Abstract
Amidst recent clarion calls for ‘transformative action’ within the sociology of sport, in this paper we consider the prospects of the field with respect to challenging social injustices and inequities. We reflect on how the sociology of sport has developed in a manner that now privileges the idiographic over the nomothetic, qualitative over quantitative methods and social constructionism over scientism. Although we acknowledge the strengths of these ways of knowing, we argue that the resulting marginalization of quantitative methods and associated scepticism towards the biological sciences may potentially limit the ability of the sociology of sport to make a difference. We subsequently draw on select feminist activists and affect theorists to consider how methodological border crossings might enhance possibilities for challenging social injustices. We proffer that it is timely to reevaluate the field’s epistemological orthodoxies in order to have greater political impact.
Keywords
In this paper we consider the capacity of the sociology of sport to play an active role in challenging injustices and creating broader social impact. There have been recent calls arguing, ‘that the work of sociologists of sport should make a difference’ (Donnelly, 2015: 422). To help make more of a difference, scholars have recently promoted various strategies. Chalip (2015: 400), for example, has advocated greater use of ‘action research’ as he believes that the ‘sociology of sport will be served by greater attention to application’. Elling (2015: 432), on the other hand, was concerned that social change associated with gender and sport was ‘slow’ and that this was related to the limited diversity in theoretical and methodological frameworks. Elling correspondingly advocated for greater use of mixed methods research. Sugden (2015: 609), meanwhile, argued for sociologists of sport to ‘climb down from the fence’ and be active in ‘designing and organising forms of social and political activism’.
These authors have not been alone in recent calls for transformative action and greater public engagement (see also Atkinson, 2011; Bairner, 2009, 2012; Carrington, 2007; Donnelly and Atkinson, 2015; Giardina and Laurendeau, 2013; Newman, 2013; Silk et al., 2010). Such calls for a turn toward political engagement reflect broader appeals across the social sciences to engage with wider audiences by means of ‘public sociology’ (e.g. Burawoy, 2005; Calhoun, 2005). Journalist-critic David Zirin (2008) has also issued an appeal to ‘[call] sport sociology off the bench’ by means of public engagement. Thus, recognition of the current limits of the impacts of the field, and the need to ‘make a difference’, have come from multiple sources.
Advocates of disciplinary reformulation under the guise of physical cultural studies (PCS) (although not without criticism, see Adams et al., 2015) have also championed public intellectualism and political engagement (see Andrews, 2008; Silk and Andrews, 2011). Yet the promoters of PCS have also framed their critique, as Vertinsky (2015: 394) noted, to directly ‘challenge … the hegemony of science currently in place within kinesiology’. The desire to challenge the scientific dominance stemmed from Andrews’ (2008: 45) concern about the broader epistemological hierarchies that privilege science over the humanities, positivism over post-positivism, and ‘predictive over interpretive ways of knowing’. Despite advocating multi-paradigm work, Andrews (2008) emphasised only qualitative research tools to make a difference. This emphasis was echoed by Silk et al. (2010) and Silk and Andrews (2011).
Although we identify as ‘critical’ qualitative researchers it was our concern about the PCS advocacy of only selective qualitative research methods that spurred our desire to contribute to discussions concerning strategies to generate broader social impact. We questioned that if the socio-cultural examination of sport is already dominated by qualitative research, then how could the promotion of greater use of qualitative research make a difference? 1 That is, we questioned whether ‘more of the same’ would make a greater impact? We were also concerned with how our colleagues in the broader field of kinesiology would react to Silk and Andrews’ (2011: 20) advocacy of a ‘continued assault on scientific based, biomedical models of research’. Similar to Vertinsky (2015), we questioned if such an assault could marginalize rather than promote the value of the socio-cultural analysis of sport. Silk and Andrews (2011: 28) even warned that the PCS ‘scholar may face difficulty with publication, tenure, funding, and may face ridicule from disciplinarians in regard to superficiality…’. Such warnings do not bode well for the prospects of positioning our field to make a difference.
We divide our paper into three sections. First, we consider the epistemological hierarchies that currently characterize the sociology of sport. We suggest that these hierarchies are in opposition to those that dominate in kinesiology, that is, the idiographic dominates over the nomothetic, qualitative over quantitative methods and social constructionism over scientism. In recognition that these existing hierarchies are the results of the workings of power, rather than a planned and calculated ‘field’ strategy, we provide an abridged and necessarily selective account of their emergence within the sociology of sport. In the second section we consider the impacts of critical qualitative sociological research under the dominance of these hierarchies. Although this is a difficult and clearly imprecise task, we suggest our ‘field’ has limitations in its ability to make a difference.
In the third section, we argue that if we desire our research and teaching to play an active role in public life, it is necessary to think innovatively about the research and communication strategies that we draw upon. With this in mind, we consider the work of critical pedagogues, affect theorists and select feminists to illustrate that there could be benefit in encouraging greater methodological and theoretical diversity. Similar to Elling (2015), we suggest that there might be value in promoting greater use of quantitative, mixed method and interdisciplinary research approaches with the natural sciences. We acknowledge that our call runs counter to the epistemological orthodoxies in the field, and we feel a certain discomfort in doing so, yet as Massumi (2002) suggests, it is only through the promotion of differing frameworks of thinking and ways of knowing that social and disciplinary changes can occur.
Reflecting on sociology of sport orthodoxies
Even a cursory reading of the leading journals in the field reveals the dominance of qualitative approaches and critical theorizing. Dart’s (2014) content analysis of 25 years of publication in the field’s three leading journals revealed it as having developed with clear patterns of emphasis, yet in highly uneven ways. The breadth of topics of analysis, type of sports analysed, methods, use of theorists and geographical spread of research, for instance, are heavily skewed. His identification of dominant theoretical approaches (e.g. as linked to feminist scholarss, Foucault, Bourdieu, Marx, Elias and postmodernists) confirm the prevalence of critical traditions grounded in subjectivist epistemologies and oriented around advocacy frameworks. In terms of epistemological orthodoxies, it is clear that subjectivity trumps objectivity, the idiographic dominates the nomothetic, and interpretivism overrides essentialism and/or scientism.
Our question is whether these current disciplinary hierarchies serve the sociology of sport productively in order to make a difference? This question is inspired, in part, by Massumi (2002), who was concerned that the dominance of critical theory within sociology has become repetitive and uninventive to the point that the insights primarily reflect the theoretical framework they were interpreted through. Sedgwick (2003) raised similar concerns about the contemporary state of critical theory by arguing, in part, that critical theorists have become paranoid about the use of the ‘correct’ social theory with the apparent aim of (re)discovering the extent of various social prohibitions. She suggested that under the guise of this form of ‘paranoid’ theorizing, critical research becomes protectionist rather than expansionist. For instance, Sedgwick argued that critical researchers have learnt to reject social research that has any links to essentialist ideas. Yet she illustrated that if essentialism was the only rationale for rejection, then such rejection might reflect the problematic disposal of the ‘baby with the bath water’. Sedgwick’s broad aim was not to promote essentialism but to challenge critical researchers to challenge their own thinking. In a similar manner to Sedgwick and Massumi, we are interested to reflect on the hierarchies within the sociology of sport, not simply to challenge thinking, but with the desire to think about how the sub-discipline could have greater social and/or political impact.
We suggest that the extant critical orthodoxies can be understood as sets of binaries that work to privilege, and potentially silence, particular topics and ways of knowing and writing, and hence particular political possibilities. The social constructionism/biological determinism opposition, as an example, works to marginalize discussion concerning the biological body: to suggest that hormones might play a role in shaping gender or sexuality risks a sociologist of sport being positioned as a biological essentialist (see Thorpe, 2014). To be clear, there are good reasons for sociologists to be sceptical of essentialism in favour of constructionism. Our concern, however, is that existing epistemological hierarchies may work to close off conversations and topics of analysis, and limit diverse research approaches. As such, we argue that our predominant epistemological beliefs may be a factor that limits our ability to make a difference. 2
In the following section, we offer an abridged account of the emergence of the critical hierarchies within the field. Whilst more extensive accounts of the uneven and complicated intersections of politics, epistemology, theory and method in the field’s emergence are available (e.g. Ingham and Donnelly, 1997; Loy and Sage, 1997; Malcolm, 2014; Rowe et al., 1997), we selectively focus upon the institutionalization of sports criticism.
A sketch of the growth of select epistemological hierarchies
Articles in the first year of publication of the International Review for the Sociology of Sport (IRSS) in 1966 reflect the nascent field as drawing on history, pedagogy, philosophy, leisure studies and sociology. Despite these broad disciplinary roots, the contents were shaped by the language and ethos of the scientific method, as researchers aspired to construct generalizable ‘truths’ in an objective manner. By the 1970s, sub-disciplinary fragmentation had been consolidated with the development of professional organizations, journals and conferences with ‘sociologists of sport’ largely operating under umbrella ‘fields’ (e.g. physical education, kinesiology, human movement studies and sport and exercise science). As Malcolm (2014) argues, the subsequent construction of the field as a ‘profession’ was contested, nuanced and was neither logical, inevitable nor consensual. He identified the key characteristics of the initial development as: distancing from roots in physical education as a means of validation; a narrowed scope of analysis on sport rather than broader conceptions of physical culture and/or leisure; and a restricted breadth of analysis precluding, for example, social psychological questions. Concomitant to this development was to some extent, and with regional variations, a distancing from social activism and applied work, which lacked credibility within the academy in the context of an emerging sub-discipline fighting for status, resources and intellectual legitimacy. The contemporary dominance of critical qualitative research emerged in relation to the development of a nascent field, faced with a need to establish institutional and intellectual capital.
Early approaches to qualitative research took place under the shadow of the dominance of positivism. By the 1980s, however, advocates of qualitative research were promoting paradigms underpinned by different ontological and epistemological tenets and with differing ways of judging the value or legitimacy of research. Donmoyer (2002) argued that the notion of paradigm incommensurability was initially crafted and promoted by qualitative researchers in relation to Kuhn’s (1962) thesis on the structure of scientific revolutions. He suggested that this occurred as a strategy to justify alternative qualitative paradigms. Donmoyer argued further that this argument was promoted with intent to intimate that a paradigm revolution was underway and that positivism, as presumably inferior, would end up as an interesting chapter in the history of social research. Yet, as Lather (2006) subsequently illustrated, paradigm proliferation and blurring (at least between the interpretivist, critical and postmodern paradigms) occurred rather than revolutionary consolidation as Kuhn surmised.
Paradigmatically, although one could (on occasion) mix qualitative and quantitative research methods, within this shift the positivist and constructivist paradigms were deemed to be incompatible (Sparkes, 1992). The following observations from Hall (1988: 335–336), concerning feminist cultural studies, were symptomatic of the promotion of paradigm incommensurability and the associated desire for establishing superiority of the critical paradigm at this juncture:
Those advocating a critical sport sociology (e.g., Marxists, socialists, feminists, cultural theorists) are at odds with the idealist/positivist paradigm because of its inability to recognize its own ideology, and with the social definition paradigm because of its seemingly apolitical stance to the social world. . . . There has to be some paradigm resolution here, although admittedly the ideological differences between the idealist/positivist paradigm and the others is so great that we must settle for a more unified, theoretically informed, critical sociology of sport.
Such shifts as advocated by Hall were symptomatic of a broader critical turn toward ideologically invested, theoretically-driven approaches within the sociology of sport commencing during the late 1970s and 1980s, and characterized by calls to ‘take sides’ and indeed, propelled by the enduring and earnest commitments of many researchers to generate social change.
Reflecting upon the critical and qualitative turn, Heinemann and Preuss’s (1990) content analysis of IRSS reveals that the use of qualitative methods grew dramatically during the late 1980s. They also concluded that the shift towards qualitative research was associated with an ‘increased interest in the clarification of conceptual problems and (even more so) in methodological problems (but) has led to a drop in practice-orientation and application’ (p. 11). Thus the critical qualitative turn was associated to some extent with a turn away from a practice orientation and concomitantly the real-politik of practical engagement. The embrace of postmodernist sensibilities further pushed sports scholarship toward more diverse methods/approaches. Yet critics suggested that esoteric topics and language, an overly philosophical focus and political ambiguity were the prices to pay for the new conceptual terrain (see, for example, Hargreaves, 2004; Malcolm, 2012; Morgan, 1995).
Under this impetus, explicitly theorized, critical qualitative approaches that were premised on an ideological investment in social justice were valued throughout the 1990s as a preferential option, with methodological approaches that avoided the pitfalls of a naïve (and male centric) positivism and offered hope for radical social transformation (e.g. see Denzin and Giardina, 2006). Critical sport scholars and qualitative methods subsequently forged a seemingly ‘natural’ alliance. It was also during the 1980–1990s that social constructionism and interpretivism came to dominate throughout the wider social sciences/humanities and essentialist/scientific understandings of humans became a topic of critique. Sedgwick and Frank (1995) asserted that during this time critical social researchers actively distanced themselves from biological knowledge as a strategy to legitimate their research amongst fellow critics. They claimed that, ‘the distance of any such (critical) account from a biological basis is assumed to correlate almost precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference (individual, historical, and cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative force, and to the possibility of change’ (p. 496). Such critiques, if entertained, provide for uncomfortable reflection on the part of social scientists. Indeed, positivism became a term of some derision. Cultural anthropologist Roscoe (1995: 492) similarly reported that critiques of the scientific method led to a situation where positivism, within some academic circles, was transformed from ‘a term once synonymous with progressive liberalism into one of pejorative conservativism’.
Two practical constraints arose in this regard according to Bairner (2009). First, there is a problem for academics seeking roles as public intellectuals as they are so far removed from the ‘oppressed’. Second, they lack kudos and credibility amongst sports advocates (e.g. fans, administrators, journalists) who enjoy the emotional engagement and pleasures of sport, which academic critics at times appear to disdain. Hence, they lack capital amongst those they aim to empower through practical and policy interventions.
In this section, we have offered a brief and necessarily incomplete genealogy of the field to illustrate that critical theorizing and qualitative research approaches have become dominant due to an array of interlinked factors, including chance, 3 paradigmatic arguments and the workings of power. Although we consider ourselves critical-qualitative researchers, we also believe it is important to reflect on the political and applied impact of the existing epistemological hierarchies. In the following section we consider the complex question: ‘how successful has the critical sociological study of sport been, under the dominance of the critical-qualitative shift, in encouraging social change?’
Judging the impact of critical-qualitative research within sport sociology
Ascertaining the impact of critical sport sociology is fraught with complexity and is rarely undertaken. In one of the few discussions of the issue, Donnelly and Atkinson (2015) suggest that sociologically informed research has informed public debate and progressive social change in multiple ways. They suggest that systematic quantitative research has hastened racial integration in sports, heightened leadership opportunities for women, and helped sensitise media to stereotyping. They also claim a more general success in combatting quixotic notions of sport as a ‘universal panacea’ (p. 374) and promoter of social good. Finally, they suggest research regarding sport as a site of social reproduction has influenced ‘social equity movements, campaigns, initiatives and policies’ (p. 376) that have helped ‘bring about the democratization of participation’ (p. 376). Donnelly and Atkinson, however, clearly acknowledge that protest actions such as the Civil Rights Movement ‘prodded’ (p. 372) or provided the initial research inspiration for examining social injustices.
Arguments have also been made, however, that the critical messages of sport sociologists do not always circulate widely. Donnelly and Atkinson (2015: 370) themselves note the limits of ‘critical theorizing’ and the ‘failure to launch a public sociology of sport at least in the United States’. They are critical of scholarship where it is limited to ‘the deployment of acerbic thought, proffered discourse on the inequities of cultural domination, a vivisection of structural inequality, or a disembodied rhetoric demanding social change’ (p. 370). On the limits of the field’s impact, Atkinson (2011: 136) reported, as an example, that: ‘[r]arely are issues in sport and exercise presented in introductory sociology textbooks, and social scientific funding agencies around the globe continued [sic] to be puzzled by the academic merit/provided/point of the sociology of sport’. In a similar manner, Zirin (2008) lamented that very few sport sociologists circulate their critical ideas within public forums and in accessible and meaningful ways.
These broad claims (e.g. Atkinson, 2011; Donnelly and Atkinson, 2015; Zirin, 2008) intimate that the critical messages stemming from sociologists of sport often circulate narrowly but can, in some cases, ‘eventually’ become ‘public knowledge’ even in the ‘absence of any formal knowledge translation system’ (Donnelly and Atkinson, 2015: 372). The key point here is that planned and systematic ways of transferring (accessible) knowledge to the public are likely to have more social impact. Accordingly, it is primarily sport scholar activists that have had a more direct influence in shaping, or attempting to shape, sporting policy/practices and the public consciousness. Whilst it is possibly fraught with danger to cite selective examples, Booth (2015) identifies the following scholar activists as examples of those who have made a difference: Bruce Kidd, Colin Tatz, Richard Lapchick, Pat Griffin, Colin King, Celia Brakenridge, Cheryl Roberts and Ashwin Desai. 4
More recently, an increasing number of scholars are circulating critical messages via twitter and blogs yet little is known about the impact of such actions (e.g. who they communicate with and what impact this has). Furthermore it is significant to be aware, as Atkinson (2011) noted, that the task of being a scholar-activist is currently constrained given that (neo-liberal) university administrators measure academic outputs along traditional lines.
Sociologists of sport who are not activists do have direct ability to circulate critical sporting knowledge amongst undergraduate students. But how do these students interpret these critical sport messages and how does it affect them? Yet again these are difficult questions to answer and they have rarely been examined. A number of such studies, however, have taken place within sport pedagogy (e.g. Curtner-Smith and Sofo, 2004; Devís-Devís and Sparkes, 1999; Hickey, 2001; Macdonald and Brooker, 2000). The results do not provide a sense of optimism that critical pedagogy in university teaching effectively promotes social change. Curtner-Smith and Sofo (2004), for example, examined the influence of the delivery of a critically oriented physical education module and associated teaching practice to pre-service teachers (PTs). They concluded that their pedagogical attempts to transform student understandings in relation to ‘elitism, racism, classism, and sexism appeared to have virtually no impact on them at all’ (p. 134). 5
Tinning (2002: 232), in the face of similarly disappointing findings, concluded that critical pedagogues should acknowledge the ‘partial, provisional, and often contradictory positions from which individuals make sense of (their) world’. For some students, the critical message could, as an example, resonate with existing beliefs and values and act to encourage desire to challenge social injustices. For others, however, the critical messages could even turn them off the very issues being promoted (Tinning, 2002). And, as Devís-Devís and Sparkes (1999) found, exposure to critical messages can cause inner tension for some.
This critical pedagogical research paints a somewhat pessimistic view of the impact associated with imparting critical perspectives to students. Although teachers of the sociology of sport can all likely identify individuals who have been shaped by critical messages, perhaps our broader impact on the majority of students may be more modest. In a similar manner, we speculate (as it is very difficult to know with any certainty) that the impact of our well intentioned critical research may also be modest, given questions have been raised about how far our voices circulate and the paucity of formal knowledge translation mechanisms. We suggest, then, that if one of the prime ambitions of the sociology of sport is to play an active role in challenging injustices then we need to think more strategically about achieving such aims. In the following section, we initiate discussion on this issue by examining one potential strategy as associated with crossing and blurring academic boundaries.
Border crossings as one potential political strategy
In this section we consider the possibilities of promoting quantitative and interdisciplinary (specifically between the social and natural sciences) research, via the metaphor of border crossing, as one potential strategy for making a difference. In making this call we are not suggesting that the dominance of qualitative research be replaced by quantitative. In contrast, we are arguing that there could be benefits in having greater methodological diversity and in attempting to forge greater alliances with the natural sciences. Given that our promotion of such research methods might be unpopular, we detail our inspiration and rationale.
Firstly, we acknowledge Grossberg’s (1997) argument that if one’s broad desire is to confront injustices and promote social transformation then it makes sense to use whatever approaches and research methods/tools that have the greatest likelihood of achieving such radical aims. Secondly, as Donnelly and Atkinson (2015: 371) noted, ‘the application of “normal science” by sociologists of sport – observation, problematization, systematic measurement, and interpretation – has led to some of the most striking insights and social changes …’. Thirdly, we have been inspired by select feminist activists, who recommend the use of quantitative methods as strategies to help induce social change, and from select affect theorists and new-materialists who draw from the biological sciences and sociology. Relatedly, a broader justification for undertaking interdisciplinary research has rested on the assumption that ‘disciplinary research has become too narrowly specialized’ (Krishnan, 2009: 2), parochial and is now providing ‘diminishing returns’. In the following, we examine why some feminists have advocated for the use of quantitative methods and why some affect theorists have promoted interdisciplinary approaches.
Our prime argument in promoting quantitative and interdisciplinary (socio-cultural/scientific) research relates to the reality that these distinct research ‘tools’ remain marginal and we believe that this marginality is linked back to the postmodern shift that occurred in the 1990s. By drawing on an array of feminist and affect theorists we hope to illustrate how some critical researchers have challenged prevailing ‘postmodern’ epistemological assumptions in attempts to make a difference.
After 20 years of feminist/activist scholarship, Bloom and Sawin (2009: 333) reflected: ‘Attempting to achieve the research ideals can lead to intractable dilemmas or exhausted cynicism, even despair, about the possibility of living up to our expectations for improving the social conditions of those we study’. In recognition of the potential for despair they reflexively detailed strategies for undertaking critical activist research and identified ‘“sites of possibilities” to leverage social and policy change’ (p. 333). Importantly, Bloom and Sawin recognised the ability ‘to communicate … analyses in ways that will reach policy makers and influence social policy’ (p. 342) as the most significant aspect of their critical work but also the most difficult to achieve. To enhance the possibilities of achieving this they encouraged researchers to develop new writing styles (e.g. turning academic papers into effective policy briefs), forge new circulation networks and accept that this form of activism will take time away from other ‘academic’ activities.
Although Bloom and Sawin (2009) did not specifically detail what types of ‘new writing styles’ they thought were effective we suspect they were referring to the use of a ‘quasi objective’ report style as complemented by the use of numerical data. In a review of feminist methodologies, for example, Fonow and Cook (2005: 2226) stated: ‘Perhaps the largest body of feminist writing about the use of numerical data and quantitative analysis concerns its potential to influence public policy at local, federal, and international levels’. They added that this belief was:
… predicated on the understanding that governments and policy makers are less attentive to the concerns of individuals, as reflected in qualitative work … and that quantitative research is needed to measure the extent of social and political problems … as well as their prevalence… Large-scale surveys have the power to alter public opinion in ways that a smaller number of in-depth interviews do not… (p. 2226)
Nightingale (2003) similarly called for critical researchers to adopt the usage of qualitative and quantitative methods. Inspired by Haraway’s (1991) radical call for the indispensability of statistics for feminist projects, Nightingale (2003: 86) suggested that ‘it is vital for scholars concerned with issues of power, positionality and hegemony to engage with this kind of work in order to exert influence within policy and development circles where positivist, statistical “scientific” research continues to be dominant’.
The promotion of critical approaches that draw on qualitative and quantitative paradigms is not new. Denzin and Lincoln (2005: 7) acknowledge, for example, that qualitative researchers can use a variety of methods including: ‘semiotics, narrative, content, discourse, archival and phonemic analysis, even statistics, tables, graphs, and numbers’. Moreover, the recognition of the complexity of social life has encouraged Fonow and Cook (2005: 2225) to suggest that ‘more complicated research methodologies, including designs that are multi-sited and transscalar, and can capture the ways political subjectivities constitute discourse, structure, and the material environment’ are required. They more pointedly stated: ‘It will take interdisciplinary teams of feminist researchers in different locations to carry out the types of research that our new conceptions of agency and activism demand’ (p. 2225).
Although many researchers have agreed, for many decades, that the idea of interdisciplinary research makes good sense, it remains marginal. 6 This is primarily because interdisciplinary research is difficult to do, as each discipline has its own language, epistemological beliefs and rules of legitimation. Particular concepts accordingly ‘cannot be simply borrowed across disciplines without mobilizing disciplinary boundary struggles’ (Papoulias and Callard, 2010: 50). Further, many researchers accept that quantitative and qualitative methods are indirectly linked to incommensurable paradigms and, therefore, the gulf between the use of quantitative and qualitative can, at times, appear too difficult to bridge. Yet, we are sympathetic to Fonow and Cook’s (2005: 2213) assertion that ‘innovative methods are derived from successful efforts to reconcile differences and even from those efforts that conclude that certain epistemological differences are irreconcilable’. Thus, in the interests of pursuing social justice it may be of value within the sociology of sport to reevaluate our epistemological and/or methodological hierarchies and be prepared to cross bridges between quantitative and qualitative research and the humanities and sciences.
To promote the possible advantages of interdisciplinary approaches, we draw on Krishnan’s (2009) framework for understanding three interdisciplinary research strategies: crossdisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. The most typical form of interdisciplinary research involves examining another discipline’s set of understandings/knowledges with respect to a particular phenomenon or by drawing on a concept or method used in one discipline and applying it to another (Krishnan, 2009). Krishnan referred to this approach as crossdisciplinarity. Crossdisciplinary borrowing, accordingly, demands a strong understanding of the ‘lender discipline’ (Krishnan, 2009: 4). Although developing this understanding can be difficult there are clear advantages for undertaking this task. Donmoyer (2006: 23), for example, argued that even if one subscribes to the notion of paradigm incommensurability, it is of pragmatic sense to at least read the work stemming from other paradigms that concern the same topic of examination. He explained:
In decision-oriented public policy fields, one must consider issues from a range of paradigmatic perspectives precisely because … what can be seen by examining the world through one perspective or paradigm may not be visible from the vantage point provided by another.
Probyn (2005: xiii) further argued for the benefits of crossdisciplinary research by illustrating in her exploration on ‘shame’ how knowledge from different disciplines can be innovatively appropriated and used:
Rather than dismissing or ignoring ideas about biology, psychology, and the innate nature of shame, let’s see what these ideas do. This is not to say that arguments about the physiology are any truer than those about its cultural expressions; it is to ask how very different ideas might mutually inflect and extend what we know.
The second strategy for conducting interdisciplinary research, multidisciplinarity, involves collaboration of researchers from differing disciplines to examine a common problem or to achieve a common goal (Krishnan, 2009). A prime exemplar of this form of research is found in the Tucker Center for Research on Girls and Women in Sport (2007). The broad aim of this multidisciplinary research centre is to explore the ‘multiplicity of ways in which physical activity and sports have become essential in the lives of girls’ (p. xv). Underpinned by feminist/activist aims the centre draws from sport sociology, psychology, exercise physiology and metabolic studies to produce a broad set of recommendations of ‘best practices’ to enhance the quality of girls’ lives.
Krishnan’s (2009) third strategy, interdisciplinarity, is more difficult to undertake. Yet in recent years some feminists (e.g. Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Grosz, 1994; Haraway, 1991), affect theorists (e.g. Nigel Thrift, Brian Massumi, Elspeth Probyn, Eve Sedgwick) and critical sport sociologists (e.g. see Markula and Kennedy, 2011; Thorpe, 2014) have undertaken such an approach by combining the biological sciences and sociology with critical intent. Although it is beyond the aims of this paper to examine such attempts in any depth, we are intrigued by Thrift’s (1994: 59) assertion that ‘distance from biology is no longer seen as a prime marker of social and cultural theory’ (p. 59) and that ‘naturalism and scientism are no longer seen as terrible sins’. We are intrigued as such claims do not appear to hold contemporary currency in the sociology of sport. Bairner (2012: 104) recently remarked, as an example: ‘At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the gulf between the natural and social sciences is arguably greater than ever before’. Yet we are concerned that this gulf (or epistemological hierarchy) could close off dialogue between the natural and social sciences, particularly with respect to how the ‘body’ is entangled in an array of social issues. Correspondingly, we concur with Douglas (1996: 112) who laments: ‘To assert that these fields (the natural sciences) have no contribution to make towards an understanding of the social “agency” of bodies is both dogmatic and unhelpful if the body is to become a meaningful presence in social theory’. In a similar vein, Probyn (2000: 14) turned to the biological sciences as a strategy to ‘revitalize studies of the body and sexuality’, as she was concerned that the body was ‘becoming reified in theory and losing its capacity to connect with other issues’.
The apparent turn to affect theorizings has been considered by Lijeström and Paasonen (2010) as a reaction to the limits of post-structuralist research, given its associated focus on the semantic and symbolic, which, they suggest, has marginalized analyses concerning the junctions between biology, affects and power. Although there are multiple definitions, affects are widely comprehended as originating from the body and unconsciously influencing how humans act/think/feel by inducing a particular state of being or experience of intensity. This intensity provides a desire to act but does not determine set actions. Affect can be linked to the thousands of sensations (e.g. sight, sound, smell, feelings of hunger) that continually impact and flow unconsciously through and around a body (Pringle, 2015).
Wetherell (2012: 2–3) suggested that affect theory ‘signifies a more extensive ontological and epistemological upheaval, marking a moment of paradigm change’. The turn to affect can be understood as an attempt to find new theoretical tools to understand and politically act within our complex social/biological world. Some sociologists might shudder at the thought of working within an interdisciplinary team that includes biologists, yet Vertinsky (2009: 48) pragmatically asserted that attempts to integrate ‘the humanities and sciences is less a matter of making the humanities more scientific than in showing how scientific inquiry can be improved when cultural embeddedness is explicitly examined, which is the hallmark of analysis in the humanities’.
Although we recognize pertinent critiques of affect theorizing (e.g. Grossberg, 2010; Papoulias and Callard, 2010; Wetherell, 2012), we also acknowledge that the tenets of affect theories could encourage critical reflection on the binaries of social constructionism/scientism and positivism/postmodernism. Such reflection may allow greater possibilities for sociologists of sport to productively collaborate with researchers in the natural sciences and engage with scientific knowledge as a challenge to the biology/sociology dualism, as similarly to Thorpe’s (2016) examination of biomedical technologies.
In this section, we have drawn on select feminist researchers and affect theorists to encourage greater consideration of the possibilities of undertaking quantitative and interdisciplinary research approaches. We are not suggesting that there is necessarily a mutual supportive relationship between quantitative and interdisciplinary research approaches. Nor are we suggesting that the use of quantitative or interdisciplinary research comes with any guarantees of making a difference. Yet given the desire to make a difference it seems critically strategic to use research tools that are better understood by the public and policy makers. Indeed, we believe it is clear that many are swayed by the power of numbers but struggle with deeply theoretical (post-structural/postmodern) arguments. We suggest that the use of quantitative research can therefore offer advantages in attempting to make a difference.
Similarly, rather than assaulting the biomedical sciences, attempts to work with biomedical researchers and influence their thinking could prove fruitful. As Vertinsky (2009) argued, sociologists of sport could benefit from undertaking interdisciplinary research as they could potentially gain access to greater research funds, disseminate research in broader academic circles and ensure that social issues and injustices are not ignored in science but underpin and inform the complete research process. Moreover, it is worth noting that despite years of sociological research raising issues concerned with masculinity, injury and heavy-contact sport, that it is biomedical research concerning concussion that has impacted the media and had the greatest impact in changing how American football is played and how many people play.
Final words
In light of recent clarion calls for transformative action we have sought to consider the challenging questions regarding the impact of sociology of sport research and prospects for research ‘making a difference’. To do so we have aimed to promote critical reflection on the broader epistemological hierarchies that have emerged to characterize the sociology of sport. These hierarchies privilege select critical-qualitative approaches. Although there is little doubt they have provided sophisticated and nuanced tools to reveal the social dynamics of physical culture, there are also limitations to the current orthodoxy. We have suggested that unless we can continue to challenge our thinking, we are potentially in danger of entrenching existing epistemological hierarchies, studying the same topics and drawing similar conclusions with potentially modest effect and diminishing returns. 7
These themes have been given renewed impetus by several authors, including those advocating a PCS approach that privileges select qualitative approaches and a particularly acerbic critique. In particular, Silk et al. (2010) offer a polemic against ‘evidence based’ objectivism and advocate a reorientation toward evaluating research based upon political investment. Whilst we share scepticism of the ways in which narrowly defined criteria of research evaluation are laden with power and can privilege particular power-knowledges, the privileging of the qualitative approaches they advocate may not best serve the field with the challenges of translating critique into transformation and social change in mind. Such concerns are also voiced by Giulianotti (2015: 71) who makes the case that: ‘there are no obvious reasons why quantitative methods cannot be fully utilized; indeed, there are many critical social scientists who utilize these methods to make similar arguments to PCS regarding relations of power and progressive social change’. To this end we have explored three options that involve paradigmatic border crossing. Whilst such approaches are laden with challenges, as we have detailed, they provide alternatives to the dominance of critical-qualitative approaches. Our underpinning aim has been to explore possibilities to be innovative and strategic in attempting to confront social injustices. In this respect we have followed Massumi (2002) who questioned: how can we expect to promote social change if we continue to use the same static framework of critical thinking to interpret social realities?
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Doug Booth, Richard Tinning and Holly Thorpe for useful feedback on earlier drafts.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
