Industrial disputes do provide interesting cases concerning the right to protest. For example, in Australian Tramways Employees Association v Prahran and Malvern Tramway Trust (1913) 17 CLR 680, it was found that the employees' desire to wear a union badge at work in order to demonstrate allegiance to the union could legitimately form part of an industrial dispute with their employer. This could be said to be recognition of a limited right to a form of silent protest in the context of industrial action or dispute.
3.
(2004) 209 ALR 182.
4.
GazeBethJonesMelinda, Law Liberty and Australian Democracy (1990) 115.
5.
Ibid.
6.
Butterworths, Halsbury's Laws of Australia, 80Civil and Political Rights, ‘III Political Rights’ [80–2200].
7.
Beatty v Gillbanks (1882) 9 QBD 308.
8.
Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218, 222.
9.
Campbell v Samuels (1980) 23 SASR 389.
10.
International treaties are relevant to the interpretation of Australian statutes (Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners Association (1908) 6 CLR 309) and the development of the common law (Deitrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292; Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1). Nevertheless, this has not yet been a basis on which the courts have sought to recognise a right to protest.
11.
Redel v Toppin [1993] (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Eames J, 1 April 1993).
12.
Ibid.
13.
Watson v Trenerry (1998) 100 A Crim R 408.
14.
(1882) 9 QBD 308.
15.
Ibid318.
16.
See generally VorspanRachel, ‘“Freedom of Assembly” and the Right to Passage in Modern English History’ (1997) 34San Diego Law Review921, 1014–15.
17.
[1974] 1 QB 142.
18.
[1965] 1 All ER 78.
19.
Vorspan, above n 16, 1017.
20.
(1987) 85 Crim App R 143.
21.
Vorspan, above n 16, 1022.
22.
(2004) 209 ALR 182.
23.
(1997) 175 CLR 520.
24.
See discussion in HryceGraham, ‘Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, Lange Revisited: Deep Divisions Appear in the High Court’, Corrs Media and Defamation Newsletter (September 2004).
25.
In Mulholland v AEC (2004) 209 ALR 582 the Court emphasised that the implied freedom recognised in Lange is a freedom from interference in pre-existing rights and that it did not create positive rights of itself. Given the uncertainty concerning the right to protest this raises further questions with respect to the implied freedom of political communication and its effect upon the right to protest. See ThompsonBelindade RidderJonathan, ‘Background: Lange’, September 2004Focus1.
26.
Hryce, above n 24.
27.
Ibid.
28.
This article was written before the advent of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 (Cth) which will expand considerably powers aimed at dealing with terrorism. This will have significant ramifications for the right to protest. An example is the crime of sedition which, according to s 80.2 of Schedule 7 of the Stanhope draft, extends to recklessly causing ‘force or violence’ that ‘would threaten the peace and good government of the Commonwealth’. This includes urging another to act in such a manner. A court determining whether such a person was entitled to the defence of acting in good faith under s 80.3 is able to consider whether he or she had intended to cause violence or create a ‘public disorder or a public disturbance’.
29.
University of Technology, Sydney Community Law Centre, Be Informed: ASIO and Anti-Terrorism Laws (2005) 3.
30.
Ibid.
31.
Would an electronic system include public transport, for example?
