Is the Danish model still a sacred cow? Danish trade unions and European integration

Industrial relations

The Danish industrial relations system combines voluntarist and corporatist features. It is voluntarist in the sense that the central rules are decided by trade unions and employer organizations. The so-called Main Agreement (Hovedaftalen) functions as the industrial relations ‘constitution’. It has its origin in the outcome of a long and bitter conflict between employers and workers in 1899. It lays down that employer organizations shall recognize trade unions as legitimate representatives of workers, with a right to collective bargaining, while the unions shall recognize the employers’ right to manage. Further provisions regulate the right to strike which is limited by a peace obligation as long as collective agreements are in force, and local representation of workers’ interests through shop stewards (trade union delegates at individual workplaces). According to other central agreements, so-called Cooperation Agreements (samarbejdsaftaler), local union representatives are entitled to be informed and consulted by employers regularly. These features add up to what may be termed ‘centralized voluntarism’, on the basis of which many issues are settled by the parties themselves, but within a centrally agreed framework.

At the same time, the Danish industrial relations system has strong corporatist elements and as such can be categorized in terms of a wider Nordic corporatism (Schiller et al., 1993). In Denmark, the state basically functions as a facilitator in relation to the industrial relations parties through institutions such as the Labour Court and an arbitration council, but also through relatively generous expenditure on unemployment insurance, vocational training, active employment policies and an early retirement scheme, thereby reducing the potential for conflict between the parties. Government and parliament generally abstain from intervening in central industrial relations issues, such as pay and working time, thus respecting the autonomy of the parties, but state intervention has taken place several times when collective bargaining ended up in conflict. The last major intervention was in the collective bargaining round in 1998. When intervention takes place, the unions and the employers’ organizations protest vigorously because they see it as a serious threat to free collective bargaining, which is considered to be the cornerstone of the ‘Danish model’. Furthermore, strong corporatist structures are in place in relation to, for instance, employment policy, vocational training, and health and safety.

For their part, the trade unions are eager to show that they respect the political system and its macroeconomic goals. Since 1987 the Danish LO (Landsorganisationen i Danmark) has explicitly supported an anti-inflationary policy by moderating pay claims to a level expected to be conducive to the competitiveness of the Danish economy. The Danish unions try to balance a strong involvement in national concertation – and concessions in that respect – with actions that demonstrate their independent power. The latter may include strike action against employers who are unwilling to sign a collective agreement, or a refusal to enter into concession bargaining on higher working time or lower pay. In fact, the level of conflict – measured in working days lost due to industrial action – is relatively high in Denmark (Stokke and Thörnqvist, 2001; Vandaele, 2011). Thus, although the industrial relations system is characterized by a high degree of cooperation and partnership, conflicts have not withered away.

Since the early 1980s collective bargaining has been decentralized, partly away from the influence of the peak organizations and partly down to establishment level, and since the mid-1990s the average duration of collective agreements has become longer (typically from two to three years) and less synchronized as they are not all bargained in the same year. Central collective agreements are bargained at sectoral level. However, there is an increasing tendency for the agreements in the various industries to differ, and national agreements increasingly include opening clauses and general rights which, in order to be applied, have to be bargained further at individual companies or workplaces. Such framework agreements allow for more local flexibility, which again promotes individualized and diversified outcomes – to the benefit of workers if local conditions are in their favour, and to the employers if the company is in trouble and unemployment is high in the area.

In recent years coverage of collective bargaining has expanded. From 1994 to 2000 the coverage of collective agreements in the private sector increased from around 50 percent to 60 percent of the workforce (Scheuer and Madsen, 2000) and total coverage (including the public sector) from around 70 percent to 75 percent, which was still the estimated coverage in 2010 (LO, 2011a). As legislation on key areas is sparse – there is no legislation on pay and very little legislation on working time – this means that 25 percent of all employed and up to 40 percent of those employed in the private sector lack not just the rights and security granted by a collective agreement, but also certain statutory rights that in other European countries are part of labour legislation.

Trade union structure and membership

Among the three union peak organizations or confederations the largest and most important is the LO (the confederation associating the unions of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers). The other confederations are the FTF (salaried employees, including teachers, police personnel and employees in the financial sector) and the AC (employees with a university or similar education). As the three confederations organize different segments of the labour force, which can be identified in a relatively objective way, they only marginally compete with each other over members. Together, the unions affiliated to the three confederations form what can be called Danish ‘mainstream unionism’. The LO traditionally was part of the social-democratic labour movement and was institutionally linked to the party, but since the late 1990s the formal links have been cut. The FTF and the AC have attempted to maintain a politically ‘neutral’ position. On issues such as labour legislation and labour market policy the three organizations work relatively closely together. Outside the mainstream unions, there are a small number of alternative unions, the oldest being the Christian Union. These unions mainly attract members by means of low membership fees and are for this reason sometimes labelled ‘discount unions’. Although they have been growing during the past few years (Lind, 2009), their importance is still negligible, not least because they are party to very few collective agreements.

For collective bargaining purposes at national sectoral level neither the individual unions nor the confederations play the central role. This is a consequence of the mixed union structure as well as pressure from the employer side to reduce the number of national agreements. Given the absence of a union structure defined along industry lines the important sectoral collective agreements are negotiated between cartels of unions and the sectoral organization on the employer side. The cartel negotiating the agreement for manufacturing industry, for instance, includes representatives from several craft-based unions, such as those of the metalworkers and the electricians, as well as from 3F, the large general union.

A peculiarity in the private sector is that only the unions of ‘blue-collar’ workers take part in negotiations and are covered by the sectoral agreement. The union of office workers, although affiliated to the LO, is excluded and has to negotiate its own agreement. The union can only do so for workplaces in which at least 50 percent of office employees are union members. This reflects a historical endeavour on the part of the Danish Employers’ Confederation (DA, Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) to have the status of ‘functionaries’ conferred on this group of employees and thus to prevent unionism. Not only office workers, but also technical and academic staff who, if organized, are typically members of unions affiliated to the FTF or the AC, are outside the sectoral collective agreement, and the employer organizations have never agreed to negotiate collective agreements at the national level with the unions representing these groups of employees. Only at establishment level has, for example, the union of engineers in some instances been able to achieve a collective agreement. These limitations on the coverage of collective bargaining in the private sector help explain why in Denmark, quite atypically, collective bargaining coverage is actually lower than trade union membership. Another reason is that, unlike in France and a number of other countries, Denmark does not operate a system of erga omnes provisions through which collective agreements can be extended to cover all employees within the sector in question.

Another atypical feature of Danish unionism, although not in a Nordic context, is that trade union affiliation is high and even increased considerably from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. When the Golden Age of social democracy and trade unionism (Standing, 1999) faded in Europe during the 1970s, with the subsequent collapse of Keynesianism and rising unemployment, trade unions in Denmark were still consolidating. During the 1970s the trade union membership rate increased by more than 25 percent, but the 15 years of membership decline since the mid-1990s has especially affected the unions affiliated to the LO, while member unions of the FTF and the AC, together with unions outside the main organizations, have actually gained members. From 1995 (1.5 million members) to 2010 (1.2 million members) the trade unions in the LO lost 20 percent of their members, while the FTF unions gained almost 10 percent and the AC unions 40 percent more members.

A major reason for the LO’s membership losses is industrial and occupational change. It is the FTF and the AC unions, which organize the well-educated parts of the labour force, that increased during these years. Another important reason for the declining membership of the LO unions is the particular variety of unemployment insurance system – the so-called Ghent system – that can be found in Denmark (as well as in Finland and Sweden). While this system traditionally links membership of an unemployment fund with union membership within specific occupational areas, the link has been weakening over the past decade (Lind, 2009).

Trade union policies

Danish trade unions are pragmatic and cooperative. They see themselves as responsible actors in a well regulated society, in which improvements in living standards and working conditions are the result of a stable and incremental development (Lind, 1996). The unions see their main tasks as securing a fair distribution of wealth in society and establishing a high level of social security. Danish unions have stepped back from demands for major structural reforms – for example, they abandoned their demand for economic democracy in the late 1980s – and have accommodated themselves to the neoliberal policies which have dominated the world since the 1980s. Together with employers and the government the unions have cherished the benefits of ‘flexicurity’, although lately certain union spokespersons have lamented that the security part is slowly and steadily being eroded.

Danish unions have basically accepted the conditions known collectively as ‘globalization’. Instead of fighting open markets and job losses in Denmark their strategy has been to participate in changes that can improve the competitiveness of the Danish economy, first and foremost by fighting for better training and a constant upgrading of skills in the labour force. This strategy means that the unions have accepted moderate wage claims to keep the national economy competitive and have been active partners in the quest for productivity increases. This helps explain why Danish unions were to be found on the sidelines in 2011–2012 when the ETUC was campaigning against the Euro Pact (see below).

From the mid-1990s stable economic growth secured both increasing employment and real wage increases, while unions at the same time conceded more flexibility in the deployment of labour. The financial crisis beginning in 2008 led to rising unemployment and falling real wages. However, so far (2012) Danish trade unions have not made any substantial changes to their broadly pro-market policies. This is in spite of the fact that the liberal-conservative government in power from 2001 to 2011 introduced a number of initiatives that adversely affected union members. For instance, in 2009 the period during which members of the unemployment insurance funds can receive unemployment benefit was reduced from four to two years, and in 2011 the early retirement scheme was changed in a way which will make it much less favourable to workers. In both cases the unions protested fiercely against the changes.

Unions divided over Danish EEC entry in 1973

Denmark became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, together with the United Kingdom and Ireland. The main motive for joining was economic; more precisely, it was seen as central that Danish export goods – notably bacon and other agricultural products – could continue to have free access to the British market.

In the debate prior to the referendum in 1972, which endorsed Danish EEC membership, the opponents on the Left conceptualized the EEC as ‘Capital’s Europe’. They argued that joining the EEC was only the first step towards entering something that would become ‘an ever closer union’ – as the Treaty of Rome describes it – and that such a future would mean increased immigration, threatening the employment of Danish workers and endangering labour standards and the autonomy of the Danish industrial relations system. The proponents, for their part, eagerly stressed the expected economic benefits of EEC membership while denying that political and social integration would ever become realistic features of the Community: consequently, industrial relations and labour standards would not be affected. Although the LO leaders campaigned for Danish entry, many trade union leaders were opposed. Among the rank-and-file opinions were also divided, but as most of the activists in the union movement were left-wingers and opponents of EEC entry their voices were fairly influential.

Danish EEC membership began at the same time as the creation of the ETUC. The Danish LO was in favour of an ETUC which covered both members and non-members of the EEC in order ‘to prevent any split of the Nordic union movement between EEC members and others’ (Dølvik, 1997: 136). This solidarity with colleagues from the other Nordic countries – which is also anchored institutionally, for instance, in Nordic industry federations – has been an inherent feature of the Danish trade unions’ representation in the ETUC.

All three Danish union confederations – LO, FTF and AC – are members of the ETUC. Furthermore, individual unions and/or union cartels are members of the European industry federations.

The Single Market and union reorientation

After Danish entry into the EEC, the discussion continued between left-wingers who feared the consequences of membership, and trade union leaders who gave assurances that nothing substantial would change in Danish industrial relations. A more active trade union orientation came about only when the plans for the Single Market appeared in the mid-1980s.

The massive liberalization inherent in the plans for a Single Market made it clear to Danish union leaders that it was no longer sufficient to ignore European developments and that union policies on developments at the European level were necessary. At first they tried to fight the Single Market project by advocating a ‘no’ in the referendum that took place in 1987, but in spite of opposition also from the Social Democratic Party, a majority of the Danish electorate voted ‘yes’. Explicitly turning against full regulatory harmonization the Danish unions advocated minimum standards to be implemented as a shield against the ‘social dumping’ that was feared as a consequence of market liberalization. One area in which the Danish unions were fairly satisfied was health and safety, in which European directives – including the 1989 Framework directive on worker participation in health and safety work – were seen as a sign that Community standards would not undercut Danish standards, besides not requiring substantial changes in Danish rules.

In principle, Danish unions – like the ETUC – supported the social dimension of the Single Market as formulated by the then President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, and its concretization in the so-called Social Charter adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1989 and followed by a social action plan the year after (Knudsen, 1995). The Danish union interest was formulated as a combination of two goals. The first was to counter social dumping, and here directives – or, preferably, negotiated agreements between the parties at European level – defining European minimum standards on various issues were seen as positive instruments. The second was to avoid EU regulation in areas and ways that would imply changes in Danish industrial relations. Specific initiatives at the EU level could easily bring the two goals into conflict and when a series of directives aimed at embedding the social dimension were discussed during the 1990s it appeared that, in most instances, the goal of defending Danish institutions took priority over the goal of improving labour standards at the European level. This was expressed fairly bluntly by the president of the Metal Workers Federation (LO, 2003: 16, our translation):

Scepticism towards EU directives

Such a nationally oriented position was confirmed by a study by Torunn Olsen (1996) who compared German and Danish political processes, involving trade unions, employer organizations and governments, during the preparation of three EU directives – on pregnant workers, employment contracts and working time. Three conclusions can be drawn from her study. First, the policies of the Danish government were based on consensus positions reached between the most important national trade union and employer organizations. Secondly, the discussions on the substantive content of the directives weighed less than concerns over the expected disruptive impact of the directives on Danish regulations. Thirdly, the Danish proposals during the negotiations were consistently aimed at minimizing the directives’ impact on Danish regulations, that is, to reduce the content of general, binding and detailed employee rights in the directives (see also Larsen-Jensen and Bøgh, 1996; Knudsen and Lind, 2000).

During the 1990s a recurrent issue was how to implement EU directives in Denmark (on the various attempts to avoid legislation, see Knudsen and Lind, 2000). After the Maastricht Treaty the European Commission accepted that directives could be implemented by collective agreements. In reality, however, all directives, except the Working Time Directive, were implemented by legislation. The Commission increasingly had doubts about the coverage of this Directive despite all sorts of guarantees from the Danish government. This resulted in the Commission sending in 1999 a letter of formal notice, the first step in formal infringement proceedings for breach of EU law. The government passed legislation – strongly criticized by the three main trade union organizations and the employers’ organization, the DA – on this directive and the Part-time Directive in 2001. Faced with a case at the European Court brought by the European Commission, the Danish government in 2003 finally backed down from the position developed by the labour market parties and the government in the early 1990s, namely that implementation of EU directives could and should take place solely through collective agreements, at least in cases where this was deemed preferable by the parties. Since then the implementation procedure has involved legislation followed by inclusion of the legislation in the following collective agreement.

The foot-dragging line described by Olsen (1996) was continued for example during the discussions on the Directive on Information and Consultation (adopted in 2002) and the Directive on agency work (adopted in 2008). In both cases the consensus-based Danish position was that European regulation was (a) not necessary and (b) could prove detrimental to domestic arrangements in Denmark. Concerning the Information and Consultation Directive, the Danish ‘social partners’ shared the opinion that the Directive would be harmful to the Danish tradition of information and consultation through cooperation committees based on collective agreements. Together, the social partners even asked the Prime Minister to intervene on their behalf, which he did. The Danish position contributed to delaying the process of adopting the Directive, as well as to watering down some of its provisions, especially by making it crystal clear in the text of the Directive that existing collectively agreed structures for information and consultation may replace the structures provided for by the Directive.

Regarding the Directive on agency work Danish union views were more divided. The divisions seemed to be related to whether unions, prior to the Directive, had managed to obtain satisfactory solutions on agency work in their national agreements or not. While the union of office workers (HK) welcomed the Directive it was seen as unnecessary by unions in the manufacturing sector, a position they shared with the employers. Thus, a small crack appeared in the otherwise strong consensus between the Danish industrial relations parties regarding EU regulation (Politiken, 23 October 2008).

Similarly, there was support from some Danish unions for the proposal for an improved Pregnant Workers Directive put forward by the Commission in 2008. However, the majority position was opposition to the Directive. At the European level the proposal was sharpened by the European Parliament in October 2010 by its decision to extend the minimum period for maternity leave to 20 weeks (as against 14 weeks in the present directive, dating back to 1992, and 18 weeks in the Commission’s proposal) and to require that women retain their salary while on maternity leave. However, the official Danish trade union position is that this directive is superfluous as maternity leave is thought to be an issue that should be dealt with by collective bargaining at the national level. This position, again, is in line with the position taken by the Danish employer organizations and the government. At the meeting of the EU Employment and Social Affairs Council on 17 June 2011 Denmark formed part of a wider consortium of countries, including Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, that argued for a freeze on the amendment of the Pregnant Workers Directive (www.euractiv.com, 16 June 2011).

The disagreements between unions regarding the revision of the Pregnant Workers Directive reflect diverging interests among their members. The majority position represented by most LO unions can lean on the fact that members covered by collective agreements more or less already enjoy the rights proposed. The minority position, taken by among others HK and AC, reflects that these unions have many members in the private sector that are not covered by collective agreements and whose rights to maternity leave depend on the Danish law on salaried employees. This law grants four weeks’ leave before birth and 14 weeks after, however, only with half pay and only for women who have been employed for at least nine months. For these union members, and of course also for other workers not covered by a collective agreement, the proposed revisions would mean a substantial improvement.

In relation to European Works Councils (EWCs) Danish unions recognized the importance and necessity of a directive, as it deals with transnational issues. Danish unions were quite active in helping to set up EWCs in the mid-1990s after the adoption of the EWC Directive. However, the unions have been hesitant to define a playing field for EWCs, and on several occasions they have warned against the possibility of EWCs becoming bargaining agents (Knudsen, 2003). This view and the beliefs behind it – notably a fear of losing members – are well described by the president of the Danish Metal Workers’ Union (LO, 2003, 19, our translation):

The EU-sceptic position of the Danish trade union movement has also been visible at ETUC congresses. Both in Helsinki (1999) and in Prague (2003) the Danish affiliates were sceptical towards the recommendations from the Congresses because EU legislation was seen as threatening the Danish system based on bi-partisan voluntarism. In Seville (2007) and in Athens (2011) the Danish unions had very few suggestions for changes to the proposed action plan. A key reason for this was perhaps the careful phrasing of the proposed actions by the preparatory committees, recommending both legislation and collective bargaining as ways in which unions should develop in order to achieve results.

Enlargement and Laval

The inclusion of new EU Member States in 2004 awoke new concerns among the trade unions about the risk of social dumping. Workers from Poland and the Baltic States were seen as a potential risk for Danish pay and working condition standards. The restrictions that were passed in the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) took off some of the pressures, but the unions wanted more control with the influx of labour. The trade unions, in particular in the building sector, are still very much on the alert on the issue. It is difficult to control whether foreign companies operating in Denmark adhere to Danish pay and working conditions, especially when the key elements are to be found in collective agreements that include provisions from sectoral-level, as well as local bargaining.

A strong challenge to the voluntarist Danish system emerged from the European Court’s Laval decision (C-341/05). Although the Court actually acknowledged the right to industrial action in order to obtain a collective agreement, the decision favoured the Latvian employer operating in Sweden as the Court found that levels of pay in the geographical area should be made more accessible and easy to find for the company (premise 110 of the judgment) as a precondition for respecting the regulation (the agreement). This was seen as a major defeat, also among Danish trade unions, and they shared the worries that ever since have been expressed by the ETUC and affiliated unions. In 2008, a tripartite commission recommended that the Danish government pass legislation which made it clear that the level of pay should be made transparent to the foreign company as a precondition for unions being allowed to take industrial action.

How pay levels shall be made sufficiently transparent and implemented, however, is still an open question (spring 2012) because most sectoral collective agreements operate with so-called minimum pay systems which do not stipulate the normal or average pay level. In a longer-term perspective, the Danish unions agree with the ETUC that a more durable solution should be found. How this will be done is also unclear at present and there is considerable concern among trade unionists about the effects of EU regulation on Danish industrial relations: together with the banning of closed shops in 2004 this case has revived scepticism towards EU regulation. It is not popular that rulings by EU judges can supersede national industrial relations regulations.

The Euro Pact

When the European Commission presented its Europe 2020 strategy in 2010 as a follow-up to the Lisbon strategy it was clear that nothing had changed in the basic trust in neoliberal ideas concerning the healing powers of the market (European Commission, 2010). The obvious problems that caused the financial crisis that commenced in 2008 were not faced by this strategy, apart from one significant thing: miscreant countries should be subject to stricter rules and tougher sanctions. When the Merkel/Sarkozy initiative was launched in early 2011 this became even more apparent: the Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and not least the Greek malaise should not repeat itself in future. The so-called Euro Plus Pact, discussed and accepted in March 2011, included many measures to improve competitiveness and economic policy coordination in the Member States (economic governance).

As a non-euro country Denmark was not part of the original signing on 11 March but at the meeting of 24–25 March Denmark signed together with other EU countries.

Already in 2010 the ETUC was sceptical about the 2020 strategy, as it focused less on social and labour market issues than previous strategies. This scepticism escalated during 2011 when the Merkel/Sarkozy initiative flavoured the Pact. At the ETUC Congress in Athens in May 2011 the main focus was on mobilizing for Social Europe and the main criticism was that the Euro Plus Pact focused on austerity measures and not economic growth and more jobs. The approved Strategy and Action Plan 2011–2014 states:

While the ETUC fiercely maintained its opposition to the Euro Plus Pact, the path of the Danish LO (and FTF) was different. On 11 March the chairman of the LO said that:

The FTF took exactly the same point of view (FTF, 2011), but by 22 March the opinions of the two main organizations had changed completely. They now supported the Pact. They both expressed their satisfaction with it and with the fact that they had now got guarantees that the EU would not intervene in wage setting in Denmark, as expressed by the chairman of the LO:

The LO’s support of the Euro Pact was repeated after the European joint declaration of 9 December 2011 (LO, 2011c).

This U-turn may seem remarkable. The ‘guarantee’ they received that there will be no intervention in the Danish labour market was that the political opposition in the Danish Folketing (the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party) at a meeting of the Parliamentary committee on Europe (Europaudvalget) had supported the government’s policy on the Pact which, among other things, states that ‘the Pact builds upon national self-determination with regard to economic policy and respect for national labour market models’ (Folketinget, 2011).

It seems that the major concern of the LO and the FTF is that the ‘Danish model’ prevail and less a desire to be in line with the ETUC in its interpretation of the political contents of the Pact. Consequently, it may also occur that the Danish unions are less critical of neoliberal approaches than their European colleagues, and that their prime focus is national priorities.

The notion of the EU as a threat to ‘the Danish model’

As we have seen, Danish union views on EU regulations on industrial relations have been quite sceptical. If we leave aside the Laval ruling – this case constitutes a threat to all unions – and concentrate on how Danish unions have reacted to the industrial relations directives of the EU, how can their policy and behaviour be explained? In other words, what considerations or ‘theory’ lie behind the policy?

First of all, there is a strong belief in the blessings of the fundamentally voluntarist Danish system of industrial relations. According to the Metal Workers’ President (LO, 2003: 17–18; our translation):

In Denmark there is strong support for this so-called ‘Danish model’ characterized, as mentioned earlier, by a minimum of legislation and an emphasis on voluntary collective bargaining as the way to resolve labour issues. Trade unions support the model because it gives them a strong position in the system and because they believe that the roles they play in it ensure a high affiliation rate. Employer organizations support it because it frees them from detailed, inflexible legislation, for instance on employment protection, working time and minimum pay. Finally, politicians support it because they believe it is the best way to avoid conflicts and because the parties are oriented towards growth and competitiveness and thus prepared to act in a ‘responsible’ way.

The quotation expresses a widely held belief that ‘too much’ legislation, irrespective of whether it comes from Copenhagen or Brussels, will disrupt the system by disturbing its delicate balance. Notably there is a perceived risk that the employers will withdraw their support for the system and instead unilaterally pursue their stated aim of deregulation. The collective bargaining system is perceived as a quid pro quo system which is disrupted when one of the sides – in this case the workers – ‘gets something for nothing’ by legislative means. In particular, this view has been put forward by the FTF and unions attached to the bargaining cartels (Sørensen, 2000).

The notion of the EU as a ‘threat to the Danish model’ has thrived not only in the trade union movement, but also in the academic field. On the basis of their studies of the Danish collective bargaining system Jesper Due and Jørgen Steen Madsen in the early 1990s invented the ‘Danish model’ as the concept that is now generally used to describe the Danish industrial relations system. They also formulated the theoretical expectation that EU regulation represents a threat to the Danish model. During the 1990s they supported the trade union movement in its demand that EU directives should be implemented in Denmark primarily through collective agreements rather than legislation. If this could not be done the whole system would be at risk (Due et al., 2000: 154).

Towards a less nationally-oriented position?

The main thrust of the notion of the EU as a threat to Danish industrial relations remains intact. It is still the predominant view that EU regulation based on legislation – especially if it touches core collective bargaining areas – will have harmful effects on the Danish model. This view has its stronghold in the FTF (Sørensen, 2000) and among union officials who are responsible for collective bargaining, whereas the LO as a peak organization has shown more interest in developing proactive policies toward European integration. An LO publication from 2001 discussing collective agreements versus legislation simply stated, ‘The Danish model is not threatened’ (LO 2001: 1) and argued for a more nuanced view on improvements in labour standards achieved through legislation.

With its basis in the voluntarist Danish tradition over the past decade or so the trade union movement has attempted to formulate a more proactive policy, pointing to alternative methods of EU regulation. Since the late 1980s Danish unions have propagated negotiations between ETUC and UNICE (now BusinessEurope) as preferable to legislation. However, this position did not realistically take into account employers’ reluctance to negotiate at the European level. The 2003 LO Congress opted for connecting the desire for negotiations with demands for a framework agreement between ETUC and UNICE/CEEP – defining procedures for negotiations at the European level – as well as a European labour court with authority to rule in conflicts that have a transnational character. However, and contrary to the ETUC position, the Danish resolution pointedly failed to demand a right to strike at the European level. As long as this is not part of the package, it will be difficult to drag the employers to the European negotiation table.

Thus, as far as orientations toward European integration are concerned, Danish unions’ first priority remains the national corporatist system and good relations with the other parties in this system. The wish to advance European industrial relations is constrained by this priority, but it does exist. When the Danish LO president congratulated the EC/EU on its 50th anniversary in 2007 his assessment was positive:

He also stressed that the EU has an important role to play in securing global regulations aimed at fair conditions vis-à-vis multinational companies and the global economy.

It would perhaps be an exaggeration to claim that Danish trade unions have adopted a less nationally-oriented position on EU matters. They are still sceptical towards EU involvement in the regulation of the Danish labour market because they simply believe that things are better regulated by the parties in Denmark than through political intervention, be it in Copenhagen or Brussels. Apart from the Euro Pact – with regard to which Danish unions do not share the ETUC’s scepticism – it seems that in recent years the Danish unions’ opposition has diminished, in contrast to their European colleagues and sister organizations. One reason for this may be that the ETUC has applied a much more flexible strategy for dealing with European regulation with the result that Danish unions are much more relaxed when issues are discussed at European trade union level. Another reason is that since the end of the 2000s progress with ‘Social Europe’ has virtually stopped; the process of extending and harmonizing labour rights across the EU seems to have been put on hold. Therefore, the challenges to Danish unions on this front have to a large degree disappeared. The new challenges come mainly from the increased competition within European labour markets and European court rulings defining market freedoms vis-à-vis trade union rights. Danish unions are here in the same boat, so to speak, as unions in many other countries.