reality that sustains mega-events is markedly different from the original reasons. As emerging states, both countries officially communicate sporting mega-events as catalysts for social development against the backdrop of enormous public spending that generates significant profit for private organisations. The local development is seen as a tangible motive to promote the event, as other symbolic outcomes would not justify the levels of public expenditure. Moreover, a belief founded on a series of patriotic and nationalistic sentiments emphasises the importance of giving an opportunity to these countries to host mega-events. The events serve as a showcase for these states and an opportunity to project desired images and messages to the rest of the world. These can in turn have positive outcomes, albeit temporary ones (Manzenreiter, 2010). Secondly, local organising committees, elites and the mainstream media justify the reasons for hosting mega-events. They tend to be rhetorical in which citizens are expected to support the expenditure of significant amounts of public finance on a month-long spectacle. Yet the FIFA World Cup, in the South African case at least, was only accessible to a small segment of the local population (Bolsmann, 2012). Thus FIFA serves the interests of the elites underwritten by significant public funding (Maguire and Young, 2002). Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) and Jennings (2007) show how FIFA controls and exploits the world game for its narrow commercial interests. By considering South Africa, this trend is even more apparent and evident. Existing inequalities were reinforced within South Africa, as areas with developed infrastructure received further investment at the expense of areas that remain underdeveloped and marginalised (Cronjé et al., 2010). Finally, many South Africans had access to the World Cup through the medium of television and radio. They too are able consume the event as will Brazilians in 2014. Yet this is underpinned by rhetoric of legacy, which remains elusive, intangible and peripheral.

Footnotes

Funding

This research was undertaken without grants from public, commercial or non-profit funding agencies.

Notes

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