Global Citizenship Versus Globally Competent Graduates

Introduction

We live in a highly complex and interconnected world, which is not flat, just, and open to all. In such a world, the “global citizenship” concept is an oxymoron. This article will argue that the notion of global citizenship in higher education (HE) is not a viable and desirable proposition for the South, which is largely excluded from the debates about the concept. Furthermore, we will argue that although it is correct that global problems such as conflict, human rights violations, poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation “require individuals to exercise global responsibility” (Dower, 2000, p. 553), we do not need global citizenship for this. Instead, we need socially responsible, ethical and globally competent graduates.

In this article, we will compare the notions of citizenship and global citizenship. As any meaningful discussion about global citizenship cannot be done without reference to geopolitics, we will focus on globalization, sovereignty, and the importance of states. We will explore whether privilege and affluence are requirements for global citizenship and whose values and norms will guide global citizens. We will also examine whether the global citizenship movement is offering anything new to HE. Finally, we will offer a proposition for the South, which calls for the development of globally competent graduates rather than global citizens.

Citizenship Versus Global Citizenship

Bowden (2003) considers the concept of “global citizenship” to be “under-theorised and problematic” (pp. 349-350). The notion of global citizenship is incompatible with the “general theory and ideal of citizenship.” One of the key features of citizenship is a “determinate relationship to a political community” (Dower, 2000, p. 556). Citizenship “denotes a constitutionally defined relationship between an individual and a nation-state” (Karlberg, 2008, p. 310) and includes (at least in functioning democracies) a “meaningful say in the public and political arena” of a country in which the citizens live. The benefits and duties of citizenship are linked to the relationship between the citizens and states (Bowden, 2003; van Liempd, 2013). Furthermore, when it comes to the international law, “it is nation-state citizenship that is recognized and honoured” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 456).

Global citizenship

shifts the perspective from the local and immediate to a broader plane . . . through the idea of citizenship, it evokes a sense of practical responsibility towards others regardless of their location in terms of geography, class, gender or ethnicity. (Skrbiš, 2014, p. 6)

Some see global citizenship as a “descriptive term, intended to capture various cross-border identities, relationships and allegiances that have been developing during the current period of intensive globalization” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 449). These are only two out of many definitions and/or conceptualizations. De Wit, Hunter, Jones, and Leask (2013) point out that “there is no common agreement on the what, why and how of global citizenship” (p. 25). Some see it as a “state of mind.” However, they add that “this creates a tension for those who do not regard it as the role of higher education institutions to realize states of mind, but to provide knowledge and skills.”

Bowden (2003) writes that today’s global citizens are mainly the

citizens of the cosmopolitan, globalised, liberal-democratic Western world that constitutes “the centre.” It is a world which outsiders are welcome to join (or are drawn into), only so long as they measure up or are happy to conform to Western values. (p. 355)

Other critics argue that global citizenship will never become more than rhetoric as “requisite conditions—culture, identity, institutions—do not exist” (Dower, 2000, p. 554). According to Murray and Overton (2014), “it is wrong to assume that globalisation is homogenising global society; difference is perpetuated and society fragmented” (pp. 180-181). They add that despite the rhetoric from many circles, “localisation processes . . . remain salient.” Arneil (2007) writes that “if citizenship is defined in terms of shared norms, ideas or values, there seems little basis for a common citizenry at the international level” (p. 301). Some authors argue that to have functional global citizenship, we may need some form of “world government” (Arneil, 2007, p. 301; Calhoun, 2002, p. 873), which is a utopian and dangerous idea. The world “is not yet a polis, and we should not even try to make it one by creating a world state, which is bound to be remote, bureaucratic, oppressive and culturally bland” (Parekh, 2003, p. 12).

Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Importance of States

Globalization is seen “among the people who ‘matter’ in the countries that ‘matter’” as a force for good leading the entire world “to the era of converging incomes, converging institutions as democracy becomes a universal norm and cultural richness as people of different background interact more frequently” (Milanovic, 2003, p. 667). However, others, who often “matter” far less than the above group, see it as a process through which the powerful Western states and institutions seek to create a new “kind of empire, one governed by a single set of universal laws” (Arneil, 2007, p. 302). These countries and institutions shape the unfolding of the global politics and economics, “whereas others are relatively weak and/or are becoming weaker and are largely condemned to ride on the waves generated by the planet’s powerful economic actors” (Herod, 2014, p. 162). Most notably, this is done through the promotion and imposition of Western-style liberalism and economic and political systems around the globe in a “one-size-fits-all” fashion (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009, p. 47), “rarely giving a thought to the social and political implications” of their actions (Dowden, 2008, p. 87). Backed by the Western economic, military, and diplomatic power since the early 1990s, this campaign has been able to “overshadow, outbid and outgun” all other alternatives (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 403).

Arneil (2007) calls the above an attempt to create “liberal/neo-liberal global citizenship,” adding that a “globalized theory of neo-liberal citizenship encourages non-Western peoples to be incorporated into a global market” (p. 307). Most of them, however, are incorporated as cheap labor for the benefit of the North. Thus, the process of globalization has led to a creation of “bi-polar worlds of connected and disconnected, economically advantaged and exploited, democratically represented and disenfranchised, ‘them’ and ‘us’” (Walker & Maxwell, 2009, p. 152). Although liberal scholars argue that globalization has leveled the playing field and created economic and other opportunities for all, we still “exist in a world of enormous inequalities within and between localities” (Murray & Overton, 2014, p. 183). If we do not consider global inequalities, we will

have the illusion that we really can enjoy the incredible mobility that technology affords us and not see what an incredible privilege it is and that a huge majority of the world’s population are shut out and face fences and barriers wherever they try to move, where we are facing open borders and possibilities. (Klein, 2006, p. 114)

Karlberg (2008) argues that in an interconnected and interdependent world, “unfettered national sovereignty is a dangerous anachronism that prevents us from addressing the social and environmental challenges” (p. 317) that the world faces. This is true but we continue to live in a world “structured by state sovereignty” (Sutch & Elias, 2007, p. 177). In addition, it is the powerful countries that protect their sovereignty and national interests by any means. Although the developed world protects and cherishes its sovereignty, the developing world’s sovereignty has been violated by the powerful countries and international financial institutions for decades through the imposition of one-size-fits-all policies, norms, and standards (Klein, 2006).

Whether we like it or not, countries around the world will not give up national sovereignty and focus on national interests as long as they prescribe to realism, or realpolitik, the oldest and most used theory of international relations. Political realism is a “doctrine of scepticism” (Crawford, 2000, p. 73) that leads governments to act not necessarily according to moral and legal principles or the need to address global challenges, but by considerations of power and advancement of national interests (Sutch & Elias, 2007). We see this on a daily basis, in discussions about environment, development, growth, employment, immigration, or security. The Human Development Report 2013 rightly points out that a better strategy would be the practice of “responsible sovereignty.” This would include “taking the long-term interests of the world as a whole into account when formulating national policy” (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2013, p. 116). However, short-term socio-economic, political, and security considerations dominate policy making internationally and prevent effective engagement on the pressing long-term issues that concern the whole of humanity.

Contrary to the one-size-fits-all neo-liberal prescriptions promoted and often imposed by the United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank—which did not lead to economic development and growth in the South but further increased poverty, inequality, instability, and social injustice (Calhoun, 2002; Milanovic, 2003)—the recent resurgence and rise of the South were the result of the implementation of “pragmatic policies that respond to local circumstances and opportunities—including a deepening of the developmental role of states, a dedication to improving human development (including by supporting education and social welfare) and an openness to trade and innovation” (United Nations Development Programme, 2013, p. 1). This shows that, contrary to the thinking of the neo-liberals and cosmopolitans who want to move beyond states and focus on national thinking and planning, centralized states are the key for economic growth and development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013).

Privilege and Affluence

HE internationalization is driven largely by European, American, Canadian, and Australian “rationales, strategies, approaches and activities” (Deardorff, de Wit, & Heyl, 2012, p. 458). This is particularly evident in the calls for global citizenship to be the end goal of international HE. The global citizenship movement, like cosmopolitanism, hails from the Western world, tends to be elitist, and is practiced and promoted by those with the ability and means to travel and engage around the globe (Andreotti, 2006). Both cosmopolitanism and global citizenship in HE are driven primarily through liberal education institutions in the global North. These institutions are not accessible to all; they “remain the privileged domain of the economic elite” (Naseem & Hyslop-Margison, 2006, p. 54). According to Calhoun (2003), “the views of cosmopolitan elites express privilege; they are not neutral apprehensions of the whole” (p. 532). “To be in a position to claim to be a global citizen is a privilege that is reserved for the modern, affluent global bourgeoisie” (Bowden, 2003, p. 360). Calhoun (2003) describes the requirements for global citizenship:

“Good” passports and easy access to visas, international credit cards and membership in airline clubs, invitations from conference organizers and organizational contacts, all facilitate a kind of inhabitation (if not necessarily citizenship) of the world as an apparent whole. (p. 543)

Cosmopolitans and global citizens put the world and “universal reason” before their countries and the symbols of national, ethnic, or religious belonging (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 17). They are “generally antinationalist, seeing nations as part of the fading order of political life divided on lines of states” (Calhoun, 2003, p. 535). Yet, these “citizens of the world” who claim to be beyond nations continue to hold closely onto their country’s citizenship and passports, which protect them and facilitate easy travel around the world (particularly if they are from the global North). Despite their claims and/or desires, global citizens “are neither beyond not above the states.” Their ambitions “remain dependent upon the capacity of states to provide and guarantee a secure base” (Bowden, 2003, p. 360). Thus, the large majority of the “global citizens” still have strong allegiance to their countries and communities, pay local and national taxes, with their allegiance to humanity as a whole being not more than half-empty rhetoric.

However, the majority of the people on earth, mostly those living in the “third world,” can be described as “global subjects” of the powerful economic and geopolitical forces (Karlberg, 2008, p. 319). Calhoun (2003) writes that even those from the South with the means to travel often “find their international mobility sharply impeded and sometimes blocked” (p. 543). This has been especially prominent since September 11, 2001. “The global border control regime encourages a sense of natural cosmopolitanism for some [those from the North] and reminds others of their nationality (and often of religion and ethnicity as well) ” (p. 543). Calhoun adds that “however cosmopolitan their initial intentions or self-understandings,” people traveling from the South are often reminded that “at least certain sorts of cosmopolitanism are not for them.”

For the majority in the South, the world outside their countries and regions is a distant metaphor, which they will never see due to their socio-economic situation. The Internet did change things for the better for many people and has become

a tremendous driver of a more level playing field—a flatter world—for those who are connected, but for those who are not, the digital divide renders them less than spectators. In a very real sense they fall off the map. (Walker & Maxwell, 2009, p. 151)

Furthermore, as Klein (2006) points out, we cannot escape the fact that “we have so many fences and walls in our supposedly globalized society” (p. 113). These walls will remain because the rich and powerful need the walls to protect themselves from the mobility, needs, demands, and anger of the poor.

Whose Values and Norms Will Guide Global Citizens?

An important question that the proponents of global citizenship tend to ignore is whose values and norms will guide global citizens. The world is a complex and diverse place and different continents, regions, countries, and even communities within countries have different customs, values, norms, and standards that guide their lives and interactions. Deardorff et al. (2012) ask an important question: “Is it [even] possible and desirable to reach commonly agreed upon foundational principles” (p. 459), which will guide global citizenship?

As noted above, global citizenship is closely associated with the ideas and ideals of cosmopolitanism (Bowden, 2003; Skrbiš, 2014), which is defined as a “belief that humanity as a whole constitutes a relevant identity group and that concrete moral and political obligations arise from this identification” (Furia, 2005, p. 338). Calhoun (2002) points that cosmopolitanism is a “discourse centred in a Western view of the world” (p. 873). It is based on three key tenets, namely, individualism, universality, and generality. When it comes to individualism, “the primary unit of concern is the individual rather than families, ethnic, cultural or any other sub-groupings, nations or states” (Bowden, 2003, p. 354). If individualism is a key tenet of global citizenship, this will be in direct conflict with customs, norms, and values in many societies around the world, which prefer communal living.

Disregard for non-Western values, norms, and standards by the global citizenship movement should not come as a surprise as the advocates of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship have in the past only “embraced and advocated . . . Western liberal democratic values at the expense of non-Western values” (Bowden, 2003, p. 360). Calhoun (2003) argues that despite their claims, cosmopolitans and global citizens are not “culture free; they do not simply reflect the rational obligations of humanity in the abstract” (p. 543). In many ways, the culture, values, and norms that they promote are products of “Western dominance and the kinds of intellectual orientations it has produced” (p. 543). This is not, and has never been, a truly multicultural pluralist project but cultural imperialism and continuation of the “Western enlightenment’s long history of universalism-cum-imperialism” (Bowden, 2003, p. 360). Continuing to project “Western values and interests as global and universal which naturalises the myth of Western supremacy in the rest of the world” (Andreotti, 2006, p. 44) will only lead to further distancing of the North and South.

Is Global Citizenship Movement Offering Anything New to HE?

Lilley (2014) argues that the global citizenship is “a multi-level construct. It represents the ‘ideal global graduate’ underpinned by moral and transformative cosmopolitanism” (p. 3). She offers an “identikit of markers” that distinguish global citizens from others. These include leaving a comfort zone; thinking differently; engaging beyond the immediate circle of family, friends, and peers; showing mature attitude and taking initiative; and not having narrow expectations in life and work. Similarly, Jones and Smith (2014) write that global citizenship is about “going beyond our comfort zone” (p. 12), including the acceptance of foreign customs. They add that one of the features of global citizens is the willingness to “seek common understanding when language is a barrier.”

Skrbiš (2014) lists the following competencies for global citizens, which are based on cosmopolitanism: responsibility to the broader global community, openness toward others, commitment to respect and value diversity, and compassion toward others. Nussbaum (2007) argues that universities need to provide global citizenship education that “cultivates the critical capacities, fosters a complex understanding of the world and its peoples, and educates and refines the capacity for sympathy” (p. 40). Tarrant (2010, quoted in Lilley, 2014) lists three types of “student global citizens” (p. 8):

There are numerous problems with the above descriptions of global citizenship education. They maintain that doing good in the world, caring about the planet, and respecting other people’s views make one a global citizen. They also label those who are interested and willing to go an extra mile and explore in life as citizens of the world. In the case of Tarrant’s three types of global citizens, “ordinary” social responsibility is “repackaged” ¹ by the global citizenship movement without adding anything new and concrete.

It is evident from the above that the promoters of global citizenship are not offering anything new to HE. They are only attempting to repackage basic common sense and human decency, social responsibility, and good critical thinking skills, coupled with the knowledge, awareness, and care for global issues, ² into a new movement, a creation of a new “learned” elite known as global citizens who are open-minded and enlightened, unlike their “close-minded,” “nationalistic,” and “tribalistic” peers who apparently do not care about the people or world beyond their ethnic or religious groups or outside the borders of their countries.

We will not help our students and graduates by giving them a “fancy global sounding title,” to borrow the term from Mestenhauser (2011, p. 43). Rather than jumping onto popular and currently fashionable buzzwords, the aim of HE institutions should be the development of globally competent students ready to function, work, succeed, and make a difference in a constantly changing, diverse, and complex world.

The Proposition for the South (and the Rest)

The notion of global citizenship in HE is not a desirable proposition for the South. The countries in the South cannot afford to spend their time and resources on vague rhetoric and popular buzzwords. Instead, HE institutions need to be pragmatic and prepare students for the real world, which is not flat, just, and open to all.

Nussbaum (2002) is correct that “we live in a world in which the destinies of nations are closely intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival itself” (p. 12). In addition, we are fully aware that “national policies have regional and global consequences” (UNDP, 2013, p. 116). This, however, does not require us to become global citizens, even if this was a real possibility and not an abstract and ambiguous proposition; rather, we need to be able to engage in serious negotiations, compromise, and come to concrete solutions about the most pressing global issues. ³ Peace, stability, access to basic human needs, and the survival of humankind itself do not depend on whether we are cosmopolitans and/or global citizens; these will depend on our ability to persuade powerful countries to change the unjust, unequal, and oppressive economic, trade, and political systems and allow the less powerful countries to develop and prosper. We further need “a more transparent and democratic conduct of international relations” and reform and democratization of international structures and organizations such as UN Security Council, World Bank, and IMF (Parekh, 2003, p. 14).

To “cultivate humanity and world citizenship,” Nussbaum (2007, p. 37) recommends that all students learn the basics of world history, major world religions, and be proficient in at least one foreign language. This is still very rudimentary knowledge that will not make one a global citizen if global citizenship is to have any meaning and credibility. ⁴ The complex and constantly changing world requires from HE institutions the development of graduates who possess real global competencies and knowledge “that are attuned to political, social and economic complexities” (Skrbiš, 2014, p. 8). Bowden (2003) writes that we need to develop graduates who have a “sense of belonging and an appreciation or understanding of their own history and culture” (p. 359). Such graduates would need to be “open-minded and aware that beyond our respective borders are peoples who may be different to you and/or me, but who place a similar value on their identity” (p. 359). They would also need to be aware that their own actions as well as those of their countries can have impact elsewhere.

We need to develop globally competent graduates ⁵ who are “sensitive to cultural differences, allowing them to collaborate effectively across different cultures, and across the distinct social and business settings of different countries” (Skrbiš, 2014, p. 5). Mestenhauser (2011) argues that we need to educate students to fully understand that they and their countries are “part of the global setting, that [we all have] equal responsibility for the global system [and] that [we are] aware of how we impact the system by our actions” (p. 65). Furthermore, global competence requires substantial knowledge of geography, world history, and global issues and dimensions such as health, environment, economics, and politics (Skrbiš, 2014). In a similar fashion, Mestenhauser (2011) adds that today’s graduates need to be “globally literate” (p. 127). He sees this as possession of “accurate, relevant and instant knowledge about other people and their cultures because it matters what we know about others and what they know about us” (p. 127).

We need to prepare our students for life in a real and challenging world. To do this, we cannot follow the cosmopolitan theory, which sees and values humanity as an abstract. Rather, we need to help our students in concrete ways (Calhoun, 2003), developing them into globally competent and socially responsible individuals. Countries in the South (and the rest of the world) need to continue to improve their internationalization strategies and programs and strive to develop graduates who possess critical thinking skills, value diversity, and can communicate and collaborate with people from different countries and cultures and work in a complex and constantly changing world. Instead of promising our students a fairy tale of global citizenship, we need to empower them to understand the world and their place in it and become competent, ethical, and responsible individuals with global perspectives in their respective fields.

Conclusion

In a complex world full of deep-rooted injustices and structural inequalities, where international relations are based primarily on realpolitik, power, and national interests, global citizenship is an oxymoron. Despite the fact that cosmopolitans may have “morally noble intentions,” their ideas and ideals face “overwhelming philosophical and practical difficulties” (Naseem & Hyslop-Margison, 2006, p. 51). Global citizenship is “either impossible or (at best) largely rhetorical in nature” (Arneil, 2007, p. 301).

“Words and our choice of words matter. Words provoke and shape social, political and economic change. Words are complex, contingent and open to multiple meanings” (Michael Byers, quoted in van Liempd, 2013). In this article, we have argued that instead of using the global citizenship concept in HE, we need to find a more inclusive and less loaded concept. International HE scholars and professionals need to focus on the development of globally competent graduates who are fully aware of their roles in the quest for a better tomorrow for their communities, countries, regions, and the world as a whole. The difference here is not only about semantics. Global citizenship is an abstract concept, whereas global competence can be taught and measured.

It is hard not to see global citizenship, as currently promoted in the North, as a push by the well-off parts of the world for solidarity with the “backward” South. Although this may sound extreme, we do not think it is too far off. This patronizing approach, which portrays the South as the problem, a helpless mass, which cannot survive without the assistance from the “enlightened” North, will not make the world a better, more equal place; it will only sow more divisions and animosity. In addition, the idea that only those who consider themselves as cosmopolitans and global citizens care about the whole of humanity is preposterous. Well-educated, engaged, and active citizens who care about their countries, regions, and the world as a whole, and who are able to think and operate both locally and globally, offer far more hope for the future than an affluent minority interested in “fancy” sounding titles.

As the discussion about global citizenship and past and current HE internationalization practices cannot be separated, for any concept to be accepted by the majority of international HE scholars and practitioners, as well as students in all corners of the globe, a sincere and inclusive engagement is necessary. This, however, has not been the norm when it comes to international HE, which has lacked inclusive and truly international dialogue. The same has been the case with the global citizenship project. The debate has been dominated by the powerful countries in the North and mainly by academics from liberal HE institutions. From time to time, there are last-minute add-ons, which are asked to provide a perspective from the South and in that way give “legitimacy” to the debate and make it appear “globally inclusive.” Furthermore, we have yet to come across the writing by the Northern promoters of global citizenship who have considered how the concept is seen outside the developed world.

The 2014 Global Dialogue on the Future of Higher Education Internationalization held in Port Elizabeth, South Africa in January 2014, was the first ever genuinely inclusive debate about HE internationalization. The participants at the Global Dialogue have committed themselves to “promote international higher education and research that recognises the rich diversity offered by all regions for a global higher education agenda which is equitable, ethical, socially responsible, accessible and accountable” (Nelson Mandela Bay Global Dialogue Declaration on the Future of Internationalisation of Higher Education, 2014). Despite this, the debate about global citizenship has remained a debate reserved for the global North. The global citizenship/global competence debate needs to be one of the key topics for the next Global Dialogue that is planned for 2016. We need to find consensus on the relevance and appropriateness of the terms and concepts in our field. Inclusive debates are likely to bring different insights and different solutions that will work for most, if not all.