Asylum-seekers and the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ in Austria,Finland and Italy

Abstract

German

French

Drawing on both semi-structured interviews and desk-based research, this article contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how asylum-seekers may find themselves trapped in conditions of ‘hyper-precarity’ in Austria, Finland and Italy, and how their vulnerabilities compare to those of other groups of workers. The first section of the article explains the different histories of Austria, Finland and Italy in terms of hosting asylum-seekers, before outlining the recent labour market dynamics of each of these countries. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of the different elements constituting the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ as experienced by asylum-seekers. These elements include discussions of precarity, vulnerability and law. The third section explains how the interviews and desk-based research were conducted and analysed. The fourth and final section of the article presents findings and their implications.

Keywords

Asylum-seekers labour market access legislation precarious work vulnerability Austria Finland Italy

Introduction

The Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) stipulates that Member States have to offer access to housing, food, clothing, health care and education for minor asylum-seekers as well as access to employment under certain conditions to adult asylum-seekers.¹ However, the Directive allows for different levels of access to these entitlements.² While allowing asylum-seekers to take up lawful employment in EU Member States is one means to ensure that this group is not (directly) pushed into undocumented work, such provisions may still exacerbate asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities with regard to precarious work more generally.³ In this article we investigate asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities to precarious work in the context of three case studies of EU Member States: Austria, Finland and Italy. Specifically, the focus is on how these vulnerabilities converge and diverge, both across the three countries and relative to other groups of workers within these countries.⁴

Austria, Finland and Italy were chosen as case studies because of their particular histories of hosting asylum-seekers and integrating them in their societies. Alongside these contextual reasons for choosing Austria, Finland and Italy as case studies, we also selected these three countries because one of the authors originates from Austria, another from Finland and the third from Italy. All three countries registered an increase in asylum applications during and after the 2015 ‘migrant crisis’. In Austria the labour market integration of asylum-seekers – although currently portrayed by politicians there as a novel process – occurred as early as the 1990s because of labour shortages (Der Standard, 2016, 2018a; ORF, 2015; Kodydek, 2011). In Finland, by contrast, asylum claims tended to be low up to 2015, so that claimants were – and still are – not considered to be a potential active labour force by the state, despite having the right to work (Farchy and Liebig, 2017; Jokinen, 2016; Wahlbeck, 2018). Italy, meanwhile, has a long history of hosting asylum-seekers (Migration Policy Institute, 2017). This may be explained by the country’s geographical location and the Dublin Regulation. In theory, asylum-seekers enjoy the same rights as refugees – who enjoy the same rights as locals – in accessing the Italian labour market (Ciccarone, 2016), but reality paints a different picture (The Guardian, 2018). That the granting of labour market access to asylum-seekers varies among these three countries may be partially explained by their particular experiences of hosting them, as well as their internal labour market dynamics. While Austria, Finland and Italy all grant varying degrees of labour market access to asylum-seekers, however, these immigrants’ propensity to take up jobs deemed ‘precarious’ is apparently greater on the whole when compared with other groups of workers because of what Lewis et al. (2014a, 2014b) call the ‘hyper-precarity trap.’

As the introduction to this special issue points out, there remains the question of what exactly labour market integration means. In the case of Austria, Finland and Italy, specifically, asylum-seekers may be integrated into labour markets in the following ways. In Austria, employment of asylum-seekers is basically possible after an initial period of six months. The 2004 Bartenstein Decree, however, considerably limits the scope for finding employment in Austria (Arbeiterkammer, 2015). This decree stipulates that employment permits for asylum-seekers can be issued only in the context of seasonal employment quotas in agriculture, forestry and tourism. When such a quota is available and asylum-seekers find employment, they are no longer eligible for government benefits or housing and have to support themselves. As of 2012, asylum-seekers under 25 years of age may embark on an apprenticeship in sectors where a shortage of workers has been noted (Der Standard, 2013).

In Finland, asylum-seekers are entitled to start working three months after they have applied for asylum in the case of people who possess identity documents, and after six months in cases in which such documentation is lacking (§79, Aliens Act, 30 April 2004/301). Asylum-seekers can also apply for a work permit if they manage to find employment that fulfils the requirements for such a document (including a salary that is above the income threshold). Asylum-seekers are entitled to a basic subsistence allowance from the state during the asylum process. If their asylum application is rejected and asylum-seekers cannot get a residence permit on any other grounds, they may have no other option than to remain in the country as an undocumented resident. In Italy, asylum-seekers have the right to work after 60 days from the date of their asylum application (Article 22, para. 1, Legislative Decree No. 142/2015). Previously, asylum-seekers could access the labour market after six months from the moment they filed their application, if the procedure was still ongoing and the delay was not due to the conduct of the asylum-seeker. Despite the change in the legal framework, de facto employment opportunities remain limited to manual labour.

The legally defined labour market access of asylum-seekers in Austria, Finland and Italy does not, however, guarantee that this group of persons is not at risk of becoming employed in precarious jobs. Indeed, news coverage (The Guardian, 2018; Yle News, 2017; Helsinki Times, 2017; Der Standard, 2018b), reports (Allsopp et al., 2014) and academic material (Bales and Mayblin, 2018; Lewis and Waite, 2015; Lewis et al., 2014a, 2014b; Van Kooy and Bowman, 2018; Waite, 2017; Waite and Lewis, 2017) suggest that asylum-seekers are likely to fall prey to precarious working conditions precisely because of their particular vulnerabilities, which are exacerbated by the framing of labour market access by national legislation (Anderson, 2010).

In this article, we apply Lewis and Waite’s (2015) ‘hyper-precarity trap’ framework to make sense of asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities in Austria, Finland and Italy and consider how they compare with other workers’ vulnerabilities. This framework blends together a unique number of interrelated but distinct processes: legal (stratified rights), economic (labour market dynamics) and social (exacerbation of vulnerabilities). Together, these processes leave asylum-seekers susceptible to precarious work. Drawing on both semi-structured interviews with ‘experts’ and desk-based research, we seek to contribute a more nuanced understanding of how these vulnerabilities produce multi-layered insecurity and uncertainty among asylum-seekers, and how they compare with the vulnerabilities of other groups of workers. The article is structured as follows: the first section explains the different histories of Austria, Finland and Italy in terms of hosting asylum-seekers, before outlining the recent labour market dynamics of each of these countries. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of the different elements constituting the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ as it is experienced by asylum-seekers. These elements include discussions of precarity, vulnerability and law. The third section explains how the interviews and desk-based research were conducted and analysed. The fourth and final section of the article presents our findings and their implications.

Asylum-seekers and labour market dynamics in Austria, Finland and Italy

At the time of writing,⁵ 59 per cent of businesses in Austria have reported encountering challenges in recruiting enough workers, while the unemployment rate – currently standing at 6.8 per cent – has been declining since March 2017 (Lindorfer et al., 2018). The need for workers is therefore real and may lead to bottlenecks if not addressed properly. Again, looking at figures for June 2018 shows that 79,114 job positions are available, out of which approximately 16,000 are apprentice positions. According to data from the Austrian Labour Market Service, 949 asylum-seekers aged 25 or under are working as apprentices. At the same time, news coverage reports that a third of the 949 asylum-seeking apprentices are at risk of deportation (Kurier, 2018), in addition to those who already have been deported (Der Standard, 2018b). Many businesses are not in agreement with government policy in deporting rejected asylum-seeking apprentices because of the significant labour shortage, irrespective of whether they are employed as apprentices or workers.

Very recently (late August 2018), the Austrian government announced its intention to revise existing law around apprenticeships in relation to asylum-seekers. The media has reported that the end of this initiative may work out in two different ways, because the government announcement is open to various interpretations: either asylum-seekers and businesses will face further challenges in collaborating, or access to becoming an apprentice for non-nationals and non-EU citizens will be deregulated.

While the integration of asylum-seekers into the Austrian labour market today is accompanied by heated discussion, in the 1990s asylum-seekers were integrated into the labour market in order to meet labour shortages without much concern being expressed (ORF, 2015; Kodydek, 2011; Der Standard, 2016). The governance of labour market access is therefore not necessarily due to the inflow of migrants, but rather because of the political climate, which does not necessarily reflect economic needs. Still, Gächter (1995) has noted that the laws setting out the access of foreigners have hardly changed since the interwar years in terms of discriminating against them.

In the context of Finland, the hosting of international migrants is a rather recent process. Finland used to be an emigration country, and international migrants arriving there until the 1990s consisted mainly of migrants returning with their families (Farchy and Liebig, 2017). The immigration pattern to Finland started to change in that decade, when migrants from Russia, Estonia, Somalia, former Yugoslavia and, in more recent times, Afghanistan and Iraq began to arrive (Farchy and Liebig, 2017). The intake of asylum-seekers when compared with that of the Scandinavian countries proper has traditionally been low (Wahlbeck, 2018). This may be explained to some extent by the country’s remote geographical location: situated in north-eastern Europe, Finland shares borders with the Russian Federation, Sweden and Norway. The Russian border remains closely controlled by Russia, while direct flights to conflict areas are few (Wahlbeck, 2018). In the 2000s, the number of asylum applications per year averaged out at a couple of thousand. In 2014, 3651 asylum claims were received (European Migration Network, 2016, cited in Wahlbeck, 2018). The following year, the arrival of 32,746 persons claiming asylum constituted an unparalleled increase, both in applications and migrants. As Wahlbeck (2018) notes, asylum policy became a politically salient topic the same year.

Asylum-seekers who have been granted a resident permit for at least 12 months are considered permanent residents and covered by the Finnish social security system. Wahlbeck (2018) points out that access to the universal welfare system is not synonymous with equal rights in the labour market. While currently no (academic) insights are available on how former asylum-seekers have fared in the Finnish labour market, Sarvikämi (2017) has shown that the unemployment rate among nationality groups characterised by a large proportion of refugees tends to be very high when compared with that of other groups.

Discussions about the labour market experience of asylum-seekers take place against a significant shortage of labour in 50 professions in Finland (Helsinki Times, 2018). The potential of asylum-seekers as workers has been recognised by international non-governmental agencies, such as the Finnish Red Cross and the private sector (The Guardian, 2016; Integrify, 2016; Ornamo, 2017). While these initiatives demonstrate that there is scope for asylum-seekers to fill labour market shortages, stories have surfaced about them being subject to unlawful employment conditions (Yle News, 2017; Helsinki Times, 2017): the case of asylum-seekers working in a restaurant located in Lahti stands out because of their continuous lack of payment and the fact that they learned of these job positions through the Finnish Red Cross’s temporary employment scheme.

Italy has, in contrast to both Austria and Finland, a much longer history of hosting asylum-seekers (Migration Policy Institute, 2017). This is, in the first instance, because of its geographical location at the southern shore of Europe, where boats that have crossed the Mediterranean may land more easily, enabling a larger number of people to claim asylum there (of course, not every asylum-seeker who comes to Europe will necessarily pass through Italy). The Dublin Regulation (Regulation No. 604/2013), which was adopted by the EU to ‘rapidly determine the Member State responsible [for an asylum claim]’, has had a particular impact in the Italian context due to this location factor. In the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis, however, the Dublin Regulation was temporarily suspended by a few countries because of the unprecedented number of people moving across the continent.

The number of asylum-seekers received in Italy has therefore tended to be comparatively higher than in many other Member States of the EU. Even in the long history of Italy’s hosting of asylum-seekers, however, 2015 represented a peak. While little is known about the labour market integration of asylum-seekers in Italy – some news coverage about community work offered to asylum-seekers to facilitate integration is available (The Local, 2017) – academic literature (Palumbo, 2016) and news coverage (The Guardian, 2018) point mainly to the vast number of rejected asylum-seekers who work in seasonal sectors.

Regarding the current state of the labour market, Italy has a less acute overall labour shortage than Austria and Finland, though it does lack workers in the tech industry (The Local, 2016). This situation may be explained by the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which is still felt in terms of a comparatively high unemployment rate and a lack of jobs considered ‘secure’ (OECD, 2018). In July 2018, the ‘dignity decree’ was passed, which is aimed at reducing the number of short-term and insecure jobs (The Economist, 2018).

Theoretical framework

In order to understand better the processes that conspire to increase asylum-seekers’ susceptibility to precarious jobs – and how these vulnerabilities may vary between Austria, Finland and Italy, as well as differ from other groups of workers in each of those countries – this article draws on the work of Lewis et al. (2014a, 2014b) and, more specifically, the analytical device of the ‘hyper-precarity trap’. The ‘hyper-precarity trap’ demonstrates how the combination of socio-legal structuring of constrained rights and entitlements, combined with neoliberal labour market policies, results in multi-dimensional insecurities. These multi-dimensional insecurities facilitate both ‘demand’ for and ‘support’ of unfree labourers. This shows that the coming together of several structural processes – namely, gender and socio-legal status – as well as the individual’s migratory movements ‘create[s] multi-dimensional insecurities that contribute to the necessity to engage in, and close down exit from, severely exploitative or forced labour’ (Lewis et al., 2014b: 171).⁶ This section will discuss key ideas relevant to the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ framework: notably, unfree labour, precarity (in the context of employment), insecurity and the regulation of labour market access.

Ample evidence exists that the lives of asylum-seekers are shaped by poverty, social exclusion and even destitution (Crawley et al., 2011; Dwyer et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 2014a, 2014b; Lewis and Waite, 2015; Waite and Lewis, 2017; Allsopp et al., 2014; Van Kooy and Bowman, 2018). In the past, efforts to tackle these three phenomena, when experienced by workers generally, focused on including labour in globalised fields of production (Hickey and Du Toit, 2007). Based on the assumption that participating in globalisation would improve workers’ (economic) livelihoods, this line of reasoning was subsequently abandoned when accounts emerged that labour in (global) supply chains included various forms of unfree labour.

The exact meaning of ‘unfree labour’ is subject to discussion. This concept, which scholars have come to acknowledge as being part of a continuum (Skrivankova, 2010; Lewis et al., 2014a, 2014b; Lewis and Waite, 2015), previously tended to be seen as the opposite of ‘free labour’.⁷ Current forms of ‘unfree labour’ are different from the types that are perhaps most commonly conceived of in the public imagination, including debt-bondage, slavery and indenture (Bales, 2004; Phillips, 2013) and may take the following forms: short-lived employment contracts; a lack of options for workers to leave employment (because of indebtedness and/or the withholding of wages, combined with their perception of responsibility, obligation or debts, which may be used by employers further to increase pressure on workers); and degrading, dangerous and harsh working conditions (which may amount to human rights and labour law violations). Despite experiencing ‘unfree’ employment conditions, workers may nevertheless receive wages (Phillips, 2013).

The characteristics of ‘unfree labour’ highlighted by Phillips (2013) also involve elements of precarity. Precarious work is contingent employment that lacks protection and employment entitlements; it tends to be found in sectors characterised by the following: seasonal employment (agriculture, for example); comparatively low entry conditions for workers and high staff turnover (as in hospitality); and fixed-term production cycles (for example, construction). Work in these sectors is judged to be precarious not only because of these temporal and educational factors, but also because workers experience challenges in planning for the future, saving money and being able to obtain loans (Knox, 2010). Precarious jobs may thus also count as insecure jobs.

Scholars have approached the concept of precarity in two different ways (Lewis et al., 2014a). The first group of authors understands ‘precarity’ to have ramifications beyond the work sphere (these authors also tend to talk about ‘precariousness’; see work by Bourdieu, 1998; Butler, 2004, 2009; Ettlinger, 2007; Giddens, 1990; Neilson and Rossiter, 2005, 2008; Tschöll, 2014). The second group of authors views precarity as a result of changes in global production and neoliberal labour market policies (Lewis et al., 2014a, 2014b; Phillips, 2013). For the purpose of this article, the term ‘precarity’ is used to investigate labour conditions that exacerbate asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities, while also bearing in mind its profound ramifications for people’s lives.

The link between precarious employment and insecurity is not straightforward, however, despite a growing awareness that employment precarity also has ramifications in spheres other than work. Piore (1979), for instance, has stated that the imagined temporariness of new migrants may be different from that of migrant workers who have been working in the host country for a certain period of time. A number of factors, such as fewer language skills, limited knowledge of the labour market and lower expectations, may lead new migrants to see work from an exclusively instrumental point of view, and so they may not experience precarious employment as being insecure in a problematic sense. Also, the worker may discount the temporariness of a particular role if there is the potential for advancing their career. The temporary character of work does not therefore necessarily translate into a heightened feeling of insecurity for new migrants (this may also be because the given state fixes the length of their stay), but may be seen as one step in the process of moving on to better employment opportunities. Meanwhile, Curtis and Lucas (2001) highlight that work lacking the prospect of career advancement may be viewed as temporary, by both migrants and non-migrants, and as an opportunistic way to secure a foothold in the labour market. While asylum-seekers may be ‘Piorean’ in a sense, they should not be mistaken for ‘birds of passage’. In addition to engaging in precarious work, asylum-seekers face insecurity in terms of not knowing whether their asylum application will be decided in their favour. As such, asylum-seekers not only experience precarity at work but at a more existential/ontological level, encapsulated by the term ‘precariousness’.

Workers who tend to work in precarious jobs are considered to be ‘vulnerable’. Vulnerable workers are those ‘who are at risk of having their workplace entitlements denied, or who lack the capacity or means to secure them’ (Health and Safety England, 2016: 1). Resort to the law may be one way of tackling such situations (by eradicating the risk of precariousness in relation to employment protection coverage; Koukiadaki and Katsaroumpas, 2017).⁸ This possible solution also exacerbates workers’ vulnerabilities, however, because the law restricts (or extends) access to labour markets for different socio-legal groups.

When discussing how states limit the labour market access of certain groups of persons (for example, asylum-seekers), Anderson (2010) talks of an ‘institutionalised insecurity,’ while Van Kooy and Bowman (2018) refer to ‘manufactured precarity’. In the case of asylum-seekers and their labour market integration in the United Kingdom, Mayblin (2016) argues that the lack of legal ways for asylum-seekers to integrate in labour markets should be seen as indicating governments’ belief in the ‘pull factor thesis’.⁹ Lewis et al. (2014b: 581) also identify the stratification of socio-legal statuses by states as ‘central to the production of (hyper)-precarious migrant workers’. This particular framework has so far only been applied in the work of Bales and Mayblin (2018) alongside Lewis et al. (2014a, 2014b), and Lewis and Waite (2015) in the context of the United Kingdom.

Our article not only contributes in an empirical fashion to a better understanding of asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities therefore, but also on a theoretical level, by focusing on how the intersection between socio-legal statuses and neoliberal labour market dynamics intensifies precarious employment realities and experiences of asylum-seekers in Austria, Finland and Italy.

Methodology

This article draws on interviews with 20 experts in the field (see Table 1) and desk-based research. We use the term ‘expert’¹⁰ to signify a person who has been working in some capacity on issues of labour migration, health and safety, and representation. This might include launching campaigns, publishing reports and/or assisting persons directly. The sample comprises a staff member from an international organisation (IO), a labour inspector (LI), a labour market expert (LME), four legal experts (LE), four ministry officials (MO), four representatives of workers’ organisations (WO) and, finally, five staff members from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The three national contexts are distinguished from each other in our analysis by placing appropriate country abbreviations in front of participants’ monikers: ‘At’ for Austria, ‘Fi’ for Finland and ‘It’ for Italy (for example, ‘participant Fi-NGO#2’).

Table 1.

Categories and number of participants in Austria, Finland and Italy.

Participant categories	Austria	Finland	Italy	Total
International organisation (IO)	–	–	It-IO	1
Legal expert (LE)	–	Fi-LE	It-LE#1, #2, #3	4
Labour inspector (LI)	–	Fi-LI	–	1
Labour market expert (LME)	At-LME	–	–	1
Non-governmental organisation (NGO)	At-NGO	Fi-NGO#1, #2	It-NGO# 1, #2	5
Ministry official (MO)	At-MO#1, #2	Fi-MO#1, #2	–	4
Workers’ organisation (WO)	At-WO	Fi-WO#1, #2, #3	–	4
Total	5	9	6	20

Note: The sample of participants varies from one country to the next. This difference is not intentional, but a result of how potential participants were identified and approached. In the case of Finland, staff at the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control facilitated interviews. In the Austrian and Italian contexts, participants were identified through media analysis. Moreover, in all three countries each participant was asked who they would recommend for an interview (known as the ‘snowball effect’).

The interviews were conducted face-to-face, by telephone or by email. Face-to-face and telephone interviews lasted between one and one-and-a-half hours. As it was not especially important for the analysis of our interview data to incorporate ‘social (interactional) cues’¹¹ (because our interest lay in participants’ knowledge about a process that affects third parties and not about participants directly (Opdenakker, 2006)), telephone and email interviews turned out to be viable alternatives to face-to-face interviews. Email interviews consisted of sending a range of open-ended questions to participants and asking them to answer these questions as extensively as possible in a written form. Interviews that were not conducted in English were subsequently translated. Data analysis was undertaken by deriving codes from several thorough readings of the interview transcripts.

When we approached participants who had been identified, we first provided a summary of the research project and information that the project was coordinated by the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. We also made it clear that they would be free to withdraw from the study at any time and that their anonymity was guaranteed. They were also offered the opportunity to review a final transcript of their interview.

Findings from systematic desk-based (secondary) research supplemented data yielded by semi-structured interviews. The systematic desk-based research amounted to reviewing reports published by governments, non-governmental organisations and supranational entities, alongside academic material and news coverage that dealt with asylum-seekers and labour markets. In order to find material, library catalogues and research and journal databases were consulted by using a number of keywords. These keywords included ‘labour market integration (or access)’, ‘asylum-seekers’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘precarity’ in the context of Austria, Finland and Italy.

One document that was found during the secondary research stuck out: this comprised briefings commissioned in 2016 by the European Commission dealing with the labour market integration of both asylum-seekers and refugees in all EU Member States (Ciccarone, 2016; Jokinen, 2016; Lechner et al., 2016).¹² These briefings in relation to Austria, Finland and Italy specifically turned out to be a very valuable first stepping stone in understanding how the treatment of asylum-seekers in accessing labour markets differs not only from that of refugees but also that of third-country nationals and recipients of subsidiary protection.¹³ The following criteria were used by the European Commission to evaluate the accessibility of labour markets for these different groups of people: (i) support from public employment services in integrating into labour markets; (ii) access to hiring subsidies, start-up support, on-the-job training and other labour market integration support; (iii) eligibility for mentoring schemes; (iv) eligibility to receive unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance; (v) conditionality of benefits linked to job-search requirements; (vi) length of support provided to the persons following their finding employment; and (vii) availability of services to asylum-seekers and refugees, for which third-country nationals are not eligible. While these accessibility criteria make no specific reference to asylum-seekers’ vulnerability to precarious work, they highlight the (limited) extent to which asylum-seekers can access services and/or benefits related to labour markets. The next section of the article discusses the insights gained from this secondary research, how these compare to data yielded by the semi-structured interviews and how, overall, they converge – or not – with characteristics of other socio-legal groups, notably refugees and third-country nationals.

Findings and discussions

Vulnerabilities of asylum-seekers to precarious work

This section begins by considering in which of the three countries under consideration asylum-seekers are technically most prone to the ‘hyper-precarity trap.’ These findings, based on desk research, are then supplemented and discussed in light of data yielded by our semi-structured interviews. The final section considers what the data suggest in relation to the question of which group of migrant workers across the case-study countries may be most vulnerable to precarious employment: asylum-seekers, refugees, recipients of subsidiary protection or third-country nationals.

In Austria, Finland and Italy, asylum-seekers have access to the labour market, although to varying degrees. In Austria, asylum-seekers are merely entitled to work in agriculture, forestry and tourism, alongside having access to on-the-job training and to a voluntary integration year.¹⁴ For asylum-seeking apprentices below 25 years of age, the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ turns out to be different. In their case, the remit of choice in professions was greater, although the repercussions of the government’s very recent announcement ending these employment possibilities for asylum-seekers remains to be seen. While it may be correct to write that asylum-seekers are entitled to find lawful employment in Austria, this statement is not always applicable. The quota for asylum-seekers to work in agriculture, forestry and tourism may not be renewed on a yearly basis (Arbeiterkammer, 2015). Hence, asylum-seekers in Austria may find themselves in the same ‘hyper-precarity trap’ as those in the United Kingdom: not allowed to enter the labour market lawfully and (potentially) being pushed into undocumented work. Stratified rights, either by excluding asylum-seekers from or including them in labour markets, represent one route into ‘hyper-precarity’. If asylum-seekers have the opportunity to work in agriculture, forestry and tourism, however, their ‘hyper-precarity trap’ is different.

Agriculture, forestry and tourism are sectors in which contingent work is widespread. Because of the nature of demand in these sectors – which tends to be short-lived – combined with the ‘just-in-time’ delivery principles, labour laws are easily violated because the need to satisfy customers rapidly does not work in tandem with legal working hours. If asylum-seekers become unemployed, they are not eligible for unemployment benefits but revert to being recipients of state benefits targeted at asylum-seekers. Asylum-seekers are highly likely to face destitution if they exit an employment arrangement because they are no longer able to afford (private) rent (once they take up a job, they have to move out from accommodation offered by the state) and obtaining sheltered accommodation from the state is a lengthy process (Arbeiterkammer, 2015).

Therefore, the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ experienced by asylum-seekers, if allowed to exist, also concerns the nature of sectors and jobs.¹⁵ Because there is an awareness of unlawful and precarious working conditions in Austrian agriculture, the Sezonieri campaign was launched in 2014 to reach out to field workers, instruct them about their rights and assist them in making use of their rights. No information is offered in languages that refugees in Austria tend to speak, however, though information is available in a number of Central and Eastern European languages, alongside English and German. No such campaign has been launched in the tourism sector.

Another dimension of the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ in the Austrian context, though this may also be applicable to other countries, relates to asylum-seekers’ migratory histories and geography. Costs accumulated during travel – notably due to the practice of closed borders – may be one reason why asylum-seekers need to take up any precarious jobs available to pay back debts, while the geography of their employment – meaning the isolated nature of work in agriculture, forestry and to some extent in tourism – may be another factor that exacerbates asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities to precarious work in the context of the ‘hyper-precarity trap.’

In Finland, asylum-seekers are excluded from accessing public employment services and related assistance (Jokinen, 2016). The main reason for asylum-seekers’ difficulties accessing the labour market is that this group is not currently a target group for active labour market policies (Jokinen, 2016). Because they are not a target group, asylum-seekers lack both state oversight and assistance in finding employment, whereby they became an easier target for unscrupulous employers. The first ‘hyper-precarity trap’ characteristic is a supposed paradox: the granting of a work permit, combined with the suspension from any services and assistance offered by public employment services. While asylum-seekers may technically take up any employment in Finland, they are reliant on businesses (Integrify and Ornamo) and non-governmental organisations (Finnish Red Cross) reaching out to them. These outreach initiatives should be welcomed because they demonstrate that the private and non-governmental sectors have recognised the potential of asylum-seekers as workers, in contrast to the state, which appears to adopt a more passive approach. The irony in this approach by the state, which broadens Lewis and Waite’s (2015) framing of the ‘hyper-precarity trap’, is that the state’s reluctance to acknowledge asylum-seekers as workers is highly likely to contribute to their experiences of unlawful employment practices, a trend reported in 2017. It is not necessarily asylum-seekers’ exposure to the nature of employment per se which contributes to their experience of the ‘hyper-precarity trap’, but rather the failure of the state to guarantee lawful employment opportunities. The rolling back of the state, or rather its hollowing out by the private sector, has been discussed by Crouch (2004, 2011) for instance. While the rolling back of the state – in the sense of not recognising one group of workers – may currently apply exclusively to asylum-seekers, it may well eventually also apply to other groups of workers, whereby precarity is likely to spread. The ‘hyper-precarity trap’ experienced by asylum-seekers in Finland may thus be a symptom of the state outsourcing some of its functions.

The ways that asylum-seekers in Austria and Finland find themselves in ‘hyper-precarity’ do not hold true in the case of Italy. In Italy, asylum-seekers are eligible for the same labour market services and benefits as refugees, recipients of subsidiary protection and third-country nationals (Ciccarone, 2016). Thus, asylum-seekers are technically on the same footing as locals in terms of rights. While this apparent inclusion of asylum-seekers gives the impression that they are at least not discriminated against by law, Ciccarone (2016) provides a number of practical reasons why the supposed equal treatment does not hold true in practice. First, the availability and access of integration programmes differs significantly according to providers and their location. In the case of asylum-seekers, reception centres may provide such programmes and, in rare cases, public employment services (PES) which, however, do not have to be in the immediate geographical proximity to asylum-seekers’ reception centres. Secondly, the coordination of institutions tasked with facilitating the integration of asylum-seekers at both local and sub-national levels needs improvement. Thirdly, a number of obstacles hinder asylum-seekers from obtaining a residence permit and thus being able to seek lawful employment: delay by state institutions in registering asylum claims, the complexity of the administrative procedure and a lack of resources/staff members by agencies who are tasked with registering asylum claims (Ciccarone, 2016). In the case of Italy, the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ seems to relate to where asylum-seekers are based. The geographical element in Lewis and Waite’s (2015) ‘hyper-precarity’ framework not only refers to asylum-seekers’ own migratory history, but also to the (Protection System for Refugees and Asylum-seekers [SPRAR] or governmental) centres where they have been placed. Geography does play a key factor in the likelihood of asylum-seekers accessing labour market integration programmes offered by municipalities and obtaining work permits because SPRAR centres tend to provide asylum-seekers with a more encompassing training compared with other initiatives, although funding for such centres remains limited (Asylum Information Database, 2018). The geographical dimensions of the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ in the contexts of Austria and Italy differ with respect to whether they are applied to the work space or accommodation. While Ciccarone (2016) does not make reference to the nature or quality of jobs, it may be assumed that due to the geography/remoteness of asylum-seekers’ accommodation, the choice of employment is limited and subject to companies’ rules. Such situations are reminiscent of (labour market) monopsony, in which workers lack the opportunity to negotiate working conditions because of a lack of alternative employment, whereby they have to endure the conditions set by companies. While monopsonistic labour markets are common in rural areas, they do not necessarily represent a gateway into precarious work.

Comparing the findings from desk research across the three case-study countries, asylum-seekers in Finland technically ‘score’ the worst in terms of their ability to access labour markets compared with findings from Austria and Italy. The additional practical insights provided by Lechner et al. (2016) and Ciccarone (2016), however, already demonstrate that a higher number of support measures for entering labour markets does not necessarily translate into less vulnerability. If the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ framework is viewed as exclusively consisting of neoliberal labour market policies and a precarious socio-legal status, then it appears not to apply to the Italian context. As the analysis of asylum-seekers’ entitlements, socio-legal status and geography has demonstrated, however, the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ plays out differently in Austria, Finland and Italy. In the case of Austria, the outsourcing of employment in agriculture, forestry and tourism appears to be a leading reason for propelling asylum-seekers into ‘hyper-precarity’, while in the Finnish and Italian contexts different unique factors – the lack of attention paid by the state and the geographical placement of asylum-seekers, respectively – appear as driving forces. ‘Hyper-precarity’ may therefore also affect asylum-seekers who are able to access the labour market by being pushed into precarious work and not only those who are banned from entering the labour market, as in the United Kingdom.

Comparing results from desk-based research with interview data

The analysis of desk-based research about the link between asylum-seekers and the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ has demonstrated that asylum-seekers may indeed have labour market access and still be vulnerable to finding themselves in this trap. These vulnerabilities do not necessarily relate to asylum-seekers’ own characteristics but may be exacerbated by other factors, such as state policies regulating labour markets and the handling of the asylum application system. In the case of the three case-study countries, vulnerabilities were more common between Finland and Italy than between Finland and Austria or Italy and Austria. Still, the most common vulnerability identified by participants in all three countries concerned a lack of knowledge regarding languages, labour market rules and labour rights. It-LE#3, Fi-LI and At-LME describe the situation as follows:

This [the vulnerability to precarious employment] is also due to an inability to speak the language and the lack of professional training. (It-LE#3)

It’s because people don’t know how things in Finland ought to be. (Fi-LI)

The greatest challenge […] to working in Austria is the German language. (At-LME)

Asylum-seekers may gravitate to countries where relatives or other people belonging to their social networks reside (Koser, 1997). Therefore while the choice to flee one’s country may be rational in the context of war, persecution and/or other serious human rights violations, it is unlikely that there will be an opportunity to plan ahead and obtain language skills. Moreover, while Austria, Finland and Italy each offer classes in their national language, accessing these classes may be difficult. Classes may be held in remote locations in relation to asylum-seekers’ accommodation. Travelling to these classes, if transportation costs are not subsidised by the state, may not be feasible from a financial point of view.

The following vulnerabilities raised by participants differed by country. Participants It-NGO#1, It-NGO#2, It-LE#3, Fi-LE and Fi-NGO#2 identified, as another very common vulnerability, issues related to the asylum application system. This vulnerability was also identified in the Austrian context, although it was not as prevalent as it was in the answers of respondents from Italy and Finland. It-NGO#1 and Fi-LE summarise the failures as follows:

There are several aspects that can lead asylum-seekers to being vulnerable: […] the failures and delays of the Italian reception system and the judiciary. To these, I would add bureaucracy; difficult to understand, even for Italians. Who among us can carefully read our paycheck and interpret it correctly? (It-NGO#1)

[Asylum-seekers] are in a weaker position in the labour market and, of course, in general in a weaker position because of their status. (Fi-LE)

Interestingly, the voicing of issues relating to the asylum application system occurred in Finland and Italy where the number of asylum-seekers is low in proportion to inhabitants. This observation may be explained in light of a lack of awareness on the part of the Austrian government about how its asylum application system may exacerbate asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities (although the Austrian Chamber of Labour has recognised this risk (Arbeiterkammer, 2015)). Indeed, state policy more generally has been discerned as responsible for such problems. Participants At-WO pointed out both the restricted labour market access and the low state subsidy that asylum-seekers enjoy. This subsidy falls away when asylum-seekers begin working lawfully. Once this job opportunity has come to an end, re-applying for the subsidy is time-consuming. During this time, asylum-seekers are basically left with no funds.

Vulnerabilities identified in semi-structured interviews coincide with findings gathered from desk-based research, but go further in terms of reflecting on how asylum-seekers’ socio-legal status may be one route into ‘hyper-precarity.’ While findings from desk-based research pointed towards labour market restrictions in combination with neoliberal employment law as one way into precarity, data from the interviews highlight how socio-legal statuses are being rendered precarious by the same entity that shapes them, namely state policy. The extended length of asylum applications, combined with weaker status in the labour market and the risk of losing state benefits all contribute at different levels to asylum-seekers becoming, little by little, entrapped in a state of ‘hyper-precarity’, something which seems to be difficult to escape from, for example, because of the sheer length of time involved in assessing and / or filing applications. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2016) reported that in Austria asylum-seekers experienced severe delays of several months in filing their application with the police. This delay may result in non-registered asylum-seekers not being able to access many reception conditions. The situation for registered asylum-seekers does not look very different in terms of time: several of them had to wait for a year for their personal interview (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016). In the context of Italy, asylum applications tend not to be assessed within the stipulated timeframe of 33 days (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016). In May 2018, media reported that Finnish immigration officials will have as of July 2018 up to six months to decide on asylum-seekers’ application (Yle News, 2018). While this news may be welcomed, approximately 100 applicants in Finland who claimed asylum in 2016 have still not been notified about the outcome of their application. The average time for assessing asylum claims before July 2018 was between 16 and 20 months (Yle News, 2018).

Finally, the question remains of which group of persons may be most vulnerable to precarious employment among asylum-seekers, refugees, recipients of subsidiary protection and third-country nationals. While the ‘hyper-precarity trap’ framework has so far only been applied to asylum-seekers, data from the semi-structured interviews show that another group of workers may be equally vulnerable: legally staying third-country nationals. Third-country nationals are as heterogeneous a group as any other: they may be highly qualified or low-skilled migrants. In the context of Austria, third-country nationals may be hired on the basis of the ‘Red-White-Red Card,’ while in Finland and Italy this will be on the basis of EU ‘Blue Cards.’

Third-country nationals’ vulnerability stems from their socio-legal status. They are tied through their visa to their employer depending on Member States’ legal framework. Hence, exiting employment conditions that are deemed precarious are unlikely if they have to leave the country within a specific time period or face being deported. Also, in contrast to asylum-seekers and refugees, who have to attend classes on culture, language and society (among other subjects), third-country nationals are not necessarily exposed to such information. This point was taken up by the Finnish labour inspector in our interview sample, who concluded that third-country nationals may, after all, be more vulnerable to precarious work because of their potential lack of exposure to general information about the host country. While their stay may not be as uncertain as with asylum-seekers, for instance, their socio-legal status represents a predicament in a different way, by limiting them to specific employers and potentially curtailing their exposure to information about society and labour markets.

Conclusion

This article has set out to understand how framing the labour market access of asylum-seekers in Austria, Finland and Italy may contribute to exacerbating asylum-seekers’ vulnerabilities to precarious employment. These three countries were chosen because they grant asylum-seekers different degrees of incorporation within their labour markets. While findings based on desk research indicate that asylum-seekers experience various degrees of entrapment in ‘hyper-precarity’ (Lewis and Waite, 2015), despite having labour market access, the factors leading to this entrapment differ according to national contexts. These factors are country-specific: in the case of Austria, they are related to insecurities around employment opportunities and neoliberal labour market policies; in Finland, they amount to a lack of support by the state, such that asylum-seekers’ socio-legal status becomes precarious; and in Italy the geography of asylum-seekers’ lives (their migratory biographies in combination with employment available in rural areas) seems to play a key role. Therefore, the novel aspect of this article is its demonstration that Lewis and Waite’s (2015) ‘hyper-precarity framework’ also applies to asylum-seekers who have access to labour markets and not only to those who are banned from entering the labour market, as is the case in the United Kingdom. While asylum-seekers tend to be legally the worst off in accessing labour markets (which is the case in Austria and Finland, but not in Italy) when compared with refugees, recipients of subsidiary protection and third-country nationals, data from semi-structured interviews indicate that third-country nationals are likely to be more isolated/precarious in their employment than asylum-seekers because their visa is tied to their employer.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Aili Pääkkönen for transcribing interviews, Matti Joutsen, James Milton, David Runsten and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments, which significantly improved the article. Last but not least, we would like to thank Marina Luttrell and Maria Jepsen for their help.

Funding

This work was supported by the scholarship programme of the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI).

Notes

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