Accounting for killing: Accountability for death

Introduction

Long past and recent history has shown that when the security of a government is threatened or violated or, more generally, the preservation and strengthening of the power of the State is sought for high-level political reasons, any “tool” can be used to hamper, fight, counter-fight and even physically eradicate the assumed enemies and their allies. ¹ Accordingly, governments can adopt either transparent or secret politics of necessity which may leave little or no space for justice, ethics or morality. Indeed, on the contrary, governments can use any legitimate or illegitimate means to obtain results in defence, or for the betterment, of the State/national interest. Today, the term “targeted killing” is used in the international legal debate on the lawfulness of state-sponsored killings of selected individuals and is defined as a form of “premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of the state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals” (Hunter, 2009: 2; also see Perez, 2010). The death of Al-Qa’ida leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 is a highly prominent instance of targeted killing (Norington, 2011).

Set in Venice in the sixteenth century, this study on the theme of the targeted killing or harming of humans as enemies of the State is based on examinations of a rare and formerly highly secretive surviving record found in the Venice State Archive (VSA), and other sparse surviving primary records, as well as an array of secondary sources. The study aims to go beyond extant research by reporting on rich unearthed evidence pertaining to the secretive premeditated killing of the enemies of the Venetian State during the early sixteenth century and in providing explanations of the behaviour involved. The evidence of decisions made in the process shows financial details of certain interactions for sinister purposes, thereby illuminating a process of accounting as part of the information set that was regarded as necessary in rendering the governmental officers responsible for such decisions accountable for death. Admittedly, Venice has been a major historical locus where intelligence and counter-intelligence systems took a regular form. As Funnell (2010) explained “although the need for information about one’s enemies or potential enemies had always been important in any military success as far back as ancient times”, it was not until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when this intelligence gathering had become “a sophisticated and truly effective form in the Italian city States of Venice and Genoa, a form that was quickly mimicked by most other major European states [Thompson and Padover, 1963]” (Funnell, 2010: 32, also see Soll, 2009: 21). Therefore, such systems were well established in Venice by the time the written records informing this study were secretly prepared. Such records were prepared by the Council of Ten (hereafter the “CX”) which constituted the police apparatus in the Venetian State.

The authors’ knowledge of the survival and related availability of this rare primary record first came to the notice of one of the team on reading Newman (2005), which then stimulated the authors’ collaboration in this investigation with a focus on the accounting and accountability dimensions of this most unusual source. The study’s time–space intersection does not commonly come within the investigative experience of most accounting historians (Anderson, 2002; Carmona, 2004; Williams and Wines, 2006). Accordingly, the study is intended to augment an understanding of public sector accounting and accountability of the era, which remains an undeveloped strand of research for accounting historians (Carnegie and Napier, 1996; Carnegie and Potter, 2000; Colquhoun, 2009; Walker, 2005), ² and may augment modern-day conceptions of public sector accounting and accountability (see, for example, Gomes et al., 2011) A limitation of this study, however, is the paucity of surviving primary records, including records of the financial particulars of transactions.

As far as can be ascertained, accounting for the secretive premeditated killing of potential enemies of the State is virtually unexplored in the accounting literature. A small number of accounting historians have addressed accounting in the context of the Jewish Holocaust. For instance, Funnell (1998: 436) pointed out that the perpetration of the Holocaust required the “operation of an efficient machine with the sole objective of processing millions of people as quickly, costlessly and effectively as possible to produce corpses”. Lippman and Wilson (2007) investigated the role of accountants and the information they prepared in perpetrating the injustices on humans who were transferred to concentration camps during the Holocaust. In contrast with this study, it is noted that the premeditated annihilation of Jewish people was not a top-level secretive process known only to a few highly powerful individuals in government. Funnell (2010) merely touched on the subject of accounting and high-level secretive killings. The author investigated the role of accounting for intelligence systems, basing his analysis on an English Act which was concerned with controlling public expenditures and the setting of spending limits for the secret service (Funnell, 2010). Funnell (2010) did not, however, examine any available evidence of accounting for killing or harming, nor examine any underlying accountability processes based on any surviving evidence. Indeed, virtually nothing is known in the literature about accounting and accountability in schemes which may involve the secretive, targeted killing or harming of certain individuals who are identified as enemies of the State, due, invariably, to the lack of available surviving evidence of such secret activities. Of course, such secretive records are not intended, on their preparation, to enter the public realm.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the scenario for investigation and also depicts the historical orientation of the study, outlining the methodological approach adopted. The following section on State security and accountability outlines the theoretical concepts adopted in the study. A brief overview of the sixteenth century political context in Venice is then provided. There follows an overview of the government of the Venetian Republic, with a focus on the role, nature and operations of the CX, its power and rules, thereby providing relevant contextualization of the key governmental processes in place, and on which this study is centred. The examination of the available evidence of accounting for killing and accountability for death, based on surviving primary records, especially on the contents of a rare and formerly highly secretive record, is then presented. The final section presents concluding comments.

Scenario for investigation and historical orientation

The use of the CX in order to reinforce, protect and defend the State from internal and external threats during the period 1510–1527, combined with the fortuitous availability of a previously secret record of certain sinister events, has permitted reflection upon, and extension of, currently known forms of accountability. The crucial Venetian evidence of the premeditated killing or harming of the enemies of the State using public funds, based on decisions by the CX in very secret meetings, is derived from entries found in the rare and exceptional “very very secret book” (VSA: Libro secreto secretissimo, hereafter known as the “top-secret book”). ³ In short, this investigation would not have been possible in the absence of this formerly highly secretive and rich record. Notions of accountability in historical accounting research are long-standing and have been traced to the Domesday Book of 1086 (Godfrey and Hooper, 1996). While the accounting literature has, in the main, depicted the different meanings/nature/categories/dimensions/styles and limits of accountability (see, for example, Ahrens, 1996; Andrew, 2007; Gray et al., 1996; Messner, 2009; Moerman and Van der Laan, 2011; Neu, 2000a; Roberts, 1991; Sinclair, 1995), it has not specifically elucidated the notion of accountability for death in the context of secretive premeditated killings. Accordingly, this contribution may facilitate the broadening of previously known dimensions of accountability within the context of the literature on the theme “Accounting and the State”.

At the onset, it is important to outline the methodological approach adopted in undertaking this historical study. The study is indeed a case study set in the Venetian Republic and centred around the top-secret book and other sparse surviving primary records, as well as an array of secondary sources. Given the distance of five centuries from the time of the recording of the secret information, and the conduct of this investigation, as well as the sinister nature of the underlying activities, an unavoidable limitation of this study is grounded in the paucity of the evidence available in the form of primary sources. Only the top-secret book found at the VSA out of a possible series of top-secret volumes of the genre is publically available, while many others, more than likely, have not survived to the present time. The other surviving primary sources relate to the sections entitled “Secret Parts” (SP) and “Mixed Parts” (MP) of the CX section at the VSA. These primary records contain a wide variety of deliberations which have been helpful for indicating the concern of the CX for certain State affairs of the time, as well as the regular operations of the CX in contrast to its “very secret” ones, as elucidated in the surviving top-secret book. Secondary sources have also been examined to provide historical contextualization for the study, including the illumination of the “Reason of State” philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), and to substantiate some of the evidence that has emerged, especially around the event known as the “Sack of Rome” (1527), which coincides with the main issue considered in the top-secret book. Machiavelli was alive during the period of the historical events embraced by this investigation, thus making his insights particularly apt in the Venetian context. He is widely acknowledged for his significant contribution to Italian cultural heritage and as a prominent founder of modern political science (see, for example, Milner, 2002b).

The concern with records of account or account keeping in this investigation is not focused on finding early or the earliest evidence of particular forms of accounting technique, but rather is centred on the recording of the monetary details of certain commitments or transactions as part of a wider information set that was prepared for underlying accountability purposes. In this study, a broad interpretation of accounting is applied to embrace documents of any kind which typically use text and numbers in structured or unstructured ways to provide records of commitments and transactions between named or unnamed parties. Rather than a search, based on present-day conceptions of accounting thought and practice, for “the accounting”, this study addresses “an accounting” of the financial details of certain secret transactions in the local, time-specific context. In short, accounting in this study is unsystematic, incomplete and may not even resemble accounting as known or accepted today. Drawing on Miller and Napier (1993), this study may be regarded as one of the genre they proposed as “genealogies of calculation” in contrast to traditional accounting history. The use of the term genealogy is intended to convey “a focus on the outcomes of the past, rather than a quest for the origins of the present” (Miller and Napier, 1993: 631). According to Miller and Napier (1993: 633), “we need to give a history to disparate and variable devices, without submerging or marginalizing them in an unbroken teleological narrative that begins with the ‘invention’ of double-entry bookkeeping and ends at a particular locale in the Anglo-Saxon present”.

As will be elaborated upon in the next section, the complex dimensions of the case study are informed through the application of theoretical concepts which involve the adoption of both synchronic and diachronic perspectives. Under the synchronic approach, a phenomenon of the past is examined by reference to underlying philosophies or cultural values of the local, time-specific context, while the diachronic approach seeks to interpret the past through the lenses of more contemporary knowledge and values (Saussure, 2000). In this study, the synchronic perspective relates to the use of Machiavelli’s philosophy, referred to as “Reason of State” (Machiavelli, 1513), in order to illuminate the cultural values underpinning the protection, preservation and strengthening of the State in the context of Europe, in general, and the Venetian Republic, in particular, during the sixteenth century. The diachronic perspective, on the other hand, relates to identifying the accountability regime employed by the CX in Venice during the sixteenth century in light of the contemporary literature on accountability, with specific reference to the notion described in this study as “secretive collective internal horizontal accountability”, thereby extending the notion proposed by Fox (2008) of “collective internal horizontal accountability”. The study’s findings, therefore, are interpreted by drawing on a rationale for ruling populations that was known at the time of the occurrence of the historical events examined, as well as by applying a concept, developed from the contemporary literature, which reflects more recent knowledge creation on styles of accountability. The combined adoption of a synchronic and a diachronic approach for analysis purposes further confirms the novelty of this investigation.

State security and accountability

The rationale for the governmental approach that may enable the secretive, premeditated killing or harming of individuals to protect the State is traced to the sixteenth century “Reason of State” tenets that were embedded within Machiavelli’s milestone The Prince (Machiavelli, 1513) (Il Principe). Machiavelli claimed that “it is often necessary, in order to keep hold of the state, to act contrary to trust, contrary to charity, contrary to humanity, contrary to religion” (Milner, 2002b: 97). ⁴ As aptly remarked by Nauert (2006: 134), “a ruler may virtually do anything that is truly necessary for the survival of his state: lie, cheat, murder, wage aggressive wars, or terrorize”, thereby subordinating religion and morality to the urgent self-preservation aims and needs of the State. In adhering to Machiavellian tenets, there are no fixed limits, at least in theoretical terms, to the absolute borders of the actions of specific governmental authorities. Such actions incorporate the use of public funds to either transparently or secretly commission the killing or harming of individuals for governmental purposes.

In 1513, at the time Machiavelli wrote The Prince, Italy – as will be addressed further in the next section – had been subject to several foreign incursions which led inexorably to the Sack of Rome (Guicciardini, 1540). In a period characterized by uncertainty and wars, Machiavelli’s masterpiece was one of the many manuals written and presented to rulers by humanists during the Renaissance, and was used to educate any Prince in good government by outlining a detailed list of main governmental tenets as well as the “capital errors” in statecraft (Milner, 2002a: xviii). In truth Niccolò Machiavelli, a great humanist, having had previous political experience as well as misfortune, ⁵ was eager to be considered for appointment to a key government post; accordingly, he had to demonstrate through this book that “he knew the art of the state better than anyone else” (Viroli, 1992: 145). The Prince, dedicated to the young Florentine ruler Lorenzo de’ Medici, sought to provide any Prince with a detailed list of “do’s and don’ts”, as well as vices and virtues, which may help Princes to “preserve the state”, which was the overarching concern of any ruler of the era (Milner, 2002a: xxiii).

A Prince – according to Machiavelli – “should have two fears: an internal one, in regard to his subjects, and an external one, in regard to foreign powers” (Milner, 2002b: 99). In order to preserve the State, that is “to retain power and maintain social stability”, any ruler is legitimized to fight and use “law and force” in the process. As pointed out by Machiavelli, “the first belongs to man, the second to animals. But since the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to the second. It is therefore necessary for a prince to know how to make good use of the animal and the human” (Milner, 2002b: 96). Machiavelli maintained that for a Prince “it is much safer to be feared than loved” (Milner, 2002b: 93, 97). Notwithstanding this viewpoint, he recommended that “a prince … should not deviate from good if possible”. Machiavelli also stressed that a ruler should “know how to act badly when necessary … [as]… the means will always be judged honourable” (Milner, 2002b: 97–98). Based on previous governmental experiences of different sovereigns, Machiavelli provided a long list of do’s to any ruler, including “to wipe out” the enemy’s “blood line” once a kingdom has been conquered, to “cut to pieces” resistance, including “mercenary armies” which cannot be commanded (Milner, 2002b: 50, 84), and to portray the successful strategies and methods adopted by a Duke when attracting and killing his enemies (Milner, 2002b: 86). The pitiless and scandalous vision and notion provided by the Reason of State rationale led Pope Pius V to state that “ratio status is not at all raison d’Etat; ratio status is ratio diaboli, [that is,] the devil’s reason” (Foucault, 2009: 241).

The Reason of State rationale was employed to support the behaviour of governments whose security or existence was threatened, thereby triggering the adoption of transparent or secret politics of necessity, which employed any tool, irrespective of any justice, ethics or religious morality, which was necessary for the protection, preservation and strengthening of the State. It is argued in this study that Machiavellian tenets permeated early sixteenth-century society in Europe, and justified and legitimized the premeditated secret decisions taken by the CX to kill or harm the enemies of the Venetian State. Such sinister actions, however, evoke novel dimensions and facets of accountability, which, as far as can be ascertained, have not been previously examined in the accounting literature due to a lack of surviving written evidence in the public domain for such killing or harming.

Accountability has become a major strand of research in accounting scholarship (see, for example, Day and Klein, 1987; Roberts, 1991), and has triggered a wealth of investigations which has served to highlight the different meanings/nature/categories/dimensions/styles and limits of accountability, both in the private sector (see, among others, Ahrens, 1996; Messner, 2009; Moerman and Van der Laan, 2011; Munro and Mouritsen, 1996) and in the public sector (see, for example, Andrew, 2007; Carnegie and West, 2005; Cooper and Catchpowle, 2009; Corbett, 1996; Funnell, 2003; Gray et al., 1996; Neu, 2000a, 2000b; Sargiacomo and Gomes, 2011; Sinclair, 1995) as well as in religious communities (refer, for instance, to Jacobs and Walker, 2004; Quattrone, 2004). Today, it is recognized that accountability exists in a diversity of forms. According to Gray et al. (1996: 38), “accountability can be simply defined as: the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible”. These authors make clear that “accountability involves two responsibilities or duties: the responsibility to undertake certain actions (or forbear from taking actions) and the responsibility to provide an account of those actions” (Gray et al., 1996: 38). As indicated, the literature on the Reason of State is recognized as providing the rationale for the former, while Fox’s (2008) notion of collective internal horizontal accountability, as extended in this intriguing context, is drawn upon in providing the rationale for the preparation (and indeed the survival) of the top-secret book. ⁶

The notion of collective internal horizontal accountability (Fox, 2008) is explained as follows. In the case of collective accountability, all members of the group are mutually accountable rather than a single individual or leader being held accountable. With reference to internal accountability, the accountability is not external to members outside the particular group. Concerning horizontal accountability, members of a group are equally accountable to each other within the group. Such accountability obligations arise, for instance, when “members of a group are mutually responsible to each other”, such as in the case of members of a sports team who are aspiring to team success (Fox, 2008: 31). In sixteenth-century Venice, however, the performance of the secret affairs of the CX was not subject to public evaluation as is the performance of the sports team which competes in public. Rather, the accountability was secretive as members of the CX were prohibited from informing parties external to the group of the decisions and actions taken by the CX as a collective. Indeed, the evidence recorded in the top-secret book, including entries of monetary amounts of expenditure committed or incurred in fulfilling the missions depicted, was pivotal to ensuring and maintaining long-life accountability among those peer-officers. Given this inward, secretive orientation, this study is not concerned with vertical accountability. The differentiation between hierarchical vertical (Bovens, 2008: 74–92) and horizontal accountability is also addressed by Fox (2008: 30), who differentiated between the two notions in stating “vertical accountability refers to the power relations between the state and its citizens, while horizontal accountability refers to processes of institutional oversight, checks and balances within the state”. As will be shown, the members of the CX were rendering an account to themselves and expressly not to external parties, thereby effectively delineating a coincidence of the “accountor” and the “accountee” in this fascinating setting. Such accountability is described as secretive collective internal horizontal accountability.

In the United States when important Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secrets were revealed in 2007 by the disclosure of previously well-guarded classified documents, the CIA chief at the time, Michael Hayden, was reported as stating that the documents were “reminders of some things that the CIA should not have done” (Calabresi, 2007: 9). Likewise, the information contained in the top-secret book of the CX, that emerged through the public availability and examination of the top-secret book, reports on certain things that the Venetian Republic, specifically on moral and religious grounds, at least as perceived today, should not have done. Notwithstanding latter-day perceptions, such actions were justified by the need to protect the Venetian State and its allies under the rationale of Reason of State.

The contextualization of this sixteenth-century study occurs within the following two sections. The political situation of the time is illuminated, and this is followed by an overview of government in Venice, with a focus on the organization, power and rules of the CX.

Political context during the fifteenth and early sixteenth century in Venice

Considering that the deliberations of planned or actual events reflected in the top-secret book spanning the period 1510–1527 are strongly impregnated with the political alliances and wars of the period, culminating in the Sack of Rome of 1527, a brief chronology is provided of the crucial political alliances and wars. This synopsis is necessary in order to explain the complexity and instability of the system of major coalitions of the States dominating affairs within Europe, and to elucidate the role played by Venice as a mutable pawn within the changeable European arena. Admittedly, from 1494 to 1530 the lands of modern day Italy were the site of a series of conflicts, known as the “Wars of Italy”, which involved, at different points, all the major States of western Europe: France, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Papal States (comprising territories under direct sovereign rule of the papacy), Venice, as well as the Ottoman Empire (Guicciardini, 1540; Pellegrini, 2009). Some of these conflicts are outlined, focusing particularly on the observation period from 1508 to 1527, because the surviving Venetian evidence, as examined later, is deeply involved in this intricate political situation. The conflicts of prime relevance to this study are detailed in two key phases: (1) the War of the League of Cambrai (1508–1516); and (2) the War of the League of Cognac (1526–1530).

The government of the Venetian State

During the period covered by this study, Venice had a unique system of government (Cessi, 1981; Cozzi, 1980). The government in Venice was not versed in the usual forms of statesmanship, due to the adoption of the Republican State model, instead of the Empire model or the Monarchist model. In Venice, political decisions could not be taken by any single person, as under the Empire or Monarchy models. Therefore, more democratic decision making occurred in Venice (Finlay, 1999: 940), involving elite members of Venetian society.

The Dux (Doge) performed an honorary ceremonial role within the Venetian power structure. The position was similar to the ancient kings of Sparta. Both were the guardians of laws and the symbol of the majesty of the State, even if the Dux carried out the burden of office without any form of arbitrary power (Libby, 1973: 13–14). In respect to the role of the Dux, the words of Novagero, a famous Venetian intellectual of the sixteenth century, are enlightening:

There is no one who does not know that no private interest or personal concern could influence him; neither friendship nor enmity could turn him aside from his course; that he never said by day nor thought by night anything that would not be useful to the state. (Vulpius, 1718: 40)

The supreme body of the Republic, possessing both legislative and executive power, was known as the Great Council, and comprised 480 members. The Venetian aristocracy exercised control over the membership of the Great Council. As a result of a legal decision made in 1297, known as the “Serrata”, the Great Council’s membership was hereditary in order to exclude from membership families which had merely become wealthy in recent times. Further, the Serrata stated that only people from families that had already been represented on the Great Council were permitted to be part of this body (apart from any exceptional person who was specifically identified for membership by the Dux) (Damosto, 1937: 31–32). The Great Council delegated power to other smaller bodies, comprising the Lesser Council, the Council of Forty, the Senate and the CX. The Lesser Council was chaired by the Dux and comprised six councillors, one for each “Sestiere” or ward into which Venice was divided. Initially, the Council of Forty exercised judicial and legislative power which was delegated by the Great Council, but in later years the Council of Forty lost its legislative power to the Senate. The Senate was elected by the Great Council and possessed legislative power as well as the power to deal with international commerce and political problems, the military and issues of war (Cessi, 1981: 272).

The most important body in the context of this investigation is the CX. The CX was charged with a wide range of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, and was initiated on 10 July 1310, more than two centuries before the formation of Ivan the Terrible’s apparatus known as Oprichnina (1565–1572) ⁷ (Winchell, 2006: 335). The CIA and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) are essentially modern-day examples of similar forms of organizations. The origin of the CX is linked to an important and unsuccessful plot against the Venetian Dux, known as the Tiepolo-Querini conspiracy (Cessi, 1981: 278; Macchi, 1864: 56). At that time, the CX was formed to repress rebellious sentiment stemming from this riot, and to deter new attacks in the future which threatened the security of the State (Damosto, 1937: 54). The CX was only created for a designated period of 80 days – ending just after the feast of St Michael (that is, 29 September 1310). However, on account of the long duration of the tensions, the CX was given a series of extensions until it become a stable agency of the State in 1335 (Hazlitt, 1966: 555, 572).

The CX was composed of 10 ordinary members, chosen from among the members of the Senate and elected by the Great Council, as well as the Dux and his six councillors (that is, the members of the Lesser Council), and at least one of the “Avogadores” of the Local Government. ⁸ Hence, the CX comprised 17 voting members in total, as the Avogadores were not entitled to vote (Damosto, 1937: 53; Romanin, 1855: 57). The ordinary members were drawn from among the most respectable citizens of the Republic, and were each required to be at least 40 years of age. They were also required to be members of unrelated Venetian families and were prohibited from holding any other office within the State so as to avoid potential abuses of power. In order to preserve their independence, members of the CX did not receive any salary and they were prohibited from receiving gifts of any type under threat of death as punishment (Romanin, 1855: 53). The same punishment was applied in cases of corruption (Winchell, 2006: 341). The ordinary members were elected in different meetings by the Great Council, and the tenure of their appointment was for one year. Serving a further term was possible after a cooling-off period of one year. This cooling-off period was later extended to two years (Damosto, 1937: 54). While the Avogadores were not permitted to vote, each of them was permitted to accuse any ordinary member of the CX of legally acting irregularly or illegally (Damosto, 1937: 53; Romanin, 1855: 57). As a result, the Avogadores could initiate the suspension of the CX’s deliberations. Only in those situations expressly involving the State’s security interests were the Avogadores denied power of veto (Macchi, 1864: 93–94).

It was necessary for the members of the CX to swear to work exclusively in the interests of the advancement and honour of the Republic. They were expressly required to keep secret all matters discussed and the nature of decisions taken, and to regularly attend the meetings of the CX (Macchi, 1864: 76–77; Romanin, 1855: 58). The deliberation mechanism inside the CX involved a system of voting based on ballotte (balls). This system allowed members to express votes in favour and against, as well as doubtful votes, as will be illuminated further in the next section.

The management of public funds originally rested with the Great Council, but in 1324 the administration of public monies passed to the Senate. Gradually, the CX “usurped many of the attributes of the senate” and was able to raise and manage public monies (Brown, 1904: 355). According to Brown (1904: 355), “no specific legislation entrusted the Ten [CX] with financial authority, but a brief order of the senate, carried in September 1468, while definitely stating that certain subjects were reserved for the Council of Ten, added et altre cose secretissime” (and other very secret things). The CX was not obliged to refer its use of funds for secret expenditures to any other body (Damosto, 1937: 54; Romanin, 1855: 66). The funds were managed by a Treasurer (Camerlengo) who was elected by the membership of the CX (Damosto, 1937: 54). The CX could directly organize fund-raising, and, in the process, indicate general or vague reasons for the use of such funds, as will be illustrated in the next section. An important source of public money in Venice was represented by “forced loans” (prestiti or imprestiti) (Kohn, 1999: 10), the capital of which was funded in the various monti of the Venetian Republic, namely the Monte Vecchio, Monte Nuovo (1483), Monte Nuovissimo (1504) and Monte di Sussidio (1525) (Brown, 1904: 354–355). Generating public funds by means of forced loans meant that “citizens were required to subscribe a fixed percentage of their assessed wealth” (Kohn, 1999: 10). With powers extending beyond its original status, the CX had become unpopular, and, in 1582, “the dominant financial power in the State was restored to the senate … and remained with it till the fall of the republic” (Brown, 1904: 355).

According to Damosto (1937: 54), the CX aimed to preserve the State’s safety, and to safeguard the Republic’s citizens, as well as to protect morality within the Republic. Specific competences of the CX were to persecute political conspirators, rebels, unsavoury factions, spies and diffusers of State secrets (Damosto, 1937; Macchi, 1864: 77–78). The CX took action against internal or external rebellious behaviour that had at least the potential to threaten the stability of the State or to otherwise disturb the citizens of Venice and weaken community morality. In pursuing this purpose, the CX established an intelligence and counter-intelligence system, with spies and undercover agents who were spread not only within Venice, but also throughout Europe and outside its geographic borders (Norwick, 1981: 222). In relation to its functions, the CX’s deliberations and decisions were characterized by utmost efficiency and a pervasive secrecy. Violent actions, such as secretive premeditated killing, were a key component of State protection initiatives. It was crucial to preserve the secrecy of sensitive deliberations and decisions (Preto, 2004: 55; Romanin, 1860: 121).

The Venetian Republic sought to realize a mix of constitutional elements, where both aristocratic and democratic principles were at work (Carrithers, 1991: 249). The Venetian context was characterized by a degree of equality among the ruling aristocracy, specifically the CX members in this investigation, and between the ruling aristocracy and the Venetian population. While the CX was very powerful, its members returned to their roles as regular citizens at the end of their terms in office, without any form of protection against reprisals for their secretive and violent actions that were collectively taken for the sake of the State during their period of membership of the CX (Brown, 1895: 180; Crawford, 1905: 252; Romanin, 1855: 53–54). From the beginning of the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth century, a formal system of secret accusations operated in Venice (Preto, 2006). This system involved citizens making secret accusations by means of posting anonymous letters through a stone lion’s mouth set in a wall denouncing certain people. These anonymous letters were signed with the expression “persona per hora segreta” (that is, as a secret person). This system of anonymous informing to the CX was a common means of signalling that a crime, or at least a perceived crime, had taken place in order to press for an exemplary punishment. This necessitated a quick and secretive approach (Preto, 2006: 93; Romanin, 1855: 59). ⁹ This system, however, involved risk for the members of the CX, who were not specifically protected in respect to actions taken by them in undertaking secret State-related activities as CX members. While acting in accordance with the Reason of State philosophy, using public funds for the killing or harming of individuals for governmental aims, there was a risk that any current or former CX member would be secretly accused of treason for authorizing and funding certain sinister actions and potentially be placed on public trial. ¹⁰ The system was, therefore, potentially hazardous for CX members, both past and present.

The conflicts among the rival Venetian aristocratic families possibly constituted the trigger points to secretly accuse specific past or present CX members of certain violent actions taken for the sake of the State. Hostility within the Venetian patriciate, such as the competition between office holders within the Republican bodies, could be expressed in open terms through the ballot voting system (Finlay, 1980: 219), but could also be expressed in undisclosed and secretive ways, such as the anonymous accusation system officially operating in Venice. The accountability of members of the CX, therefore, was not discharged for all-time on leaving the office of the CX but was effectively life-long. However, no evidence of any kind was found in this study of the possible use of the top-secret book as evidence in a public trial against any past or present member of the CX, although such a situation was evidently at least theoretically possible. The findings of the examination of the contents of the top-secret book are now presented.

Analysis of contents of top-secret book

Entries in the top-secret book of the CX begin on 29 September 1510, marking the feast of St Michael, and the final entries therein recorded were made on 13 May 1527 – a span of almost 17 years. ¹¹ The entries in the book appear in different handwriting, evidently reflecting the different writing styles of the various secretaries of the various compositions of the CX, who kept records of secret meetings. The dates on which the deliberations took place appear at the top of each deliberation and the results of the voting procedures are shown at the bottom. The full names of the members of the CX involved in the secret meetings are clearly visible at the bottom or at one side of each deliberation.

The secret information set included entries of financial details pertaining to certain commitments to incur periodic expenditure or relating to particular payments made to individuals as undercover agents of those individuals. In particular, financial details of three specific transactions were found to be recorded. The transaction to be considered in what follows relates to an amount of money that was agreed to be paid each year to an unnamed individual for undertaking certain unspecified acts. The other two transactions relate to amounts that were paid as monetary gifs to an individual who acted as a messenger for a willing assassin. The mere recording of financial details of these secret transactions confirms the importance of such information in this sinister situation. Therefore, the existence of the top-secret book of the CX, coupled with the contents of the book, is perceived in this study as the mechanism for accountability. Given this conception, the sparse evidence of accounting for transactions included in the top-secret book is a key component of the total information set that was prepared in the course of discharging the notion of accountability deployed. The secretive collective internal horizontal accountability of the members of the CX is enshrined through the recording of information, including financial information, in strict secrecy, on the premeditated killing or harming of the enemies of the Venetian State.

As outlined by Newman (2005), and in accordance with Machiavellian tenets, the will of the CX to secretly commission the killing of the enemies of the State is clearly evident in the book. According to the translation of Newman (2005: 20), it involved a scheme proposed

… by a doctor to a Venetian general fighting against the Turks in Dalmatia. He offered to cut the infected glands off bubonic plague victims and create a toxic potion to be spread on woolen caps, which could then be sold cheaply behind enemy lines to the Turks. Presumably, plague and buyer’s remorse would result. The plot was enthusiastically endorsed by the general until someone gently reminded him that because so many Venetian troops were stationed behind the lines in Dalmatia, his soldiers could be infected too and indeed perish along with the enemy.

As indicated, the CX used public funds for secret purposes and would hire named or unnamed individuals, as undercover agents, to undertake sinister actions in secret on behalf of the Venetian government. This is clearly illustrated in the pages of the top-secret book, where it is shown that in December 1513, the CX deliberated to assign a yearly sum of 1,500 ducats to a man who was engaged to “do marvellous things for the Council” (4r). No evidence of the nature of these “marvellous things” was found, although the huge regular amount paid at that time at least hints at underlying drastic and urgent measures being taken for the protection of the State. This entry in respect to a retained tool identifies an annual obligation of the CX (known today as a form of executory contract) rather than a payment for services rendered. Evidence of the recording of the latter is shortly outlined.

The CX engaged in deliberations both at a secret level by means of its secret meetings, and at a public level in its regular meetings. This background to decision-making processes is provided in order to further demonstrate how the Reason of State rationale informed the operations of the CX as a police apparatus of the State, and to portray the accounting and accountability implications. Given the paucity of surviving primary records, attention is focused on the Sack of Rome, which is the only specific event revealed in the surviving top-secret book which can be documented with reference to existing primary sources at both the public and secret levels. The Sack of Rome is also the last event that is covered within the deliberations of the surviving top-secret book.

The main concern of the CX regarding the invasion of the lands of the Pope, who, as pointed out earlier, was allied to Venice, is immediately recognizable in the public deliberations of the CX at the end of April 1527. At the time, the emperor, Charles V of Spain, had already dispatched a contingent of lansquenets, commanded by the Duke of Bourbon, one of the greatest French commanders, to fight against the Pope and the Papal States. One week after the departure of the Duke of Bourbon, in the regular meeting of 27 April (VSA, CX, SP, n. 2 1527/28), the CX condemned, “the insolence of seditious and bloody bandits” operating against the Church. The CX underlined its unwillingness to “bear them any longer” and that “it was necessary to eradicate them in any possible way and to use any possible tool in order to maintain the dignity of our State and the peaceful living of one of our very loyal [allies]” (3r). In order to do so, the CX deliberated upon two options: (1) to dispatch the Captain of the Infantry and regular soldiers; or (2) to use twice the number of volunteers in place of military personnel. Any proposed action, however, was postponed until a later time, depending on the availability of a sufficient number of soldiers to conduct the attack. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim of the CX is clearly repeated at the end of the deliberation, where the surviving record shows that the CX, in condoning violent actions, agreed on the need to “eradicate them, to tear them to pieces, and completely extirpate them … [and grant the State] the freedom to use the money needed to reach such an aim … using prudence, diligence and virtue” (3r/v). Such clear intentions to kill the enemies of the State are indeed consistent with Machiavelli’s Reason of State philosophy.

Importantly, on the same day, the CX met in a secret meeting and took the following crucial decision:

Having received an offer from Babon de Naldo [the name of the willing killer] ¹² to poison the Duke of Bourbon, who with his troops has made many fires against the land of the Church [The Papal States] … and who currently is proceeding against our League [the Saint League], that offer be accepted on the authority of this Council, and he be fixed with the poison. (VSA, CX, VSP: 5v)

The security of the Venetian State and also of the Papal States, as one of Venice’s staunch allies at the time, had been seriously threatened by an external threat posed by the Duke of Bourbon and the lansquenets (Cessi, 1981: 524). Consistent with Machiavellian tenets, according to which the prince or any governing agency/ruler should “know how to act badly when necessary…” (Milner, 2002b: 97–98), the CX secretly decided to commission the killing of this enemy of the State. The notion of secretive collective internal horizontal accountability among the membership of the CX is embedded in this deliberation, which had been unanimously voted for in the first round of voting. The CX members were in solidum, and, therefore, were equally accountable to each other for the secret decision to eradicate the Duke of Bourbon. Although facing the politics of necessity, those individuals, as indicated earlier, were all effectively accountable life-long for death, and their full names are highlighted at the left hand side of the deliberation. Should any member of the CX be secretly accused in future of violating the borders of the governmental authority, or indeed should act as a delator to implicate any of the remaining members of the CX, the top-secret book provided written evidence which implicated all CX members in enshrining the names of everyone who participated in highly secretive decisions. This secret yet illuminating record thereby contributed to the maintenance of secretive collective internal horizontal accountability among the individual members of the CX throughout their lifetimes. The top-secret book confirmed the decision that was collectively made by CX members to eradicate an enemy of the State by poison. The accountability for death specifically lay within the CX rather than lying outside the CX.

Nevertheless, some unstipulated concern appears to have arisen among the members of the CX, such that they may not have had sufficient information to act quickly or they may not have had immediate access to sufficient funds to pay the killer. Whatever the reason(s) may have been, the CX decided on 3 May 1527, but not unanimously, “to postpone the action to a more convenient time … dismissing the messenger of Babon de Naldo, and commending his good intentions/will” (VSA, VSP: 5v). The 3 May 1527 deliberation that is recorded in the top-secret book is reproduced as follows:

… about the previous decision to accept the offer made by Babon de Naldo … the decision taken is suspended … the messenger of D.Babon de Naldo is now dismissed … he has to go back to his master, and thank him for his good disposition and the desire he had for the benefice of our State … we’ll let him know when he has to proceed [to poison] … XX [20] ducats as gift be given to the messenger. (VSA, VSP: 6v)

Under the accountability regime in place, the recording of the amount of the gift was regarded as a component of the essential information related to these secret deliberations and the underlying sinister intentions.

The monies of an unspecified sum that was initially agreed to be paid to Babon De Naldo for poisoning the Duke of Bourbon had to be quickly arranged in order to finance the proposed secret mission. Although there is no clear evidence of the amount involved in either the public or the secret deliberations of the CX, it was likely to have been a most substantial amount of money, based on the 1513 secret decision – as mentioned earlier – to assign 1,500 ducats per annum to a man who would do “marvellous things” for the Venetian State. Nevertheless, a significant public fund-raising operation is recorded within the regular deliberations of the CX, which, on 8 May 1527, decided to quickly collect the amount of 16,000 ducats by means of the Monte di Sussidio, not clearly specifying the reason(s), but only indicating that “the money is greatly needed … and anyone in the Council knows why” (VSA, SP: 3v). A further clue seems to suggest that this funding was linked to a “poisoning” operation. As indicated in an entry at the bottom of the funding deliberation, temporary secrecy was clearly imposed on this financial operation under the penalty of death till the end of the operation (that is, impositu silentiu sub debito s. et in pena vita donec expediat quantu opus fuerit). The large amount of 16,000 ducats, the urgent need for that money for a purpose only known to the CX, combined with the secrecy required under penalty of death, are factors that give rise to speculation on the possible need of this sum for the poisoning operation. However, it has not been possible to confirm the relationship, if any, between this vaguely portrayed public fund-raising exercise, and the planned eradication of the Duke of Bourbon as a result of the initial secret decision of the CX.

Meanwhile, on 6 May 1527, the Sack of Rome took place, which claimed a reported 20,000 lives (Giucciardini, 1758; Pellegrini, 2009). Due to strong resistance and the sacrifice of the entire Swiss Guard, the Pope sought refuge at Castel Sant’Angelo and survived the siege. The Duke of Bourbon was killed in the battle as a result of a hit from the culverin of Benvenuto Cellini, a talented Italian soldier possessing superior ballistic skills, who from within the walls of the fortress shot the Duke while riding his horse at the front of the lansquenet troops (Cellini, 1998: 60). News of war in the sixteenth century, especially relating to foreign invasions was required to be passed on by human messengers who needed time to penetrate the troop-lines and reach not easily negotiated or long distance destinations.

On 13 May 1527 the news of the Sack of Rome reached Venice, and in the regular meeting of the CX this information is reported, including the news of the death of the Duke of Bourbon (VSA, SP: 4v). On the same day, the CX held another secret meeting where it was noted that “the messenger of D.Babon de Naldo, who came to our Council for our reasons and who remained in this zone waiting for our answer, be dismissed and be given the amount of XXV [25] golden shields” (VSA, VSP: 6v). The Duke of Bourbon had already been killed, and the willing assassin, Babon de Naldo, was no longer required to secretly assassinate the key enemy figure on behalf of the CX. Accordingly, the messenger was dismissed with the provision of another monetary gift, the amount of which, for accountability purposes, was also recorded in the top-secret book as an element of the necessary information to be kept in respect to this mission, with an unanticipated yet desirable end for the Venetian Republic. A regular Italian soldier had already famously solved the political issue, thereby cancelling the secretly appointed assassination plan. However, the will of the CX to premeditatedly commission the poisoning of an enemy of Venice for the sake of the Reason of State remains reflected in the top-secret book, as silently enshrined at the time but publicly known today. As no monies were required to be paid to eradicate the Duke of Bourbon, the secret book does not record the amount that was evidently agreed to be paid in line with the original decision.

Conclusion

This historical case study has centred on the surviving top-secret book of the CX, and other surviving primary records, as well as a range of secondary sources. The study fits within the genre of investigations defined by Miller and Napier (1993) as genealogies of calculation, in contrast to traditional accounting history with a focus on accounting as technique. The study has not focused on accounting as technique or as an end in itself but as a means to an end within an accountability regime in a novel historical context. While the primary sources underpinning this study are sparse, the investigation has elucidated the interplay of accounting and accountability in the context of sinister activities of the sixteenth century. The study has shown how accounting for killing the enemies of the Venetian State and its allies during the sixteenth century was a means of rendering the powerful governmental officials who made such decisions accountable for death. The investigation has employed diachronic and synchronic perspectives, thus further adding to the novelty of the research.

The synchronic perspective is underpinned by Machiavelli’s Reason of State philosophy in providing a rationale for the decisions taken by the CX. Machiavelli lived during the time of the actual events that have been examined, and his philosophy provides a rationale for the implementation of a cruel and pitiless approach by sovereigns in adopting any legitimate or illegitimate means to preserve or strengthen the security of the State. Based on the rare and exceptional top-secret book, the study provides evidence of certain individuals acting “contrary to trust, contrary to charity, contrary to humanity, contrary to religion” (Milner, 2002b: 97), thereby abandoning any respect for justice, morality, religion or ethics for the sake of the Reason of the State. The diachronic perspective for interpreting the primary sources and the events they elucidate has highlighted a hitherto unexplored style of accountability in light of the contemporary literature on accountability. Indeed, the premeditated decision to harm or kill the enemies of the State, combined with the information recorded in the top-secret book, including accounting information, pertaining to those actions, are shown to be related to hitherto undisclosed processes of secretive collective internal horizontal accountability. The study, therefore, extends the notion of “collective internal horizontal accountability” as proposed by Fox (2008), in both defining and reflecting the accountability of members of the CX to each other only through secrecy.

The analysis has augmented an understanding of the events and circumstances involved. The study has permitted the elucidation of certain aspects of the operation of the police apparatus in the Venetian State. Indeed, in order to protect and defend the State from an external threat in the form of the military advances of the Duke of Bourbon, as shown, the CX decided to secretly poison him – thereby adhering to the Machiavellian rationale – and to record details of this decision, including the particulars of financial arrangements, in secret, for accountability purposes. Importantly, and as indicated, this novel form of life-long accountability for death, illuminated by the Machiavellian “Reason of State” philosophy, goes beyond the different styles of accountability as depicted in the contemporary accounting literature. Paraphrasing Sinclair (1995), who has viewed accountability as a “chameleon” which may assume various forms depending on the context, this study has illuminated a further novel “death-related” form of the chameleon. Relatedly, while Messner (2009) has recently stressed the limits of “exposed accountability” in the private sector, this article has sought to illuminate a hitherto unexposed dimension of accountability in the public sector.

This genre of accountability was also found to be effectively life-long, extending beyond the period of appointment to the CX in order to give a formal insurance, protecting each member of the CX, who jointly acted for the sake of the State, from false secret accusations of being a murderer, which could lead, albeit unfairly, to the identification of a scapegoat for the sinister deeds undertaken. Moreover, the secretive collective internal horizontal accountability of the members of the CX was so strong that it effectively contributed to the survival of the top-secret book across five centuries, thereby enabling this study to be undertaken once the book was assigned to the public record for research purposes. This notion of accountability may usefully be employed in future studies of similar phenomena in other historical contexts, as well as in contemporary settings where the term targeted killing, or similar, may be deployed.

Despite the paucity of the primary sources available in this study, the surviving top-secret book which has underpinned this investigation is both rare and exceptional. It is plausible to believe that this rich surviving record was one of a series of top-secret volumes of this type, but this cannot be confirmed as a result of this investigation. However, the possible emergence, in future, of other similar books would enable further research to be undertaken, thereby permitting further contributions to be made to the literature on this topic. Other records of the kind may emerge in respect to other jurisdictions, and, as a result of similar investigations, further develop the literature from a cross-jurisdictional perspective. Notwithstanding this possibility, this study may remain unusual for some time to come given the high-level secrecy surrounding such sensitive operations in local, time-specific contexts.