Governance and accounting practices in hybrid organizations: Insights from a sixteenth-century charity in Venice

Abstract

This article explores governance and accounting practices in hybrid organizations. Currently, hybrid organizations represent an increasingly pervasive phenomenon, but their role has also been central in the past. To achieve this aim, we consider the case of a charity, the Scuola Grande di San Rocco, as its activity grew in scope and complexity during the sixteenth century in the Republic of Venice. The Scuole Grandi represents a form of hybrid organizations because these charities were privately managed, but publicly regulated. They shared a devotional orientation and performed de facto welfare functions in progressive integration with the State. Based on an analysis of balance sheets and administrative documents, this article aims to discuss the role of governance and accounting in enabling hybrid organizations to operate through multiple logics.

Keywords

accounting charities governance hybrid organizations multiple logics

Introduction

Recently, scholars have paid increasingly more attention to the phenomenon of hybrid organizations and the specific managerial challenges posed by these organizations. A number of these studies have been conducted within the stream of institutional theory.

Institutional theorists have progressed from the original claim that institutional pressures shape organizational behavior isomorphically (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Some scholars have begun to acknowledge the issue of institutional complexity: not only one pressure but multiple logics shape organizational behavior in different ways (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Different actors respond differently to the environment because they embrace a different logic, which explains practice variance and heterogeneity (Lounsbury, 2001; Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). If this notion is true for all organizations, it applies even more to organizations that operate in the intermediate realm between private businesses and public and nonprofit services (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Dees, 1998), that is, hybrid organizations. Therefore, hybrid organizations are defined in this literature as organizations that combine different institutional logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) and face divergent if not conflicting institutional demands (Pache and Santos, 2013).

By reviewing past research investigating institutional logics, we highlight three key points and blind spots that need to be addressed. First, research investigating institutional complexity has mainly portrayed multiple logics as contradictory and competing for field dominance (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005; Dunn and Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007) and only rarely as complementary (Perkmann et al., 2018; Smets et al., 2015). Research has explored organizational responses to logic multiplicity, but these studies mainly focused on decoupling (Greenwood et al., 2011), compartmentalization (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007) or selective coupling (Pache and Santos, 2013). According to Smets et al. (2015), all these responses resolve complexity by separating competing logics and only rarely by integrating them (Jay, 2013). Therefore, our knowledge regarding how different logics coexist and interdepend on one another is limited.

Second, scholars have mainly focused their attention on how these organizational responses to institutional complexity result in new practice creation, innovation, and change (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005; Dunn and Jones, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007) and have mainly studied these responses in nascent hybrids (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013) or during critical moments of change (e.g. Reay and Hinings, 2005). With some exception (Smets et al., 2015), we know virtually nothing about how different logics inform everyday work in current organizational practice, specifically in organizations that face established institutional complexity.

Third, studies examining organizational responses to institutional complexity have mainly concentrated on organizational design aspects to explore how organizations structure themselves to cope with institutional complexity (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Santos et al., 2015) or, at the individual level, the micropractices that people perform to manage multiple logics (Perkmann et al., 2018; Smets et al., 2015). Although not central to this work, there are claims highlighting the importance of governance and accounting in coping with the tensions posed by multiple logics in these settings (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009); however, with some exceptions (Antonelli et al., 2017), we do not know much about how the coping practices are performed.

Altogether, we investigate how multiple logics coexist in current organizational practice in contexts of established institutional complexity. Specifically, we ask the following question: ‘how do governance¹ and accounting practices help hybrid organizations operate through multiple logics?’

To answer this question, we focus on charities and embrace a historical perspective. We focus on charities because the literature on hybridity and multiple logics has overlooked the phenomenon of charities and faith-based organizations. However, charities traditionally play both private and welfare roles in society, thus blurring the boundaries between the private, often the religious, and the public spheres (Cairns et al., 2007; Crofts, 2009; Rochester and Torry, 2010); therefore, charities represent a typical hybrid setting deserving attention. We embrace a historical perspective because hybrid organizations are not a novel phenomenon despite apparent belief in this sense (Battilana et al., 2012); therefore, insights into how these organizations operate through multiple logics may be derived from the past. Historically, charities are considered to merge a devotional nature with the desire to contribute to material needs, hence balancing spiritual and economic aims (Moggi et al., 2016). Moreover, widespread historical evidence suggests that interplay existed between public and private bodies in governing poverty (Servalli, 2013). In the Middle Ages, assistance to the poor was provided by the Church; however, in the Modern Age, this role has progressively been assumed by the State (see the wide diffusion of ‘Laws of Poor’ at that time, Pullan, 2005) mainly via a system of charities (Black, 1992; Pegrari, 2000). Charities are often funded for devotional purposes and members’ mutual aid, but according to Pullan (1982), the larger, outward-looking charitable organizations served whole cities not only their own members and, hence, performed a constitutive welfare function in society.

We explore the case of an important charity in the sixteenth-century Republic of Venice, namely, the Scuola Grande di San Rocco (SGSR here after), which was similar to many other entities at that time. It worked at the crossroads of multiple logics (private, religious and public), performing a de facto welfare role in Venice. The archives of SGSR are a rich source of valuable documentation concerning the governance and accounting system of this charitable entity since its establishment. In turn, the study of this documentation broadens the understanding of the role of the governance and accounting practices in having together the multiple and increasingly complex demands made by the State, its donors, its members and civil society. Consequently, SGSR represents an instructive case for advancing research and examining how hybrid organizations managed to balance multiple logics. In particular, the primary role of governance and accounting in this endeavour is highlighted. By investigating the role of governance and accounting practices in the establishment and development of this charitable entity, we contribute to the debate on hybrid organizations and multiple logics in two main ways. First, we shift attention from logics’ struggle in salient moments of institutional change and innovation to addressing logics’ interplay in current organizational practice in contexts of established institutional complexity. Second, we shift attention from issues of organizational design or individuals’ actions to the role of systems of governance and accounting in organizations, which are coping with the typical challenges of multiple logics.

This article is structured as follows: first, we review the literature on hybrid organizations from an institutional logics’ perspective. Then, we present our methodology, followed by a report on our main findings regarding SGSR’s hybrid nature, the evolution of its governance and accounting system and how this worked as a response to managing its institutional complexity. Finally, we discuss our findings considering the reviewed literature.

Institutional logics’ perspective on hybrid organizations

Institutional complexity

Neo-institutional theory was established as a set of concepts and theories regarding environmental effects on organizations leading to isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Subsequently, scholars began to note that macro-environmental pressures do not shape organizational behaviour in similar ways: the situation is more complex because institutional environments are more fragmented and contested (Lounsbury, 2008). Friedland and Alford (1991) maintained that within isomorphic pressures, institutional logics moderate organizational decisions and actions. Institutional logics are socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices (interests, values and beliefs) by which individuals provide meaning to their daily activity and organizational tasks (Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Thus, the socio-cultural context shapes institutions that generate various interests, values and practice models (institutional logics) and regulate organizational behaviour in different ways (Lounsbury, 2008). Society is constituted by such multiple institutional orders, which explains organizational practice variation and heterogeneity, rather than isomorphism; different organizations respond differently to the environment because they espouse a different logic (Lounsbury, 2001). Greenwood et al. (2010, 2011); termed this phenomenon ‘institutional complexity’, for instance, organizations are challenged by the alignment of their structures and practices with incompatible behavioural logics.

Research investigating institutional complexity has mostly portrayed multiple logics as competing for field dominance and examined logics’ struggles and resistance, especially in contexts of institutional change in which one logic replaces another. For example, Reay and Hinings (2005) studied the contested passage from a medical logic to a business-like logic in the managerialization of healthcare in Alberta. Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005) explored the transposition of a new diversity management practice from the United States to some Danish firms by examining what enabled the progressive dominance of the new institutional logic tied to the new practice to impose itself. However, in some settings, different and even incompatible logics coexist in a complex way, and are not necessarily in competition for field dominance.

Hybrid organizations

Several studies investigating institutional complexity have addressed hybrid organizations as contexts of high complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2013; Perkmann et al., 2018). The term ‘hybrid organizations’ encompasses a wide range of organizational phenomena that operate in the intermediate realm between private businesses and public and nonprofit services (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Dees, 1998), for instance, organizations that perform social tasks and are often publicly owned, but privately run (Kickert, 2001). These organizations are called ‘hybrids’ because they incorporate different institutional logics by combining varying mixes of governance, which are usually associated with the State, the market and civil society. These organizations are simultaneously shaped by all possible underlying values (e.g. quality of service, competitiveness, efficiency, and community engagement) and simultaneously rely on various resources (public financing, commercial revenues, volunteering and donations) and different governing modes (Evers, 2005; Mair et al., 2015). There is a growing interest in hybrid organizations in management studies because these organizations are considered an increasingly pervasive phenomenon in contemporary society. Scholars explain this trend considering the modern turn towards social values in our contemporary business world (Austin et al., 2006; Battilana et al., 2012; Haigh and Hoffman, 2012) and the retreat of the welfare state since the 1980s (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Evers, 2005; Jägers and Lapsley, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2007). These changes seem to have contributed to the move towards hybrid organizations in social service provision and social entrepreneurship. These atypical organizational forms continue to attract scholars’ attention because hybrids exhibit inherent challenges and tensions in their complex governance, organization and decision-making processes (Evers, 2005; Helmig et al., 2004; Jay, 2013; Kickert, 2001).

Hybrid organizations’ responses to institutional complexity

There are differing positions regarding how hybrids cope with the issue of multiple logics. Most researchers have focused their attention on how organizations can restructure in terms of governance and organizational form (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Perkmann et al., 2018; Santos et al., 2015; Ysa, 2007); other scholars have explored the hybridization in individuals’ professional identity (Kurunmäki, 2004; McGivern et al., 2015) or individuals’ responses to managing competing logics in everyday work (Smets et al., 2015).

Overall, there are three main types of documented responses of hybrid organizations to institutional complexity. First, decoupling occurs when organizations or individuals perform continuous negotiations or reach compromises among different logics, but the different practices they adopt are merely ceremonial: their underlying beliefs are left unchanged (Greenwood et al., 2011). Second, organizations solve complexity by compartmentalizing logics in different units or processes (e.g. Dunn and Jones, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007). Third, Pache and Santos (2013) show that instead of adopting the strategies of decoupling or compartmentalizing, hybrid organizations selectively adopt and combine elements drawn from different institutional logics. This selective coupling appears to be a safer strategy than decoupling, because it does not increase the risk of faking compliance (Pache and Santos, 2013). Furthermore, there are claims that these complex organizations are not influenced by ‘macro’-dominant logics in their day-to-day activities; these organizations rather develop their own highly idiosyncratic procedural logics. Quattrone (2015) questions the belief that organizations (and individuals) act by conforming to external ordering principles, in other words, to one or more readily available dominant logics. Instead, he argues that organizations act based on a ‘procedural logic’, which is a specific mix of rhetorical practices and routines. Accordingly, while hybridity may not be shaped by the rivalry among logics or the selective adoption of ‘ready to use’ legitimated practices, it is shaped by an endogenous dynamism that leaves individuals and organizations to imagine the modes of action in the context in which they operate.

Role of governance and accounting

Governance and accounting practices emerge as a fundamental element in the debate regarding hybrid organizations in several ways (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009). Evers (2005) makes a conclusive generic claim about the ‘need of forms of governance and control to work through the typical tensions of hybrid organizations’. Kickert (2001) also states that performance measurement, cost control, accountability and budgeting are indispensable mechanisms for ensuring quasi-autonomy in hybrid organizations. Antonelli et al. (2017) describe the role played by accounting in a capitalist and utopian socialist hybrid. Shaoul et al. (2012) argue that more and different reporting is needed in public–private partnerships (for instance, in addition to more narrative reporting and accessibility to the public) for them to be responsive to multiple influences and demands.

By focusing on charities, some studies have explored the role of accounting in different types of charitable institutions in the past. For example, Orelli et al. (2013) studied the role of accounting and internal control practices in a credit institution in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, namely, the Monte di Pietà in Bologna, and showed how accounting played a central role in the management of this complex charity. Manetti et al. (2017) documented the specific systems of accountability adopted in the fifteenth century by a charity organization, namely, the Confraternita della Misericordia, to ensure transparency in the management of offerings and donations for a plague emergency. Servalli (2013) reconstructed the case of Misericordia Maggiore (MIA), which was the largest charitable institution in the city of Bergamo under the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century domination of the Republic of Venice. She showed that the more MIA grew and engaged with poverty alleviation in Bergamo, the more specialist control and bookkeeping practices (even mastering the double-entry bookkeeping system) were developed. MIA’s activity was double-faceted through its sophisticated accounting practices. This charity simultaneously performed welfare functions and a strict control of its territory and people. Consequently, governance and accounting may play paramount roles in shaping how hybrid organizations cope with the institutional complexity they typically face.

All in all, then, how hybrid organizations manage to enact simultaneously different values and respond to different demands posed by their field is a topic of discussion in the contemporary literature. Our purpose is to trace the elements that might help explain how a historical charitable entity managed to cope with its multiple logics and discuss the importance of governance and accounting practices in weaving together the multiple and increasingly complex demands stemming from its inherent institutional complexity.

Method

The case of SGSR

We focus on the case of SGSR by reconstructing its establishment and development in the sixteenth-century Republic of Venice (one of the Italian States at the time). SGSR was one of the six Scuole Grandi, namely, the main charitable institutions of the Republic of Venice. SGSR was likely to be the richest and most powerful charity in the sixteenth century (Pullan, 1982) and was the only one to survive the following decline of the Republic of Venice. Like the other Scuole Grandi, SGSR was privately managed, but publicly regulated; it had a devotional nature, but it was independent from the ecclesiastical administration, and it had a noncommercial orientation although it relied on business funds of citizens of the Republic of Venice. The earliest documented evidence of SGSR’s establishment dates to 1478, which corresponds to one of the recurring pestilences that afflicted the city. A decade later, the Republic of Venice approved the institution of a new confraternity² and officially recognized it as a Scuola Grande.

In this article, we analyze SGSR’s governance and accounting system as it developed from its establishment through to the sixteenth century. We selected the sixteenth century as our focal time span for two main reasons. First, this time span allowed us to capture the role of governance and accounting practices from the beginning of SGSR’s activity through its rapid development. Second, the sixteenth century marked a crucial transition for the Scuole Grandi in general; during this period, the Scuole Grandi took on a more structured social role by providing housing and social assistance to the needy population. They became progressively more integrated with the State (Pullan, 1982), developing a more hybrid form.

Sources

We accessed extraordinarily rich archives: we sourced two main sets of documentation composed by hundreds of pieces each at the SGSR’s archives and the State Archive of Venice (Sardi and Zanon, 2007).

One of the authors spent several months in the archives scrutinizing primary sources, such as Registri delle Parti (the minutes of the executive board meetings), balance sheets and other accounting and administrative documents available for the period under consideration. In addition, to support our findings, we analyzed secondary sources, such as Tonon’s (1999, 2003, 2013) meticulous reconstruction of several facets of the charity administration during the first decades of SGSR, Pullan’s (1982) work on the social policy of the Venetian Republic in the sixteenth century (Pullan, 1982) and Ballarin’s (1997) work on the different ways in which SGSR was financed.

Operationalization

We use the extant definition of hybrid organizations as those organizational settings that combine different institutional logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013). To account for the hybrid nature of SGSR and capture the role of governance and accounting, we had to detect the influence of specific logics. According to Thornton et al. (2012: 54), all logics can be operationalized, coded and compared along with their ‘elemental categories or building blocks’, such as their respective sources of legitimacy, authority or identity and their bases of attention, norms or strategy. Therefore, in our case, to detect the different logics, we identified the different sets of interests (bases of attention), relationships with key actors³ (sources of legitimacy) and demands (bases of norms) posed by these actors. Hence, for the purpose of our analysis, a logic was defined as the presence of specific interests mobilized by specific actors and entailing specific demands.

Analytical procedure

In the first part of our analysis, we investigated all primary and secondary sources and inductively traced all pieces of evidence related to the hybrid nature of SGSR. We identified at least three logics (devotional, private and public logics) that embodied different interests (spiritual, material and social interests) and entailed relationships with different types of stakeholders (the Church, the charity members, the State and the civil society).

In the second part of our analysis, we transcribed and coded all pieces of evidence related to aspects of SGSR’s governance and accounting practices with emphasis on how these aspects developed following SGSR’s establishment and whether and how they responded to the growingly diverse demands posed by SGSR multiple interests and stakeholders.

In the following findings sections, we report evidence related to the SGSR increasingly hybrid nature and the development of governance and accounting practices in the sixteenth century. Finally, we connect the practices with the hybrid nature, showing how the specific governance and accounting arrangements worked as SGSR’s administrative response to weave together the coexisting logics that constituted its hybrid nature.

SGSR and its increasingly hybrid nature

At the end of the fifteenth century, the Republic of Venice was a powerful and aristocratic city-state with great wealth due to both its commercial activity and territorial conquests. However, the Portuguese discovery of the sea route to India compromised Venice’s privileged economic position in the Mediterranean. In addition, the naval industry, which constituted the main industrial activity at this time, was gradually declining. The crisis of Venice’s traditional businesses led to a period of instability and depression in the labour market, which affected the first 30 years of the sixteenth century (Pullan, 1982). In addition, recurring epidemies and famines exacerbated the difficult conditions faced by the city. Therefore, the problems of poverty and social assistance were clear priorities for the Republic. Unsurprisingly, during this period, the Republic of Venice began to rely heavily on the charitable activities of its system of Scuole Grandi (Fortini Brown, 1996; Guidarelli, 2011).

Devotional logic: spiritual interests and relationships with the Church

The Scuole Grandi were lay devotional associations that developed in Venice in the thirteenth century. These institutions were large, powerful confraternities that performed charitable roles. The members of the Scuole Grandi were called ‘brothers’ and were primarily male citizens from the bourgeoisie. Nobles could join SGSR, but were exempted from administrative offices. Similarly, priests were excluded from the governing boards but could perform other functions (such as celebrating mass and funeral services and participating in processions). Each Scuola (pl. Scuole) had its own patron saint, and it held meetings in a church or in another location, engaged with religious services and collective prayer. Its aim was to assist the poor and suffering people. In general, the rise of this type of organization was related to the process of reform of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church aspired to reconnect with the laity, granting it an active role and new responsibilities inside the community, thereby, preventing the dissemination of heretical doctrines (Pullan, 1982). Despite being independent from the ecclesiastical administration, the Scuole established relationships with convents, religious bodies and priors for the mutual exchange of favours. For example, SGSR paid its rent to the friars of the neighbouring cathedral.

Initially, SGSR was dedicated to generic devotional and liturgical activity. The ‘brothers’ were invited to participate to funerals and daily masses, which served as moments of sharing prayers, remembering dead ‘brothers’ and offering thanks to God. A crucial activity was the organization of periodic processions throughout the city to exhibit the relics of the patron Saint (Tonon, 2003). Initially, the Scuola was supported only by charitable contributions during religious services and processions (Ballarin, 1997; Tonon, 2003). Therefore, its original nature was essentially a devotional one, mobilized by spiritual interests, which were sometimes conflicting (Tonon, 1999) with the Church.

Private logic: material interests and relationships with its members

As SGSR became more established and developed, material interests and a nexus of relationships between its members and the benefactors became prominent. Thus, a new, private logic of SGSR emerged and became entangled with the original, devotional logic.

SGSR’s ‘brothers’ had to pay registration and annual fees to the confraternity (respectively called benintrade and luminarie) in exchange for the protection by the Scuola and mutual aid (Tonon, 1999). As the number of ‘brothers’ increased, the fees became a major source of income for SGSR, which subsequently started managing considerable economic resources due to its large number of members (around 500 or 600, according to Ballarin, 1997).

Since 1498, 20 years after its establishment, SGSR started the practice of investing money in the Camera d’Imprestidi or Monti, which were public non-profit pawn banks, in the form of bonds issued by the Republic of Venice. The bonds received an interest rate up to five per cent (see ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: Libro Parti antiche e Regole della Scuola: f. 685 and following).

In 1538, the government of the Republic of Venice established a new system of voluntary loans consisting of temporary deposits in the Zecca, the official government mint (see ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, bb. 9–10, Registro leggi pubbliche). However, by that time, SGSR was more inclined to invest in real estate (houses, stores near Rialto suburb, or empty land near SGSR, according to Tonon, 2003) because these investments were considered more reliable than industrial or financial speculations (Pullan, 1982). Indeed, after the 1520s, rents from properties became the main source of inflows of SGSR, contributing for almost half of its total inflows in the sixteenth century (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 387, Bilancio 1551–1685; Ballarin, 1997).

In addition, starting from the 1520s–1530s, SGSR benefitted from considerable amounts of money and properties from legacies of wealthy Venetian citizens. The officials of the Scuole were responsible for administering the benefactors’ estates, namely, landed properties, houses, financial investments, and similar, and to provide social assistance to the needy population, especially confraternity members (Pullan, 1982). During the sixteenth century, more than 60 bequests can be counted for the SGSR (ASV, SGSR, prima consegna, b. 438: Testamenti con sommario). Some bequests directly supported SGSR, for instance, the confraternity was allowed by the testators to use the money at its own discretion to meet its current expenses. For major bequests, SGSR was usually tasked with managing testators’ goods in a way that respected their intentions. For instance, following the terms of the legacy, SGSR officials could sell or rent benefactors’ properties or allocate them to the poor.

In summary, a private logic mobilized by material interests, such as speculative investments and other monetary returns for SGSR, quickly overlapped with the original devotional logic. However, this overlapping included elements pertaining to the social and welfare sphere as well.

Public logic: social interests and relationships with the State

The charitable role was a constitutive feature of SGSR. Its statute (called Mariegola) highly dwells on the importance of charity for the confraternity (Tonon, 1999). Many people living in misery needed support, but they were asked to serve SGSR and pray for the souls of their benefactors. During Easter and Christmas or periods of famine, SGSR provided flour to the poor; starting from 1535, SGSR also provided a fixed amount of money every month to the poor (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581; Tonon, 2003: 47–48). Another form of charity was transferring money, which means ad pias causas, to hospitals and religious institutions (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 741 and following). This type of transfer was partially regulated by the Republic of Venice, which listed specific institutions needing financial help.⁴ Moreover, SGSR financed the marriages of poor young women (called donzelle) who were the daughters of poorer ‘brothers’. Starting from 1503, SGSR managed the allocation of dowries to those girls who were ‘suitable and worthy of receiving them’ (see ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 769 and following). In the same period, SGSR was increasingly engaged with social housing projects, such as financing the building of houses for the needy population who were assigned to the houses for free or at favourable prices (Tonon, 2003). Finally, charitable donations were periodically allocated to assist prisoners (especially ‘brothers’ who were jailed because of their debts) or support military campaigns (the so-called galeotti).

Like the other Scuole Grandi, SGSR also embodied a public logic along with its devotional and private aims; in that it responded to a whole array of social needs of the civil society. This role entailed an increased scrutiny of its activities. Despite their private legal status, the social role performed by the Scuole Grandi became subject to the supervision of the Venetian judicial authority and, in particular, the ‘Council of Ten’, which was one of the major governing bodies of the Republic of Venice, responsible for state security. In 1401, the ‘Council of Ten’ acquired the right to approve any change in the Mariegola (the statute) of the Scuole Grandi. Thus, the ‘Council of Ten’ legitimated their participation in the Scuole’s internal affairs and favoured the process of alignment of the Scuole activity with the Republic interests (Fortini Brown, 1996). Initially, the control of the ‘Council of Ten’ was limited to the confraternities’ meetings and devotional processions with the goal of ensuring public order and preventing any subversive action; however, over time, the system of the Scuole also became a useful tool for fiscal purposes. Starting from 1509, the State’s practice of employing financial resources from the Scuole to support military campaigns became official through the institution of a general tax applied to all confraternities proportionated to the resources they could supply (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 9: Registro leggi pubbliche; Pullan, 1982). The Ottoman–Venetian wars (in 1537–1540 and 1570–1573), which demanded an extensive support, exerted intense pressure on Venice’s finances. Indeed, the Scuole minutes of the executive board meetings (Registri delle Parti) contain various decrees about providing financial and human resources to the Republic of Venice.

The progressive incorporation of larger welfare functions (dowries, subsidization of hospitals or religious institutions, social housing, prisoners’ assistance and military campaigns) was paralleled by a growth in the number and variety of its activities, certainly indicating that SGSR played a relevant role in the society. SGSR mobilized many resources and needed to respond to a growing set of diverse interests (its devotional aim, its members’ or benefactors’ charitable or speculative interests and the interests of the society at large) in interrelation with diverse actors ranging from the Church, its members and the Republic of Venice.

Evolution of SGSR’s governance and accounting system

In this section, we explore the role of governance and accounting practices in weaving together SGSR’s multiple and increasingly complex demands stemming from different logics.

Governance

Governance regulations for the distribution of power

From the very beginning, SGSR paid close attention to the regulation of its governing board (its composition, election, and turnover) to avoid the creation of positions of power and ensure collective interest.

The Scuola was led by a small board of 18 ‘brothers’ called Banca. The statute (Chapters 2 and 4 of the Mariegola), which was subsequently integrated by a decree of the ‘Council of Ten’, identified the composition of the board and the rules for its members’ election (Tonon, 1999). The Banca included the Guardian Grando (executive director), the Vicario (vice director) and other officers with coordination, control, secretary and bookkeeping functions in addition to officials and treasurers, all of whom remained in their role for one year (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581, Mariegola Maior). This ensured a continuous rotation and avoided any potential risk of establishing ongoing positions of power. The Banca oversaw deliberations about spending decisions and ordinary administration. Many of their decisions, especially those concerning important issues, such as the distribution of charity or any changes in the Mariegola, had to be ratified by the members’ plenary assembly, called Capitolo Generale, which met twice a year. All ‘brothers’ attended these meetings and were invited to listen to the Guardian Grando’s annual report, followed by the priests’ sermon and a lecture regarding the statute. In addition, during the assembly, new board members were elected from a group of ‘brothers’ nominated by the board members who were leaving the Banca’s offices.

In 1520, the ‘Council of Ten’ widened the Banca, establishing an additional government body, the Zonta, which had the same functions as the Banca (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 203 and following). The Zonta was composed of 12 members elected by the Capitolo Generale, who could not have family relationships – either by blood or by marriage – with the members of the Banca.

Governance regulations to protect citizens’ (non-noble and non-clerical) interests

The statute provides evidence of the separation of SGSR’s members between disciplinati (poor members worthy of receiving charity, who, in return, offered their service in humble works and during processions, masses and funerals) and esenti (the richest and most privileged members, who included governors, nobles and ‘brothers’ with the credentials to access high governments positions). As previously mentioned, nobles could join SGSR, but the administrative offices were reserved to the citizen class. In addition, priests were excluded from the governing boards, and their participation was limited to celebrating mass and funeral services and participating in processions. Significantly, a decree issued in 1536 stated that the chaplain had to obey the Guardian Grando (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 46: Parti vecchie di Scola).

Governance regulations to protect the benefactors’ interests

During the sixteenth century, the legacies entrusted to SGSR were rapidly growing in number and amount. In addition to its general governing system, SGSR started to add the organizational units called Commissarìe. Commissarìe were internal units endowed with an autonomous accountability, financial and managerial control of a legacy. Thus, Commissarìe were a form of sub-organizations established by the confraternity to manage the most important legacies entrusted to SGSR by a dying ‘brother’ (benefactor).

Each Commissaria was managed by a commissioner. During the sixteenth century, there were four Commissarie Grandi,⁵ which managed the largest amounts of money and property of SGSR and, thus, needed to fill in separate accounting books. Otherwise, accounting data were recorded within SGSR’s own books, sometimes in distinct sections. Commissioners all depended on the central administration of the confraternity and were required to report periodically regarding the state of their accounts (Fortini Brown, 1996). Although the accounts of the Commissarìe were kept in separate books, occasionally, transfers from the Commissarìe were used for salaries or other ordinary expenses, and these transactions were recorded in the overall balance sheets. This practice became even more common in the following years (Ballarin, 1997).

Each decision concerning the Commissarìe’s governance or allocation of resources had to be discussed during executive board meetings in which the relevant commissioners were invited to participate and had the right to vote. As reported in several decrees about Commissarìa Donà (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 299 and following), any decision was taken with a two-third majority.

In summary, boards, Commissarìe and regulations constituted a complex governance system aiming to ensure the rotation of power and the protection of SGSR members’ and benefactors’ interests. This arrangement can be conceptualized as SGSR’s administrative response to some demands posed by its private logic.

Accounting practices

Considerable attention was paid by SGSR to keeping careful accounting records, developing professional roles in charge of bookkeeping and coordinating resource allocation both for the administration of the Scuola overall and for the quasi-autonomous administration of the Commissarìe.

Bookkeeping

SGSR’s bookkeeping practices initially consisted of simple books in which the Scrivano (a sort of secretary with rudimental bookkeeping functions) registered fees. The Scrivano (pl. Scrivani) collected fees, registered ‘brothers’ participation in meetings, identified ‘brothers’ who did not do their payments, and he entered all disbursement data into books (see ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581, Mariegola Maior, chapters 2–4). In addition, the statute stipulated that every six months, an overall review of the administration was to be performed by the Guardian Grando, Guardian da Matin and Scrivano (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581, Mariegola Maior, chapter 7). This statute indicates the intended level of attention to SGSR’s administration since its establishment.

Further evidence suggests that this orientation was taken very seriously in SGSR, especially as the Scuola increased its activity and complexity. Subsequently, SGSR created books to register donations to needy ‘brothers’. A 1553 decree suggests that each brother could only benefit from one type of donation at a time and had to be registered in a specific book; moreover, any change in the allocation of money had to be approved by the Capitolo (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581). In that way, the Scuola could better control its expenses and the number of people receiving charity.

Apparently, income and expenditure accounts were kept in cash balance sheets (bilanzi) on a yearly basis. Regrettably, no detailed accounting records from the first centuries of activity survived over time, except for one book compiled at the end of the seventeenth century that summarized the main items on the balance sheets for the period 1551–1685 (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 387). This book displays the cash accounting figures of the central administration of SGSR on a simple entry basis.

Regarding the Commissarìe, we have already noted that the major Commissarìe had a separate, internal accounting and accountability (their own books, their own managers, the commissioners and their own bookkeepers). However, the Guardian Grando of SGSR was responsible for verifying the accuracy of the books of all Commissarìe and reporting any mistakes. Thus, the bookkeeper was obliged to release the books to the Guardian Grando or be deprived of his salary (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581). Indeed, statements, such as ‘the book of Commissarìa X’ is inaccurate and ‘it must be adjusted by the Quadernier [i.e. the “bookkeeper”]’ (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581), are not infrequent among the minutes of the Scuola. Overall, SGSR clearly played an important role in monitoring the accounts of the Commissarìe.

Accountants

Close attention was given by SGSR to the professional roles of those in charge of the bookkeeping. Initially, one of the board members was tasked with rudimentary bookkeeping (the above-mentioned Scrivano) to control the payment of members’ fees and the distribution of charitable giving. However, as SGSR’s activity rapidly increased and diversified, new and increasingly professional functions were introduced.

For example, in 1514, the following problem of control was reported: ‘Scrivani entered data confusingly in the books’ (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 131 and following). This problem of inaccuracy in the accounting data was followed by the decision to establish a second professional role (Quadernier, literally ‘bookkeeper’) that was exclusively dedicated to the accounts recording. The Quadernier was a salaried employee of the Scuola. He was paid five ducats per year as a fixed salary plus a variable component ‘depending on his operations and his merits’ (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 131 and following).

Furthermore, in 1525, another decree of the SGSR boards stated that the Scrivano must not touch cash without prior approval by the designated professional (arguably, the Quadernier; ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 131 and following). This provides further evidence of the fact that there was a cash balance kept and controlled by a professional Quadernier and an established practice of internal control on the accounts of the SGSR overall. Confusion regarding the functions of the different accounting professionals in SGSR was probably an issue and an object of continuous interest for the governing boards. Indeed, in 1532, another board decree (applying a disposition of the ‘Council of Ten’) attempted to create some order in the accounting functions by naming another role (Cogitor) and establishing that the Scrivano was in charge of recording financial transactions, while the Cogitor was responsible for transcribing the transactions into the ledger (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 131 and following). Although some ambiguity between the roles of Quadernier and Cogitor persists (Tomasin, 1982), they clearly had to be professional accountants (rasonati), allowing us to conclude that differentiation and professionalization of accounting roles in SGSR was relevant.

Resource allocation and control

Several board decrees remind how to spend or allocate resources. In some cases, these decrees concern general dispositions, such as the 1528 rule establishing the allocation of resources to the following three different areas: (1) the payment of the rent to the friars of Frari Cathedral, because they are the owners of the premises; (2) the deposit (one-third of all other resources) for extraordinary expenditures (the Banca and Zonta were in charge of choosing whether to invest or spend those amounts, according to ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 741 and following); and (3) the payment of current expenditures (salaries, dowries and other forms of charity, which were two-third of the resources).

In other cases, SGSR instituted ad hoc dispositions for specific expenditures. For instance, in 1528, a board decree established that SGSR would have donated one ducat yearly to the local hospital, for a period of 10 years (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 741 and following). Similarly, a budget cap of 20 ducats per year was established for devotional expenditures or ceremonies (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 741 and following). In addition, a sort of budget for donzelle was deliberated in 1534 as follows: the Scuola could support no more than eight donzelle per year, with 10 ducats per donzella (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 581: f. 744). Finally, as already noted, the testaments that accompanied the major Commissarìe constituted a sort of plan for spending funds over time.

Public interest in the Scuole administration also led to the establishment of a body of external Revisori (auditors). In 1558, three citizens not previously involved in the management of the Scuole Grandi were elected as auditors (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 9). Their task included the identification of any action performed by the Scuole that was against the law or against the will of the donors (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 9). The number of Revisori was increased to six in 1587, and they achieved the status of Magistrato in 1622 (ASV, SGSR, seconda consegna, b. 9).

In summary, this attention to bookkeeping, the professionalization of the accountants’ roles, the resource allocation plans and the above-mentioned forms of control can be interpreted as the SGSR response to the need to ensure the correct and transparent functioning of its devotional, social and charitable activities and benefactors’ wills. The system thus balanced the demands posed by its multiple logics.

Hybrid nature and administrative responses

SGSR had devotional nature that eventually developed to include at least two further functions in response to the following logics: devotional, private, and public. SGSR was a lay devotional, privately managed and privately funded institution; simultaneously, it became relevant for the politics and the public services of the Republic of Venice. Thus, we found an increasingly hybrid nature associated with this entity.

The coexistence of multiple institutional logics was not free of tension. The first tension was between the regulation of private and public use of available resources. Donations and legacies received were intended to serve devotional and charitable purposes, but as SGSR developed, its economic and social aims also increased, and it had to deploy many resources to respond to a growing set of diverse concerns, including participating in the financing of the military endeavours of Venice. This change may have been undesirable by the members, especially in consideration of the prospective donors of SGSR. Donors often conditioned their will endowments to specific activities. The second tension originated from the choice of investment options. Like other confraternities, SGSR was inclined to invest in real estate. As discussed above, this responded to a double logic, including a social logic (to acquire properties for allocation to the poor) and a strategic logic (safer investment than other options, such as financial investment). However, SGSR invested large amounts of money in bonds issued by the Republic of Venice to meet external pressures. The third tension was observed in the motivations leading to the affiliation of members to SGSR. The formal motivation was mainly devotional, but material concerns were also present. For poor members, the affiliation to the Scuola and the services offered, such as processions, were conditions for receiving assistance. For rich members, the affiliation to SGSR offered a path for the election to administrative offices, which led to obtaining visibility and ultimately political power. That career was otherwise reserved to nobles in other institutions of the Republic of Venice.

We also found that SGSR was particularly attentive to the management of its resources, ensured strong control over the way those resources were used and recorded. Despite the gaps in the SGSR archives of the accounting books, its particular attention to a strictly regulated governance and professional accounting practices are proven by the several decrees through which SGSR’s governing bodies issued precise guidelines about which books to keep and how to keep them (i.e. how to preserve and copy them, who was in charge of each accounting function, and the professionalization of these roles).

We argue that these practices are related to its hybrid nature and underlying its multiple logics, as summarized in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

SGSR hybrid nature and administrative responses.

The governance structure and regulations can be viewed as SGSR’s simultaneous administrative response to the many concerns posed by its private and public logics. The governance roles were not open to nobles and clergymen, thus the Scuola was one of the most important options for rich citizens to engage in political roles. However, the direct intervention of the Republic of Venice (through the ‘Council of the Ten’) in the writing of the statute and the appointment of the top administrative roles was consistent with the effort of the Republic of Venice to nurture its political interests.

Accounting practices (bookkeeping, professionalization of accountants’ roles, resource allocation and control) can be viewed as tools by which the correct and transparent conduct is ensured in the devotional, private and public spheres. For example, the frequent overall review of accounts (performed every six months) in addition to the role differentiation between the Scrivano and Quadernier and the appointment of three different Scrivani to record independently the transactions are clearly indicative of the effort exerted by SGSR towards the use or preservation of its assets for the common interest of all parties. Furthermore, the institution of Commissarìe can be considered as a modern organizational solution of quasi-autonomy that ensured both more hands-on (see the use of separate governing offices and bookkeeping) and transparent (see the importance of reporting) administration of donors’ legacies (Commissarìe) towards the donors’ wills. The Commissarìe’s quasi-autonomous status enhanced the visibility of the legacy, thus preventing the use of those resources for financing the general expenses of the Scuola or the Republic of Venice. This shows the potential tensions over resources’ use and investments. Finally, the reported attention to transparency seems to be a response to the public nature of SGSR; like all other Scuole Grandi, SGSR was supplementing the welfare functions of the Republic of Venice (Fortini Brown, 1996; Pullan, 1982;), even if it did not receive any form of public funding.

A full set of governance and accounting practices ensured a balanced response to the sometimes synergic but also potentially conflicting interests of the Republic of Venice, the SGSR members and its donors. This system provided the necessary coordination between the Republic of Venice and SGSR. SGSR was left fundamentally free in its operations, although within central controls. The emphasis on accounting and administrative technologies at SGSR supported its legitimacy as a welfare agency of the Republic of Venice and an entity for pursuing the devotional and material aims of its members and donors. Indeed, the rapid development of SGSR, the extent of the legacies it endowed, and the role it assumed within the Republic of Venice can be interpreted as signals that SGSR was successful in this endeavour, thanks to a display of relevant administrative care and accounting skills.

Discussion and conclusion

The case of SGSR helps us to illustrate how governance and accounting are important practices for shaping the functioning of hybrid organizations at the interface among public, social aims and private interests. Governance, accounting knowledge, and practices are more than simply technical issues; these mechanisms ensure credibility and responsiveness to a variety of conflicting or synergic demands, which was – and is – a crucial issue for any charitable and hybrid organizations.

Contributions to the institutional logics and hybrid organization literature

This study nurtures the debate on institutional complexity as follows. We unveil institutional complexity (i.e. the coexistence of multiple logics) in organizational practice showing how that it is not only a feature of major institutional change (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 2005) or the result of new practices’ creation or innovation (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Lounsbury, 2001), but it can be an embedded feature of organizations. Shedding light on this issue is important because there are plenty of organizations, which normally operate in an established institutional complexity (e.g. universities which deal with research, teaching, and administrative logics; hospitals which need to balance care and efficiency logics; arts organizations which operate between aesthetic and business logics). How these organizations normally deal with these tensions in their everyday practice is scarcely addressed in the literature (Perkmann et al., 2018; Smets et al., 2015).

We argue that in these settings of established institutional complexity, multiple logics are not necessarily in conflict. Previous research, which focused on institutional change, has reported evidence of struggles for dominance among logics with a strong political view of power and resistance (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Townley, 1997). However, this is not the only occurrence of logics’ multiplicity. Logics can compete, but clearly, they can also ‘just’ coexist (Jay, 2013; Smets et al., 2015) enacting parallel rather than conflicting demands. Our study shows that multiple logics coexisted in SGSR (due to its stakeholders’ composition), but they were not necessarily in competition; rather, they emerged as parallel demands. For instance in SGSR, the social interest towards poverty alleviation matched the material interest of its poor members as well as coexisting with the interest for power and prestige of its rich members. We shed light on how governance and accounting systems can play a role in this management, leading to the following points.

Contrary to previous research on the organizational responses to institutional complexity, we found that organizations’ reactions do not necessarily lead to compromises (Greenwood et al., 2011) or prioritizing one logic over another (Pache and Santos, 2013). Instead, organizations develop their own administrative solutions capable of interweaving the coexisting demands. For instance, SGSR developed the Commissarìe system with its own rules for keeping accounts to ensure both internal control and external compliance. Partially in agreement with Quattrone (2015), we believe that it would be reductive conceptualizing these organizational realities in terms of tensions and struggles between competing logics. Organizations craft their own specific ways of managing such complexity, and governance and accounting play a crucial role in this process.

Through this latter consideration, we reinforce the view of previous scholars who emphasized the importance of accounting practices in managing hybrid organizations (Antonelli et al., 2017; Evers, 2005; Kickert, 2001). Through the reconstruction of SGSR’s governance and accounting systems, we show how these can be a powerful means to orchestrating institutional complexity in everyday practice.

Contributions to the charities and accounting history literature

This study provides additional in-depth insights into the administrative aspects of charitable entities. As Helmig et al. (2004) stated, underlying the distinctive nature of charities and unpacking how they work is important if we consider the declining resources available to the increasing numbers of charities and the dangers that this instance poses to their ongoing existence. In particular, the matter of charity governance has been considered a major issue as follows: charities need to demonstrate that they not only apply the highest standards of control of the resources at their disposal, but also that they use them appropriately. This is a concern for donors, for those who rely on the charitable services and for governments, which increasingly seek to supplement their public sector services with those offered by voluntary organizations (Hyndman and McDonnell, 2009).

Historical research on charities remains limited, but it is increasing (Álvarez-Dardet Espejo et al., 2006; Moggi et al., 2016; Orelli et al., 2013; Servalli, 2013). This involves organizations that were partially religious, but independent from the ecclesiastic administration and private organizations somehow dependent from public administrations. This article feeds this stream of literature, proving that historical cases on the management of hybridity provide insightful reflections on our contemporary world.

Limitations and future research

Our findings are drawn from a single case study and the available archival evidence. Therefore, they cannot be considered generalizable to the universe of charities or hybrid organizations. However, we believe that the features of SGSR’s hybrid nature summarized in Figure 1 resonate with the experience of many other entities in other settings across time and space. We also believe that our general conclusion about the parallel demands and how governance and accounting helped interweave them (as shown in Figure 1) can be reasonably applied beyond the scope of this case.

More accounting research on hybrid organizations could advance the extant knowledge on organizational and administrative responses to institutional complexity. In particular, more (historical) research may explore the common traits or practices variability in the responses offered by other hybrid organizations when developing their own procedural logic (Quattrone, 2015) and coping with the typical challenges of their inherent institutional complexity.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Primary sources from State Archive of Venice

Sc. Gr. S. Rocco, prima consegna:

busta 4, Nuova sistemazione della Veneranda Scuola di S. Rocco e sue commissarie amministrate in ordine alle parti proposte 1793

busta 19, Catastico commissaria Donà. Secolo XVIII con notizie dal 1302 al sec. XVI

buste 20–21, Quaderno affittuali commissaria Donà

busta 22, Commissaria Donà. Spese, 20 gennaio 1743 con notizie dal XVI secolo

busta 41, Catastico istrumenti. Sec. XVIII medio, con copie di documenti 1500–1720

busta 115, Commissaria Capis

buste 123–136, Commissaria Donà

busta 232, Commissaria Pietro Cornovi dalla Vecchia

busta 438, Testamenti con sommario

busta 539, Giornal Commissaria Moro. 1560 sin 1582

busta 545, Giornale Commissaria Moro

busta 570, Giornale Commissaria dalla Vecchia. 1585 sino 1600

busta 586, Commissaria Zucca. Giornale 1557–1581

busta 606, Commissaria Donà. Giornale 1528–1556

busta 610, Commissaria Donà. Registro scontro 1586–1605

busta 657, Bilanzo della Commissaria dalla Zucca 1551–1742

busta 658, Commissaria Moro. Bilancio Guardian Grande 1559–1748

Sc. Gr. S. Rocco, seconda consegna:

busta 9, Registro leggi pubbliche (1312–1797)

busta 10, Registro leggi pubbliche

busta 31, Instrumenti Commissaria Zucca. 1557–1612

busta 44, Libro parti vecchie di scuola

busta 45 A, Parti vecchie di Scola 1514–1532

busta 87, Atti relativi a intrade, interessi ed asse della scuola 1595–1678

busta 89, Asse della Scuola di San Rocco 1749 (con notizie dal XVI secolo)

busta 114, Commissaria dalla Vecchia. Copialettere 1527–1693

busta 387, Bilancio 1551–1685

busta 581, Libro parti antiche e regole della scuola

busta 609.2, Commissaria Vecchia. Minute

buste 610–11, Bilanci commissarie

busta 632, Pagamenti 1569–1650

busta 660, Costantin de Todero. Giornale di cassa 1564–1577

busta 661, Costantin de Todero. Giornale di cassa 1548–1564

busta 725, Carte di amministrazione. Entrate e uscite. 1533–1553;

Carte della Commissaria e ditta Costantin de Todero. 1518–1789

busta 728, Squarzafolio della Commissaria Costantin de Todero (con doc. dal 1592)

busta 763, Entrata e uscita della scola agiustata sino l’anno 1679

busta 787, Commissaria Donà. Quaderno. 1750 con notizie dal 1526

busta 826, Liber de rezever. Ditta C. de Todero. 1525–1532; Quietanze. 1513–1523; Elenco delle merci caricate sulle navi; Amministrazione C. de Todero Marcorà con notizie dal 1538

busta 828, Commissaria Donà. Minute con documenti in copia dal 1517

busta 832, Miscellanea. Commissarie diverse 1526–1588

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