Contingent nationalism: The genesis of ultras’ nationalist discourse

Introduction

Although the nationalism of ultras is a phenomenon which is vivid, it is not fully understood. Numerous studies from different countries, including Croatia (Perasović and Mustapić, 2018), Cyprus (Maniou, 2019), Greece (Zaimakis, 2018), Italy (Testa and Armstrong, 2010), Israel (Ben-Porat, 2006), Russia (Gloriozova, 2018), Romania (Faje, 2018), Serbia (Djordjević and Pekić, 2018), Spain (Spaaij and Viñas, 2005) and Turkey (Battini, 2012) provide detailed accounts of the current character of ultras’ nationalism. Yet the plenitude of research on the topic and its international diversity does not necessarily translate into a full understanding of the genesis of nationalism in football stands. While some studies propose several interpretations of its origins by connecting its development with some wider political processes, there is a considerable gap in regular empirical research focused on the processes which influenced the emergence of ultras’ nationalism and shaped its current form.

This article aims to bridge this gap by presenting the results of a study on the historical development of nationalism of Polish ultras. Nationalism is approached here as a discourse creating the meaning of nation (e.g. Billig, 1995; Łuczewski, 2012; Sutherland, 2005) by linking nation with different social constructs (ethnicity, language, territory, religion, etc.). The main objectives of the study are: (a) to reveal the processes shaping ultras’ nationalist discourse; and (b) to explain how it has been reproduced and institutionalised. By focusing on how culturally and institutionally driven practices have been creating and (re)producing nationalist discourse and thus the meaning of nation, the study follows the constructivist approach to nation (e.g. Billig, 1995; Brubaker, 1996; Fox, 2017; Łuczewski, 2012; Sutherland, 2005). It applies the post-foundational discourse analysis (PDA) (Martilla, 2015) as a new methodological approach in nation-building research. PDA defines discourse as a field which creates the meaning of an object and thus allows the conceptualisation of nation as a construct shaped by nationalist discourse. The range of the discourse is determined by its institutional materialisation as institutions regulate the cohesion and reproduction of practices of articulation. Considering that the meaning of nation can vary within different communities, it is clear that there is more than one nationalist discourse shaping it. Many studies (e.g. Djordjević and Pekić, 2018; Grodecki, 2020; Testa and Armstrong, 2010) show that football supporters create their own vision of nation. It is observed that they internalise nationalisms present in public discourse in a certain period and transform them into nationalisms distinctive for this social environment. This proves the existence of a distinctive nationalist discourse which creates the meaning of nation in the ultras circles. It also makes research on ultras potentially insightful for wider nationalism studies, as exploring this mechanism can reveal new processes shaping and reproducing nationalist discourse.

The Polish case was selected for three main reasons. Firstly, because nationalist performances are one of the main features of Polish ultras culture. Secondly, due to its relative homogeneity in terms of the current character of nationalism. This means that Polish ultras groups share a common vision of their nation, one that, in general terms, is described as conservative, anti-liberal, right-wing, xenophobic, with elements of deep historical sentiments (e.g. Chwedoruk, 2015; Kossakowski et al., 2020; Woźniak et al., 2019). This also means that there are no groups articulating alternative views on nation (left-wing or civic, for instance). However, this homogeneity has developed only in the past few years, which makes it possible to examine what processes contributed to the ‘victory’ of one particular form of nationalism in Polish football stands and its current reproduction within ultras groups. Thirdly, due to the availability of comprehensive data on ultras’ displays (choreographies, banners and flags), covering almost the entire period since the emergence of ultras culture in Poland, gathered by the nationwide fanzine of football supporters To My Kibice (We, the fans; TMK), which has published reports and pictures from every Ekstraklasa game (the top tier in Poland) since 2002. This creates a unique opportunity to examine the content of each nation-related display ever since, and thus to systematically analyse the development of ultras’ nationalist discourse.

The article opens with an overview of studies exploring the genesis of nationalism among ultras groups in different countries and research on contemporary nationalism of Polish ultras. It is followed by an explanation of theoretical approach to national discourse analysis applied in this study, and a presentation of the methods of data gathering. The next sections present the findings of the study – they discuss four forms of ultras’ nationalist discourse: nationalist discourse based on the skinhead subculture: a hotchpotch of symbols (2002–2005); the rise of historical memory (2006–2010); the materialisation of historical memory and the decline of Celtic Crosses (2011–2014); and nationalism as a response to external threat (since 2015). Their discussion leads to final conclusions.

Ultras’ nationalism

Existing studies point out several processes that contributed to the emergence of nationalism in ultras groups, which differ depending on local specifics. Firstly, the emergence of nationalism can be viewed as a reflection of a general sentiment in society struggling with an inefficient economy, which consequently developed a reluctant attitude towards the rising waves of immigrants (Guschwan, 2007: 254‒257). This has been the case of some ultras groups in Italy, whose nationalism takes the form of ‘romantic’ neo-fascism, stressing the resurgence of such traditional values as community and respect (Testa and Armstrong, 2010: 213). Secondly, ultras could internalise nationalism which was a dominant anti-communist ‘resistance ideology’ during the transformation period in post-communist countries, like in Serbia (Djordjević and Pekić, 2018) or in Russia (Gloriozova, 2018). Thirdly, the role of ethnic military conflict. This is mainly the case of countries involved in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where this borderline experience was conducive to the strong internalisation of ethnic identity (Djordjević and Pekić, 2018). Fourthly, some studies stress the role of the skinhead subculture, which had permeated football stands and postulated a revival of historical nationalisms (Gloriozova, 2018; Spaaij and Viñas, 2005; Zaimakis, 2018). The skinhead subculture influenced the ultras also in terms of nationalist symbols like the swastika, the Celtic cross or the skull, which are still to be seen in the stands in some countries (like Russia). Fifthly, the emergence of nationalism can stem from the efforts of ‘right-wing’ activists who infiltrate supporters’ groups. This is the case of Russian hooligan groups whose military code and anti-state attitudes created an open ground for extreme ideologies (Glathe, 2016). Sixthly, nationalism can result from top-down implementation. This is the case of countries like Greece (Zaimakis, 2018), Romania (Faje, 2018) or Turkey (Battini, 2012), where football was used by the political authorities as a means to disseminate state-produced national ideology.

The emergence of nationalist discourse in Polish football stands is linked with the influence of anti-communist nationalism (Grodecki, 2020) and the advent of the skinhead subculture in the late 1980s (Grodecki, 2018; Woźniak et al., 2019). The former stems from the wider socio-political context of Poland as a post-communist country. Although communism aimed to invalidate nationalisms in subjugated countries, its organisational logic reproduced and reinforced national sentiments: nationality – clearly distinguished from citizenship – became the basic social category used by the regime to control access to resources and positions. As a result, national identities were strongly internalised by the citizens of communist countries and further politicised by local (national) elites when the system began to crumble. As the only existing alternative, nation was used as an identity construct against communism, which gave rise to anti-communist nationalism. This form of nationalism offered only an empty national identity (i.e. without any normative postulates) used against communist ideology, and was a remedy for anomie left by communism in ethnically homogeneous countries (Brubaker, 1996). This gave rise to two principal Polish nationalist discourses which exist today: (new) anti-communist and post-communist (anti-anticommunist). The former is characterised by strong support for the 1989 systemic transformation and conservative views, and links nation with Catholic religiosity. The latter voices a more negative assessment of the transformation process, is less critical about the period of the People’s Republic of Poland and is associated with more liberal and left-wing views (Grabowska, 2004; Łuczewski, 2012). It is believed that anti-communist nationalism from the transformation period was internalised by organised supporter groups emerging at the time and became the linchpin of its current form. The skinhead subculture, on the other hand, had arrived in the late 1980s and spread among supporter groups across the country in the early 1990s. It contributed to the dissemination of national and fascist symbols in Polish football stands.

The current nationalism of Polish ultras culture is depicted as far-right-wing, xenophobic, with elements of deep historical sentiments (Woźniak et al., 2019), anti-liberal and conservative (Chwedoruk, 2015), exploiting traditional values for the reaffirmation of manhood (Kossakowski et al., 2018) and as a resistance ideology (Grodecki, 2020); it is also considered relatively homogeneous. This is often explained by the above-mentioned historical processes (i.e. the internalisation of anti-communist nationalism and the expansion of the skinhead subculture) and by anti-state protests before Euro 2012, which united football supporters. In these protests, ultras used conservative and nation-related values as a response to the neoliberal logic guiding the government’s legislative and policing actions against football supporters (Chwedoruk, 2015; Kossakowski et al., 2018). Other studies also suggest that this homogeneity is strengthened by wider institutional factors like the rooting of state nationalism in the educational system, weakness of left-wing political parties, and the impact of the Roman Catholic Church on politics (Woźniak et al., 2019: 14). Some authors also show the dominance of national identity over other identities in the world of Polish football fans (Kossakowski and Besta, 2018: 877). On the other hand, their nation-related displays take the form of ‘occasional nationalism’ (Grodecki, 2020), which means that they only appear in particular nation-related contexts and are less frequent than displays related to ultras’ culture and club rivalry.

In general, existing studies have identified the current characteristics of ultras’ nationalist discourses and some processes which could contribute to their emergence. However, due to the lack of comprehensive historical data, research on the latter has mostly been driven by the logic of ideological cohesion. Such an approach focuses on explaining the genesis of nationalism on the basis of its current characteristics. This implies ideological rationality, which presupposes that specific elements have developed because they were ontologically consistent with its current shape. It limits the potential range of processes that could have influenced the development of nationalism in football stands. Drawing on an analysis of comprehensive data on the content of ultras’ displays and applying a methodological frame which allows investigation of both the contingency and conditionality of social change, this study aims to fill these gaps by recapturing the process of development of ultras’ nationalist discourse.

Nation as a discourse

This study uses PDA’s methodology introduced by Tomas Martilla (2015) and adopts it in nation-building research. It is situated in the constructivist paradigm of nation research, focused on how the meaning of nation is reproduced rather than what nation is, which was the main concern of traditional approaches (primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism; see Smith, 1986). Nation is approached here as a product of (nationalist) discourse (e.g. Billig, 1995; Łuczewski, 2012; Sutherland, 2005), which connects nation with different elements or social constructs like symbols, religion, territory, history, behaviours, ethnicity, etc., and therefore creates its specific meaning. This analysis aims to reveal the processes creating the meaning of nation by focusing on the historical development of ultras’ nationalist discourse and its institutional materialisation. The study applies PDA as a methodological approach as it allows to: (a) analytically reconstruct the discourse creating the meaning of nation; and (b) reveal processes of its (re)production by studying the sedimentation of practices recreating this discourse.

PDA draws on both structural (Saussure, 1916) and post-structural theories of discourse (Derrida, 2001). It is based on the conception of ‘relational epistemology’ revised by Derrida (originally introduced by Saussure), which assumes that there are no objective rules that regulate social practices. Instead, they are regulated by a contingency logic; that is, rules established by already existing practices (Derrida, 2001; Martilla, 2015: 4). This means that discourses do not originate from any objective foundations but are the contingent outcome of ‘practices of articulation installing them’ (Martilla, 2015: 5). Practice of articulation is defined as every practice that creates the relation between elements and thus creates its identity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). The relative stability of discourse is achieved through the process of sedimentation. In PDA, discourses are ‘sedimented’ in social structure by the concealment of their contingent origin and by ‘materialisation’ of practices of articulation in particular institutions and subject roles. Institutions and subject roles regulate the cohesion of practices of articulation and therefore the meaning of particular objects which they create (Martilla, 2015). This means that practices of articulation create discourses but discourses structure practices of articulation, by constituting ‘their “objective” conditions of possibility’ (Martilla, 2015: 11). As a result, discourses produce and regulate the social meaning of objects.

In PDA, then, discourse ‘refers to any differential arrangement of discursive elements – i.e. signifiers – in which these elements receive their distinctive meanings – i.e. signifieds’; this approach ‘makes use of the concept of discourse also to describe the structural logic, which in the absence of any objective rules, regulates the range of socially valid and acceptable practices of articulation’ (Martilla, 2015: 4). In general, PDA provides analytical tools not only to reconstruct the content of the discourse, but also to examine its sedimentation and thus the processes which have contributed to reproduction of the meaning of a specific object (i.e. regulate practices of articulation). In other words, it makes it possible to reveal processes which have been shaping the meaning of nation. The regulative dimension of PDA has a vital role for studying the process of nation building, as institutional sedimentation is one of the commonly stressed key aspects in different conceptions defining nation as a product of discourse. The nation is materialised in such institutional dimensions as state policies (Brubaker, 1996), state education (Jaskułowski et al., 2018), national symbols (Billig, 1995; Dumitrica, 2019), popular culture (Stone, 2007), literature (Verdery, 1995), science (Kilias, 2004), local collective practices (Łuczewski, 2012), etc. – and its attendant reproduction in everyday life as something ‘taken for granted’ (Fox, 2017).

PDA treats discourses as analytical constructs co-constructed by the researcher rather than as objective entities. They are used as models to examine what processes have been shaping the meaning of studied object. They are distinguished on the basis of the two empirical criteria: cohesion of practices of articulation in a relatively stable period of time visible in nodal points, and contrariety to other discourses (Martilla, 2015). Nodal points are signifiers which ‘symbolize the identity of a discourse, making it possible to distinguish a discourse from other discourses’ (Martilla, 2015: 6). The nodal point of discourses which build the meaning of nation – that is, nationalist discourses – is simply the term ‘nation’. Practices of articulation connecting different elements with the object ‘nation’ establish national identities of social constructs and create nationalist discourse. In other words, they define which social constructs (like history, territory, institutions, groups, ethnic and political criteria, etc.) are part of a nation and which are not. Obviously, there is more than one nationalist discourse which shapes the meaning of a particular ‘nation’, and the Polish case is no different (e.g. Kilias, 2004; Łuczewski, 2012).

The nationalist discourse of Polish ultras can be distinguished from other nationalist discourses on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria. Firstly, the nodal point of nationalist discourse is apparent in choreographies, occasional banners, flags, murals and chants referring to the Polish nation or using national symbols. Secondly, a considerable cohesion of ultras’ practices of articulation within the nationalist discourse is visible in a relatively homogeneous character of current ultras’ nationalism. Thirdly, ultras’ nationalist discourse sets boundaries using the logic of resistance (Grodecki, 2020): it situates nation in opposition to some other actors and discourses or glorifies resistant attitudes.

PDA also offers a conceptualisation of the process of changing meaning within a particular discourse (Martilla, 2015: 5). It assumes that in order to shape the social meaning of an object, discourse has to achieve relative temporal stability. This stability is dependent on the level of sedimentation of practices of articulation in the structure. In PDA, those practices which reproduce the current meaning of an object are considered hegemonic. Their hegemony is maintained by the institutional dimension of the discourse, which regulates the practices of articulation. Its stability, however, can be undermined by counter-hegemonic practices of articulation, which aim to change or introduce new meanings. Counter-hegemonic articulations may also undermine ‘taken for granted’ hegemonic meanings by a so-called ‘reactivation’ process, which reveals the contingent nature of discourse and, consequently, contributes to the destabilisation of hegemonic discourse.

Methods of data gathering

Studies from other countries suggest that ultras groups internalise nationalist discourses present at some point in the history of a particular country and transform them into discourses distinctive for their social environment (Djordjević and Pekić, 2018; Gloriozova, 2018; Perasović and Mustapić, 2018; Spaaij and Viñas, 2005; Testa and Armstrong, 2010). In order to explore the process of formation of ultras’ nationalist discourse, this study will use the PDA’s diachronic analysis. It allows the study to capture how particular elements appearing in discourse have been connected with nation, and how established meanings of nation have been regulated and reproduced. The PDA’s diachronic analysis of nationalist discourse involves three main stages. It begins with identifying hegemonic (maintaining the stability of discourse) and counter-hegemonic (undermining the stability of discourse) practices of articulation (in a particular period of time). Then it proceeds to content analysis, which aims to reconstruct the content of contested and contesting articulations. As a result, it is possible to acquire data on changes in a given discourse at a given time induced by specific contesting actions. In the third step, what comes to be analysed is the materialisation potential of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses and the influence of the latter on the former. In other words, what comes under scrutiny is the roles and institutions that support the stability of the contested discourse and the extent to which these roles and institutions have been contested (Martilla, 2015: 26).

The PDA’s diachronic analysis requires historical data on the content of analysed discourse and information which makes it possible to reconstruct structural regulations of practices of articulation. Thus, this study draws on content analysis in order to capture ultras’ practices of articulation which have been creating their nationalist discourse at football games. These practices have been investigated through the analysis of three forms of ultras’ displays which refer to the nodal point ‘nation’ and involve the use of national symbols: (a) choreographies; (b) occasional banners; and (c) large flags. These three forms of displays have been selected for two reasons. Firstly, because they are the main tools of articulation of ultras’ views to the wider public at football games. Secondly, only these three forms of articulation can be fully retraced on the basis of the existing sources of data, which is crucial for the aims of the study.

Access to comprehensive data on ultras’ nationalist displays is available thanks to the nationwide fanzine TMK. Published monthly since late 2001, TMK is the main fanzine created by supporters and dedicated to football fan culture in Poland. As of early 2002 it has included ultras’ reports from all top-division football games in Poland, describing them from their own perspective. The reports include pictures and information on hooligan clashes, choreographies, occasional banners, large flags (called fany in ultras slang), and descriptions of protests against club, football or state authorities. This makes TMK a unique source of regular data of this kind in Europe.

Although the gathered data concerns all displays presented by ultras groups since 2002, it needs to be stressed that it does not cover the entire course of development of nationalist discourse in Polish football stands in general. Elements connected with nation were also presented earlier – during anti-communist protests at some stadiums in the 1980s, and by members of the skinhead movement in the 1990s. Unfortunately, there is no source which would make it possible to collect regular data on the displays of Polish supporters before 2002. Nonetheless, the existing range of data allows the revelation of almost a full picture of the development of nationalist discourse since the emergence of ultras culture in Poland. Although the first ultras group appeared in late 1999, it was not until the 2001/2002 season that they emerged in almost every Polish club (Grodecki, 2018: 118).

The analysis considered 204 issues of TMK published from January 2002 ¹ to January 2019 (to cover all games from 2018), which include 4120 ultras’ reports from all Polish top-division games and 211 reports from games of Polish clubs in European Cups (4331 reports in total). These reports bring information on 115 choreographies, 187 occasional banners and 94 flags referring to nation (396 displays in total). Additionally, 22 reports from public national events were analysed in order to identify the content of nation-related displays presented at these events (i.e. local marches commemorating ‘Cursed Soldiers’, reported from 2011 to 2015: 5 reports from different groups; Independence March, 2009–2018: 10 reports; Supporters’ Pilgrimage, 2012–2018: 7 reports). These are all events connected with nation which have been regularly covered in the TMK fanzine.

The content of reports from football games and public demonstrations has also been studied to pursue the second dimension of the analysis – the reconstruction of structural regulations (materialisation of discourse) of practices of articulation. To this end, the analysis also considered articles in TMK devoted to current national issues authored by supporters of different clubs (19 articles). Some reports and all the articles contain more extensive explanations of the reasons why specific values, historical figures or slogans have been presented by ultras, and why every ‘Polish football supporter’ or ‘real Pole’ should follow these constructs. In result, they are a valuable source which depicts the process of establishing new practices of articulation and their regulations. This approach to fanzine material follows an analytical tradition of fandom studies which has proved many times that fanzines are a very reliable source of data on the processes shaping discourse (Antonowicz et al., 2018; Haynes, 1995; Millward, 2008).

Data analysis

Drawing on the PDA’s diachronic analysis of practices of articulation, four ultras’ nationalistic discourses have been distinguished, situated within particular time frames (as discourses achieve relative stability only in a particular period of time) and organised chronologically. As a reminder, social change within discourse is defined as a change in practices of articulation and in the discursive materiality which regulates them. As a result, the meaning of an object (nation) is also changed to some extent. Therefore, the new nationalist discourses of ultras have been distinguished on the basis of changes or development of practices of articulation linked with nation. As applied here, the logic of scrutiny of all forms of ultras’ nationalist discourse follows the sequence of diachronic analysis. It begins with identifying and reconstructing the content of hegemonic (maintaining the stability of discourse) and counter-hegemonic (undermining the stability of discourse) practices of articulation (in a particular period of time). From there, it seeks to identify the influence of the material dimension of counter-hegemonic practices on hegemonic ultras’ discourse.

Nationalist discourse based on the skinhead subculture: a hotchpotch of symbols (2002–2005)

The ultras’ nationalist discourse of this period was characterised by four main features: a strong presence of nationalist skinhead symbols; the ‘nationalisation’ of stadium space with large Polish flags bearing the names of cities or clubs and national symbols; the decline of fascist symbols; and some attempts to establish new practices of articulation.

The strong presence of nationalist symbols connected with skinheads can be considered a ‘legacy’ of the 1990s, when this subculture was omnipresent in Polish football stands. Skinhead symbols were visible mostly in the form of flags with the Celtic cross. According to Testa and Armstrong (2010: 122), the link between the Celtic cross and nationalist-oriented movements has been established by Jeune Europe and symbolised their national views based on racist (white supremacy) and ethnic criteria. In the case of Polish ultras, the Celtic cross was often combined with national symbols (particularly white-and-red flags bearing the names of cities or clubs and their coats of arms and crests), which clearly expressed the ethnic (Breton, 1988) view on the Polish nation. As observed, in the period under consideration there were also few cases of the use of the swastika, which, too, was closely connected with the skinhead subculture and had been displayed in Polish football stands on many occasions before 2002. At that time, though, the use of this symbol sparked a debate in TMK (45/2005: 51), where such displays were strongly criticised. Moreover, displays using the swastika were condemned in an official statement by one of the supporters’ associations. Although fascist symbols were to appear again a few times in the future, it can be argued that this period marked an end of ultras’ common approval of practices of articulation linking nation with fascism.

In this period some ultras groups also tried to influence nationalist discourse using three different elements. First, there was a banner with the Palestinian flag, displayed by Polonia Warsaw ultras in 2002. There is no clear indication of what this flag was meant to symbolise. On the one hand, Palestinian flags in football stands are currently associated with left-wing ideologies (Doidge, 2013: 11). On the other, it could have been an anti-Israeli (and anti-Semitic) display. The latter interpretation is strengthened by a banner displayed by the same ultras group during the next year’s derby with Legia. It pictured Kazimierz Deyna, a former player of this club, with the Star of David and the caption ‘Contempt’. Second, there was anti-communism, as evidenced by a banner displayed by Polonia ultras in 2004. They aimed to humiliate their derby rival by connecting the crest of Legia with former communist authorities and with Bolsheviks (caption: ‘Remember about your Bolshevik descent, pansy’). Within the next few years, the presence of anti-communism in football stands was to become more frequent and in a different form to stigmatisation of the opponent (see more in the next section). Third, commemoration of historical events. This period saw the first occasional banner devoted to the Warsaw Uprising. Displayed in 2004 by Legia Warsaw ultras, it featured a simple caption reading: ‘1944–2004, We remember’. It was the first time that the stadium was used as a place of commemoration of an anniversary of a historical event.

To sum up, the analysed form of discourse was still dominated by articulations typical of the skinhead subculture. However, some more radical practices of articulation came under criticism and their role in supporters’ displays diminished. Within the next few years, skinhead symbols were fully replaced by symbols referring to historical memory.

The rise of historical memory (2006–2010)

The ultras’ nationalist discourse of the second half of the 2000s developed by sedimentation of practices of articulation commemorating historical events, which came to be linked directly with nation. What is also apparent is the change of the dominant forms of articulation of nation. They came to include not only the simple form of national flags, but took a more nuanced form of occasional banners and choreographies. Finally, this period saw an increase in numbers of nation-related displays (see Figure 1).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

The number of choreographies and occasional banners referring to nation, 2002–2018.

In this period of nationalist discourse, practices of articulation typical of youth, skinhead subculture (Celtic crosses and flags with national symbols dominating in the previous form of discourse) functioned along with commemorations of historical events connected with the nation. These new practices of articulation quickly became the main characteristic of ultras’ nationalist discourse (34 out of 60 displays in the 2006–2010 period: 2006 – 4; 2007 – 6; 2008 – 6; 2009 – 15; 2010 – 3). Ultras mostly commemorate armed outbreaks during wars (Warsaw Uprising, Upper Silesian Uprising), anti-communist strikes of workers (Gdańsk, Lubin and Poznań), anniversaries of the Soviet military aggression during the Second World War, and state independence (mostly Independence Day, 11 November, but also Constitution Day, 3 May). Although most of these events have a local character, all of them are linked with the nation.

The domination of commemorations of local historical events demonstrates the existence of a collective memory of particular local events among some supporter groups. Yet it does not explain why they became associated with the nation and how they have spread. The former could be explained by the consequences of the communist system, which strengthened nationalism by making nationality a fundamental social category, clearly distinguished from the state and citizenship (Brubaker, 1996). It fostered the emergence of a ‘social vacuum’ (Nowak, 1979), a gap in identification between the family and nation in Polish society at that time. As a result, nation became a marker of a wide community different from and even resistant to the (communist) state. This could have established practices of articulation associating nation with community and collective resistance. The ultras have followed this pattern of articulation in their commemorations of collective memory, linking the resistant local communities with the national cause. This is clearly evidenced in the first choreography commemorating local workers’ protests in Gdańsk in 1970, ² displayed by Lechia ultras in 2009: ‘We remember the murder committed on the nation.’ It included a typical phrase used by supporters to express the memory of an event (‘we remember’, pamiętamy) and fitted workers’ protests into the frame of national resistance.

The growing presence of commemorations of historical events expressed in national symbols has been the effect of imitation. Some ultras groups followed the pattern of articulating their local collective memory in the language of national discourse, and others only mimicked demonstrations of national identity (without the local memory component) by commemorating broader historical events or national holidays, which clearly shows the contingent foundations of the discourse. The imitation process was probably fostered by the development of ultras culture and the rising rivalry in terms of spectacular displays following the advent of TV broadcasts from top league games in 2005.

The same mechanism – that is, the collective memory of workers’ protests and the mimic logic of its expression – is also the reason behind the massive presence of anti-communist displays. Anti-communism is one of the basic traits of the nationalist discourse of Polish ultras. Out of the total of 302 identified choreographies and banners, 110 were related to anti-communism – that is over 1 in 3. The analysed period saw the rise of choreographies and occasional banners related to this element (seven) – they were displayed by ultras groups from the cities where workers’ protest had taken place (Gdańsk, Lubin, Poznań) and by two other clubs (Śląsk and Jagiellonia), which commemorated the introduction of Martial Law in Poland by communist authorities in 1981.

This form of discourse is also marked by displays against non-ethnic-based policy in both club teams and the national squad. In 2004, Pogoń Szczecin ultras protested against the decision to build the first team based on Brazilian players instead of Polish ones. In 2008, ultras of two clubs displayed occasional banners against the naturalisation of Brazilian player Roger. The existing ethnic nationalism takes a new form, whereby nation is used as a resistance construct against football policy.

In February 2008, ultras also engaged in a protest against the Kosovo declaration of independence: banners ‘Kosovo is Serbia!’ (written in Serbian Cyrillic and in English) were presented across the country (at seven out of eight Ekstraklasa games). There is no clear data indicating why ultras engaged in this action. Nevertheless, it can be stated that it established a new relation in the nationalist discourse, which from then on was fortified with public demonstrations concerning international affairs. What is more, it was the first coordinated nationwide banner action. It came in reaction to legislative changes related to the organisation of Euro 2012 (for more, see Antonowicz and Grodecki, 2018), which limited the range of permitted behaviours in the stands by imposing a ban on flares, political banners, etc. The new regulations were met with protests and fostered the countrywide consolidation of supporters in order to coordinate their actions against them.

In general, this period saw the development of key elements conditioning ultras’ nationalist discourse as it is today: (a) the two points of reference: nation as community marker and a resistance construct; and (b) consolidation of the supporters community, which has fostered coordination of nationwide actions. This quickly contributed to the materialisation of nationalist discourse and, as a result, created the sense that nation is self-evident and primordial in football stands.

The materialisation of historical memory and the decline of Celtic crosses (2011–2014)

This period of discourse was characterised by a peak of displays referring to nation (see Figure 1), with a clearly apparent domination of commemorations of historical events or figures (84 out of 98 displays). The new practices of articulation began to use anti-communism also as a marker defining contemporary antagonists of the nation, and established the construct of Polish–Hungarian friendship. This period also saw the decline of skinhead symbols – Celtic crosses. Moreover, the nationalist discourse of ultras spread from the stands to nationalist public demonstrations organised elsewhere.

The expansion of commemorations of historical events, which are at the core of ultras’ nationalist discourse today, can be explained by both mechanisms stressed in PDA: (a) contingency logic, whereby practices of articulation (and thus discourses) are developed based on the rules established by the existing practices of articulation; and (b) the materialisation of those practices in institutionalised form. The former process is clearly visible in both the consistency and variety of the historical events which are adopted in discourse. Consistency is apparent in the fact that all ultras’ displays use nation following the three main points of reference: they use it as a marker of ‘an own’ community, they fit resistance as part of the national cause and they use nation to express ultras’ values (discussed further below). The variety is noticeable in the wider range of historical events commemorated in displays: they picture armed struggle during wars and in battles, anti-communist protests of workers, anniversaries of military aggression against Poland during the Second World War, state independence, war genocides of Polish people, and historical figures connected with these events. Historical figures are particularly important here because they have come to be used as an image of desirable virtues in the world of supporters and thus established the nation’s third point of reference (to express values). Many different historical figures have been presented in ultras’ displays, but since 2012 Cursed Soldiers ³ have been widely accepted as the main role models (TMK, 186/2017: 64). Football supporters adopted these particular figures because they had fought against both Nazi Germany during the Second World War and communist authorities after the war, and were rejected as national heroes by left-wing political movements.

The materialisation of the discourse is visible in three dimensions. Firstly, in the institutionalisation of practices of articulation commemorating particular historical events. The most important of them are celebrated regularly in displays on their anniversaries. What is more, they have come to be commemorated on special flags devoted only to those anniversaries (contrary to banners and choreographies, which are occasional and disposable, flags are more permanent and can be displayed on many occasions). The second dimension is the expansion of themed merchandise. The bottom-up production and sale of clothes in club colours or bearing symbols of informal fan groups is a widely spread practice among football supporters in Poland. They have also engaged in the production of merchandise bearing national symbols, slogans, dates of historical events or images of historical figures. Advertisements of retailers specialising in patriotic clothes have even started to appear in TMK. The third dimension refers to the rise of supporter groups focused on nation-related activities, including the organisation of commemorations of historical events, historical education or releasing nation-related merchandise. Depending on the club, they function as formal entities within supporters’ associations or as informal groups within a wider community of supporters of a particular club. This shows that nationalist discourse influenced the structure of the supporters community and expanded it: it came to include subject roles responsible specifically for its reproduction.

It is not surprising, then, that the cohesion of practices of articulation came to be regulated more robustly. This was clearly visible in displays against Ruch Chorzów supporters, who at that time had strongly articulated their Silesian identity using flags in German with the Silesian coat of arms (e.g. during a game with Ruch in Chorzów, Lechia ultras displayed a choreography with a banner reading ‘This is Silesia, This is Poland’). Another case in point was an internal conflict in Polonia stands in 2013: the local ultras group connected with Antifa was removed from the stands by a different ultras group. Polonia ultras later claimed that the group linked with Antifa had always only been tolerated in their stands, and that ‘the right-wing oriented group had always been in power at the Polonia stadium’ (TMK, 141/2013: 53). This indicates that national identity started to be used to legitimise ultras groups within the supporters community. Moreover, this shows that nationalist discourse became perceived as self-evident and thus achieved the status of ‘having always been there’. The latter is also clearly apparent in articles published in the TMK:

For as long as I can remember, football fans have always looked to the right – the reason for this is not politics but identity. Love for the club, love for the city, basic rules – this connection with the love for the country, attachment to national symbols. (137/2013: 50)

A new element of the discourse was the expansion of the meaning of communism. It came to be used not only in reference to the past, but also as a marker of contemporary antagonists. While nation became a symbol of community, anti-communist articulations came to be used in resistance against contemporary political and media elites. This came in response to the government’s (led by a liberal party) legislative actions against football supporters before Euro 2012 and to the liberal media coverage demonising football fans. Ultras equated these elites with communist authorities: they perceived their actions as imposing a different – in this case, liberal and Europeanised – vision of the Polish nation. According to Eric Hobsbawm (2012: 174), this is quite a common pattern in post-communist countries, where national identity is used to draw a line between the innocent and those responsible for the current predicament. This is clearly expressed in one of TMK’s columns:

So far, however, not much has changed: just like thirty years ago communism was fought against in the stadiums, it is fought against today.… The authorities are neither wiser nor more Polish. Moreover, perverts and macdonaldisation have to be fought against. (TMK, 115/2011: 49)

The discourse from this period was also developed by practices of articulation showing Polish–Hungarian friendship. It shortly became materialised in official friendly relations between Polish and Hungarian ultras and hooligan groups. What is more, Hungarian chants became one of the forms of commemoration at national events. Some of the ultras groups also designed flags bearing the national symbols of both countries and later even started to commemorate historical events important for the Hungarian nation (e.g. the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 – TMK, 182/2016: 13).

As identified in the material under consideration, this period saw the last flag with the Celtic cross in top league stadiums (TMK, 159/2014: 14). The demise of this symbol came as a result of two factors: actions by football authorities, which imposed sanctions against the use of it shortly after the beginning of preparations for Euro 2012 (in 2007), and, as described here, the internal dynamics of ultras’ nationalist discourse, which became focused mainly on historical memory. This put an end to skinhead national symbols in football stands in the top Polish league.

Finally, football supporters started to widen ultras’ nationalist discourse by cross-club engagement in public demonstrations. Since 2012, supporter groups from different cities have organised or participated in local events celebrating Cursed Soldiers Day. Since the same year they have organised an annual pilgrimage to Jasna Góra Monastery in Częstochowa (the most important Catholic shrine in the country), a religious event also involving nationalist demonstrations. In the analysed period, all of those pilgrimages were themed by particular historical events perceived as important for the nation. Since 2010, organised groups of supporters have also participated in the Independence March (organised by nationalist movements to commemorate the anniversary of regaining independence by Poland in 1918). The rising popularity of the march among football supporters also came as a result of increasingly repressive measures taken against them by the government before and after Euro 2012. The march not only became a space of protest where tension could be released, but, most importantly, also strengthened clear boundaries between supporters (and their nationalism) and the government (i.e. the state). In this case, nation was used as a symbol of collective resistance against the liberal nationalist discourse. This can be seen in a TMK report on the Independence March of 2013:

The formula of the March makes it the best opportunity to gather and shout out together all that’s connected with our country and our stands and lies heavy on our hearts …. Some participate in the March purely for patriotic reasons.… Others want to get their own back on the government for all the repressions and to show the supporters’ power. (TMK, 147/2013: 6–7)

Nationalism as a response to external threat (since 2015)

The current nationalist discourse of ultras is still strongly based on commemorations of historical events (97 out of 137 identified displays), with Cursed Soldiers as one of the vivid elements (28 displays). However, it has been expanded by the practices of articulation using nation as a resistance construct in the case of issues perceived as current external threat. This is visible in ultras’ protests over two issues: a debate on policy towards Syrian refugees which developed in Poland in 2015 (and even sparked some protests organised by right-wing-oriented political movements in several cities), and political narratives describing Nazi concentration camps on the Polish territory as ‘Polish’.

In 2015, ultras groups supporting teams from the top league presented 17 displays against the migration policy on Syrian refugees (which is also why the peak of nation-related displays was recorded that year; see Figure 1). The ultras’ campaign used displays (choreographies, banners) and was mainly based on the slogan ‘Stop the Islamisation of Poland’. Apart from referring directly to the religious dimension, it also came as a sign of resistance against West European countries and their civic-based nationalism, which had allegedly contributed to their Islamisation (this is clearly visible in a Korona Kielce banner: ‘Instead of following Orban’s example, you’re on your knees before Angela’). More nuanced displays also suggested that instead of allocating funds to aid schemes for refugees it is more important to deal with problems faced by ethnic Poles (‘We want returnees, not illegal immigrants!’; ‘3 million Poles live in poverty, 200,000 Polish children are malnourished, over 50,000 Poles are homeless. Where is the help for them?’). Such postulates are typical of ‘nationalizing states’ nationalism, characterised by the idea of ‘the state of and for a particular ethnocultural “core nation” whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state’ (Brubaker, 1996: 103). Yet it needs to be stressed that these protests also came as a reaction to the pro-refugee displays of many ultras groups across Europe (in ultras’ perspective, the ‘fallen’ Western Europe). This means that Polish ultras used the ethnocultural definition of nation to mark their distinctiveness.

The second issue concerned the narrative of ‘Polish death camps’, which had appeared in political statements in some European Union (EU) countries. In response, ultras groups presented banners with the slogan ‘#GermanDeathCamps’. Although in this case ultras followed the government campaign promoted by this slogan, their action should not be taken as a sign of general support to the political party in power at the time. One of the articles in TMK (198/2018: 15) stressed that protesting against ‘such a slur’ was a cross-political issue which should ‘unite all real Poles’.

Regardless of their genesis, both campaigns came in response to current issues perceived by ultras as a threat to an ethnoculturally defined nation. Although similar articulations had been conducted by individual ultras groups in the past, it was the first time when such displays were presented nationwide. In other words, ultras stands started to be used as a space where the ethnic nation is defended in moments when it is perceived to be under threat from foreign culture and foreign political interests. ⁴

Conclusions

The aim of this study was to reveal the processes which have shaped, materialised and reproduced the nationalist discourse of ultras based on the case of Poland. The data analysed here does not go back as far as the early days of the nationalist discourse in Polish football stands, as ultras culture emerged when articulations of nation had already been there. However, by analysing data on ultras’ displays which cover almost the entire history of this culture in Poland, this study shows that its growth has influenced the development of nationalist discourse at football stadiums and thus expanded the meaning of nation.

In general, results of the research support existing findings showing that ultras internalise national discourses present in a certain period and transform them into nationalisms distinctive for this social environment. This analysis presents how ultras’ nationalist discourse has been shaped using a novel methodological frame (PDA) which allows the capture of both the contingency and conditionality of social change. It indicates that this process has been driven by contingent imitation of other ultras groups and resistance towards some broader nationalist discourses. The study indicates that initially ultras’ national discourse was following articulations of the skinhead subculture. The sharp change in the nationalist discourse of ultras in Poland began with commemorations of historical events, which appeared as an articulation of local collective memory. They were soon linked with nation as a marker of ‘our own’ community in collective resistance against different (historical) antagonists. This supports the findings of studies pointing out the role of anti-communist nationalism as ultras followed the practices of articulation established during the communist period, which identified nation as a resistant community distinct from the state (Brubaker, 1996; Gellner, 1997). As a result, nation came to be associated with resistance and history. This pattern has been disseminated by some ultras groups and then mimicked by others. This shows that ultras’ nationalist discourse has been shaped by a logic of contingency. It means that the practices of articulation which have established this discourse have been driven by ‘rules that originated from preceding practices of articulation’ (Martilla, 2015: 4). These rules have created the main points of reference, which established the use of nation as a marker of: ‘our’ community; resistance against antagonists (also by defining different antagonists as enemies of nation); and supporters’ values (expressed by national heroes as role models). The new practices of articulation have assigned new objects to these points of reference and thus expanded the range of topics drawn into nationalist discourse.

The wide prevalence of nationalist discourse and the attendant homogeneity of practices of articulation among Polish ultras have been achieved as a result of their rapid sedimentation in several dimensions of supporters’ activities. Nationalist discourse has spread from the stadiums to everyday life in the form of nation-related public demonstrations, materialised in various forms (clothes, flags), and was institutionalised in both formal and informal structures of the supporters community. As a result, it came to be perceived as a basic and self-evident element of ultras culture. The pro-national identity has even been used to legitimise ultras groups within the wider supporters community. This encouraged articulations denouncing minority groups expressing other views of nation and, as a result, wiped out counter-hegemonic attempts.

In a broader perspective, this analysis brings findings supporting the studies approaching nation as a ‘contingent event’ and ‘institutionalised form’ (Brubaker, 1994, 1996): it shows how nation has been shaped, transformed and materialised in a social environment recognised by its distinctive forms of nationalism (e.g. Djordjević and Pekić, 2018; Testa and Armstrong, 2010).

Unfortunately, the analysis was not able to show the genesis of articulations concerning Kosovo’s independence and Polish–Hungarian friendship. However, following the logic of contingent nature of discourses, it seems that in both cases ultras have followed popular national myths, respectively of Pan-Slavic solidarity (with Serbia) and of a special bond between Poles and Hungarians, regarding common interests, history (resistance) and mentality. The issue that should be investigated further is who (what subject roles in particular) influences the new practices of articulation among ultras, and whether ultras discourse is influenced by external actors like nationalist organisations. There is only evidence showing that in one case in the early days of ultras culture (2004) a nationalist movement briefly sponsored a local fanzine. Also, at least four choreographies presenting ‘Rój’, one of the Cursed Soldiers, appeared on the list of paid contributions commissioned by producers of a feature film devoted to his life (TMK, 175/2016: 5). Although at this point Cursed Soldiers had already been present in ultras’ nationalist discourse, this indicates that their nation-related displays are not always bottom-up initiatives.