This article presents an alternative approach to the development of a general theory of microconstitutional choice. The goal of the alternative approach is to identify conditions that affect the likelihood that individuals who face a common-pool resource dilemma will extract themselves from the situation by changing the rules affecting the structure of the situation. These conditions are viewed as variables affected by a situation rather than as assumptions or constants. Situations vary in their capability to generate better or worse information to fallible, learning individuals in the extent to which individuals share norms, in the symmetry of their interests, and in the type of rules regulating entry and use of common-pool resources. Predictions should be based on the specific configuration of these situation-specific variables.
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