Organising and mobilising Central and Eastern European migrant women working in care. A case study of a successful care workers’ strike in Switzerland in 2014

Introduction

In the industrial relations literature the inflow of Central and Eastern European (CEE) workers following EU enlargement in 2004 ¹ and its impact on western European trade unions have been widely discussed (for instance, in a recent book edited by Marino et al., 2017). In contrast to previous immigration (compare Castles and Kosack, 1973; Penninx and Roosblad, 2000), the newly arrived migrants tended to occupy segments of the labour market that were more fragmented and in many instances characterised by precarious employment conditions. This presented even more organisational challenges for trade unions, already dealing with membership decline (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). The Swiss labour movement was still affected by CEE migration even though the country opened its labour market to citizens of those countries only in 2011. Subsequently, Swiss trade unions, as was the case for their other western European counterparts, had to adapt their strategies to reach out to new types of migrant.

The article describes the response of Unia, the largest Swiss trade union, to the challenge of organising and mobilising CEE migrants in the context of a strike predominantly involving Polish care workers. The strike took place between 14 and 26 June 2014 at Primula, a small care company in Switzerland. According to Unia, this was the first strike by CEE care workers. The strike was presented at the SGB (USS) congress in October 2014 as one of the most important – and successful – examples of organising care workers by trade unions. Furthermore, the strike has been chosen as one of the most successful collective actions in Unia’s history and included in a book commissioned by Unia to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Swiss general strike (Alleva and Rieger, 2017).

The case study method has been chosen to explore the complexity of the relationship between Unia and the CEE female migrants newly arrived in Switzerland, highlighting Unia’s policies related to CEE migrant workers.

The article begins with description of Unia’s strategies for organising migrants, followed by an analysis of the strike. The main research question focuses on why carers were able to persuade union officials to launch industrial action. The outcome was successful despite the migrants’ limited knowledge of industrial relations and lack of prior experience of strike actions in their home countries. Furthermore, the strike is presented in the wider perspective of other western European trade unions’ efforts to mobilise migrant workers. Given the particular features of the strike, such as the fact it took place at a small company, and factors such as the workers’ occupation and nationality, the existing literature within the framework of which the strike could be subjected to direct comparison is limited. There are, however, a number of similarities between the strategies adopted by Unia and recent strategies of British and Dutch trade unions when it comes to migrant worker mobilisation and union revitalisation, as well as their reliance on American trade union organising strategies. Therefore, the author has chosen to compare Unia’s approach with the efforts of British and Dutch trade unions. Both have been well analysed in the literature, particularly those of the British unions (for example, Alberti, 2014; Connolly et al., 2014; Holgate, 2005), whereas an example involving Dutch unions was examined recently by Connolly et al. (2017).

The article ² is intended as a contribution to the literature on the organisation of migrants by western European trade unions (see also Castles and Kosack, 1973; Connolly at al., 2014; Holgate, 2005; Marino, 2012; Marino et al., 2017; Penninx and Roosblad, 2000; Perrett and Martínez Lucio, 2009; Wrench, 2004), with particular attention to CEE workers (Meardi, 2007; Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010) and the way in which their mobilisation may contribute to a wider debate on trade union revitalisation (Frege and Kelly, 2004; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Turner, 2008). In addition, it is a contribution to the literature on union mobilisation strategies (Alberti, 2014; Gall and Fiorito, 2012; Kelly, 1998; McAdam, 1988) because it provides an analysis of workers’ participation in a strike.

Although there is a large literature on organising migrant workers and ethnic minorities (see, for instance: Alberti et al., 2013; Gordon, 2005; Holgate, 2005; Milkman, 2006), recently also from the perspective of migrants’ own experiences of unionisation (Alberti, 2014), as well as literature focusing specifically on the organisation of CEE workers (Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010), research considering CEE workers’ participation in industrial action remains underdeveloped. The existing studies mainly overlook the labour agency of CEE migrants, with the exception of a recent study on the labour agency of construction workers in the Netherlands (Berntsen, 2016). Research on Swiss trade unions’ efforts to mobilise migrant workers from CEE countries is similarly limited.

Accordingly, the article’s aim is to address the above gap in the literature on Swiss trade union strategies for organising CEE workers. Secondly, it suggests that it is crucial to take into consideration the collective agency and mobilisation potential of CEE female workers when developing strategies for mobilising this group of workers. Finally, the article argues that perceptions of migrant women, in particular CEE women, need to be changed. They are not just the passive victims of global care chains (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Parreñas, 2001) nor ‘a ready made labour supply which is, at once, the most vulnerable, the most flexible and, at least in the beginning, the least demanding workforce’ (Morokvasic, 1984: 886). Their collective agency has allowed them to transform their social and employment situation, as discussed in the case study.

The article draws on the following definitions of agency and organising. Agency is defined as: ‘the ability to exert some degree of control over social relations’ (Sewell, 1992: 20). Organising is understood, similarly to Connolly and colleagues (2017), as ‘an approach to recruit new workers, empower union members and encourage worker self-organization’, as well as ‘a strategic opportunity for renewal and revitalization in the context of declining union density and institutional power bases (Frege and Kelly, 2004; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013) (quoted in Connolly et al., 2017: 321).

Trade union challenges in organising CEE workers

After the Second World War, major western European trade unions faced challenges in their approach to organising migrant workers (Castles and Kosack, 1973). Penninx and Roosblad (2000), later with Marino (Marino et al., 2017) divided those challenges into three sets of dilemmas influencing unions’ approach to migrant workers: resistance to versus support of migration policies; inclusion versus exclusion of migrants within trade unions; and special versus equal to local members’ treatment within their structures. These approaches were generally developed over time, with the first dilemma (resistance versus support) appearing in the years following the end of the Second World War, the last (special versus equal treatment) from 1980s onwards. As a result, all approaches adopted by western European trade unions towards CEE migrants have taken place within the framework of the special versus equal treatment dilemma, with many trade unions opting for the special treatment approach (Marino et al., 2017). Penninx and Roosblad (2000) also argue that there are four sets of factors that influence differences between union responses to migration: the power and structure of the trade unions, economic and labour market situation, factors connected with society and factors connected with migrants’ characteristics.

The above dilemmas are similar to two approaches identified by Alberti et al. (2013) in their analysis of the efforts of British trade unions (GMB, Unison and Unite) to organise migrants. Drawing on the intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1993), authors described these efforts as based on universalistic and particularistic methods, where the former is ‘based on a supposedly homogeneous worker identity, while the latter targets migrant workers as members of specific ethnic communities, or as migrants with specific social and workplace needs’ (Alberti et al., 2013: 4140). According to the authors, the particularistic approach turned out to be more efficient in terms of attracting and sustaining migrant workers.

As a result of the accession of several CEE countries to the EU in 2004, Poland become one of the main sources of migration to western European countries. Between 2004 and 2014 more than 1.9 million Poles left home to live in western Europe (GUS, 2015).

The United Kingdom was one of the first EU countries (along with Ireland and Sweden) to lift labour restrictions for CEE migrants. It also had the largest inflow of Polish migration – 780,000 – followed by the Polish migration to Germany (470,000) and Ireland (120,000) (GUS, 2015). The British trade unions thus have extensive experience of dealing with CEE migrants, which has been widely researched. For instance, Fitzgerald and Hardy (2010) identified two sets of union responses to organising CEE workers. The first concentrates on recruitment and organising methods; the second includes the development of local, national and international linkages. The organising approach quickly provided structural challenges because many potential members were employed in non-unionised, fragmented workplaces or when recruited to a union faced further difficulties in becoming activists. Trade union officers, when interviewed by Fitzgerald and Hardy (2010), were unable to assess how successful their efforts to recruit CEE workers had been. James and Karmowska (2010), Connolly et al. (2014) and Tapia (2014) argued that many British trade union activities in organising migrant workers depended on various circumstances, including strong and committed branches, dedicated union officers and external funding, as well as the political will to embed migrants in unions’ structures.

Other western European trade unions embraced similar methods and encountered comparable challenges. For instance, Dutch unions established a dedicated unit of Polish organisers (Marino et al., 2017), German agricultural and construction union IG BAU created an association for mobile workers (Greer et al., 2013), and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions launched a Polish members network. ³

A number of these initiatives were project-based or were disbanded, as in the case of the Polish members’ network at the GMB (Alberti et al., 2013) or the Polish network in Unison (Tapia, 2014). Others, such as the association of mobile workers, struggled to attract members (Greer et al., 2013). There are, however, examples of more positive experiences. For instance, Irish trade union SIPTU employed CEE organisers and Unia appointed a Polish-speaking organiser in 2012. In addition, the union also set up a Polish members’ network. ⁴

Importantly, the existing literature focuses mainly on the perspective of trade union officials when discussing inclusion strategies aimed at CEE migrants, with research based on interviews with union officers and analysis of policy documents. Quite often, the voices of CEE migrants and their needs and expectations are overlooked. As a result, there has been little discussion of CEE workers’ agency, both when it comes to their decision to engage in union activism and with regard to how unions respond to this engagement. This article is intended to fill this gap.

Research methods

At the time of the strike the author was employed by Unia head office as an organiser responsible for CEE workers. During the initial days of the strike, the author tried to take more of an active role, but once it became apparent that Unia regional officials did not want the involvement of an officer from the central office, the author stepped back and took on the role of participant observer, with a view to discussing the events of the strike in his dissertation. At the same time, it was not crucial for the author to be more engaged in the strike because he had previously been involved as an organiser in a number of successful labour disputes involving Polish and Slovakian workers and the author was happy with the role given to him by the regional officers. Given the author’s position within the trade union and pre-existing relationships with the workers, analytic auto-ethnography (Anderson, 2006) was chosen as the most suitable method of presenting the research findings. The analytic autoethnography method formulated by Anderson (2006) is characterised by complete member researcher status, analytic reflexivity, narrative visibility of the researcher himself, dialogue with informants and, finally, a commitment to theoretical analysis.

The data for this case study are based primarily on seven semi-structured interviews, four with striking workers and three with union officials. The study is also supported by fieldwork notes, as well as other written documents related to the strike.

All interviews were conducted and recorded in the native language of the informant, that is, German or Polish, with the exception of one interview with a regional manager, which was conducted in English. The names of the strikers were changed.

The research used a qualitative, inductive approach, with data collection determined through ongoing interpretation rather than pre-existing hypotheses. The analysis of transcripts was conducted a year after the strike. The data were coded according to the emerging categories, such as collective agency, strike initiative, strike leadership and worker mobilisation.

Unia’s experience in organising migrants, industrial relations context and the care sector in Switzerland

The Swiss model of industrial relations is defined as a coordinated market economy with neo-corporatism (Oesch, 2011). Unia as the largest Swiss trade union (Oesch, 2012) represents workers in the private sector, in which half of its 200,000 members are of migrant origin, as are a large proportion of its employees (Unia, 2014). Unia was created in 2004 as a result of the merger of five trade unions: GBI (construction), SMUV (predominantly industry) and three smaller unions: VHTL, ‘Unia’ and ‘Action’. Its members are divided into four groups: construction (the largest), followed by industry (such as metal, chemical), craftwork and, finally, a service sector, including private care. Care providers are one of more recent groups of workers targeted by the union.

Applying Penninx and Roosblad’s (2000) framework of three dilemmas in terms of the union’s response to migrant workers, the approach adopted by Unia might be described as ‘inclusive’, based on the provision of special treatment for foreign members. In terms of union identity, drawing on Hyman’s triangle of industrial relations (2001), ⁵ Unia could be located between class and society. In terms of Connolly and colleagues’ (Connolly et al., 2014) modification of Hyman’s typology for analysing trade union responses to migration, Unia could be described as mainly a class- and social rights–orientated union, while at the same time lacking community orientation.

Unia’s positive attitude towards migrant workers needs to be situated against the complex background of changes within the Swiss trade union movement (compare Erne and Imboden, 2015; Pedrina, 2016). In the aftermath of the Second World War trade unions were resistant to the employment of migrant workers because they represented a threat to the pay and working conditions of local workers (Degen, 2000). Furthermore, many migrants (predominantly Italian and later Spanish) initially arrived on the basis of the highly exploitative seasonal worker status or temporary employment permits, with trade union support (Schmittter-Heisler, 2000). For instance, migration was perceived not only as a threat to Swiss workers’ identities (with many migrants being Catholic as opposed to the majority of local workforce, who were Protestant) but also as liable to bring conflict to the workplace and pose a threat to the quality of work and social partnership (Riedo, 1976). According to Degen (2000), this initial anti-migration approach could not be sustained as many migrants became a permanent part of the Swiss workforce and trade unions had to recruit foreign workers if they wanted enough members to retain the ability to bargain on behalf of local workers. At the same time, the new generation of Swiss unions officials, particularly in the GBI, became more supportive of foreign workers (Pedrina and Keller, 2018) and started to campaign against seasonal worker status (Steinauer and Von Allmen, 2000). As a result, from the late 1960s onwards the trade unions began to develop more inclusive structures catering for migrant members and shifted their attitude to supporting initiatives aimed at improving the legal status of foreign workers (Schmitter Heisler, 2000). These inclusive attitudes resulted in increased union density among migrant workers so that in the mid-1980s migrants constituted a significant part of their membership (Steinauer and Van Allmen, 2000).

Although seasonal worker status was removed only after the introduction of bilateral agreements with the EU (regarding free movement of workers) in the early 2000s, overall, Swiss unions were successful in using the negotiation process to improve the level of protection of migrant workers (Pedrina and Keller, 2018). Using the political leverage provided by the Swiss system of direct democracy (Wyler, 2012), unions approved the bilateral agreements with the EU under the condition of introducing special accompanying measures (flanking measures) to protect all workers from wage undercutting (Erne and Imboden, 2015). The legislative framework of flanking measures included legislation improving protections for posted workers (stipulating equal pay with local workers), extended coverage of collective bargaining agreements and the introduction of tripartite committees (Erne and Imboden, 2015). The tripartite commissions were able to negotiate national labour agreements (NAV) in sectors without collective bargaining agreements where wages are undercut (SECO, 2015). One of these agreements, discussed later in this section, was introduced for the workers employed for domestic duties.

Already in the mid-1970s the GBI, Unia’s formative union, created formal structures of migrant workers’ committees (Pedrina, 2016). Apart from the formal migrants’ committee Unia also has informal language groups for migrant communities, such as the Portuguese, Albanians and Spanish (Pedrina, 2016). Formal committees and informal language groups are aimed at enhancing migrant participation not only in terms of trade union decision-making but also in Swiss society (Alleva, 2001). Within Unia, in 2013 Polish members, supported by the author, created an informal national group. In 2014, Unia supported the creation of a regional group of Polish care workers in Zurich ⁶ and this was where some of the strikers first met. Furthermore, the region where the strike took place cooperates closely with the US union Unite Here and regularly sends its organisers to the United States to learn organising methods.

At 23.3 per cent of the population, Switzerland has one of the largest populations of migrants in Europe, after Luxemburg (OECD, 2015). The number of migrant workers in Switzerland will probably continue to increase, in particular in the care sector, because of the ageing of Swiss society (National Office for Statistics, 2010). Overall, the care sector is highly dependent on labour from CEE countries, whose citizens have been allowed to work in Switzerland without major restrictions since 2011. The majority of care workers who have recently migrated to Switzerland came from Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, joining the ongoing flow of carers from eastern Germany (Schilliger, 2013). According to various estimates, including those provided by Unia, there were about 15,000 CEE workers employed in the long-term care sector in 2014.

CEE care workers are employed mainly on precarious employment contracts in part-time, temporary posts, as well as on a bogus self-employment basis; some of them may even be undeclared workers (Wigger et al., 2013). Since 2011, some terms and conditions (including minimum wage) for care workers have been regulated by the national labour agreement (NAV Hauswirtschaft) (SECO, 2015). The agreement regulates the employment of all workers engaged in domestic duties and was introduced to prevent wage discrimination against female workers from Central and Eastern Europe (Erne and Imboden, 2015). Because this is not a collective bargaining agreement and does not regulate all working conditions (such as stand-by work), the working regulations for carers are open to misuse.

In May 2014 Unia and members of the employers’ organisation Zu Hause Leben (Living at Home) ratified a collective bargaining agreement that stipulated improved working conditions for care workers employed by care companies. ⁷ The demands of the trade unions during the strike were based on this agreement and as such, the union requested its ratification by the employer.

Finally, CEE care workers in Switzerland are organised by two trade unions: Unia and VPOD (SSP), a public service union. Both unions started organising Polish care workers recently (first, Unia from late 2012, later VPOD from the middle of 2013) and launched informal groups. ⁸

Description of the strike

The strike took place at a small care company, Primula, specialising in private care, operating in Canton Zurich in Switzerland. At the time, the company employed 15 workers, including 13 carers and two administrative officers. Out of all the care workers employed by the company seven participated in the strike, all of them recent migrants (Polish, Slovakian and one of Polish origin from Germany). Those who did not participate in the strike were also of migrant or Swiss origin, including administrative officers who were Swiss.

Primula front-line workers were employed on a number of different contract types and patterns. The main issue that faced carers not working on a live-in basis was unpaid travel time, which was often longer than the time taken up by their assignments. Carers employed on live-in care duty contracts did not receive compensation for overtime and stand-by work.

At the end of May 2014, the manager of Primula decided to introduce new contracts for the workers, which downgraded the terms and conditions of employment by introducing a six-month anti-competitive ⁹ clause and reducing the hourly rate for night work. The workers also faced ongoing issues in terms of unpaid travel time and delays to overtime payments. The deadline for accepting the new contracts was established individually for every employee, but all of them were informed that they should either accept the new conditions by the end of June or resign. Two Primula workers approached the author with their grievances at one of the meetings for Polish workers in Zurich. The author facilitated the contact between them and the regional Unia manager, setting in motion the chain of events that led to the strike.

Strikers demanded the removal of the anti-competitive clause, the introduction of a collective agreement, including higher wages (specifically, a higher rate for night work) and paid overtime and travel time. Unia requested a meeting with the employer on behalf of the workers but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. As a result, the carers were left with no option other than to go on strike. ¹⁰ The strike commenced on 14 June and concluded after 11 days, on 26 June 2014.

Three major events took place during the strike: a rally was held in front of the company offices, gathering almost 50 Unia members and supporters, including strikers; a film documentary about the strike was broadcast after the main news on state TV; ¹¹ and the cantonal office for conciliation and arbitration became involved in the strike and invited the trade union and the employer to a formal meeting to negotiate.

The meeting at the conciliation and arbitration office secured a major victory for the union. All demands, including removal of the anti-competitive clause, higher wages, 13th salary ¹² and paid travel time were accepted, apart from the introduction of the collective agreement. This was despite the fact that all claims accepted by the employer were based on terms and conditions stipulated by the collective agreement. Finally, workers participating in the strike received a year-long protection against dismissal. The agreement was implemented on 11 July, 14 days after the settlement.

Discussion and findings

It can be gleaned from the interviews and the fieldwork notes that the workers were highly motivated to go on strike. Their motivation was high enough to put pressure on the union to call for industrial action, even though the union was not prepared for a strike at that time. Moreover, the workers never portrayed themselves as victims but more as self-confident individuals who were able, with adequate support, to protect their rights and who expected equal participation in decision-making.

Nonetheless, it is important to underline the author’s role in the strike, with the author firmly convinced that his role was more substantial than that of an interpreter. First of all, he may have played the role of catalyst for the strike as without him the women would not have been able to contact the relevant regional organiser and confirm the legality of their demands, which in turn contributed to the ‘cognitive liberation’ (McAdam, 1988) necessary to trigger the strike action. Secondly, his presence showed the workers that the union recognised their specific needs as migrant workers by providing a Polish-speaking organiser, thus allowing them to fully exercise their collective agency, this way also fully showcasing Unia’s approach to organising CEE migrants.

Strike legacy and lessons learned

The strike was an important event for the union, both externally and internally. Externally, it helped to raise the union’s profile among newly targeted group of workers. The strike also demonstrated the organisational power of the union as the most influential one in the care sector in Switzerland, in line with its already strong position in the construction and industry sector. The union’s organisational power was particularly important because a few months before the strike the union had signed a collective agreement with an employers’ organisation for the care sector. Internally, the union has been provided with an opportunity to assess its mobilisation capabilities.

The strike was a learning process for both the workers and the trade union. Even though the strike was a victory for the workers, however, most left the company. Those who stayed were the two workers who broke the strike, as well as one of the carers, who at the time of the strike was going through the process of revalidating her nursing diploma, which would allow her to find a better paid job. The company changed its name and the managing director stepped down, but eventually the company closed down in mid-2015.

This is why, after the strike ended, union officials found it difficult to assess whether the employer was adhering to the agreement. The carers who did not participate in the strike did not join the union even though the agreement also improved their conditions of employment. But although the union representatives struggled to reach out to existing employees, the successful outcome of the strike gave significant hope to other carers. It also provided an opportunity for the trade union to effectively organise more employees in the care sector and improve their working conditions.

Regional manager: The strike was in the media. It was a public conflict and people working in the same situation became aware of that and realised that they could be active in this sector and we got in touch with more people working in the same conditions. That has an effect – making it easier for us to fight these bad conditions. I think [that] these seven women made a lot of people working in this sector proud. Many people were shocked that it’s possible, that [it] can really work. That uniting was successful, and it was a good sign for the workers of that sector. ¹³

Concluding remarks and comparison with migrants’ mobilisation in European countries

As this article demonstrates, Unia’s response to organising Central and Eastern European workers was in many instances similar to the approaches taken by other western European trade unions. Unia’s trade unions have since the 1970s developed formal structures for migrants, mirroring for instance Black British members’ self-organised trade union groups (Wrench, 2004). This policy is different from the approach taken by Spanish or Italian trade unions, which do not promote the creation of migrant workers’ groups as these are perceived as somewhat separatist and with the potential to foster divisions among their members (see, for instance, Connolly et al., 2014; Marino, 2012). Thus, following EU enlargement, Unia already had structures in place that allowed for the inclusion of new groups of CEE migrants, in contrast to British unions, in which participation in Black members’ committees was based on race, not nationality (Tapia, 2014).

Unia’s strategy for recruiting migrants by employing officers speaking the relevant language mirrors the US ‘like recruits like’ principle (Milkman, 2006). Based on this strategy, the union decided to employ a Polish-speaking organiser, an approach also adopted by UK (Alberti et al., 2013; Fitzgerald and Hardy, 2010) and Dutch unions (Connolly et al., 2017). Furthermore, drawing on important organising methods from the United States, the existing structures supporting migrant representation have been supplemented recently by a community organising approach, such as the establishment of the informal group of Polish members in Unia. This group mirrors Filipino and Polish networks created by Unison (Tapia, 2014) and similarly aimed to go beyond the workplace and reach out to migrant communities more broadly. As has been the case with other unions, Unia has provided migrant members with reserved seats in decision-making bodies and produced information materials in key migrant languages, along with a Polish-language website for Polish workers. ¹⁴

If we compare the strike with the mobilisation of cleaners in London hotels (Alberti 2014) or at Amsterdam airport (Connolly et al., 2017) further similarities appear in terms of Unia’s approach. These include using the media to gain public support or organise a solidarity demonstration, methods used by Unite and FNV-Bondgenoten in organising cleaners in London and Amsterdam. Similarly, including strikers in decision-making processes suggests that the union approach was a combination of ‘top down’ direction with ‘bottom up’ mobilising, which, according to Milkman, has proved to be successful in organising migrants in the United States (Connolly et al., 2017; Milkman, 2006). Another similarity with the Dutch trade unions was that, following the strike, Unia employed one of its participants as an organiser to support the mobilisation of migrant workers.

There are additional similarities with Dutch and British trade unions regarding internal discussion of the sustainability of mobilisation efforts (Connolly et al. 2017; Alberti 2014). It has to be noted that because the care company no longer exists it is difficult to assess how the success of the strike influenced membership growth and the position of Unia in the care sector. Moreover, the collective agreement, which provided a basis for the strike settlement, was later terminated by the employers’ organisation. This was not due to the union mobilisation, however. ¹⁵

The most distinguishing feature of Unia’s approach to organising migrant workers is its commitment to special treatment. This commitment is based on the experiences of its former union GBI, which from the mid-1970s had a migrant workers’ committee. Importantly, GBI campaigned for migrant rights by demanding the removal of ‘seasonal worker’ status and fighting for the introduction of the equal pay principle for migrant workers through bilateral agreements with the EU. Furthermore, following on from GBI’s experience of supporting migrant workers through formal committees and informal (language) groups, Unia responded to the needs of CEE care workers by appointing a Polish-speaking organiser and by supporting the self-organisation of Polish members. This was done first by creating an informal group of Polish members in Unia in 2013 and secondly by setting up an informal language group of Polish care workers in the region where the strike took place, in 2014.

Crucially, as this research demonstrates, from the beginning of the strike, the role of the workers was on an equal footing with Unia officials in initiating and leading the industrial dispute. The union drew on the strength of the strikers’ motivation, allowing them to play an important and equal role in the industrial action. Moreover, the strikers did not behave as victims (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Parreñas, 2001), nor were they the most vulnerable members of the workforce (Morokvasic, 1984). Instead, they maintained their collective agency in dealing with events before and during the strike.

Last but not least, as this research indicates, female care workers from Central and Eastern Europe may be as easily (or even more easily) mobilised than local workers, particularly in sectors with precarious employment conditions, such as the care sector. Their mobilisation potential, if rightly handled by trade unions, could be deployed not only for their own benefit but for that of local members. Therefore it could be argued that, once empowered to exercise their collective agency, CEE migrant women could increase the overall organising and mobilising capacity of western European trade unions. This hypothesis, however, requires further research.