Abstract
This Special Issue presents a symposium on the article “Endogenous dynamics of institutional change” by Daniel DellaPosta, Victor Nee, and Sonja Opper (authors henceforth referred to as DNO). It includes commentaries by Robert Solow, Randall Calvert, Christopher Cameron and Michael Macy, Paul DiMaggio, Arnout van de Rijt, and Martin Ruef.
The article presents an original computational model of change in institutional frameworks. As in a classic rational choice model, individual behavior is shaped by utility gain. When changes in behavior disrupt institutional equilibria, the interdependence among actors generates positive externalities, which in turn trigger a cascade. As the cascade progresses, it motivates accommodations among state actors. This three-stage process is illustrated in analyses of both the rise of private manufacturing in the Yangzi delta region of China, and gay bars in San Francisco.
The commentaries offer views of the article from a wide variety of theoretic perspectives. These provide multiple insights into the mechanics by which the proposed model operates, and the manner in which it can be expanded and applied in new empirical contexts. Robert Solow begins by praising the Visiting Scholars Program of the Russell Sage Foundation for offering the opportunity for intellectual interchange between himself, a macroeconomist, and co-author Victor Nee, a sociologist. True to Solow’s intellectual perspective, he presents a macroeconomic model, which shows how conclusions from the article’s model can be independently derived, and how alternative institutional dynamics can arise, given distinct sets of parameters.
Alternatively, drawing on his expertise in game theory and network analysis, Randall Calvert employs a network-game model to suggest several expansions of the DNO model, including the addition of a model of movement leadership in which leaders have sufficient foresight to bear the costs involved in initiating innovations, which then progress through the clique network.
So too, based on their work on computational models, Christopher Cameron and Michael Macy suggest a broadening of the DNO model: instead of merely viewing actors as utility maximizers, actors can be seen as motivated by several other behavioral principles. These include credibility, in which actors are governed by a social learning process in which others’ behavior becomes a guide to their own behavior; legitimacy, in which behavior is governed by conceptions of propriety; and emotional contagion based on self-reinforcing diffusion of affective responses.
Later, Paul DiMaggio extends the DNO model to cases where the state does not oppose change; in this way, he enlarges the scope of the empirical analyses to additional cases, for example, the cotton economy in the 1840s, and the saloon–political machine relationship. The expansion is especially useful in both emphasizing the strengths of the DNO model and the methods by which it can be expanded to apply to new cases.
Subsequently, Arnout van de Rijt offers an analysis of the anatomy of the DNO model to show that it exemplifies the paradigm for rational choice theoretic analysis proposed by James S. Coleman, one of the founders of Rationality and Society. Specifically, van de Rijt shows that the DNO model is structured in a manner consistent with what has been termed the “Coleman boat,” in which explanations of macro-level phenomena such as institutional change have a “bottoms up” structure: macro-phenomena shape the contexts in which individuals make decisions, then utility maximization governs individual actions, and the latter in turn impact macro-level phenomena. Hence, explanation occurs through a three-step process, from macro to micro, from micro to micro, and then from micro to macro.
Finally, drawing on organizational ecology, Martin Ruef emphasizes the conceptual parallels between the DNO model and ecological theory. He notes, for example, that both models anticipate an S-shaped trajectory for successful innovations. Ruef concludes by suggesting the possibility of an agent-based model that combines insights from rational choice and ecological perspectives.
The article by DellaPosta, Nee, and Opper provides an excellent illustration of the benefits of middle-range theorizing—an intellectual approach with a particular affinity to rational choice theory. The clarity with which the article delineates the mechanisms underlying its model facilitates further theoretic development. These consist of alternative extensions of the model based on the wide variety of alternative intellectual traditions represented by the contributors to this symposium.