The role of rationality in motivating participation in social movements: The case of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China

Abstract

This study proposes a theoretical model that integrates the rational approach with the structural and cultural approaches to explain motivations for participation in social movements. In this integrative model, rational perceptions about the benefits and costs of participation have both mediation and interaction relations with structural and cultural motivators. First, rational perceptions mediate the motivating effects of interpersonal ties to prior participants and collective identity. Interpersonal ties and collective identity construct individuals’ perceived benefits and costs, which in turn affect their participation motivations. Second, perceived benefits and costs also interact with interpersonal ties and collective identity in affecting participation motivations. Interpersonal ties and collective identity may affect how sensitive the individual is to the formed rational perceptions. Especially, interpersonal ties weaken the motivating effect of perceived benefits. We apply this model to the case of China’s recent nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations. Using original data from a large-scale survey on 1458 university students in Beijing, we find this integrative model effective in explaining university students’ motivations to participate in future anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Keywords

Anti-Japanese demonstrations participation motivations rational choice social movement

Introduction

Research on motivations to participate in social movements has come a long way in the past few decades. A variety of studies from sociology, political science, and social psychology have tried to reveal the factors motivating individuals’ involvement in social movements. Based on their differing focuses, we can identify the rational, structural, and cultural approaches.¹

The rational approach is closely related to the rational choice tradition in sociology (Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997; Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012). Perceived benefits and costs are seen as the key factors that explain individuals’ motivations for collective action (Klandermans, 1984; Muller and Opp, 1986; Oberschall, 1994; Opp, 1986). Individuals seek to achieve instrumental goals and avoid potential risks when deciding whether to participate. In this approach, participation motivations are essentially dictated by rational calculation of costs and benefits. The structural approach links individuals and social structure to explain social movement participation (Giugni, 1998; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Passy and Giugni, 2001). The social structure an individual is embedded in (such as interpersonal networks) may either provide opportunities or impose restrictions for participation motivations (McAdam et al., 1988; Schussman and Soule, 2005; Snow et al., 1980). The cultural approach highlights the salience of shared cultural identity in motivating individuals to engage in a social movement (Klandermans, 1997; Melucci, 1995; van Zomeren, 2013). It emphasizes collective identity as a key facilitator of participation motivations (Friedman and McAdam, 1992; Simon et al. 1998; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).

These approaches have contributed greatly to our understanding about individuals’ motivations for movement participation. Nevertheless, the relationship between the rational approach and the other approaches is not always clear. Scholars such as Opp (2009) have long called for and worked on the integration of these approaches to produce more insights into participation motivations. Rational choice theorists have also suggested incorporating concepts and mechanisms of other approaches to enrich the rational approach (Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012). Accordingly, this study explores the relationship of rational factors with structural and cultural factors in shaping individuals’ motivations for movement participation. It proposes and empirically tests an integrative model that explicitly incorporates the three approaches. In particular, this integrative model highlights two possible types of relations, mediation, and interaction, between rational choice and the other two approaches.

First, rational factors may mediate the effects of structural and cultural factors on individuals’ motivations for movement participation. Specifically, interpersonal ties to other participants and collective identity are both likely to shape individuals’ rational calculation such as perceived benefits and costs of participation, which in turn affect participation motivations.

Second, rational factors may also interact with structural and cultural factors in influencing participation motivations. Specifically, there can be a negative interaction between the effect of rational calculation and that of interpersonal ties or collective identity. The existence of structural and cultural effects is likely to decrease the salience of rational choice. Individuals with social ties to other participants or strong collective identity may become less sensitive to rational cost-benefit calculation when deciding whether to participate.

The diagram in Figure 1 depicts the integrative model proposed in this study. Interpersonal ties and collective identity may indirectly influence participation motivations through rational perceptions about benefits and costs (the mediation effect). Interpersonal ties and collective identity may also condition the influence of perceived benefits and costs on participation motivations (the interaction effect). Taken together, structural and cultural factors not only shape rational perceptions about participation, but also affect how sensitive the individual is to the formed rational perceptions.

Figure 1.

Proposed integrative model of motivations for movement participation.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it theoretically integrates the three major approaches and especially explicates the relationship between rational choice and the other two approaches. Second, it empirically applies this model to the study of China’s recent anti-Japanese demonstrations. Relations between China and Japan have been turbulent in recent years due to historical and territorial disputes. Both countries frequently engage in disputes over historical memories about Japan’s invasion of China during World War II. The relationship is further strained by the long-contested sovereignty over an island chain, the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands, in the East China Sea. Nationwide demonstrations erupt across China periodically. The scale of these demonstrations often shocks outside observers. In 2014, we conducted a large-scale survey on 1458 university students in Beijing about their motivations to participate in future anti-Japanese demonstrations. Applying the proposed integrative model to this empirical case, we expect to achieve two goals. First, we empirically test the applicability of our theoretical model. Second, guided by this model, we also investigate the factors motivating university students’ willingness to participate in future anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Three main approaches to participation motivations: an overview

Previous studies have shown that in general people who believe that through collective action they can improve the situation of the group they belong to while not facing high risks (the rational approach), who know someone already involved in a social movement (the structural approach), and who identify with a group and thus care about the situation of the group (the cultural approach) are more motivated to participate in a social movement.

Rational factors: perceived benefits and costs

Highlighting the rational choice conception of movement participation, scholars (Huber, 1997; Klandermans, 1984; Muller and Opp, 1986; Oberschall, 1994) theorize the rational motivation in social movement participation. This rational motivation reflects cost–benefit calculation individuals make when considering their participation in collective action (Klandermans, 1997).

Individuals can be motivated to participate by instrumental purposes. The prospect of improving the deprived situation or bringing positive social changes can motivate them to participate in a social movement. If they expect the movement to be effective in realizing such instrumental goals, they have more incentives to participate. Perceived benefits can be understood both at the individual level and the group level (Passy and Giugni, 2001). Individuals can be concerned about individual gains or collective benefits. For a social movement such as anti-Japanese demonstrations, participation does not have tangible individual benefits. Actually, in most movements, group-oriented benefits play a more influential role in movement participation. The “collective power” (van Zomeren et al., 2008: 507) from perceived group-oriented benefits provides people with motivations to act collectively.

In the case of anti-Japanese demonstrations, we conceptualize perceived benefits as individuals’ belief in the role of anti-Japanese demonstrations in helping China’s foreign policies towards Japan. The primary goal of anti-Japanese demonstrations is to influence China’s Japan policies and to give the Chinese state some leverage in dealing with Japan (Reilly, 2012; Weiss, 2013). Both protesters and the Chinese state are well aware of this instrumental use of anti-Japanese demonstrations. The Chinese state can point to popular protests and say that its hands are tied at the negotiation table, thereby pressuring Japan to make concessions. A typical example is the diplomatic leverage gained from anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 when tens of thousands of Chinese took to the streets to oppose Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Those popular protests helped the Chinese state make a strong case against Japan’s bid. If individuals believe that anti-Japanese demonstrations would help the state’s diplomatic policies, they should have more incentives to participate.

In addition to the benefit, another indispensable component in rational calculation is the cost. Perceived costs, especially risks of violence, deter individuals’ motivations to join a social movement (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987; McAdam, 1986; Opp, 1986).² One prominent risk is possible violence in street demonstrations and disruption to normal life. When street demonstrations get out of control, participants may face such risks as being involved in violent acts or even suffering physical harm. Street demonstrations may also throw social institutions into disorder, thereby disrupting individuals’ normal life and causing inconveniences. Thus, potential social instability resulting from street demonstrations can be a major deterrent to participation motivations.

While anti-Japanese demonstrations are largely peaceful, they do sometimes get violent and pose a threat to domestic stability (Reilly, 2012; Wallace and Weiss, 2015; Weiss, 2013). In previous demonstrations, it was observed that in some cities businesses were ransacked, windows broken, cars smashed, and streets blocked. Several individuals were beaten up by fervent protesters for driving Japanese cars, for example. Moreover, given the limited channels for political participation in China, some citizens may seize the opportunity to promote their domestic goals and vent their anger at domestic institutions such as local governments and police. Hence, anti-Japanese demonstrations can potentially trigger domestic instability. When the perceived risk of jeopardizing domestic stability is high, individuals may anticipate higher costs of engaging in anti-Japanese demonstrations. As a result, their willingness to participate may decrease.

Structural factor: interpersonal ties

Social networks have been found to have an impact on social movement participation. Such social networks mainly include membership in organizations (movement-related or not) and interpersonal ties (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). Scholars further classify these networks into formal and informal ties which operate differently in predicting social movement engagement under different political contexts (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). As a typical form of formal tie, membership in organizations is found to motivate individuals’ movement participation. This effect is more common in democratic countries with available social movement organizations (SMOs). Informal ties, or those interpersonal ties with friends, family members, and acquaintances who have been involved in a social movement, are also found to motivate people to join a movement (della Porta, 1988; Snow et al., 1980; Yu and Zhao, 2006). Recently, scholars have noticed the more prevalent role of informal ties in mobilizing movement participants. In many movements, people “avoid long-term engagements” with formal organizations, and therefore, formal SMOs do not exist in many cases (Klandermans et al., 2014: 498). Instead, movements are more likely to be mobilized by loose and preexisting informal networks.

The relative importance of informal ties may be particularly relevant in China’s anti-Japanese movement. In China, formal ties through SMOs are almost nonexistent as the state keeps a tight control over civil associational activities. Instead, informal ties with other individuals who are already part of the movement may be more salient in motivating people to join a movement. Therefore, we do not distinguish formal and informal ties, but pay major attention to the role of interpersonal ties in motivating individuals to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations. If individuals know someone who has experience in anti-Japanese demonstrations, they may be more willing to join too. Individuals consciously or subconsciously follow the behavior of others with whom they are associated, so as to avoid being different from their peers. Moreover, knowing people who have attended anti-Japanese demonstrations also increases their chance of receiving relevant information and being persuaded to join the demonstrations in their social interactions.

Cultural factor: collective identity

Scholars link collective identity and social movement participation through social identity theory. Social identity theory contends that people can go beyond individual identity (as “I”) and identify with certain groups (as “we”) (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Huddy, 2001; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). This feeling of “we” brings group members the “inner obligation to act upon internalized movement-specific norms and goals” (Stürmer and Simon, 2009: 684) and enhances group commitment and solidarity (Hunt and Benford, 2004), especially during inter-group conflicts (Melucci, 1995). A social movement is essentially collective action that requires a socially relevant identity, a sense of belonging to a group (van Zomeren et al., 2008). With this sense of belonging to the group, individuals would care about the situation of this group and become willing to pursue collective interests. In general, stronger identification with a group is associated with a greater propensity to join a social movement on behalf of that group.

Not all types of collective identity matter in a specific movement. The salient collective identity depends on the protested issue (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). In particular, nationalism provides a potent form of collective identity and looms large in movements against foreign targets (Calhoun, 1993). A strong sense of self-identification with the nation creates “nationalist aesthetics” that would make individuals invest strong emotions such as pride in their nation (Berezin, 1997; Zubrzycki, 2009). Nationalist identity is particularly salient in authoritarian and transitional countries such as China “where diverse institutions of civil society are lacking or fail to provide for a diversity of public discourses and collective identities” (Calhoun, 1993: 387). Individuals with strong nationalist identity proudly identify themselves as part of the nation. They may feel more obligated to protest against Japan to defend perceived national interests. Anti-Japanese demonstrations resonate with nationalist identity.

Mediation effects in the integrative model

These different approaches focus on different motivators and should be integrated to gain a better understanding of protesting motivations. Scholars, especially social psychologists, have already initiated the theoretical integration. Among them, Opp’s (2009) work is particularly noteworthy.³ He contends that dominant explanations for political protests, such as resource mobilization, political opportunity, collective identity, framing, and dynamics of contention, are often fraught with uncertainties regarding individual incentives to participate in collective action. It is important to bring in individual-level cognitive processes, especially individuals’ perceptions, in order to understand the link between macro-level structure and micro-level incentives. Our integrative model is such a step following Opp’s important insight. Our model specifically aims to clarify the relationship of rational perceptions with structural and cultural motivators. We hypothesize that rational cost-benefit considerations both mediate and interact with the motivating effects of interpersonal ties and collective identity. We elaborate on the mediating and interacting relations in this section and the following section, respectively.

Individuals’ perceived benefits and costs are not a priori existence and should not be treated as purely exogenous to the motivation process. In their rational calculation, individuals assess benefits and costs of participation in a movement. Different people perceive the same situation differently. Perceived benefits and costs are inherently subjective and differ from person to person. They may be socially constructed by interpersonal ties and collective identity. Interpersonal ties and collective identity can influence participation motivations indirectly, through the path of shaping perceived benefits and costs of participation.

Mediation path 1: interpersonal ties → perceived benefits and costs → participation motivations

We identify two possible mechanisms, the diffusion mechanism and the efficacy (or empowerment) mechanism, through which interpersonal ties help shape perceived benefits and costs. First, according to the network theory of social influence, perceptions are diffused through social networks (Friedkin, 1993, 1998; Mark, 1998). Connections with movement participants socialize individuals to acquire certain political consciousness that elevates their belief in the benefit of participation and diminishes their aversion to risks. Movement participants have greater faith in the instrumental value of the movement and are less averse to potential risks. That is why they participate in the first place. The elevated sense of benefits and less aversion to risks diffuse in social networks. Individuals connected to prior participants have a good chance of acquiring similar perceptions, because people tend to consciously or subconsciously learn from others in their networks. Furthermore, with movement participants in their networks, in their social interactions people have a greater chance of being persuaded into accepting similar perceptions about the benefit and cost of participation.

Second, social ties to movement participants also empower individuals and heighten their sense of efficacy. Efficacy refers to individuals’ expectation that there is a good chance of changing current conditions or policies through collective action (Gamson, 1992). The enhanced sense of efficacy stems from a supportive social network that includes like-minded peers. Both contextual efficacy (Dijkstra and Bakker, 2017) and group efficacy (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013) theories contend that the prospect of participating together with others increases the perceived impact individuals can make. The likelihood of participating with others they know potentially enhances individuals’ belief in the chance of succeeding in achieving the movement’s goal and also renders participation less intimidating. The heightened sense of efficacy supported by the prospect of acting collectively, not alone, can thus help increase perceived benefits and reduce perceived costs of participation.

In light of these two interrelated mechanisms, individuals’ perceived benefits and costs are defined and redefined as they connect with other participants in their social networks. Interpersonal ties with prior participants shift individuals’ rational calculation in favor of participation, through elevating perceived benefits and decreasing perceived costs.

We apply this insight to anti-Japan demonstrations in China. As discussed above, the primary goal of anti-Japanese demonstrations is to influence China’s Japan policies and to provide China with more bargaining power in dealing with Japan. The major risk stems from possible domestic instability. Therefore, we arrive at the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1a. Those who know someone involved in previous anti-Japanese demonstrations are more likely to view anti-Japanese demonstrations as benefiting China’s foreign policies toward Japan, which in turn increases their willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Hypothesis 1b. Those who know someone involved in previous anti-Japanese demonstrations are less likely to view anti-Japanese demonstrations as jeopardizing China’s domestic stability, which in turn increases their willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Mediation path 2: collective identity → perceived benefits and costs → participation motivations

Stronger collective identity can motivate people to protest through elevating their perceived benefits and lowering their perceived costs. Cultural cognition theory suggests that cost-benefit perceptions are shaped by individuals’ fundamental cultural values (Kahan, 2012; Kahan et al., 2011). People develop certain perceptions about the benefit and cost of their action based on the entrenched values defined by their cultural identity. Individuals’ self-defining values such as collective identity affect their perceived benefits and costs of movement participation through cultural cognitive bias.

Even if the same information is available about a social movement, the information is filtered through individuals’ cultural preferences, or cultural cognitive bias. Cultural values guide individuals’ selection and interpretation of available information (Allum et al., 2008; Gauchat, 2012). Cognitive bias makes people favor information confirming their deep-rooted cultural values over disconfirming evidence. This constructivist nature of information processing suggests that perceived benefits and costs are constructed by collective identity. If individuals have a sense of belonging to the group, they value actions that can improve the situation of the group more than those who have no such identity. Consequently, they would play up the information about the benefits of movement participation while downplaying the information about the costs. Identifying as part of the group, they are more likely to have faith in the group’s collective capacity in achieving desirable goals and avoiding negative consequences.

Specifically, the perceived benefits and costs of participating in anti-Japanese demonstrations are influenced by nationalist identity. Individuals who strongly identify with the nation place more values on actions on behalf of the nation. Anti-Japanese demonstrations are congruent with their nationalist identity, so due to cognitive bias they may selectively pay more attention to the information showing how anti-Japanese demonstrations help China’s diplomacy while ignoring the news about the violence and disorder caused by these street protests. They thus tend to view their collective action as benefiting the nation, not posing a threat to the nation.

Hypothesis 2a. Those who have stronger nationalist identity are more likely to view anti-Japanese demonstrations as benefiting China’s foreign policies toward Japan, which in turn increases their willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Hypothesis 2b. Those who have stronger nationalist identity are less likely to view anti-Japanese demonstrations as jeopardizing China’s domestic stability, which in turn increases their willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Interaction effects in the integrative model

Besides the mediation effects, rational factors may also have interacting relations with structural and cultural factors. These factors do not affect participation motivations independently but may interact with each other. The interaction effects are likely to be negative. Interpersonal ties and collective identity may reduce individuals’ sensitivity to rational incentives.

Interaction effect 1: interpersonal ties × perceived benefits and costs → participation motivations

We see two distinct mechanisms through which interpersonal ties affect participation motivations. First, interpersonal ties shape individuals’ rational calculation of benefits and costs, which in turn affects participation motivations. The mediating effect discussed above reflects this mechanism. Second, after rational perceptions about benefits and costs have formed, interpersonal ties also affect how sensitive the individual is to these rational perceptions. This second mechanism reflects the diffusing influence of prior participants in the individual’s social networks (Gould, 1993, 1996; Knoke, 1990; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Snow et al., 1980). Due to peer influence or even pressure, individuals may take certain actions simply following their social ties without resorting to rational calculation. The negative interaction effect between interpersonal ties and rational perceptions captures this second mechanism.

Rational choice and social diffusion represent two competing logics motivating individuals to participate in social movements. There is likely to be a negative interaction effect (i.e. the increase in one factor weakens the effect of the other factor) between rational choice and social diffusion. When individuals have prior protesters in their networks, rational considerations would become less essential because simply following others (sometimes indiscriminately) would provide sufficient motives. The prospect of participating with friends or others they know may make the rationalization of their decision about participation less necessary. Hence, rational perceptions and interpersonal ties are two competing motivators. The existence of social ties to prior protesters may undermine the effect of rational perceptions.

Hypothesis 3a. Perceived benefits of anti-Japanese demonstrations (benefiting China’s foreign policies) and knowing someone involved in previous anti-Japanese demonstrations have a negative interaction effect on the willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Hypothesis 3b. Perceived costs of anti-Japanese demonstrations (jeopardizing China’s domestic stability) and knowing someone involved in previous anti-Japanese demonstrations have a negative interaction effect on the willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Interaction effect 2: collective identity × perceived benefits and costs → participation motivations

Similarly, collective identity may also affect participation motivations through two channels. Besides shaping rational perceptions that drive movement participation, collective identity may also influence participation motivations through conditioning the actual effect of rational perceptions. After rational perceptions have formed, there may be a negative interaction effect between these perceptions and collective identity. Individuals can derive intrinsic values from participation in a social movement if the movement is in line with their cultural values (Boudon, 2003; Yee, 1997). When individuals are motivated by their collective identity, they may become less responsive to instrumental incentives (Boudon, 2003). Collective identity influences the subjective perception and definition of the movement (Schnabel, 2006) and leads to strongly anchored scripts without the need for careful rational calculation (Esser, 2009).

In nationalist movements such as anti-Japanese demonstrations, individuals with strong nationalist identity may take it for granted that they should participate, and thus may not consider the actual benefits and costs. Avid nationalists are less likely to base their participation decisions on careful rational calculation, so they may be less sensitive to perceived benefits and costs. In contrast, for those with weaker nationalist identity, they may need more rational justification for their participation so rational factors may play a greater role for them.

Hypothesis 4a. Perceived benefits of anti-Japanese demonstrations (benefiting China’s foreign policies) and nationalist identity have a negative interaction effect on the willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Hypothesis 4b. Perceived costs of anti-Japanese demonstrations (jeopardizing China’s domestic stability) and nationalist identity have a negative interaction effect on the willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Socio-demographic and emotional controls

When analyzing the relations among rational, structural, and cultural factors, we also consider basic socio-demographic characteristics that may affect students’ motivations to demonstrate in the Chinese context (Walder, 2006; Yu and Zhao, 2006; Zhao, 2003). Gender, family income, membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and self-perceived academic performance are often used in predicting students’ movement participation. First, under the same political and institutional context, it is often observed that men are more willing to participate in street demonstrations than women (Finucane et al., 2000). Second, individuals from less well-off family background have less interest in maintaining the status quo and are more willing to participate in social movements that call for change (Dixon and Roscigno, 2003; Walder, 2006). Third, CCP members in general follow the party line more closely and have greater interest in politics. They are also expected to take more responsibilities for defending perceived national interests (Yu and Zhao, 2006). Accordingly, CCP members are expected to express more willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations than non-CCP students. Fourth, students with poor academic records may be less concerned about and less occupied by studying, so they may be more willing to spend time and energy engaging in anti-Japanese demonstrations (Yu and Zhao, 2006).

We also control group-based anger in the analysis, considering the possibility that individuals may participate to vent their anger against Japan. Emotions such as anger may play an important role in motivating movement participation (Goodwin et al., 2001; Jasper, 1997, 1998; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). Group-based anger is argued to be the emotional response that is most closely related to social movement participation (van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren et al., 2004). When individuals are angry with the other group that is seen as the trigger of the unjust situation, this anger propels them to take action. Similar to many social movements, anti-Japanese demonstrations have been found to be emotionally charged (Gries, 2004; Reilly, 2012). Many Chinese are angry with Japan for its ambivalence toward its war responsibilities during World War II, insincere apologies for wartime atrocities, and “occupation” of the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands (Bush, 2010; He, 2009; Kristof, 1998; Rozman, 2004). Street demonstrations present a channel for them to vent this anger.

Taken together, we expect that men, individuals with lower family income, CCP members, those with poor academic records, and those who are angry with Japan are more willing to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Data and method

Anti-Japanese mass demonstrations erupted in China periodically in recent years. The most recent wave of demonstrations occurred in August and September 2012, when anti-Japanese protests broke out in as many as 208 of China’s total 287 prefectural cities (Wallace and Weiss, 2015; Weiss, 2013), protesting the Japanese government’s decision to purchase and “nationalize” the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. The anti-Japanese movement has arguably become the largest nationwide movement in China since the 1989 pro-democracy movement. In light of its significance, we choose the anti-Japanese movement to empirically test the proposed integrative model of motivations for movement participation. Guided by the integrative model, this empirical investigation also helps us better understand individuals’ motivations in China’s anti-Japanese demonstrations. In the past decade, nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in 2005, 2010, and 2012. Considering their frequent occurrence, it is very likely that they may occur again in the near future. This study can shed light on the profile of potential recruits into future anti-Japanese demonstrations.

We conducted a large-scale survey on 1458 Chinese students from three top universities in Beijing, including Peking University (PKU), Tsinghua University (THU), and Renmin (People’s) University of China (RUC) in June 2014. Approximately 500 students were surveyed from each university. We collected information on students’ motivations to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations and the potential motivating factors.

We chose university students as our subjects because they are “a highly active population and have played an important role in most major social movements” (van Dyke, 2003: 245). The role of university students in social movements is particularly prominent in the Chinese context. University students in Beijing have long played a leading role in all major social movements. Especially, PKU, THU and RUC have been recognized as the center of student activism in China (Yu and Zhao, 2006; Zhao, 1998, 2004). They are “among the largest and the most prestigious with a history of influencing other universities and Chinese politics in general” (Yu and Zhao, 2006: 1758). In light of their significance in China’s social movement history, we selected the three universities for our survey.

Sample and sampling

We employed carefully designed probability sampling to select our survey participants. We recruited a survey team of 5–7 interviewers from each university. Each survey team surveyed approximately 500 students from their respective university. A total of 1458 questionnaires were collected (504 from PKU, 467 from THU and 487 from RUC). The final sample has an average age of 22 years, with 54.05% being male (N = 788) and 45.95% female (N = 670). Undergraduate and graduate students make up 67% and 33% of the sample, respectively. These numbers well represent the overall profile of the student body in these universities. Well-designed sampling gives us confidence in the representativeness of the collected data.

Variables

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is the student’s motivation to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations. We use this survey question to measure the variable: “If there are demonstrations against Japan in the future, how likely will you participate?” The possible responses are on a 5-point scale ranging from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (5). Thus, a higher score indicates a higher level of willingness to participate in future anti-Japanese demonstrations. Figure 2 shows the distribution of differential participation motivations among students. Students’ motivations vary along the 5-point scale. It is worth noting that a substantial proportion (6.36%+39.28% = 45.64%) of all sampled students expressed clear willingness to participate in future anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Figure 2.

Willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Perceived benefits

We measure perceived benefits through the question: “Do you think anti-Japanese demonstrations are beneficial to China’s diplomacy toward Japan?” There are five possible responses on a 5-point scale ranging from “not beneficial at all” (1) to “highly beneficial” (5). A higher score suggests a higher level of perceived benefits of anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Perceived costs

The perceived costs variable is measured by this question: “Do you think anti-Japanese demonstrations would jeopardize China’s domestic stability?” Responses are on a 3-point scale including “promoting domestic stability” (1), “no effect on domestic stability” (2), and “jeopardizing domestic stability” (3). A greater number indicates a higher level of perceived costs of anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Interpersonal ties

This variable is measured as a crude binary variable. Respondents are asked whether they know someone who has ever participated in anti-Japanese demonstrations. If they know, it is coded as 1. If not, it is coded as 0.⁴

Nationalist identity

We use two questions to measure nationalist identity. The first question is “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement that I am proud to be a Chinese rather than a citizen of other countries?” The second one is “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement that the world would be better if all other countries were like China?” We code people’s answers on a 5-point scale from “disagree strongly” (1) to “agree strongly” (5). Therefore, for both questions, a higher score implies stronger nationalist identity. We use the variable from the first question in the following analysis. Nevertheless, we also tried using the variable from the second question and a composite variable from both questions. The results were substantively the same.

Group-based anger

Group-based anger is captured by this question: “How do you feel about Japan in general?” We measure the responses on the following 5-point scale—“Like Japan very much” (1), “Like Japan somewhat” (2), “Neutral” (3), “Dislike Japan somewhat” (4), and “Dislike Japan very much” (5). Hence, a higher score suggests a greater level of negative sentiment toward the protested other group Japan.

Socio-demographic characteristics

Gender is a dummy variable, with male coded as 1 and female as 0. Family income is measured through this question: “How much is your parents’ total monthly income approximately?” The possible responses are on a 9-point scale—lower than 1000 RMB⁵ (1), 1000–2000 RMB (2), 2000–4000 RMB (3), 4000–6000 RMB (4), 6000–8000 RMB (5), 8000–10,000 RMB (6), 10,000–15,000 RMB (7), 15,000–20,000 RMB (8), and over 20,000 RMB (9). A larger number indicates more family income. CCP membership is a dummy variable, with 1 indicating a CCP member and 0 a non-CCP member. Academic performance is measured by respondents’ self-reported academic standing in their class. We code the answers on a 5-point scale ranging from “bottom 20%” (1) to “top 20%” (5). A higher score suggests better academic performance.

Previous participation

Prior experience in anti-Japanese demonstrations may have an impact on our modeling. For instance, it may shape individuals’ rational perceptions and, at the same time, generate more social contacts with other protesters. We thus control for previous participation in the analysis. It is measured by this survey question: “Have you ever taken part in any demonstrations against Japan?” It is a binary variable with 1 indicating “yes” and 0 “no.”

Basic descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1, while Table 2 shows their correlations. No correlations between explanatory variables are alarmingly high. Indeed, we do not identify multicollinearity problems in the regression analysis.⁶

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis.

Variables	Mean	Std. dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations	2.992	1.206	1	5
Perceived benefit	2.609	1.041	1	5
Perceived cost	2.401	0.600	1	3
Interpersonal tie	.221	0.415	0	1
Nationalist identity	3.779	1.123	1	5
Group-based anger	3.547	0.987	1	5
Gender (male)	0.540	0.499	0	1
Family income	5.222	2.003	1	9
CCP membership	0.314	0.464	0	1
Academic performance	2.285	1.134	1	5
Previous participation	0.043	0.203	0	1

CCP: Chinese Communist Party.

Table 2.

Correlations between willingness to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations and other variables.

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1. Willingness to participation in anti-Japanese demonstrations	.416*	–.257*	.209*	.157*	.240*	.022	–.140*	.037	–.037	.095*
2. Perceived benefit		–.436*	.104*	.107*	.207*	.046	–.136*	.043	–.009	.013
3. Perceived cost			–.100*	–.088*	–.131*	–.119*	.063*	–.029	.023	–.011
4. Interpersonal tie				–.032	.103*	.053*	.003	–.002	–.032	.282*
5. Nationalist identity					.204*	.054*	–.070*	.012	–.023	–.100*
6. Group-based anger						.168*	–.113*	.043	–.003	.001
7. Gender (male)							–.110*	–.085*	–.116*	.030
8. Family income								–.023	.082*	.037
9. CCP membership									.217*	–.061*
10. Academic performance										.030
11. Previous participation

CCP: Chinese Communist Party.

From 2-tailed tests, ^*p < .05.

Method

We choose the statistical method that can test both types of relations (mediation and interaction) stressed in our theoretical model. First, we adopt the structural equation model (SEM) to examine how perceived benefits and costs mediate the effects of interpersonal ties and nationalist identity on participation motivations. In the theoretical model there are two groups of explanatory variables. Interpersonal ties and nationalist identity are exogenous in the sense that they affect participation motivations and are not shaped by other variables. In contrast, perceived benefits and costs are endogenous. While they affect participation motivations, they are themselves shaped by interpersonal ties and nationalist identity. Perceived benefits and costs are the mediating variables through which interpersonal ties and nationalist identity indirectly influence participation motivations. The SEM is an ideal choice that can accommodate the mediation effects. Interpersonal ties and nationalist identity are also allowed to directly affect participation motivations in the SEM, in order to capture their remaining motivating effects that do not go through the perceived benefits and costs as measured in our data. For example, the measured rational perceptions here all pertain to costs and benefits for China, not for the individual.

Second, we use interaction variables to examine how interpersonal ties and nationalist identity interact with perceived benefits and costs in affecting participation motivations. We create four interaction terms including interpersonal ties × perceived benefits, interpersonal ties × perceived costs, nationalist identity × perceived benefits, and nationalist identity × perceived costs. We incorporate them into the SEM to estimate their effects on participation motivations.

Taken together, the SEM actually estimates the following three regression equations simultaneously

\begin{array}{l} B e n e f i t s = β_{0} + β_{1} T i e s + β_{2} I d e n t i t y + β_{3} A n g e r + β_{4} M a l e + \\ β_{5} I n c o m e + β_{6} C C P + β_{7} A c a d e m i c + β_{8} E x p e r i e n c e + ε \end{array}

(1)

\begin{array}{l} C o s t s = β_{0} + β_{1} T i e s + β_{2} I d e n t i t y + β_{3} A n g e r + β_{4} M a l e + \\ β_{5} I n c o m e + β_{6} C C P + β_{7} A c a d e m i c + β_{8} E x p e r i e n c e + ε \end{array}

(2)

\begin{array}{l} M o t i v a t i o n s = β_{0} + β_{1} T i e s + β_{2} I d e n t i t y + β_{3} B e n e f i t s + \\ β_{4} C o s t s + β_{5} T i e s \times B e n e f i t s + β_{6} T i e s \times C o s t s + \\ β_{7} I d e n t i t y \times B e n e f i t s + β_{8} I d e n t i t y \times C o s t s + \\ β_{9} A n g e r + β_{10} M a l e + β_{11} I n c o m e + β_{12} C C P \\ + β_{13} A c a d e m i c + β_{14} E x p e r i e n c e + ε \end{array}

(3)

In these equations, β₀ is the intercept and the other βs are the coefficients of the explanatory variables, while ε is the error term. We use the “sem” command in the Stata software (release 13) (StataCorp, 2013) to conduct the modeling.

Results

We tried estimating various SEMs with different model specifications, with or without control variables. These SEMs generated substantively the same results. Below we base our discussion on the results of the full SEM that takes all control variables into account.

We first test the hypothesized mediation effects without considering the interaction effects. The estimated SEM results are presented in Table 3. The whole modeling consists of three sub-models—Model 1 with perceived benefits as the dependent variable, Model 2 with perceived costs as the dependent variable, and Model 3 with participation motivations as the dependent variable. For the sake of clarity, although the three models are estimated simultaneously by the SEM, we discuss their results separately.

Table 3.

Motivations to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations: SEM results.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Perceived benefit	Perceived cost	Participation motivations
Interpersonal tie	.205^**	–.110^**	.470^***
Interpersonal tie	(.066)	(.038)	(.068)
Nationalist identity	.069^**	–.037^**	.089^**
Nationalist identity	(.025)	(.014)	(.026)
Perceived benefit			.379^***
Perceived benefit			(.031)
Perceived cost			–.146^**
Perceived cost			(.053)
Group-based anger	.170^***	–.054^**	.155^***
Group-based anger	(.029)	(.017)	(.030)
Gender (male)	.006	–.116^***	–.107
Gender (male)	(.056)	(.033)	(.058)
Family income	–.056^***	.013	–.041^**
Family income	(.014)	(.008)	(.014)
CCP membership	.074	–.056	.054
CCP membership	(.060)	(.035)	(.062)
Academic performance	.003	–.008	.037
Academic performance	(.025)	(.015)	(.026)
Previous participation	–.071	.041	.412^**
Previous participation	(.140)	(.082)	(.144)
Intercept	2.995^***	2.462^***	2.463^***
Intercept	(.169)	(.099)	(.256)

SEM: structural equation model; CCP: Chinese Communist Party.

(1) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; (2) from 2-tailed tests, ^*p < .05; ^**p < .01; ^***p < .001; (3) female is the reference group for gender.

Models 1 and 2 estimate how interpersonal ties and nationalist identity construct perceived benefits and perceived costs, respectively. Interpersonal ties and nationalist identity have significant effects in both models. Specifically, individuals who know others involved in anti-Japanese demonstrations and those who possess strong nationalist identity are more likely to view anti-Japanese demonstrations as beneficial in promoting China’s diplomacy (Model 1), and are less likely to see anti-Japanese demonstrations as risking China’s domestic stability (Model 2).

Model 3 assesses the effects of interpersonal ties, nationalist identity, perceived benefits, and perceived costs on participation motivations. They all display significant effects. Specifically, those who have interpersonal ties with prior demonstrators, those with strong nationalist identity, those who believe that anti-Japanese demonstrations benefit China’s foreign policies and do not jeopardize China’s domestic stability, tend to be more willing to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations.

How do these results bear out the research hypotheses? Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b are all supported by the empirical results. While perceived benefits and costs affect participation motivations, they are significantly constructed by interpersonal ties and nationalist identity. Interpersonal ties and national identity can affect participation motivations indirectly through shaping individuals’ perceptions about benefits and costs. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in addition to the indirect effects via the mediating perceived benefits and costs, interpersonal ties and nationalist identity still have significantly remaining direct effects on participation motivations. In other words, perceived benefits for China’s diplomacy and perceived costs to China’s domestic stability do not capture all the motivating effects of interpersonal ties and nationalist identity. This may be due to the fact that not all costs and benefits associated with movement participation are included in our modeling. The ones considered here pertain to costs and benefits for China. While they are important costs and benefits considered by people in general, there may be other personal cost-benefit considerations (such as personal pleasure derived from group activities and possible risks of being beaten up or jailed).

In addition to these variables of our major interest, the emotional variable and some socio-demographic variables also have significant influences in the modeling. Individuals who are angry with Japan are more likely to see anti-Japanese demonstrations as benefiting China’s diplomacy (Model 1) and not causing domestic instability (Model 2). These angry individuals are also more willing to join anti-Japanese demonstrations (Model 3). Among socio-demographic variables, only family income has a significantly direct impact on participation motivations (Model 3). Individuals from less well-off families are more willing to participate. Furthermore, gender and family income have significantly indirect effects on participation motivations, as they significantly affect perceived benefits and perceived costs. Specifically, individuals from less well-off family background are more likely to see anti-Japanese demonstrations as benefiting China’s diplomacy (Model 1). Women tend to perceive greater costs in participating in anti-Japanese demonstrations than men (Model 2). CCP membership and academic performance have no significant effects in the whole modeling. Finally, while previous experience in anti-Japanese demonstrations has no effect on either perceived benefits or perceived costs, it shows a significantly positive effect on participation motivations.

Next, building on the full SEM we estimate another battery of SEMs with interaction terms to test the hypothesized interaction effects. Table 4 shows the estimated results. The models (Models 1 and 2) predicting how interpersonal ties and nationalist identity affect perceived benefits and costs (the mediating effects) are essentially the same as discussed above. Here, we focus our discussion on the interaction effects. We estimate four SEMs examining the four interaction terms one at a time. We show the results of the four interaction terms in Models 3–1, 3–2, 3–3, and 3–4, respectively.

Table 4.

Motivations to participate in anti-Japanese demonstrations: SEM with interactions.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3–1	Model 3–2	Model 3–3	Model 3–4
	Perceived benefit	Perceived cost	Participation motivations	Participation motivations	Participation motivations	Participation motivations
Interpersonal tie	.205^**	–.110^**	.987^***	.561^*	.470^***	.471^***
Interpersonal tie	(.066)	(.038)	(.183)	(.273)	(.068)	(.068)
Nationalist identity	.069^**	–.037^**	.087^**	.089^**	.109	.045
Nationalist identity	(.025)	(.014)	(.026)	(.026)	(.063)	(.103)
Perceived benefit			.429^***	.379^***	.407^***	.380^***
Perceived benefit			(.035)	(.031)	(.089)	(.031)
Perceived cost			–.137^**	–.137^*	–.147^**	–.213
Perceived cost			(.053)	(.058)	(.053)	(.164)
Interpersonal tie × Perceived benefit			–.188^**
Interpersonal tie × Perceived benefit			(.062)
Interpersonal tie × Perceived cost				–.039
Interpersonal tie × Perceived cost				(.114)
Nationalist identity × Perceived benefit					–.008
Nationalist identity × Perceived benefit					(.022)
Nationalist identity × Perceived cost						.018
Nationalist identity × Perceived cost						(.041)
Group-based anger	.170^***	–.054^**	.157^***	.155^***	.155^***	.156^***
Group-based anger	(.029)	(.017)	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)
Gender (male)	.006	–.116^***	–.104	–.107	–.108	–.106
Gender (male)	(.056)	(.033)	(.058)	(.058)	(.058)	(.058)
Family income	–.056^***	.013	–.042^**	–.041^**	–.041^**	–.041^**
Family income	(.014)	(.008)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
CCP membership	.074	–.056	.057	.053	.053	.054
CCP membership	(.060)	(.035)	(.062)	(.062)	(.062)	(.062)
Academic performance	.003	–.008	.037	.036	.037	.037
Academic performance	(.025)	(.015)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)	(.026)
Previous participation	–.071	.041	.406^**	.412^**	.416^**	.419^**
Previous participation	(.140)	(.082)	(.144)	(.144)	(.144)	(.145)
Intercept	2.992^***	2.464^***	2.343^***	2.460^***	2.412^***	2.542^***
Intercept	(.169)	(.099)	(.259)	(.262)	(.323)	(.454)

SEM: structural equation model; CCP: Chinese Communist Party.

(1) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; (2) from 2-tailed tests, ^*p < .05; ^**p < .01; ^***p < .001; (3) female is the reference group for gender.

Among the four interaction terms, only the one between interpersonal ties and perceived benefits (Model 3–1) is statistically significant, while the others such as interpersonal ties × perceived costs (Model 3–2), nationalist identity × perceived benefits (Model 3–3), and nationalist identity × perceived costs (Model 3–4) all fail to reach statistical significance. Moreover, the significant interaction effect between interpersonal ties and perceived benefits is negative, so the existence of interpersonal ties to other participants reduces the coefficient of perceived benefits. The motivating effect of perceived benefits weakens if the individual has social ties to other participants. The individual would probably follow other participants they know without caring too much about the instrumental value of anti-Japanese demonstrations. Perceived benefits would be more salient in motivating people if they have no ties to other participants.

In contrast, interpersonal ties do not significantly interact with perceived costs in affecting participation motivations. Perceived costs have a similar effect on motivations for those with interpersonal ties and those without. Also, after the perceptions of benefits and costs have formed, they operate independently from nationalist identity in affecting participation motivations. The motivating effect of rational considerations does not differ for individuals with different levels of nationalist identity. Taken together, the results here support Hypothesis 3a but not Hypotheses 3b, 4a and 4b.

Based on the results above Figure 3 visualizes the modified integrative model. We do find empirical evidence in support of both mediation and interaction effects between rational perceptions and structural or cultural factors. In comparison with our original model, the interaction effect is only found to be significant between interpersonal ties and perceived benefits, however. It raises another interesting empirical question whether this finding about the interaction effect is peculiar to the case of China’s anti-Japanese demonstrations or more generalizable. Nevertheless, the results here do support the existence of some sort of interaction between rational perceptions and other factors.

Figure 3.

Modified integrative model of motivations for movement participation.

Conclusion and discussion

This study proposes a theoretical model that integrates the rational approach with the structural and cultural approaches to explain motivations for participation in social movements. This integrative model highlights both the mediation and interaction relations between rational motivators and structural and cultural motivators. First, rational cost-benefit considerations mediate the motivating effects of structural and cultural factors. Perceived benefits and costs of participation are socially constructed by structural and cultural factors such as social ties to prior participants and collective identity. Structural and cultural factors thus can have an indirect impact on participation motivations through shaping individuals’ rational calculation. Hence, rational perceptions do not take shape independently. Different individuals form differing rational perceptions about the same social movement, depending on the social structure they are embedded in and the cultural values they embrace. If we fail to take into account these mediating paths (structural and cultural factors → rational factors → participation motivations), we would overestimate the role played by rational choice while underestimating the structural and cultural effects. While it is important to see individuals’ motivations to join a movement from the perspective of rational choice, we should also note that rationality is socially constructed and can depend on structural embeddedness and cultural identity.

Second, our integrative model also draws attention to the potential interaction effects between rational perceptions and structural and cultural factors. Social structure and cultural identity can affect how sensitive individuals are to rational calculation. Even if the individuals have developed similar perceptions about benefits and costs, the motivating power of these rational perceptions can still vary, depending on the social structure the individuals are embedded in and the cultural identity they have adopted. Although we hypothesize that rational cost–benefit perceptions interact with both structural and cultural factors, we only find a significant interaction effect between interpersonal ties and perceived benefits in the case of China’s anti-Japanese demonstrations. This finding implies that interpersonal ties decrease individuals’ susceptibility to rational calculation about the potential benefit of participation. With existing social ties to prior participants, individuals are likely to decide to participate without considering the instrumental value of the movement. Perceived benefits play a greater role in motivating individuals without such social ties. In contrast, interpersonal ties do not alter the motivation-depressing effect of perceived costs. For individuals with or without social ties to prior participants, perceived costs have a similar impact on participation motivations. Furthermore, there are also no interaction effects found between cost-benefit considerations and collective identity. For individuals with strong or weak collective identity, rational perceptions have similar effects on participation motivations. Taken together, only interpersonal ties shift individuals’ sensitivity to rational calculation, mainly through reducing their susceptibility to perceived benefits of participation.

This theoretical model is found to be helpful in the empirical study of China’s recent anti-Japanese demonstrations. Anti-Japanese demonstrations have arguably become the largest nationwide social movement in today’s China since the 1989 pro-democracy movement. Guided by the integrative theoretical model, we now have more insights into the interplay among rational, structural, and cultural motivators underlying these demonstrations. Nevertheless, this empirical study is not without its limitations. First, due to the cross-sectional nature of the survey data we should refrain from jumping to strong causal conclusions. For instance, the motivating effects of interpersonal ties and nationalist identity may be due to selection or contextual effects. Individuals who are close to social circles critical of Japan are likely to both know each other and be inclined to join anti-Japanese demonstrations. Individuals with more exposure to nationalist propaganda of the state are likely to both adopt strong nationalist identity and be willing to protest against Japan. To better establish causality it would be helpful to collect longitudinal data in future research. For example, we can survey individuals’ rational perceptions and participation motivations before and after they establish connections with prior participants. Longitudinal data would be more effective in establishing causality. Second, the survey was conducted at three elite universities in Beijing so the group under study is the student body from these universities. We should avoid overgeneralizing the findings here to all university students around China, let alone all Chinese citizens. In future research, it would be interesting to examine whether the findings here apply to other social groups in China.

More generally, this integrative model reflects the direction toward which the scholarship on social movement participation should develop. It is well recognized that structural, cultural, and rational factors motivate movement participation. Very few novel explanatory factors have been found in recent studies. It is time to explicitly explore the interrelationship among these well-established factors. We are surely not the only or the first ones to call for this integration (see Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012; Opp, 2009). Our integrative model represents such an attempt in this direction. By explicating the mediation and interaction relations among the motivating factors, this model suggests that rationality is socially constructed and that its actual influence is socially contingent. It helps enrich rational choice theory on social movements. To be sure, the generalizability of this model needs to be tested by more empirical studies. We find this model effective in the case of China’s recent anti-Japanese demonstrations. Scholars are welcome to apply this model to other social movements under different social and political contexts, ideally using longitudinal data.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by an Insight Grant (No. 435-2017-0147) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada.

Notes

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