Rationale of conspiracy theorizing: Who shot the President Chen Shui-bian?

Abstract

Despite their apparent, and at times escalating, significance, there are not many studies on the ways conspiracy theories are used in political debates. This research attempts to fill the gap in the existing scholarship by suggesting a rational choice view in understanding conspiracy theorizing, and tests its argument on the uses of online conspiratorial accounts about the attempted assassination of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian in 2004. Findings show that there is a significant correlation between perception of threat and proposing conspiracy theories, and online users change the direction of their conspiratorial accounts subsequent to the release of election results. The article concludes that online users propose conspiracy theories rationally in line with their political arguments and perceived threats.

Keywords

Conspiracy theory perception of threat political assassination rational choice theory Taiwan

Introduction

Conspiracy theories are socio-politically significant explanations that depict power relations in a society as secretly dominated/manipulated by certain groups/individuals. Anders Behring Breivik, who committed a massacre on 22 July 2011 in Norway, was motivated by a belief in a conspiracy theory about Muslims (Fekete, 2012); Nazi Germany produced many conspiracy theories about Jews (Ben-Itto, 2005). Despite their apparent historical significance, there are only a few studies on the political uses of conspiracy theories in academic literature. This article endeavours to fill this lacuna by proposing a rational choice view in understanding the logic of conspiracy theorizing and by empirically analyzing the online uses of conspiratorial accounts of the attempted assassination of a Taiwanese presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, on 19 March 2004. It scrutinizes the ways in which online users suggested conspiratorial accounts about the assassination attempt: what sorts of threats they expressed and who they blamed for the assassination plot. While doing so, this article not only provides a fresh theoretical approach and the first analysis of conspiracy theories in an online forum, but also introduces a new case from Taiwan, a country that is rarely investigated in the academic literature on conspiratorial rhetoric. This study argues that online users propose conspiracy theories rationally in line with their political arguments and perceived threats and confirms the value of rational choice perspective in understanding conspiratorial rhetoric.

This article first outlines the academic literature and explains rational choice perspective as a valuable theoretical approach. Then, it portrays the political context of Taiwan during the assassination period and the research methods used. Last, it discusses the findings.

Understanding conspiratorial accounts via rational choice theory

Richard Hofstadter’s (1965) The Paranoid Style in American Politics is one of the most cited works in the academic literature on conspiracy theories to date. Hofstadter (1965: 29) sees conspiratorial accounts as political narratives that incline their followers to a particular mindset which sees ‘a “vast” or “gigantic” conspiracy as the motive force in historical events.’ He contextualizes conspiratorial rhetoric as a political pathology that disseminates paranoia via distorted arguments (Hofstadter, 1965: 6) and underpins his argument by examples from American history. Hofstadter (1965: 36) emphasizes that although conspiracy theories are rational accounts, they end up being value-laden, biased theories: ‘It is, if not wholly rational, at least intensely rationalistic… comprehending all of reality in one overreaching, consistent theory… What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts… but rather the curious leap in imagination…’

Hofstadter’s view is in line with the division in existing scholarship called cultural-classical (Nefes, 2012, 2013, 2014) or realist-symbolist (Rogin, 1987) divides. A line of research follows Hofstadter’s labelling of the biased, value-laden and paranoid character of conspiracy theories as a political pathology (Aaronovitch, 2009; Ben-Itto, 2005; Cohn, 1970; Pipes, 1997; Robins and Post, 1997; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Byford (2011) conceptualizes conspiracy theories as a specific tradition of explanation to be avoided because of its deficiencies. Others claim that conspiracy theories promote monological belief systems (Goertzel, 1994), and once people believe in one conspiratorial account, they would be inclined to believe in the rest of the conspiracy literature (Goertzel, 1994; Swami and Furnham, 2012; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013). Pipes (1997: 22) warns that ‘conspiracy theories have a way of growing on a person, to the point that they become a way of seeing life itself.’ Against this possibility, Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) suggest that government officers should infiltrate conspiratorial circles to counter their crippled epistemological arguments. The other strand in the literature criticizes conceptualizing conspiracy theories as a political pathology and focuses on the rationalistic side of Hofstadter’s description. They view conspiratorial accounts as people’s rational attempts to understand social and political contexts (Birchall, 2006; Bratich, 2008; Jamil and Rousseau, 2011; Knight, 2000; Locke, 2009; Melley, 2000). According to Knight (2000), conspiracy theories illustrate people’s quest to make sense of social reality. Locke (2009) proposes that conspiracy theories are products of modernity that attempt to account for human suffering by assigning moral responsibility to individuals and groups.

This academic literature oscillates between delineating conspiratorial accounts either as value-laden, paranoid narratives or as a rational but subjugated form of knowledge. Fenster (1999) emphasizes a need to transcend this division between these two perspectives, as one approach misses the value-laden nature of conspiracy theory and the other is incapable of conceptualizing its socio-political roots. Accordingly, while criticizing the pathologization of conspiratorial rhetoric, Fenster (1999) highlights its symbolic dimensions and value-laden nature. In line with that, this study suggests that using rational choice theory is able to go beyond the divide in the scholarship, because it allows an analysis of the logic behind people’s uses of non-conventional beliefs such as conspiratorial rhetoric. Rational choice theory’s quest to understand the ways in which people give meaning to their actions can facilitate an explanation on how they make use of conspiratorial views. Coleman explains this orientation as follows:

Since social scientists take as their purpose the understanding of social organization that is derivative from actions of individuals and since understanding an individual’s action ordinarily means seeing the reasons behind the action, then the theoretical aim of social science must be to conceive of that action in a way that makes it rational from the point of view of the actor. Or put another way, much of what is ordinarily described as non-rational or irrational is merely so because the observers have not discovered the point of view of the actor, from which the action is rational. (Coleman, 1990: 17–18)

Rational choice theory can assist in unveiling the logic behind conspiracy theorizing by examining conspiratorial views both as rationalistic and value-laden accounts. First, it can scrutinize conspiracy theorizing from a cost-benefit comparison rationale, as people might use conspiratorial accounts pragmatically to blame a group even without necessarily believing them. There are various examples of the pragmatic use of conspiratorial accounts: Wood and Finlay (2008) demonstrated that the far-right British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom uses conspiratorial rhetoric to foster enmity towards Muslims. Others point out how various political movements around the world use anti-Semitic conspiracy theories strategically to justify their viewpoints and delegitimize opponents (Herf, 2005; Marouf, 1997; Nefes, 2011). Sapountzis and Condor (2013) illustrate that Greek citizens from different political perspectives use conspiracy theories to challenge dominant assumptions, social hierarchy and political legitimacy.

Second, Boudon’s (2003) cognitivist theory of action, a variant of rational choice perspective, emphasizes a rationale beyond cost-benefit comparison type and facilitates a view of conspiracy theories as value-laden narratives. Boudon’s (1996: 146–147) cognitivist model underlines axiological rationality, which refers to a value, a belief or a statement other than consequential instrumental type. In so doing, Boudon (1996, 2001, 2003, 2008) adds a consideration of values and norms as potential determinants of individual behaviour and expands the explanatory power of rational choice theory. The cognitivist model boasts a theoretical tool to explore the rationale of non-rational and non-conventional beliefs. Rydgren (2004), using Boudon’s perspective, states that xenophobic and racist views may be subjectively rational and attempts to illustrate people’s logic to hold such beliefs by referring to erroneous inferences they make. Some studies underline the importance of moral values held by people in conspiracy theorizing: Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) find that the perceived morality of authorities shapes the ways in which people propose conspiratorial views.

Using rational choice theory, this study discusses the political significance of online conspiracy theories about the assassination attempt, by taking into account both their paranoid/value-laden and rationalistic aspects, and moves beyond the division in the academic literature. This is achieved by investigating people’s responses to an attempted assassination: what kind of values they quote in their conspiratorial accounts and how they explain the event via these narratives.

In fact, conspiracy theories often thrive after political assassinations: there is vast conspiratorial literature about the Kennedy assassination in Dallas on 22 November 1963 (Knight, 2007). This could be due to the perception of nearly all political assassinations as significant threats to society (Eyerman, 2011: 32). Social order is suddenly dislocated by the targeting of prominent members of society to whom the public attribute symbolic importance. Eyerman (2011: 108–109) mentions that the murders of Anna Lindh and Olof Palme created a cultural crisis in the self-understanding of Swedish society as an exceptionally peaceful, family-like nation with a benevolent, democratic state and non-corrupt politicians. Therefore, political assassinations produce a demand for clarity and stability. Most often, the identity of the assassin becomes important, as it unveils the nature of the danger to social order. Eyerman (2011: 32) states that seeing a political assassination as a random event committed by an unstable, lone person, relieves society by marking the case as an exception, not a deliberate, orchestrated threat. Conspiracy theories are responses in the opposite direction, pointing to a plot of a clique.

Research background

Politics and political ideology in the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Currently, politics in the Republic of China (Taiwan) is mainly a competition between two political parties, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang,¹ KMT, the blue bloc²) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, the green bloc), in elections for the president of the state, representatives of the Legislative Yuan (the legislative branch of the state) and magistrates and mayors of counties and cities. Prior to the first time the DPP, the oppositional political party, was authorized to participate in public elections in 1986, Taiwan was ruled by an authoritarian single-party regime of the KMT (Schafferer, 2005; Solinger, 2001; Stockton, 2001). The KMT is often referred to as a group of mainlanders, based on the fact that most of the KMT party members arrived in Taiwan from the mainland in 1949. The DPP identified themselves as ‘native Taiwanese’ in response to the fact that most pre-1949 residents in Taiwan were excluded from political participation and decision-making until 1980. Researchers have argued that the differences between the KMT and the DPP, in terms of political ideology, are mainly caused by the difference in emphasis on national identity between the mainlanders and Taiwanese (Chu and Lin, 2001; Schubert, 2004; Stockton, 2001). A comparison of the top 10 public perceptions of the KMT and the DPP, from 1992 to 2004, showed that the KMT was first considered as ‘conservative’ in 1992, ‘in-fighting and fragmented’ in 1995 and 1998, ‘corrupt and embezzling’ in 2000, and again ‘corrupt and embezzling’ in 2004; the DPP was first considered as ‘radical’ in 1992, ‘seek[ing] Taiwanese independence’ in 1995, ‘contribute[ing] to democracy’ in 1998, 2000 and 2004 (Lin, 2006).

The 2004 presidential election

The DPP has gradually increased the number of seats it holds in different elections since 1986, and won the 2000 presidential election and the 2001 Legislative Yuan representative election. Chen Shui-bian (who obtained 39.3% of the vote) became the first DPP president, and the DPP gained the majority (obtaining 36.6% of the vote) in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT candidates obtained 23.1% in the 2000 presidential election, which meant the party came third. It also had 19 fewer seats than the DPP in the 2001 Legislative Yuan election, having obtained 31.3% of the votes. The DPP and Chen won the subsequent presidential election in 2004, on the eve of which the assassination attempt took place. It was argued that the rise of the DPP was due to a public reaction against the authoritarian rule of the KMT, and that its ideology, centred on the Taiwanese identity, also contributed to its success (Schafferer, 2005; Stockton, 2001). The KMT came back from this position in the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012.

On 19 March 2004, just one day before the presidential election in Taiwan, the DPP candidates, incumbent President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien, were both shot in a campaign motorcade in Tainan, a southern city of Taiwan. Their injuries were not life-threatening, and they were released from hospital on the same day. Due to the incident and its potential influence on the election results, some commentators described the 2004 elections as follows: ‘The dramatic victory of incumbent President…’ (Clark, 2004: 25); ‘[Chen Shui-bian] … was re-elected amidst controversy and with a very thin electoral margin of victory’ (Simon et al., 2004: 683). Nevertheless, after examining the impact of media reports of the shooting on voting behaviour, Hsu (2004) found that while 87.2% of the voters answered that it would have no influence on the way they voted, 79.1% of the voters argued that the incident would have significant effects on other voters’ decisions. Hsu (2004) confirmed the third-person effect in the case of the incident: that people assume – especially respondents with more years of education and stalwart supporters of the political parties – that the mass media will influence others more than him/herself.

Subsequently, opposition parties, particularly the KMT, proposed conspiracy theories about the event and claimed that the assassination attempt was a DPP plot to gain sympathy votes for President Chen. Opposition parties challenged the election results, organized protests and launched and lost two law-suits (Gluck, 2005). The court found a man, Chen Yi-hsiung, who committed suicide after the event and was never brought to justice, guilty (Gluck, 2005). The DPP vetoed the KMT proposal to open a ‘3-19 truth investigation commission’ and did not challenge the court decision. The conspiratorial rhetoric created political fragmentation. While the DPP accepted the official lone gunman explanation, the opponents suggested conspiratorial accounts blaming the DPP. Despite the apparent political significance of the conspiratorial rhetoric, no attention was paid to the political uses of conspiracy theories about the incident in the academic literature.

Research design

Sample

The research relies on a content analysis of three threads about the assassination incident on the discussion board named Forumosa, an English online community based in Taiwan which aims to provide an avenue of communication for English speakers in Taiwan and beyond, and which has 20,300 registered members (Forumosa, 2013). This sample could be analysed without translation, which reduced the researcher’s bias that could be created when material is translated. The research used purposive sampling. The three threads were chosen on the basis that:

They were the only conversations with a significant amount of conspiratorial accounts of the presidential assassination. Out of 654 posts, 56 contained conspiracy theories.

The first thread was the initial response to the incident with the highest frequency of replies and views on the day of the incident.

There were two subsequent threads using the same title, with ‘part two’ and ‘part three’ in their headings.

The dates of the posts in the three threads represented a complete period from the day of the incident to the official announcement of the identity of the perpetrator.

Forumosa affords anonymity to its users and enables them to express their views freely. Moreover, with that focus, I was able to closely follow the uses of conspiratorial accounts about the event through time. However, relying on data from one website inhibits me from being able to generalize the findings. Indeed, although this article describes generally the political context in Taiwan, it is beyond its scope to analyse the general conspiratorial literature in Taiwan or to locate the content of the online discussion to the wider political scene. This is also difficult because the contribution to the forum is not geographically limited. Thus, this paper confines its focus to these online conversations as an example to illustrate the rationale of conspiratorial blames.

Subjects and time frame

As Table 1 shows, the first thread was composed of the initial responses to the incident. The second thread was established after midnight on the day of the incident. The third thread was established immediately after the final official report about the event, following an investigation of the incident and the death of the perpetrator. The overall duration of the discussions in the three threads was about 358 days, with 657 posts. However, most days in the duration of the discussions saw no posts at all. The number of observation days with identified quotations in this study was 42.

Table 1.

Time frame of a series of three threads about the shooting incident.

Threads	First thread	Second thread	Third thread
The first post date	19 March 2004	20 March 2004	10 April 2004
The last post date	20 March 2004, 01:25	10 April 2004, 13:18	12 March 2005, 07:58
Title of thread	President Chen Shui-bian shot: Breaking News!	President Chen Shui-bian shot! – Part 2	President Chen Shui-bian shot – Part 3
Replies/views	239/19,149	240/17,401	175/15,096
Duration	About 10 hours	About 20 days	About 320 days
Main events	The gunshot incident	Release of the election results	7 March 2005, official announcement of the perpetrator

Coding the responses

To transcend the classical–cultural division in the academic literature and in line with Boudon’s (1996, 2001, 2003, 2008) perspective, the paper considers values and instrumental thinking of online users together. It demonstrates the symbolic nature of the conspiracy theorizing by underlining what kinds of feelings of threat and insecurity online users mentioned in the conversation, and it refers to the instrumental uses of the conspiratorial rhetoric by exploring how online users interpreted the conspiratorial accounts according to their political interests. While so doing, the study unveils users’ internal rationales of conspiracy theorizing.

In order to achieve that, the study chronicles the number of times each online user expressed perceived threats and proposed conspiracy theories. First, another researcher,³ who helped with the content analysis, and I agreed on how to code perceived threats and conspiracy theories. Second, we separately analysed the text and coded perceived threats and conspiracy theories. Then, we came together and agreed on the coded material. We coded any expression about the threat of interruption of the social and material order in Taiwan as a perceived threat. As described in Table 2, they can be grouped into four categories: (a) Chinese intervention; (b) KMT-led riots; (c) KMT challenging election results; (d) KMT single-party rule. The first is a potential Chinese intervention in Taiwan, either by disrupting the democratic process or by military invasion. The second category is that KMT could set off riots. The third category is about the KMT attempting to challenge the election results. The last is about a potential return to the pre-1986 KMT single-party period’s anti-democratic governance.

Table 2.

Index of perceived threats expressed by the online users.

Perceived threat	Definition	Example
Chinese intervention	Any expression about a potential disruption of the social and material order in Taiwan by Chinese intervention.	‘If the KMT did it, China might invade. If the election was stopped, China might invade.’
KMT-led riots	Any expression about a potential disruption of the social and material order in Taiwan by KMT-led riots.	‘Remember those riots at the KMT building in 2000? Might be a repeat.’
KMT challenging election results	Any expression about a potential disruption of the social and material order in Taiwan by KMT challenging the election results.	‘As pro-Green as I am, I fear that if Chen is swept into office on the sympathy vote some in the pan-Blue will forever challenge the legitimacy of the results.’
KMT history (single-party rule)	Any expression about a potential disruption of the social and material order in Taiwan by a return to single-party rule by the KMT.	‘Seems that anyone who criticizes the president should be executed, just like under the KMT …’

We define conspiracy theories as explanations of events that blame a group for secretly plotting them for their political advantage. There were four types of conspiratorial blame in the conversations: (a) blame the KMT; (b) blame China; (c) blame the DPP; and (d) blame gangsters. The theory that a disturbed lone gunman carried out the attempted assassination – the official line of explanation of the event – was not viewed as a conspiracy theory, because it showed the event as a random shooting by a deranged individual. Regardless, blaming a lunatic is counted as a category, since it constitutes an important indicator by showing the variety of blaming among users as well as the tendency to believe the official explanation. Table 3 below summarizes the content of the blaming.

Table 3.

Index of conspiracy theories and official explanation.

Category	Definition	Example
Blame KMT	Any conspiratorial account that sees the KMT behind the assassination.	‘What if the KMT ran the numbers and determined that CSB had gained some more and was going to win? They could decide to kill him to get a “do over” on the election in a few months.’
Blame China	Any conspiratorial account that sees the PRC behind the assassination.	‘It was a PRC sponsored hit.’
Blame DPP	Any conspiratorial account that sees the DPP behind the assassination to win the sympathy vote.	‘… it was DPP in order to get sympathy votes to win the election.’
Blame gangsters	Any conspiratorial account that sees gangsters behind the assassination.	‘If most people voted for Lien to win, the gangsters want to make sure he loses, so they had Chen shot to drum up sympathy …’
Blame a lunatic (the official explanation)	Any account that sees a lone gunman behind the assassination.	‘Well, it looks like some nut job shot Chen. How shocking!’

Findings

Perceived threats

According to Table 4, the most common perceived threat was about potential KMT-led riots in the chaotic environment caused by the assassination attempt. Twelve users remarked that this could lead to an intervention by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This was the second most frequent perceived threat expressed in the conversations. Another concern was about a KMT challenge to the election results. This was very much in line with the KMT riots argument, as it unveiled a fear about the KMT’s use of the assassination as a ploy to thwart the democratic election process. In parallel, some users talked about a potential return to the KMT’s authoritarian rule as a threat. All perceived threats pointed to the blue bloc in Taiwanese politics: the KMT and China. Moreover, these perceived threats seem to reflect the insecurities about the authoritarian single party regime of the KMT and its use of coercion.

Table 4.

Frequency of perceived threats expressed before and after the announcement of the election results.

Perceived threat	Pre-election results (334 posts)	Post-election results (320 posts)	Total (654 posts)
KMT-led riots	14	3	17
Chinese intervention	9	3	12
KMT (oppression) history	4	2	6
KMT challenging election results	2	1	3
Total	29	9	38

Table 4 demonstrates that there is a significant difference in the frequency of perceived threats expressed before and after the announcement of the election results. While there are 29 posts acknowledging threats prior to the victory of the DPP, there are only nine posts after this period. This might mean that the DPP victory reduced their worries about Taiwan’s future, because all of the threats were expressed about the DPP’s main rival, the blue bloc.

Targets of blame

There were 102 online users contributing to the forum discussion and 26 of them proposed at least one of the conspiratorial lines. If we take out the users who only posted once and never got any response, then we have 77 online users in total, 23 of whom suggested at least one of the conspiratorial lines. This shows that the conspiratorial discussion was not only among a small number of individuals.

Table 5 illustrates that nearly half of the accounts argued that it was a lunatic who attempted to kill the president. The second most common suspicion was that the event was a DPP conspiracy to win the sympathy vote in the elections. Another conspiratorial accusation was blaming gangsters who organized illegal betting. This version mentioned that they set up the assassination to alter the election results in order to benefit more from bets on the elections. There were also versions of the conspiracy theory that included the KMT and China. Although blaming the KMT and blaming China were coded differently, the accusation of these two could be understood as related, for the conspiratorial accounts referred to the KMT and China as the blue bloc. If they were coded as ‘blame blue category’, they would represent the most common conspiratorial argument, with 25 posts.

Table 5.

Frequency of blame before and after the announcement of the election results.

Target of blame	Pre-election results (334 posts)	Post-election results (320 posts)	Total (654 posts)
DPP	10	5	15
KMT	12	1	13
China	12	0	12
Gangster	11	3	14
Lunatic	19	30	49
Others	1	1	2
Total	65	40	105

The frequency of expression of conspiratorial theories before and after the release of the election results shows significant differences. The conspiracy theories about the KMT, China and gangsters dramatically decreased after the release of the results. In particular, blaming the KMT and blaming China combined were the most frequent conspiracy theories (24 in total) before the release of the results, while only one conspiracy theory about them was expressed in the post-election results period. Blaming the DPP also decreased to half its previous figure. In contrast, there was an increase in blaming a lunatic for the event. Online users stopped accusing the blue bloc after the DPP victory in the elections. They tended to side with the official explanation of the event as the act of a lone gunman, because 23 out of the 30 posts blaming a lunatic after the election results were put forward after the announcement of the official report on 7 March 2005.

Linking the perceived threats with conspiratorial blame

In order to understand the relationship between the perceived threats and the conspiracy theories, I conducted a one-tailed Pearson correlation analysis. This took into account the number of times each user suggested conspiratorial blames and expressed perceived threats. First, there was a significant correlation between talking about threats and proposing conspiracy theories (0.381) at the 0.01 level. The users who expressed perceived threats tended to propose conspiratorial accounts. Second, the perception of threat correlated particularly with proposing conspiracy theories about China (0.677), gangsters (0.274) and the KMT (0.274) at the 0.01 level. The users who perceived threats about the KMT and China tended to suggest conspiratorial accounts accusing them and gangsters. To see this trend more clearly, I grouped the conspiracy theories about the KMT and China together and found that the new variable correlated with the perceived threats about China (0.415) and KMT-led riots (0.574) at the 0.01 level.

In addition, the threats expressed about China correlated with blaming China for conspiring to set up the event (0.580) at the 0.01 level; they less significantly correlated with blaming gangsters (0.211) at the 0.05 level. The threats mentioned about KMT-led riots correlated with blaming China (0.690), blaming gangsters (0.345) and blaming the KMT (0.327) at the 0.01 level. Online users with fears regarding the blue bloc tended more often to accuse them, and gangsters. In parallel, the expression of threats about a KMT challenge to the election results correlated with blaming a lunatic (0.356) at the 0.01 level. This means that the online users tended to align with the official explanation when they were perceiving threats about a KMT challenge to the election results. In addition, I looked at the correlations among the conspiracy theories: blaming China correlated with blaming the KMT (0.544) and blaming gangsters (0.534) at the 0.01 level. Moreover, blaming the KMT and blaming gangsters correlated (0.677) at the 0.01 level.

Furthermore, a qualitative analysis of the posts of online users who suggested conspiratorial accounts, expressed opinion about potential threats and posted in pre-election and post-election periods, shows parallel results. Lane119 posted 14 times in the pre-election period and 13 times in the post-election period. S/he blamed China, gangsters and the KMT for conspiring to cause the attempted assassination, acknowledged a potential threat of a KMT riot and rejected the conspiratorial accounts about the DPP before the release of the election results. First, s/he blamed the blue bloc and gangsters, hired by the blue bloc, for the assassination attempt and rejected the accounts arguing for a DPP conspiracy. Subsequently, s/he evaluated the news that claimed two assassins had been involved as proof that the attempted assassination had been a Chinese conspiracy against the DPP: ‘I don’t think the KMT had anything to do with it. I think that CHINA commies, in cahoots with China and Taiwan gangsters, masterminded this.’ In the post-election period, Lane119 did not propose any conspiracy theories, but warned about a potential Chinese invasion and rejected the possibility of the DPP being behind the event once more. S/he seemed to be quite critical of the blue bloc: ‘KMT = “no class”’ and the China Post, a pro-KMT English language newspaper in Taiwan: ‘don’t trust anything you read in CHINA POST… Not even the weather!’

AWOL, who had three posts during the pre-election period and two afterwards, blamed China and expressed a potential threat by the KMT in the first period. S/he rejected the possibility of the DPP conspiracy. AWOL strongly excluded this explanation as KMT propaganda: ‘Planning a botched assassination is near impossible… what a daft suggestion. Of course pro-KMT would say that as they are too frightened, spineless and not enlightened enough to face the fact their party is an arcane out of date organisation that relies on intimidation and birthright as a pole to power.’ In the post-election period, AWOL neither proposed any conspiratorial lines nor expressed threats. S/he supported the idea that a lunatic was behind the event and stated that there was no possibility of a DPP conspiracy: ‘There is only one valid response to those who still believe these idiotic conspiracy theories about the assassination attempt on the president: Prove it.’

Mr He, who posted seven times (three in the pre-election period and four afterwards), blamed a lunatic, China and the KMT for conspiring to cause the attempted assassination before the release of the election results: ‘I see one as a serious one, the rest as less so: 1. Loner (crazy); 2. China (Sent a fool to do it, but that has been heard of before in secret service circles); 3. KMT (You never know).’ However, in his/her first post s/he had refused any chance of the KMT plotting the event. S/he also expressed worries about the potential threats from China and the KMT. After the results, the online user did not mention any potential threat. Mr He resumed his negative view of the KMT and insisted the higher possibility of a lunatic being behind the event.

We could add to these two other users, who did not propose any of the conspiracy theories but blamed a lunatic, expressed worries about the potential threats and posted both before and after the election. Omniloquacious posted 19 times (10 in the pre-election period and nine afterwards) and talked of threats about KMT objection and KMT riots in the pre-election period. S/he criticized a KMT politician, Sissy Chen, and underlined four times that the assassin should be a lunatic, motivated by the KMT hate speech. In the post-election period, Omniloquacious agreed with the official lone gunman theory and rejected any possible DPP involvement in the event: ‘There can be little room for reasonable doubt that the police have correctly identified the would-be assassin.’ S/he also described himself/herself as a DPP supporter.

Big Fluffy Matthew, who posted once in the pre-election period and twice in the post-election period, blamed a lunatic in his/her first post: ‘I think if it was an assassination attempt by the PRC or KMT, they wouldn’t have failed. It’s just some nutter.’ S/he continued blaming a lunatic in the post-election period and expressed insecurities about KMT oppression history.

As Table 6 shows, the significant contributors blamed a lunatic and the blue bloc in the pre-election period and either stopped blaming, or viewed a lunatic as responsible, in the post-election period. Three of them rejected the possibility of the DPP conspiracy in the post-election period, and two voiced this in the pre-election period. Moreover, while all five online users expressed threats from the blue bloc before the release of the election results, only two continued to express worries about a potential threat from the blue bloc.

Table 6.

Important contributors’ posts.

Username	Pre-election posts	Post-election posts
Lane119	Blame: China, Gangster, KMT Expressed threats: KMT riot Reject: DPP conspiracy	Blame: None Expressed threat: Chinese invasion Reject: DPP conspiracy
AWOL	Blame: China Expressed threat: KMT history of suppression Reject: DPP conspiracy	Blame: Lunatic Expressed threat: None Reject: DPP conspiracy
Mr He	Blame: Lunatic, China, KMT Expressed threats: China intervention, KMT riot Reject: KMT conspiracy	Blame: Lunatic Expressed threat: None
Omniloquacious	Blame: Lunatic Expressed threats: KMT riot, KMT challenge to election Reject: KMT conspiracy	Blame: Lunatic Expressed threat: None Reject: DPP conspiracy
Big Fluffy Matthew	Blame: Lunatic Expressed threat: KMT history of suppression Reject: KMT and China conspiracy	Blame: Lunatic Expressed threat: KMT history of suppression

Discussion

The findings illustrate two main points: (a) the online forum population seemed to be more sympathetic towards the DPP; (b) online users proposed conspiratorial blames rationally in line with their political arguments and perceived threats. First, although the majority of the users did not reveal their political affiliations, the conversation showed that they tended to be critical towards the blue bloc and sympathetic towards the DPP. Some openly acknowledged that they supported the DPP. In addition, there was a lot of criticism of the KMT and the PRC, perceived as the opponents of the DPP. For example, Sissy Chen, a KMT politician, was harshly criticized and insulted in the second thread. Moreover, the users who proposed the conspiracy theories about the DPP staging the assassination to win sympathy votes were often accused of being supporters of the KMT and China. Furthermore, all perceived threats expressed in the conversation were about the KMT and China. Last, as it could also be seen in the attitudes of the significant contributors, objections were most often made to the conspiratorial accounts about the DPP. While, there were 59 rejections of the conspiracy blames about the DPP, the total number of the rejections of the blames on the KMT, China, gangsters and lunatic was 33.

Second, the rationale of conspiracy theorizing among online users was manifested in their perceptions of threat, as they proposed these theories in line with the perceived threats. To begin with, users who expressed the perceived threats were likely to propose conspiratorial accounts. In addition, users who were mentioning the threats posed by the KMT and China tended to put forward conspiratorial accounts accusing them and, to a lesser extent, gangsters. Users seeing dangers about the blue bloc were more likely to accuse either them or gangsters of carrying out the attempted assassination. It could be speculated that the gangster conspiracy theories were related to the perception of the KMT by the users, because in Taiwanese politics the KMT’s relationship with organized crime was a popular theme at the time, evinced by a series of scandals since the 1990s (Baum, 2005; Kau, 1996). The other parties also used this Mafia-style image of the KMT in their propaganda efforts (Fell, 2005). Nonetheless, the online users did not mention such links in the conversations while suggesting the gangster conspiracy theories. Last, online users who were talking about the threats posed by China were most likely to propose the conspiracy theories about China. Interestingly, the users who were worried about the KMT riots tended to blame China more often. This seems to suggest that there was a worry about a China-backed KMT intervention in the democratic process in Taiwan. Furthermore, none of the users who perceived threats blamed the DPP in their conspiratorial accounts. People insecure about the blue bloc did not blame the political enemy, the green bloc.

Patterns of conspiratorial blame among online users also unveiled the logic of conspiracy theorizing, as they were in line with their political arguments. First, users perceiving threats about a KMT challenge to the election results tended to blame a lunatic for plotting the assassination attempt. This may mean that online users were inclined to align with the official explanation strategically, which was in favour of the DPP. Second, online users perceiving threats about the blue bloc tended to blame the KMT, China or gangsters. This supports the view that users strategically laid the blame in line with the green bloc’s interests. Third, the frequency of blaming China and the KMT was significantly lower after the election. Keeping in mind that online users were rather critical about the blue bloc, this finding may also point to a strategic use of conspiracy theories to accuse political opponents until the election victory. Fourth, blaming a lunatic steeply increased after the election results were released, suggesting that online users were aligned with the official explanation after the DPP win. This is in parallel with Eyerman’s (2011: 32) argument that viewing a political assassination as a random event committed by a lunatic relieves people’s insecurities and closes the case by showing it as an exception rather than a deliberate threat. In parallel, online users tended to reject political opponents’ accusations about the DPP-organized assassination attempt. Fifth, the change of blaming attitude in time is evident in the qualitative analysis of the five frequent contributors. While all of them expressed perceived threats from the blue bloc in the pre-election period, only two continued to express such worries in the post-election period. Moreover, although three of them proposed conspiracy theories about the blue bloc in the pre-election period, none suggested any conspiratorial line after the DPP election victory. Finally, online users proposing the conspiracy theories about China tended to blame the KMT and gangsters. They blamed the blue bloc and gangsters consistently.

As Eyerman (2011) notes, assassinations and attempted assassinations produce a period of heightened uncertainty that can trigger the prevalence of conspiratorial theories as explanatory accounts. The case seems to support this premise, as conspiratorial accounts were more prevalent before the election results. However, this conclusion should be approached conservatively, because there could be other factors, such as the political interests of online users, influencing the dissemination of conspiracy theories. Indeed, attempting to explain who is behind the event, online users proposed their conspiracy theories strategically, both defending their political interests and responding to the threats they perceived. The conspiracy theories were value-laden narratives, as they reflected the fear and menace the users attached to the blue bloc. However, they were not only mythological exaggerations responding to a cultural trauma, but also political narratives of understanding power relations, defending interests and attacking opponents. This also implies that another online forum populated by the users of opposing political views, such as the KMT supporters, would contain different conspiratorial accounts. Therefore, the users did not suddenly fall victim to, and become proponents of, conspiratorial rhetoric, but altered their position with regards to conspiratorial blames strategically in time. This supports Fenster’s (1999) call to transcend the division in existing scholarship and moves the academic discussion forward by showing that conspiracy theories might be both rational products and value-laden, biased accounts. This study introduces rational choice perspective, particularly cognitive action theory, as a valuable theoretical tool to transcend this divide. Rational choice perspective allows for delineating the logic of conspiracy, theorizing both as a product of people’s cost-benefit comparisons and normative values. The view explains conspiratorial blames both as value-laden narratives emerging from online users’ political anxieties about the blue bloc, and as strategic arguments that people put forward from a cost-benefit comparison according to their political interests, which seemed to be mainly in line with the DPP.

The article is limited to online conversations from a forum website, which cannot be taken as representative of the Taiwanese population, and is not supported by follow-up interviews with the online users, which could better inform about the users’ views. Nevertheless, by being the first analysis of an online forum containing ongoing and interconnected online conversations of conspiratorial accounts, and by illustrating the merits of rational choice theory on this case, it innovates the existing academic literature. In so doing, it points out the significance of the time factor in conspiracy theorizing, which has not yet been considered in the academic literature, by documenting people’s change of opinion. Taking these into account, future studies could look at the reasons for repetitions of conspiratorial rhetoric in time, which this study considered for a short period. They could also look at the political significance of conspiracy theories – especially regarding political assassinations – in different contexts, to provide a detailed understanding of this very popular but unexplored form of political communication, which on various occasions serves as the backbone for ideologies of violence, hatred and bigotry.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank to Feng-shuo Chang, Michael Biggs and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that gave me a chance to improve the quality of this paper.

Funding

I am very grateful to The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) whose funding provided the opportunity to develop this study for publication.

Notes

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