Social partner involvement in collective skill formation governance. A comparison of Austria,Denmark,Germany,the Netherlands and Switzerland

Abstract

German

French

Dual vocational education and training (VET) with social partner involvement in its governance can typically be found in collective skill formation systems. This article reviews the diversity of collective skill formation systems with a particular focus on their systemic governance. In particular, we look at the actors involved as well as how the systemic governance is organised in terms of corporatist decision-making bodies. The article shows that there are important cross-national differences. First, the social partners do not always participate in the decision-making at the political-strategic level. Second, social partner involvement is not always on equal terms (parity), with trade unions in some cases being less strongly involved. Third, differences in VET governance are particularly pronounced at the technical-operational level. Empirically, the article focuses on the five prototypical collective skill formation systems Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Keywords

Collective skill formation systemic governance social partners vocational education and training

Introduction

Dual vocational education and training (VET) has become a prominent topic within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2010) and the European Union (EU), with several projects launched by the European Commission. Based on the Copenhagen Process (started in 2002) and backed by the Bruges Communiqué (European Union, 2010) and the Riga Conclusions (European Union, 2015), the EU has decided to promote work-based learning, in particular apprenticeships. Involving the social partners in its governance, such dual VET is considered to have several positive societal and economic effects, most notably low youth unemployment (e.g. Busemeyer, 2015).

Dual VET systems with social partner involvement in their governance are mostly found in so-called collective skill formation systems (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012). These systems combine theoretical education in VET colleges and practical on-the-job training in companies (from here on referred to as school-based and work-based learning), involve intermediary associations of employers and employees in the financing and administration of training and provide occupational skills that are portable, certified and standardised beyond the firm level.

This article reviews the diversity of collective skill formation systems with a particular focus on their systemic governance. The term ‘systemic governance’ refers to modes of governing (economic) activities through the state, company hierarchies, networks, associations or the market at the level of the overall system (Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1985; Mayntz, 2004). Although VET governance is increasingly embedded in a multi-level system, most notably within the European Union, most political decisions on VET governance are still taken at national level (Powell and Trampusch, 2012), the level at which stakeholder groups such as trade unions or business interest associations are involved. We therefore focus on systemic governance at the level of nation states.

We pay particular attention to two aspects. First, we look at the actors involved in the systemic governance of collective skill formation systems. Most notably, are trade unions formally involved in the governance and at which level? How influential are they compared to business intermediary associations? Besides focusing on trade unions and business intermediary associations, we also look at additional stakeholders in dual training, such as schools, other training providers and regional authorities. Second, we examine how systemic governance is organised. Which corporatist bodies exist in the governance of these training systems? How do they relate to the public authorities? Which tasks do they fulfil?

The article shows that there are significant differences between the countries belonging to the group of collective skill formation systems with regard to the actors involved and the organisation of the systemic governance. Empirically, the article focuses on the five prototypical collective skill formation systems, those of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

We proceed as follows. The next section introduces a typology of VET systems and discusses the main features of collective skill formation systems. Subsequently, we examine the systemic governance and stakeholder involvement in five prototypical collective skill formation systems. A final section discusses several important differences and offers some reflections on their implications.

Varieties of skill formation regimes

The literature on skill formation regimes categorises national VET systems, differentiating between various dimensions of their institutional design (e.g. Crouch et al., 1999; Culpepper and Thelen, 2008; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Greinert, 1993; Ryan, 2000). Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012: 11–15) have developed a particularly helpful typology of skill formation regimes which views the division of tasks between firms, associations and the state in providing and financing skill development as the main reason for the differences. The first dimension concerns the public commitment to VET, while the second dimension captures firms’ involvement in VET. On this basis, they distinguish four skill formation regimes: liberal, segmentalist, statist and collective (see Table 1).

Table 1.

The variety of skill formation regimes in advanced industrial democracies.

		Involvement of firms in VET
		Low	High
Public commitment to VET	High	Statist (e.g. France)	Collective (e.g. Germany)
Public commitment to VET	Low	Liberal (e.g. UK)	Segmentalist (e.g. Japan)

Source: Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012: 12).

In the liberal regime, the general education system and market-based transactions are the primary providers of education and training. Public commitment to VET is limited and firms are rarely involved in VET apart from basic on-the-job-training. The segmentalist regime differs from the liberal one with regard to firms’ involvement in VET. Relying on internal labour markets and lifelong employment to retain employees, large firms provide newly recruited employees with a considerable amount of high-quality training, both by means of in-house training centres as well as firm-specific vocational schools. However, public commitment to VET is low and small firms are rarely involved. Most training therefore focuses on firm-specific rather than occupational skills. Statist regimes feature a strong public commitment to VET and full-time vocational schooling. However, since VET is part of the general education system, firm involvement remains limited. These systems therefore often struggle to facilitate a smooth transition from training into employment (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012; Busemeyer, 2015). This article focuses on collective regimes, characterised by high public commitment and the high involvement of firms.

There are four specific features distinguishing collective regimes from the other ones (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012: 14–15). First, they are based on dual training combining school-based and work-based learning. Second, employers and their associations are involved in the financing and administration of training, meaning that collective skill formation regimes presuppose inter-firm cooperation and employers willing to engage in collective action. Third, intermediary organisations, including trade unions, play an important role in the administration and ongoing development of these systems. Finally, collective systems lead to certified and standardised occupational skills, meaning that they are portable between firms. This may lead to collective action problems, not only on the part of the firms, but of employees as well.

From a governance point of view, collective skill formation systems offer particular challenges, because very diverse actors (e.g. individual firms, business intermediary associations, trade unions, educational organisations and public authorities) cooperate in the provision of training. Cooperation is not a matter of choice but a necessity, as the various actors are very much dependent on each other. The state provides funding to training institutions when these improve social cohesion and boost the performance of the national economy. Firms are likely to participate in training activities if they can expect to benefit from their involvement. Whether they benefit, however, is at least partially dependent on the behaviour of other firms (Crouch et al., 1999; Culpepper, 2003). As a result, collective skill formation systems are fragile institutional arrangements vulnerable to cooperation dilemmas, in which there are strong incentives for actors not to cooperate (Emmenegger, Graf and Strebel, 2019).

To sustain cooperation, collective skill formation systems typically rely on corporatist governance structures combining several governance modes and involving a host of actors (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Thelen, 2004). Hence, in the words of Ryan (2000: 43), ‘the most successful apprenticeship system of the modern era, the German, involves employers’ associations, trade unions, educators, and government representatives in a joint, multi-layered regulation along neo-corporatist or “social partnership” lines.’ However, such cooperation cannot be imposed by law but happens on the ground, which is why it is likely to vary between and within countries (Marsden, 1999). For example, the political legitimation of decisions at the national level involves actors different from those implementing these decisions on the ground. Put differently, such cooperation is not self-sustaining but depends on public policies, capable intermediary organisations and shared logics of action (Emmenegger, Graf and Strebel, 2019).

The systemic governance of collective skill formation regimes

In this section, we analyse how the systemic governance of VET varies between different collective skill formation systems and across different governance levels. In doing so, we focus on two important features of VET governance: Which actors are involved, and how exactly is systemic governance organised in terms of corporatist decision-making bodies?

Following Streeck and Schmitter (1985), we distinguish between three governance levels. At the political-strategic level, stakeholders make strategic (political) decisions on the system’s long-term development. These decisions are in need of political legitimation. While the technical-strategic level is equally concerned with the system’s long-term development, discussions also involve the stakeholders’ technical specialists, as these decisions rely on expert knowledge. Finally, the technical-operational level deals primarily with the efficient policy implementation on the ground.

Our analysis is based on primary and secondary literature, such as official documents, websites of public institutions and literature describing the institutional VET framework (e.g. country reports produced by Cedefop; Rauner, 2009; Rothe, 2001). We add a political component to this literature, analysing power relations between the different stakeholders. Due to space limitations, we restrict our analysis to formal regulations and rules, knowing that informal, routinised cooperation practices are likely to play an important role in collective skill formation systems.

We start with a discussion of Germany and Switzerland, the two most prototypical collective skill formation countries. We then turn to Austria, Denmark and finally the Netherlands. In these five countries, the share of upper secondary students in combined school- and work-based programmes is significantly higher than the OECD and EU average of 17 per cent, ranging from 33 per cent in Austria to about 40 per cent in Denmark and Germany and 59 per cent in Switzerland (OECD, 2017: indicator C1.3).¹

Germany

Germany is a federal republic with 16 states (Länder), all of which have decision-making power in many policy fields. It is therefore not surprising that the governance of Germany’s VET system is characterised by the division of competences between the federal and the state level. In addition, the social partners – most importantly the Chambers of Commerce and Crafts on the employers’ side and the trade unions on the employees’ side – are strongly involved at all levels of governance. Therefore, coordination in the German VET system is complex and involves a large number of different actors and institutions (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Main actors in the governance of the German VET system.

VET is the subject of different legal acts. Dual apprenticeships are regulated in the Vocational Training Act (BBiG) and – for skilled crafts – the Skilled Crafts Code (HwO). Both codes cover the organisation of dual apprenticeships as well as practical questions such as the recognition of training occupations (§§4–9 BBiG), the apprenticeship contract (§§10–26 BBiG), the examination system (§§37–50a BBiG; §§31–40a HwO) and the admissibility of firms providing apprenticeships (§27 BBiG; §21 HwO). However, they do not regulate VET colleges, including the theoretical courses within dual apprenticeships.

In general, the Länder have the decision-making competence for all questions concerning education policies (Schneider, 2007). However, with regard to VET the federal government and the Länder share responsibility, as VET also relates to economic and labour market policies for which the federal level is responsible (Rauner, 2009: 193–194). There is a high degree of cooperation among the various coordination bodies but also a clear division of tasks. While the federal government is responsible for the firm-based side of dual apprenticeships, the Länder coordinate all questions related to vocational colleges, regardless of whether full-time school-based training or dual apprenticeships are involved (Hippach-Schneider and Huismann, 2016; Rothe, 2001).

At the federal level, the Vocational Training Act assigns a leading role to the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, giving it responsibility for all fundamental questions concerning VET. It works closely together with the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs when recognising training regulations (§4 BBiG). A third federal institution is the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB). Belonging to the education ministry, it is responsible for several administrative tasks, such as organising the drafting of VET ordinances and updating the directory of training occupations. In addition, the law requires the BIBB to contribute to the overall development of the VET system by conducting research on VET (§90 BBiG).

Each state regulates the school-based part of VET on its own. However, in order to ensure a congruent system, the Länder ministers of education meet regularly in the Kultusministerkonferenz where they inter alia adopt framework curricula for the VET colleges, which are then implemented individually at the state level (Rauner, 2009). The heads of the VET departments of the 16 ministries in the Committee for Vocational Education and Training prepare the meetings of the Kultusministerkonferenz.

Besides the division of power between the federal and the state level, the German VET system is also characterised by a high degree of social partner involvement. Both trade unions and business intermediary associations take part in decision-making at several levels of governance. First, the political leaders of the involved partners (federal government, states, trade unions, business intermediary associations) meet once a year at the political-strategic level within the Alliance for Initial and Further Training. There, they discuss and adopt long-term strategic goals for the VET system. Alliance meetings are prepared at the technical-strategic level by VET experts from the involved institutions in the Working Committee. Neither the Alliance nor its Working Committee are prescribed by law but both have political legitimacy.

Second, the social partners as well as the federal government and the Länder delegate eight representatives, usually VET experts, to the Board of the BIBB (§92 Abs. 3 BBiG). The Board advises the federal government on all VET questions of relevance for the national level. In addition, it supports the Federal Ministry of Education in its task of supervising the BIBB (§92 Abs. 1 BBiG). Third, at the technical-operational level, the social partners are very involved in the definition of training content in the firm- and school-based part of training. Together with the BIBB, social partner specialists develop new and revise existing VET ordinances (BIBB, 2015). The implementation of the framework curricula for the VET schools, developed by the Kultusministerkonferenz, is organised in the vocational training committees at the state level, in which the social partners and representatives of the respective state meet.

To conclude, trade unions and business intermediary associations are equally involved in the governance of the German VET system at all levels (Emmenegger, Graf and Trampusch, 2019). At the political-strategic level, the political leaders of the involved institutions meet within the Alliance for Initial and Further Training. The competent Länder ministers coordinate measures regarding VET colleges within the Kultusministerkonferenz, meetings of which are prepared at the technical-strategic level by experts in the Working Committee of the Alliance for Initial and Further Training and in the Committee for VET. In addition, the board of the BIBB also discusses VET-related questions at the technical-strategic level. Operational issues, especially on the development of training content, are discussed between the BIBB and the training specialists of the social partners.

Switzerland

The Swiss VET system is guided by the principles of federalism, corporatism and consensus democracy (Berner, 2013: 40). Hence, although the Swiss VET system is to a large extent governed by federal regulations in its strategic development (Barabasch et al., 2009; Gonon and Maurer, 2012), it is de facto rather decentralised (Emmenegger, Graf and Strebel, 2019). VET is, as stated in the first article of the Swiss Vocational Training Act (BBG), the common task of the federal government, the 26 cantons and the roughly 600 so-called Organisationen der Arbeitswelt (organisations of the world of work, short version, OdAs) that represent, with a few exceptions, the social partners. Where decisions have an effect on all three stakeholders, they must be taken consensually. Therefore, a lot of interdependence exists between them. At the same time, the prominent role of cantons and OdAs leads to considerable variation and heterogeneity at the level of individual training occupations or regions.

Nevertheless, the three stakeholders have different responsibilities. The federal government and most importantly the State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SERI) is responsible for ensuring the system’s quality and ongoing development (Art. 4 & 8 BBG). In fulfilment of this task, it monitors the implementation of the Vocational Training Act by the cantons (Art. 65 Abs. 4 BBG) and can commission research on the development of the VET system. SERI is responsible for approving training regulations and accepting new training curricula (Art. 19 Abs. 1 BBG). The cantons are responsible for the implementation of the Vocational Training Act (Art. 66 BBG). In addition, they are responsible for the vocational schools (Art. 29 Abs. 5 BBG) and monitor the firms providing apprenticeships (Art. 24 BBG). The VET offices of the cantons are organised in the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal VET Offices. The OdAs organise initial vocational education and training (IVET) programmes and most of continuing vocational education and training (CVET) programmes, defining the training regulations, curricula and the vocational exams (Art. 28 BBG). Through their umbrella associations, they participate in the overall development and national governance of the VET system. However, as private actors, their participation in these tasks is entirely voluntary (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2000: 5730).

The term ‘organisation of the world of work’ (OdA) is described very broadly in the Vocational Training Act, meaning that a large variety of organisations assume the functions of an OdA, including traditional business intermediary associations, skilled craft associations, trade unions and hybrid organisations (Strebel et al., 2019). Despite this heterogeneity, it has been argued that trade unions are somewhat marginalised at the implementation level as the vast majority of OdAs responsible for individual training occupations do not include employee associations (Emmenegger, Graf and Trampusch, 2019).

However, both social partners are involved in the national governance of the VET system (see Figure 2). First, at the political-strategic level, they take part in the yearly National Summit Meeting on VET. There, the presidents of the two peak-level business intermediary associations and the two trade union confederations meet with the responsible federal counsellor (i.e., a member of the Federal Council and head of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research) and the representatives of the Swiss conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education in order to set long-term strategic goals for the VET system. Second, at the technical-operational level, VET experts from the federal government, the cantons and the OdAs meet once a year for a two-day convention to discuss questions concerning the implementation of the strategic goals set at the political level. Third, there is an advisory body to the government, the Swiss Commission on Vocational Education and Training, to which the social partners and the cantons delegate members and which advises the federal government on all questions regarding VET.

Figure 2.

Main actors in the governance of the Swiss VET system.

In summary, at the political-strategic level the political leaders of the involved institutions meet in the National Summit Meeting on VET once a year to set strategic goals for the VET system. Similarly, at the technical-operational level, the VET experts of the federal government, the cantons and the social partners meet in the Convention of the VET partners to discuss implementation issues. Interestingly, there is no such collective body at the technical-strategic level, which might explain why the Swiss VET system is considered to have a problem with regard to the implementation of decisions taken at the political-strategic level (GPK, 2016). SERI is the only federal actor taking over responsibilities at this level.

Austria

Austria’s skill formation system – while considered an example of collective skill formation – features a comparatively strong school component. About one-third of students at upper secondary level are apprentices, predominantly employed by smaller firms. Besides dual apprenticeships, there are, however, also two types of school-based VET: full-time vocational schools (about 13 per cent of students) also lead to a VET diploma, whereas vocational colleges (about 24 per cent of students) issue university-entrance diplomas alongside the VET diploma (Tritscher-Archan, 2016: 16). This feature is making the latter increasingly popular, as seen by the fact that the number of students in apprenticeships and vocational schools has declined in recent years (Lassnigg, 2011).

Dual apprenticeships and full-time school-based VET are legally and organisationally separate. Responsible for the Vocational Training Act (BAG), the legal framework for dual apprenticeships in Austria, is the Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs that supervises apprenticeships and approves training regulations (§§7–8 BAG). By contrast, the Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Research is responsible for the school-based part of VET (§§46–82 SchOG). Although Austria is a federal country, the federal level is responsible for education policies, not the states (Rauner, 2009; Rothe, 2001). Responsible for the implementation of VET, federal agencies exist in every state, with their activities coordinated in the so-called Kuchler Conference. With this set-up, the Austrian VET system (see Figure 3) differs from that of Germany and Switzerland, where the federal and subnational levels share responsibilities.

Figure 3.

Main actors in the governance of the Austrian VET system.

In Austria, the social partners are involved in strategic and operational questions at all levels. However, this involvement is restricted to dual apprenticeships. On questions regarding full-time school-based training, they have no formal say. Interest representation in Austria is organised by law, with all employers obliged to be members of the Chamber of Commerce and all employees to be members of the Chamber of Labour (Pernicka and Hefler, 2015). The chambers are equally represented on the Federal Advisory Board on Apprenticeships (B-BAG), the most important social partner body in VET (§31 BAG). It advises the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs on all questions regarding VET, including the recognition of new training regulations (§31 Abs. 2 BAG), and thus operates at the technical-strategic level. The B-BAG is supported at the technical-operational level by industry-specific subcommittees and the two social partner research institutions (ibw for the Chamber of Commerce, öibf for the Chamber of Labour).

It is important to note that the B-BAG is a body exclusive to the social partners. It is not a collective body in which all institutions involved in VET governance have a seat and thus differs from the German Alliance for Initial and Further Training or the Swiss National Summit on VET. Two representatives of the VET providers also take part in it, but without voting rights (§31 Abs. 1 BAG). The B-BAG used to play a leading role in the development of training regulations and curricula. According to Rauner (2009: 203, own translation), ‘in the past, the Ministry for Economic Affairs followed the recommendations of the advisory board in full.’ Since 2018, however, the Ministry has taken the lead in the development of new training occupations, with the B-BAG losing part of its influential position.

In summary, in Austria’s VET system the two federal ministries have the lead at the political-strategic level, without the social partners being involved. This exclusion of the social partners distinguishes the country from Germany’s or Switzerland’s VET system, where central decisions are taken collectively by the stakeholders involved. In Austria, the social partners participate at the technical-strategic level where they form the Federal Advisory Board for Apprenticeships (B-BAG). At the technical-operational level, the industry-specific B-BAG subcommittees, the social partner research institutes and the Kuchler Conference support the technical-strategic bodies.

Denmark

Similar to Germany, Switzerland and Austria, public and private actors work closely together in the Danish skill formation system. However, the Danish system has several specific features. First, it was decentralised and modularised in the early 2000s (Søndergaard et al., 2008; Wiborg and Cort, 2010), with schools and training providers now able to autonomously adapt training courses to local demands. Due to these reforms, Rauner (2009: 152, own translation) argues that ‘the VET schools as independent public institutions have a lot of autonomy when performing their tasks. (…) Overall, the focus is shifting toward the schools.’ In addition, Denmark has a well-developed adult education system. Consequently, the CVET governance institutions mirror those for IVET.

The Ministry of Education has the lead for (initial and continuous) VET at the national level. It ensures the legal framework and is responsible for maintaining coherence between VET and the general education system. It approves training regulations and qualifications, certifies vocational schools and is responsible for quality control and assurance (see Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Main actors in the governance of the Danish VET system.

The social partners participate in the governance of Denmark’s VET system through the Council for Basic Vocational Education and Training (REU), responsible for IVET, and the Council for Adult and Continuous Education (VEU), responsible for CVET. Both bodies are located at the technical-strategic level and are composed of 10 members of the trade unions, 10 representatives of business intermediary associations, two representatives of the regions and two student representatives. Vocational schools and vocational teachers are also part of the two councils but have no voting rights (§34 Vocational Education and Training Act). As advisory bodies to the Ministry of Education, both councils are able to recommend the development of new and the abolishment of existing qualifications and vocational programmes. In addition, they are responsible for monitoring labour market developments. The Ministry of Education bases its decisions on recognising new training regulations on the reports of the VEU and REU (§35 VET Act).

The social partners are also involved at the technical-operational level in the industry-specific committees for IVET and CVET. They are responsible for the development of individual programmes and advise the federal ministry on all industry-specific aspects. In addition, they authorise and monitor firms providing IVET and are responsible for examinations and vocational certificates. As there is no formal VET research in Denmark, these committees also commission research projects to identify skill needs (Rauner, 2009: 123).

In sum, the social partners are involved in the governance of VET at the technical-strategic and the technical-operational level but not at the political-strategic level. The members of REU and VEU are not the presidents of trade unions and business associations but their training experts. The councils therefore do not work on political questions, but rather on technical-strategic issues. The sole relevant actor at the political-strategic level is the Ministry for Education. At the technical-operational level, the social partners are responsible through the industry-specific committees.

Overall, the Danish VET system is characterised by a division of tasks, where the national level decides on strategic issues which are then implemented at the local level (Rauner, 2009: 151). As a result, the vocational schools and VET providers enjoy great autonomy in performing their tasks. In addition, in comparison to the other collective skill formation systems, CVET is highly institutionalised in Denmark. Similar bodies exist in IVET and CVET, with the social partners prominently involved in both bodies. Given that the same people often take part in the REU and the VEU, IVET and CVET governance is highly coordinated.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands is the ‘youngest’ member of the collective skill formation family. On the back of a large-scale reform in 1996, the Netherlands established a collective skill formation system. Before the reform, VET took place exclusively in vocational schools. The first post-reform apprenticeships were highly modularised. However, modularisation was abolished in the mid-2000s due to the low career chances of graduates (Anderson and Nijhuis, 2012; Brockmann et al., 2008). Today’s Dutch VET system is oriented towards those of the German-speaking countries (Brockmann et al., 2008: 560).

VET is regulated by the Adult and Vocational Education Act (upper secondary VET) and by the Higher Education and Scientific Research Act (post-secondary VET). At the national level, the Ministry of Education is responsible for all VET-related questions. It ensures the legal and financial framework and supervises the quality of VET programmes. It also defines the goals and competences belonging to the different vocational programmes and is responsible for the strategic planning of VET (Fazekas and Litjens, 2014: 19). Similar to Denmark and in contrast to Germany, Switzerland and Austria, VET schools in the Netherlands are highly autonomous, for instance, deciding on how nationally defined goals and standards are implemented in the individual apprenticeship programmes.

The Social and Economic Council (SER), the main platform for social dialogue in the Dutch corporatist system, advises the Ministry of Education. The SER consists of an equal number of representatives delegated by the trade unions, the business associations and the federal government. The Council advises the government on all issues related to social and economic policies, including VET. However, VET is not the Council’s main priority (see Figure 5).

Figure 5.

Main actors in the governance of the Dutch VET system.

When it comes to VET-specific questions, the social partners mainly assume responsibilities through the Foundation for Cooperation on VET and the Labour Market (SBB). The SBB is a private organisation at the technical-strategic level responsible for the firm-based part of training. It accredits firms providing apprenticeships, offers counselling to interested students and advises the Ministry of Education on questions regarding the alignment of training content with labour market needs (Fazekas and Litjens, 2014; Smulders et al., 2016). SBB management consists of representatives of employees, employers, VET providers and vocational teachers. It has nine industry-specific associations which work at the technical-operational level on occupation- and industry-specific issues (Smulders et al., 2016).

Summing up, the Dutch VET system is characterised by the strict separation between strategic questions at the national level and operational tasks for which the VET schools are responsible. In this, the Dutch VET system resembles Denmark. The social partners are involved in the governance of VET in both aspects. At the political-strategic level, the Ministry of Education works together with the Social and Economic Council, although we must stress again that VET policies are not the SER’s main priority. At both the technical-strategic and technical-operational levels the social partners are greatly involved in questions regarding the firm-based part of apprenticeships in the SBB management board and in the industry-specific SBB associations.

Comparative discussion

In the previous section, we have reviewed the systemic governance in five prominent examples of dual VET systems. In this concluding section, we would like to highlight three important differences with regard to the actors involved and the organisation of systemic governance and to discuss their implications.

First, the social partners are prominently involved in the systemic governance of VET in each case. In addition, we observe all three governance levels in the five countries (political-strategic, technical-strategic and technical-operational). Yet, the governance levels at which the social partners are involved differ between the countries. Most notably, the social partners do not always participate in decision-making at the political-strategic level, where strategic agreements with a long-term effect on the VET system are made and which therefore require political legitimation. This is, for instance, the case in Austria and Denmark. By contrast, in Germany and Switzerland, social partners are involved at the political-strategic level as well. The Netherlands constitute an intermediate case. Why is this important? In the absence of social partner involvement at the political-strategic level, great power is concentrated in the hands of state agencies. While these often listen to the social partners, they do not have to in the absence of co-decision bodies. This has become visible in Austria, where state agencies have taken the lead in the development of new training occupations, side-lining the social partners.

It is beyond the scope of this article to thoroughly assess the consequences of the different governance frameworks on skill development outcomes and the sustainability of these VET systems. However, it seems plausible to assume that social partner involvement in political decision-making processes affects whether collective skill formation systems pursue more economic or more social goals. Collective training systems are designed to provide the economy with a well-trained and competitive workforce. Such a competitiveness-oriented system is likely to be selective and demanding, excluding young people with academically weaker credentials. Yet these systems are supposed to integrate young people into the production system, including weaker students. On the other hand, an inclusive training system is by definition less demanding and therefore less suited to the demands of highly competitive firms (Carstensen and Ibsen, 2019; Durazzi and Geyer, 2019; Thelen, 2014). How social partners are involved at the different levels of governance is likely to influence the outcome of this dichotomy. For example, it might be easier for the state to pursue social goals when it is the sole decision-maker at the political-strategic level, as is the case in Austria and Denmark. Similarly, the comparatively weak role of trade unions might explain why in Switzerland measures targeting academically weaker students do not take place within the VET system (Bonoli and Wilson, 2019).

Similarly, social partner involvement at the political-strategic level is likely to influence the Europeanisation of skill formation systems, because these additional veto players restrict the autonomy of the state. Consequently, Powell and Trampusch (2012) observe differences between Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, on the one hand, where Europeanisation processes in the context of the European Qualifications Framework have speeded up ongoing reform discussions, and Germany and Switzerland, on the other hand, where domestic discussions were considerably more conflictual due to higher levels of institutionalised social partner involvement.

Second, social partner involvement is often on equal terms. For instance, in the Danish REU and VEU commissions, trade unions and business intermediary associations each provide 10 representatives. Switzerland is the exception that proves the rule. In the Swiss system, trade unions are less systemically involved (for a systematic comparison of union involvement in Germany and Switzerland, see Emmenegger, Graf and Trampusch, 2019). Intermediary associations are primarily involved through OdAs (organisations of the world of work), which are responsible for the different training occupations and define the content of training regulations and framework curricula. As these organisations are typically employer-dominated, unions ultimately only play a limited role in VET governance in Switzerland. Admittedly, unions are involved in the strategic development of the VET system at the federal level, but mostly as veto players in a system otherwise dominated by employers (Gonon and Maurer, 2012: 129; Rohrer and Trampusch, 2011: 148). This has important consequences for firms providing apprenticeships and for apprentices. For instance, Dionisius et al. (2009) show that compared to Germany, Swiss apprentices earn less and spend more time on productive tasks. By contrast, net training costs are higher for German firms, while German apprentices spend more time in vocational schools.

Finally, the five countries differ greatly in their systemic governance of dual VET at the technical-operational level. For instance, while some countries have specialised industry-level corporatist bodies, other countries leave a great amount of autonomy to intermediary associations (e.g. Switzerland) or vocational schools (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands, although both countries also have industry-specific committees). Further complexity is added by the existence of a fully school-based VET system in parallel to the dual VET system in some countries (e.g. Austria). In addition, due to the important role of regional public stakeholders in some countries (e.g. Germany and Switzerland), within-country differences can be large. By contrast, other countries, despite their federal structure, rely exclusively on federal agencies in VET governance. For instance, in Austria, federal agencies in every state are responsible for policy implementation, a fact likely to reduce within-country differences.

Footnotes

Funding

This research is part of the Leading House GOVPET: Governance of Vocational and Professional Education and Training, which is supported by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation [grant number BIZ.2016.0016].

Notes

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