Rewards for Australian executives continue to stir debate. A recent Australian government response to pay concerns was to call on the Productivity Commission (PC) to investigate the oversight, accountability and transparency of remuneration practices. At least two PC-related outcomes were controversial: the ‘two strikes' and ‘clawback’ proposals. This article considers the reactions of two key stakeholders, namely the Australian Institute of Company Directors and the Business Council of Australia. The views of these two organisations reflect an ongoing evaluation of rules- and principles-based governance structures. Asserting the need to consider alternate analytical models when studying executive pay, the present article concludes with several questions about the intent(s) driving remuneration reforms and their possible consequences.
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