The mobilisation of gig economy couriers in Italy

Introduction

In October 2016, in Turin, northern Italy, cycle couriers working for the German food delivery company Foodora staged a series of public protests which quickly attracted considerable media attention and became known as the first case of workers’ mobilisation in the Italian ‘gig economy’. The protests sparked a lively debate in Italian public opinion about working conditions in the so-called ‘gig’ or ‘on-demand’ economy. However, the debate remains confused by the ambiguous meaning of these terms, often conflated with unrelated concepts such as that of the ‘sharing economy’ (Blanchard, 2015; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016); and by the as yet limited understanding of what these ‘new’ work organisation forms entail for the evolution of employment practices (Eurofound, 2015; Valenduc and Vendramin, 2016) and for the possibilities of workers’ collective organisation. Analysing the case of the Foodora riders’ mobilisation in Italy thus offers a timely opportunity to reflect on the current challenges facing the labour movement, in Italy and in Europe, in the brave new world of the ‘gig economy’.

The Foodora model and the reasons behind the protest

Foodora’s operating model spans the traditional logistics sector (i.e. delivery), the service sector (catering), and the ‘platform’ or ‘on-demand’ economy. ¹ Like other delivery apps such as Deliveroo and UberEats, Foodora operates an online platform that uses a ‘crowd-fleet’ of cyclists to deliver food to customers from local restaurants. This model, at least on the surface, resembles a kind of ‘platform-based on-call work’ (Valenduc and Vendramin, 2016: 34), or ‘work on demand via an app’ (De Stefano, 2016: 3). The platforms’ profits come from acting as intermediaries between consumers and workers. Restaurants pay Foodora a commission to appear on their platform and to cover delivery costs. The riders, who are classified as external contractors and hired (in Italy) on a ‘contract of collaboration’ (similar to a zero-hours contract) ² , log onto a smartphone app to receive single delivery jobs, automatically allocated by an algorithm. Therefore, whilst the work itself is physical, the organisation of the labour process is fully digitalised.

Foodora started operating in Italy in 2015, and has since heavily invested in self-promotion. On 8 October 2016, however, its expansion met with problems, as a group of roughly 50 workers staged their first public protest in Turin, calling for a boycott of the app. ³

At the time, the couriers’ fleet comprised around 100 riders, mostly young people. They had been demanding better working conditions since April 2016, through a self-organised petition. Their requests centred on bicycle maintenance and Internet connection costs – entirely shouldered by the workers – but also included demands for higher hourly wages, which were lower in Turin than in Milan, the other Italian city where the company operated. These requests were largely ignored by the company.

It was however a change in their contractual terms which led to the explosion of workers’ public protests. In September 2016, Foodora began hiring new riders on a ‘piecework payment’ system, shifting from an hourly rate (€5.40 per hour) to a payment-by-delivery system (€2.70 per delivery). When, in November, Foodora announced that the new system would be extended to the whole workforce, the couriers reacted by demanding a higher hourly rate instead.

They also contested the terms of their contract, which categorises them as parasubordinate contractors rather than employees, meaning that they are not entitled to standard employment rights such as sick leave and holiday pay. The workers claimed that, in actual fact, the firm’s model of work organisation is akin to subordinate employment: riders agree to weekly shifts and cannot cancel them without finding substitutes; they earn a set wage; wait at pre-established locations for orders; and wear branded uniforms. On this basis, they demanded to be classified as employees and covered by a national collective labour contract – and thus by the minimum wage levels set therein.

Finally, the riders demanded an end to punitive practices used against workers perceived to be ‘troublemakers’ – such as the ‘disconnection’ from the platform and group chats – which had been used to sanction the most vocal riders and ultimately to fire two promoters who had showed support for the protest.

Outside the traditional mobilisation repertoires

Up to September 2016, the riders had been autonomously self-organising their mobilisation without the support of established trade unions. As the dispute with the company escalated, the riders then sought the support of the rank-and-file independent union SI-COBAS, active in the mobilisation of workers in the traditional Italian logistics sector (Pradella and Cillo, 2015). Through the union, they presented their demands formally to the firm. When these remained unmet a week later, they launched the protest on 8 October 2016.

The mobilisation was organised as a ‘proto-strike’: the riders involved ‘unlogged’ from the app and encouraged others to do the same, thus impacting the company’s capacity to fulfil its orders. They then staged visible protests around the city with their bikes and flags, holding ‘flying pickets’ that went through restaurants and squares handing out flyers to restaurant owners and members of the public, inviting them to boycott the app. This was coordinated with an online campaign targeting the company’s social media pages with critical comments, aimed at negatively affecting its reputation.

These protest methods fell mostly outside the traditional repertoire of trade unions’ mobilisation tactics, resembling instead some of the practices adopted by the Italian precarious workers’ movements in the early 2000s (Mattoni, 2012). Indeed, the workers involved in the protest have stated in interviews that the role played by the SI-COBAS union in the mobilisation had been limited, and that they had largely relied on the experiences of mobilisation acquired through involvement in other social movements. ⁴

The October 2016 mobilisation attracted considerable coverage in the Italian media and the company suffered further reputational damage through its attempts to defend its employment practices, claiming that the work of the riders was not ‘real work’, but ‘an opportunity to cycle around, whilst gaining a small salary’. ⁵

Outcomes and aftermath of the October protest

After refusing to negotiate, following the increased media attention the company agreed to meet some of the protesters’ representatives. In response to the workers’ demands, the company increased the delivery fee from €2.70 to €3.60, and offered some discount agreements for bike repairs. These concessions, extracted through mobilisation, are not to be disregarded as irrelevant. Yet, the more substantial demands remained unmet. Foodora refused to reinstate hourly wages and to reclassify its riders as employees. In addition, the 15 riders that had been most active in the protest claim to have been ‘unlogged’ from the system and denied any more shifts, effectively being subject to the involuntary termination of their contractual relationship. ⁶ The availability of a large pool of labour allowed the firm easily to hire new workers, thus diluting the unity of the original core of protesters. Riders have also reported that the firm subsequently optimised its work organisation model so that most workers could get on average two deliveries per hour at peak times, an earnings’ level which placated some of the initial discontent. ⁷ The company’s strategy of waiting out the storm was seemingly successful, at least in the short run, in weakening the intensity of the riders’ mobilisation.

The protest had noticeable ripple effects, however. The Italian left-wing opposition party Sinistra Italiana has tried, so far unsuccessfully, to introduce a law to re-regulate employment practices in the gig economy by re-classifying as subordinate employment relationships those cases where workers are hired as parasubordinate contractors but are, de facto, subject to the control and direction of the firm as regards the timing, organisation and remuneration of their work. ⁸

Given the limited progress achieved so far on the legislative front, a group of former Foodora workers are now preparing to pursue legal avenues and sue the company, aiming to demonstrate that their engagement as parasubordinate contractors masked a subordinate employment relationship, and that the cancellation of their shifts amounted thus to illegitimate dismissal. Meanwhile, the riders are continuing their self-organisation efforts, raising awareness about employment practices in the sector and forging links with other workers. However, established Italian trade unions have remained absent from these attempts at collective organisation.

Conclusions

The Turin Foodora riders’ case shows that the collective organisation of ‘gig economy’ workers presents both considerable opportunities and challenges for the trade union movement.

On the one hand, it demonstrates that collective action is possible even with a fragmented workforce that is physically dispersed and employed on individualised contracts, falling outside the remit of collective bargaining. However, the physical presence of the workers in the urban space was still fundamental for organising efforts – limiting the portability of lessons to other segments of the ‘on-demand’ economy, where all the work takes place online. Despite the initial momentum, the riders also struggled to sustain their mobilisation over time. The company was able to take advantage of the ambiguity between subordinate and parasubordinate employment forms in Italian labour law, of the easy substitutability of its workers and of its algorithmic management practices.

Arguably, the absence of established trade unions able and willing to support the riders’ mobilisation undermined its sustainability. The lack of channels for representation and collective bargaining in the gig economy are challenging the Italian labour movement’s traditional organising strategies. Their frames of reference and organisational models have yet to adapt to the reality of these new forms of work. However, the visibility and successes obtained by the mobilisations of gig economy cycle couriers in the UK, organised both through mainstream and rank-and-file unions such as GMB and IWGB, show that it is possible to establish more sustained and structured actions (Hayns, 2016; Braithwaite, 2017).

To improve working conditions and extend established employment rights to gig economy workers, European trade unions thus need to comprehend the specificities of these forms of work organisation, which sit at the junction between logistics and ‘on-demand’ platforms. Action can be taken at the legal level, advocating for the closure of legal loopholes that permit the contractual misclassification of workers as independent contractors; and simultaneously at the grass-roots level, experimenting with forms of mobilisation that combine ‘traditional’ tactics, such as collective bargaining and strikes, with newer forms of solidarity aimed at increasing the disputes’ visibility and attracting public support.