Adopting a White-Collar Crime Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Terrorism: An Explorational Undertaking

Abstract

This article is an exploratory attempt to apply a certain theoretical framework to the criminological analysis of terrorism. It follows an approach that was applied before to the study of white-collar crime in the wake of the recent economic meltdown. In a special issue of Criminology & Public Policy, five causal variables emerged from essays that were dealing with the subprime mortgage crisis. These causal variables were used to analyze certain aspects of radical Islamist terrorism and to explore some possible ways to reduce involvement in the current wave of terrorist activities. The analysis indicates that policies targeting two out the three causal variables for reducing white-collar crime—the supply of lure and the increase in the credibility of external oversight—were seen as having potentials for reducing terrorism as well. However, the potential for promising terrorism reduction policies aiming at the third causal variable—increasing the effectiveness of internal oversight and self-restraint—seems problematic.

Keywords

radical terrorism lure credibility of oversight

Introduction

In the last few decades, a growing volume of books and articles were published on the various aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism. Most academic publications on this subject were authored by political scientists, psychologists, and economists, while criminologists were hardly involved in the study of this subject (Freilich & LaFree, 2015). However, in the 2002 November/December issue of the Criminologist, Richard Rosenfeld made a strong case for the criminological study of terrorism. He stated that terrorism is basically a form of “predatory violence” and as such it is in the domain of criminology. Rosenfeld (2002) maintained that “from a scientific standpoint, the difference between terrorism and common violence is the difference between holy water and water” (p. 4). Since the early 2000s, criminological research on various aspects of terrorism has greatly increased. This increase was buttressed by the availability of several funding sources, including the Science and Technology Directorate of Homeland Security, and the establishment of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in 2005 (Rausch & LaFree, 2007).

In an attempt to widen the scope of the criminological study of terrorism, this article explores the feasibility of using a theoretical framework that was applied in the analysis of white-collar crime to the study of radical Islamist terrorism.

Background

There are numerous definitions of terrorism (see, for example, Forst, Green, & Lynch, 2011; Hoffman, 2006). One was offered recently by the editors of a volume dedicated to criminological essays addressing what they call “the most serious problem confronting America today and the years to come—terrorism” (Forst et al., 2011, p. xix). The authors defined terrorism as “ the use of force against innocent people, usually with a political or religious motive, and typically aimed at producing widespread fear—is fundamentally an extreme form of aggression” (p. 2).

Several studies claimed that there is a change in the patterns of terrorism from “old terrorism” to “new terrorism” (see Laqueur, 1999; Lesser, Arquilla, Hoffman, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999; Neumann, 2009). On the contrary, there are some who challenge this perspective by not recognizing major changes between the traditional and the recent patterns of terrorism (see Crenshaw, 2007; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Mockaitis, 2008). Neumann (2009), who does see fundamental differences between the “new” and “old” terrorism, maintains that changes took place in three main areas: in structure, in aim, and in method. According to his analysis, the old form’s structure was “hierarchical, geared toward one centre of gravity,” while the new form is “networked, transnational reach and orientation.” The aims of the old form were “nationalist and/or Marxist,” while the aims of the new form are “religiously inspired.” Finally, the old form’s method was directed at “legitimate targets” and kept certain “rules of engagement,” on the contrary, the new form’s method is “mass causality attacks against civilians; excessive violence” (Neumann, 2009, p. 29).

According to Neumann, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) represented the “old form of terrorism.” In its structure, the Army Council was the decision-making body, the aim was the liberation of Northern Ireland, and its attacks were mainly against local British military targets although there were some attacks in England and a few were in western Europe against British targets. Through the years, the aims and ideology of IRA remained political in spite of the Catholic–Protestant divide between pro-Irish Nationalists and pro-British Unionists. Although IRA’s methods of action were violent, its “mass causality” attacks were relatively rare. Only seven such attacks were documented through the years (Neumann, 2009, p. 35; based on the records of the Conflict Archive on the Internet at the University of Ulster).

As an example of the “new form of terrorism,” Neumann depicted Al-Qaeda whose structure he found not to be clear. Immediately after 9/11 it was seen as a hierarchical organization having a chain of command and central control even so that its affiliates and sleeper-cells were spread in many countries. However, the claim that Al-Qaeda had a centrality of control is questioned by several scholars (e.g., Burke, 2003; Sageman, 2008). In illustrating the structural difference between the old and the new forms of terrorism, some pointed out that the new form has a networking structure “compromised of amateurs who join together for transitory groupings to produce mass casualties” (Dugan & Gibbs, 2009, p. 115).

The declared aim of Al-Qaeda is to liberate Muslims from the dominance of the “Crusader and Zionist Alliance” and from apostate Muslim dictators. Accordingly, Muslims have to defend the Ummah (Muslim community) in a violent struggle (the jihad). Al-Qaeda saw the aims of jihad as the creation of a Unified Muslim Nation (caliphate) governed by Sharia law, the repudiation of Western culture and the establishment of social practices based on the literal interpretation of the Koran. These aims show the confluence of religious and political ideologies. In terms of modus operandi, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates tend to engage in mass-causality attacks. Radical terrorists tend to target large number of civilians often predicated on the Koranic verse that urge Muslims to “fight and slay the nonbelievers wherever to find them . . .” (Bergen, 2016, p. 27). The targets are chosen to maximize civilian causalities, and the “use of violence for a dramatic purpose: usually to instill fear in the target population” (Stern, 1999, p. 11).

In summarizing the changes from “old terrorism” to the “new” one, Neumann pointed to three areas: (a) “the diffusion of terrorist group structures”—from formalized hierarchical toward loose network, and from one center activity toward transnational activity and recruiting; (b) “the rise of religiously inspired ideologies”—reflecting the revival of religiously inspired political movements across the world, which to a large degree, albeit not entirely, replaced nationalism; (c) “the greater lethality and brutality of terrorist operations”—changing the targets from selective government and military targets toward civilian population (indirect targets) aiming to cause mass-causality incidents (Neumann, 2009, pp. 46-47). Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which in the last few years became the most violent and prominent radical Islamist terror organization, is even more representative of the “new form of terrorism” than Al-Qaeda was.

Criminological Perspectives on Terrorism

Following the idea that terrorism should be studied not only by other social scientists but also by criminologists as well (see Clarke & Newman, 2006; Forst et al., 2011; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; Rosenfeld, 2002), in 2009, a special issue of Criminology & Public Policy was dedicated to “Homeland Security and Terrorism.” More recently, Freilich and LaFree (2015) in the introduction to the special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence titled “Criminology Theory and Terrorism” explored the growing number of criminological approaches to the study of this subject. They observed that most studies that applied criminological theories focused on what they called “neoclassical models,” such as routine activities, rational choice, and situational crime prevention (SCP). The authors called for the broadening of criminological inquiry and the inclusion of additional theoretical frameworks to this field of study. Indeed, the special issue featured articles that applied strain theory, social disorganization and routine activities frameworks, and deterrence, rational choice, and SCP approaches to the study of terrorism (Freilich & LaFree, 2015).

As mentioned, in this article, a theoretical model derived from a white-collar crime framework based on the “crime as choice” perspective is applied to analyze radical Islamic terrorist organizations, recruitment to these organizations, and the possibilities for the reduction of the terrorist activities.

This theoretical exploration is conducted with the realization that there are basic differences between white-collar crime, which itself has definitional problems (see, for example, Benson & Simpson, 2009; Geis, 1992; Friedrichs, 2010), and terrorism which, as noted earlier, also has numerous definitions. It is clear that whatever definitions are used, white-collar crimes are committed mainly for economic benefits, while terrorism is driven by political and/or religious ideology. To finance their operations, terrorists are also involved in economic and financial crimes, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling (see, for example, Hoffman, 2006; Smelser, 2007). Shover and Grabosky (2010) in the introduction to the special issue of Criminology & Public Policy (2010) which focused on “The Global Economy, Economic Crisis, and White-Collar Crime” reviewed four research articles and related policy essays of that issue. The articles aimed at explaining the “aggregate rate of corporate economic white-collar crime” and were suggesting ways to prevent or at least to reduce such crimes that led to the recent economic meltdown. The articles tended to follow the “logic of crime as choice theory” embraced by Shover and Hochstetler (2006) and they underlined

the importance of five causal variables: (1) the size of the pool of tempted/criminally predisposed individuals and criminally predisposed organizations, (2) the supply of lure, (3) prevailing beliefs about the credibility of external oversight, (4) how extensively and effectively internal oversight and self-restraint are deployed, and (5) supply of criminal opportunities. (p. 430)

In this article, the same causal variables are applied for the analysis of radical Islamic terrorism and for the potential reduction of terrorist attacks and radicalization.

In the editorial conclusion of the same special issue titled “Forestalling the Next Epidemic of White-Collar Crime: Linking Policy to Theory,” Grabosky and Shover (2010, p. 641) emphasized three main areas for policy initiatives to reduce the odds for the recurrence of the recent economic crisis. They suggested focusing on three of the causal variables mentioned earlier, namely, “reduction of the supply of lure,” “increasing the perceived credibility of external oversight,” and “increasing effective internal oversight and self-restraint.” The authors did not explore the other two variables: the “size of the pool of tempted and predisposed individuals” and the “supply of criminal opportunities” by claiming that effective policies aimed at one or more the other three variables would reduce them as well. A modified version of the above policy initiatives for the reduction of the odds for the recurrence of economic crisis suggested by Grabosky and Shover was applied to reduce the odds for Islamic terrorist activity and recruitment.

Reduction of the Supply of Terrorism Lure

The “reduction of the supply of lure” is an important step in addressing the problem of involvement in jihadist terrorism. Shover and Grabosky (2010) defined lure as “something that is attractive and covetable” (p. 431). This definition follows Shover and Hochstetler’s (2006) work focusing on white-collar crime which stated that lure is “arrangements that turns heads” (p. 27). In the case of terrorism, it is more challenging to define and analyze lure than in the case of white-collar crime where lure centers mostly on various forms of fiscal gains and economic benefits.

On the ideological level, for radical Islamists, lure includes the liberation of Muslims from political, economic, and cultural dominance of the “Crusaders” referring to Westerners, and in the context of the Israel–Palestine conflict, liberation from the Zionists. In addition, for a terrorist organization, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the lure also includes attempts to regain the past virtue and glory of the caliphate through the reestablishment of the unified Muslim nation based on Sharia law (see, Neumann, 2009).

On the operational level, radical Islamic organizations and their followers use violence and the threat of violence against noncombatants and strive to spread fear in the public in Western societies and among their adversaries (Jenkins, 1974). Above all, their aim is the pursuance and “acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change,” including the ability to exercise power to dominate, intimidate, coerce, and control other people through violence (Hoffman, 2006, p. 2). Mass-causality attacks spread fear not only among the direct targets of the attacks but also in a much wider circle increasing the reputation and self-importance of terrorists.

The lure for individual recruits can vary. Among others, for believers fulfilling the Koran’s imposition of religious duty to fight for Allah if Islam is threatened can be considered as lure. The extreme example of this lure is the suicide mission seen by jihadists as “martyrdom.” One’s readiness to sacrifice his or her life is not only a testimony of religious commitment but also seen as a performance of a religious act (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Laqueur, 1999). Becoming a martyr promises salvation, high rewards in afterlife, and tangible social and material rewards for the surviving family members (Smelser, 2007).

Thus, achieving martyrdom is a lure in a culture which highly respects and even adulates martyrs and accords them with a high level of social approval in their community, in their kinship group, and often in their close family as well (Hoffman, 2006; Pape, 2005). Consequently, becoming a “martyr” is coveted by some young Muslims in joining terrorist organizations and “a whole mythology develops around them” (O’Connor, 2009, p. 28). Similarly, violence research indicates that extreme violent acts committed by individuals who receive approval by their reference group raise their self-esteem (Albrecht, 2003), which especially for young Muslims in Western societies may be an important factor.

In looking into the background of what Shover and Hochstetler (2006) call “generative worlds” of many radicalized second generation Muslim immigrants in Western societies, it is found that they grew up in ethnic neighborhoods and are isolated and alienated from wider society, as the recent Paris and Brussels attacks illustrate. They are looking for comradeship which they can find through “differential association” (Sutherland, 1947) with other young Muslims in their social surroundings. As Curry (2011) observed, similar to juvenile gang members, terrorists are “guided by and depend on the collective and moral support of their comrades” (p. 99). The importance of friendship bonds in joining terrorist groups is also emphasized by Sageman (2004) and Pape (2005), and it is true in countries where Muslim immigrants live in ethnic enclaves, like in Belgium, France, and several other European societies. These young people whom Leiken (2016 p. 265) referred to as postmigrant “marginal men” find themselves suspended between two cultures, their parents’ old fashioned Islamic ways and the modern liberal way of life, neither of them offers them secure footing. In this context, ties to others who experience similar social marginality are very important. Involvement in extreme violence directed against civilians and aimed at spreading fear through publicity generated by sophisticated terrorist propaganda, as well as, by mainline media, provide those who engage in terrorist acts with the sense of power, recognition, and notoriety which they never had before and which they crave for (Borowitz, 2005).

For some young marginalized Muslim males, adopting an image of being tough, aggressive, violent, mean, fearless, independent, and indifferent to others’ opinions about them can be very attractive. This image is what Katz (1988) referred to as “badass,” which according to him means “real bad” (p. 81). Being a badass who can generate fear and gain publicity in a society where many look down on them may not only be attractive but also can become even glamorous. For example, in a Los Angeles Times Op-Ed, Simon Cottee (2014) claimed that the British rapper Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary the ISIS terrorist who beheaded several hostages, projected the aura of badass which is seductive and might be a powerful lure for these youth.

The reduction of lure is a major challenge in addressing the problem of jihadist terrorism

As seen, some of the lure is rooted in the Islamic religious theology and cultural tradition. Fighting for Allah and martyrdom as religious commitments could be addressed by Muslim religious leaders declaring that violence against civilians and children should not be considered as a defense of Islam. One of the problems is that there are radical clerics who in their sermons and by the issuance of fatwas (religious decrees) encourage young Muslims to commit violent acts in the fight against those who they deem threatening Islam (see, for example, Hoffman, 2006; Mahan & Griset, 2013; Yungher, 2008). One way to temper the religious fervor for violence and for achieving martyrdom would be the denial of the existence of afterlife rewards in Paradise, including the welcoming of martyrs by 72 virgins. Also, revealing, publicizing, and underscoring the fact that very few religious and secular leaders were among the martyrs who sacrificed their own life in fighting for Allah, may dissuade some youngsters from committing themselves for “martyrdom.”

Another possible way to reduce the lure is to lessen the publicity accorded to terrorists and terrorist activities in the mainline media. By all accounts, terrorists are seeking publicity to explain their cause, to recruit new members, to spread fear in the public, and to create an image of being victorious for their cause. A research project by students of political psychology and communication found that terrorists aim to gain publicity using mainline and social media to induce “fear and anxiety in people through focused acts of brutality and violence” (Huddy, Feldman, Lahav, & Taber, 2003, p. 255). In this vein, some commentators, theorists, and academics unintentionally help the terrorists’ aim to spread fear by amplifying the risk of becoming victims of terrorist attacks, and by claiming that in advanced societies people are “living in a ‘terroristic world risk society’” characterized by “perpetual uncertainty” (Mythen & Walklate, 2006, p. 26). In a stronger statement, Lumbaca and Gray (2011) concluded that “the media does indeed function as an Enabler for Terrorism” (p. 45). Other research has indicated that there is a positive correlation between the exposure to terrorism related news and the perceived risk of and fear of terrorism (Nellis, 2012). The successful management of this fear, as Forst (2011) suggested, is likely to reduce the lure of domination over people by spreading fearfulness.

The frequent reporting about terrorist acts and their victims amplifies the risk of terrorism, encourages and embellishes the reputation of individual terrorists who gain notoriety and a feeling of self-importance from continuously being the object of news headlines, from being the center of roundtable discussions and “experts’ analysis.” Besides limiting the extent of news and programs related to terrorism, publicity should be used to show and emphasize terrorists’ losses, failures, defeats, botched attempts, and infighting among different terrorist organizations and groups, without denying or attenuating the real risk of terrorist activity. This kind of publicity could break or at least lower the sense of glory and invincibility that terrorist propaganda aims to project by spreading fear in target populations. However, it is recognized that any changes in media behavior, besides being controversial in democratic societies, have to be very cautious and balanced, because as risk researchers point out, there are hazards not only in “risk amplification” but in “risk attenuation” as well (Pidgeon, Kasperson, & Slovic, 2003).

The lure of camaraderie for young men, who join terrorist groups, has been emphasized before. This lure can be reduced by publicizing that camaraderie has its limits and often does not hold when terrorists are losing ground and are in disarray. For example, there have been reports that with the defeats of ISIS by Iraqi and Kurdish forces, some Western fighters tried to return to their home countries, but they were threatened and their life was in jeopardy if they attempted to leave (see, for example, Abi-Habib, 2016). Proving that the bond of camaraderie among terrorists is not as strong as it was projected by their propaganda and as was imagined by many, and that it might weaken when terrorists are losing ground, may serve as a possible factor in the reduction of lure.

Increasing the Credibility of External Oversight

The next policy initiative to reduce white-collar crime by increasing the credibility of external oversight (Grabosky & Shover, 2010) was explored in the context of terrorism. This policy initiative followed the classical deterrence approach stemming from the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. According to this approach, people act rationally pursuing their own self-interest by using hedonistic calculus to weight the possible gains versus the potential risks of their actions. This philosophy became the forerunner of the contemporary economic perspective of the rational choice theory which found its way into the theoretical spectrum of criminology and penology (see, for example, Piquero & Tibbetts, 2002). Succinctly stated, people make choices based on the expected benefits of an action versus the expected losses that they may suffer (expected utility principle). This approach is followed by many criminologists (Akers, 1994; Geis, 1973; Shichor, 2006; Simpson, Piquero, & Paternoster, 2002).

In an article focusing on airline hijacking, Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) pointed out that using the utilitarian approach in an effort to control crime, effective use of punishment should serve as a deterrent against involvement in criminal activity. Consequently, this approach suggests that terrorist acts can be deterred if preventive policies are perceived as being effective by potential criminals. On the contrary, if there is a perception that prevailing policies are not effective, criminal activity will not only continue but likely that it will even increase (Kleiman, 1999). Following this reasoning, the level of success or failure of terrorist attacks to a large degree are dependent on whether preventive efforts are seen as effective or not by actual and/or potential terrorists (Dugan et al., 2005). Therefore, prevention efforts have to include policies and methods that can create perceptions of efficient control, surveillance, and defense against terrorist attacks. The belief in the effectiveness of these policies may deter or at least reduce terrorist activity and at the same time reinforce the public’s sense of security and public morale. Moreover, the perceived credibility of oversight may lower the level of public fear which, as seen, can contribute to the reduction of lure as well.

To create and devise effective, preventive, and reduction oriented policies, there is a need to learn and understand the motivation, the way of thinking, and the decision-making processes of terrorist organizations and of terrorist individuals (Ganor, 2015). In this vein, a recent article by Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey, and Feinberg (2013) analyzed cultural factors and their relationship to terrorism, a connection which surprisingly seldom was dealt with before. There is a tendency among Westerners, often including individuals in leadership positions, to assume that people in other societies and cultures fully share Western values, norms, concepts, and ways of thinking. This assumption is extended over non-Western societies which have cultural backgrounds not only different than their own but even hostile to Western values and norms. People who grow up in these kinds of societies are guided by different rationality in their thinking and actions than Westerners are accustomed to. As rationality is a cultural construct, terrorists and would be terrorists have to believe that the measures implemented to prevent terror attacks are efficient in their own terms. Ganor (2015) maintained that Western counterterrorism “experts” and decision makers make the mistake of considering terrorists as irrational people, and therefore, their actions cannot be predicted and analyzed. In other words, the effectiveness of preventive measures has to be demonstrated in terms of the terrorists’ culture and their “rationality.”

Relating to the issue of the terrorists’ rationality, Clarke and Newman (2006) suggested that terrorists are rational “seeking to maximize their benefits, while reducing the effort required and risks of failure” (p. 12). Although this approach seems similar to the rationality concept of Western culture, however, for the terrorists “the benefits constitute harm to society attacked—in terms of loss of life, destruction, disruption of commerce and heightened fear.”

Making the perception of oversight over terrorism to be seen more effective and credible both in the eyes of the terrorists and in the eyes of the general public might be problematic for several reasons. Counterterrorism efforts are continuous and mostly covert; therefore, foiled terrorist attacks are not always visible and publicized in detail and may have only a limited impact on the perception of their effectiveness. Also, counterterrorism efforts are hampered by what Ganor (2015) referred to as “reverse symmetry effects” (p. 4). According to this concept, terrorist portray themselves as David fighting Goliath the big state power; this asymmetry “allows” them to violate all internationally accepted conventions, thus they use human shields, private homes, hospitals, places of worship, and schools to launch their attacks while authorities trying to stop them limit their own activities in line with certain “rules of engagements.” These rules may vary among Western countries, and sometimes may be even violated by them, nevertheless they do restrain their counter activities and tend to limit their effectiveness to fight and reduce terrorist attacks.

A related issue of concern in democratic societies is to what degree oversight policies and practices may violate individual liberties and human rights. The problem is maintaining liberty which according to Kleinig (2011) is “concerned with external social control on the person” (p. 359) while protecting human rights. Trying to maintain external and credible oversight over terrorism which is in line with the moral values of democratic societies may hurt the effectiveness of these efforts. For example, practices such as certain information gathering techniques, profiling, use of informants, certain interrogation methods, wiretapping, telephone record checks, hacking, and limits on social media could enhance preventive efforts, but are restricted as they are considered as violation of privacy and/or violation of human rights. The ethical and moral concerns to maintain democratic values and norms in fighting terrorism are likely to hamper the effectiveness of these efforts, which in turn, may create the perception that the external oversight is not efficient enough.

Also, the political discourse and debate about terrorism add to the perception of ineffective oversight. For example, the tendency to overemphasize terrorist threats in the aftermath of 9/11 projected a picture of lack of alertness, weakness in information gathering, and lackluster preventive efforts. Also, the tendency of the authorities to play down the importance of terrorist organizations, such as President Obama’s characterization of ISIS as “juvenile varsity” gave the impression of misconception and even naiveté by the administration to fully recognize terrorist threats, which is likely to result in the use of inefficient measures to prevent and control terrorist attacks. Similarly, the Fort Hood shooting by Major Nidal Malik Hasan, that killed 13 soldiers and injured more than 30 others, was classified by the Department of Defense as a case of “workplace violence” could have raised doubts in the public about the government’s attitude, sincerity, seriousness, and ability to implement effective policies for the oversight and reduction of terrorism. This case became even more perplexing by the revelation that Major Hasan had previous contacts with the radical cleric Al Awlaki and openly made radical Islamic statements while serving as a psychiatrist in the army (see Simon, 2013). Similarly, revelations such as the one that Omar Mateen who during his killing spree in Orlando pledged alliance to ISIS, had been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) previously for possible terror connections but was not detained, and several terrorists in Europe who were involved in major attacks (e.g., in Paris, Brussels, Berlin) were on the police list as suspects, raise questions regarding the effectiveness and credibility of oversight both in the eyes of the terrorists and in the eyes of the public.

There are some steps that could be taken to increase the “prevailing estimates of the credibility of external oversight” of terrorism both by the terrorist and by the public. Some of them are listed as follows: (a) The extent of media reporting of activities related to terrorism should be curtailed. News programs, documentaries, roundtables, and interviews focusing on terrorism and related topics should be limited as much as possible. It is understood that in a free market system media outlets are competing for audience by providing sensational programs, but as mentioned, the media’s saturation with terror related broadcasts and presentations amplifies the risk of terrorism and contributes greatly to excessive fear of terrorism. Forst (2011) pointed out that not only the media but also politicians who are exploiting the public fear for political purposes contribute to the amplification of risk, thus they should be actively urged to use self-restraint in this regard. As noted, the spread of fear reinforces the perception of lack of credibility of oversight. Although the reduction of fear is clearly related to changing this perception, it is realized that restraining media coverage and politicians’ use of fear of terrorism for political purposes are hard to implement in a democratic society in which free speech and the freedom of press are fundamental principles. (b) There are many foiled terrorist attempts, arrests of terrorists, and prosecutions of alleged terrorists (Dahl, 2011). All these cases, as well as, any new policies related to surveillance, acquisition of new technology to discover terrorist cells and potential terrorists, should be widely publicized to discourage terrorist involvement and to increase the public’s and the terrorists’ perceptions of the effectiveness of oversight. (c) Administrative classifications and statements by government officials should be realistic and credible to reinforce public perceptions that the problem of terrorism is taken seriously by the authorities and there is a bona fide effort to implement effective measures of oversight over terrorist activity.

Increasing the Use of Effective System of Internal Oversight and Self-Restraint

Another target for reducing white-collar crime suggested by Grabosky and Shover (2010) was to increase “the use of effective systems of internal oversight and self-restraint” (p. 641). The question is how to define internal oversight and self-restraint in addressing radical Islamist terrorism. In case of jihadist groups and individuals having various degrees of religious devotion, religious leaders should provide the first line of internal oversight. However, as mentioned, although there are religious leaders who try to moderate violence, often others such as Anwar al-Awlaki became the spiritual leaders of terrorist groups or at least the supporters of radical Islam. In fact, even after his death, Anwar al-Awlaki continues to be a major inspiration for the radicalization and recruitment of “lone wolf” terrorists through his video recordings (see, Simon, 2013).

The community where terrorists or would be terrorists live has a major impact on the support or the restraint of terrorism. Southers (2013) in his recent book on homegrown terrorism referred to the “enabling community” which shows a general support for terrorist activities, even so, that most of the community members are not actively involved in such behavior. As Islamic terrorism is characterized by a networking structure in which increasingly amateurs, often in transitory groupings cause mass causalities (Neumann, 2009), more attention should be paid to the “enablers” of terrorism. Dugan and Gibbs (2009) in their review of recommendations for the reduction of terrorism did mention the importance of support networks of enablers in furthering rather than limiting terrorist activity.

Ganor (2016) claimed that the potential terrorists’ inner circle (family members, friends, community leaders, and clerics) which serve as their emotional support-base, has an important role in their decision to join a terrorist group or to refrain from terrorist activities. Policies aimed at reaching this support-base might help, albeit in some cases may even hamper, efforts to reduce recruitment to terrorist organizations. To gain support of Muslim communities in the West against terrorism, there are efforts to seek the cooperation of moderate community leaders. Schmid (2014) observed that large segments of Muslim populations in their native countries, as well as in Western countries, sympathize with and often support terrorist organizations. Malthaner and Waldmann (2014) went even further suggesting that terrorist groups

emerge from and operate within a specific, immediate social environment—what we call the radical milieu—which share their perspective and objectives, approves of certain forms of violence, and (at least to certain extent) supports the violent group morally and logistically. (p. 979)

As mentioned, there are imams, who as religious leaders could have tried to slow down violence and to preach for peace and restraint but did not do so, or even did the opposite. Also, as Schmid (2014) found, some Western governments have tried to engage “non-traditional” Muslim leaders to counter attempts to recruit violent extremists by terrorist organizations. Schmid did not find these attempts very successful, reaching the conclusion that “the distinction between acceptable ‘non-violent extremists’ and unacceptable ‘violent extremists’ is a false and illusionary one since religious extremism (as opposed to some form of secular radicalism) is inherently violent. Islamist extremism needs to be challenged and confronted rather than accommodated and tolerated by liberal democracies.” (p. 2). The above accounts do not see much promise in the impact of positive community influence in reducing terrorist involvement through an approach described by Hoffman (2006) as “strong confidence-building ties with communities from which terrorists are most likely to come or hide in, and mount communication campaigns to eradicate support from these communities” (p. 169).

In many cases, the most productive internal oversight agents might be primary group and peer group associations of active or would be terrorists. As indicated earlier, similar to the importance of peer and friendship relations in delinquency, involvement in terrorist groups is influenced by social bonds formed in peer, friendship, and kinship groups (Curry, 2011; Sageman, 2004). Southers (2013) reinforced this position by emphasizing the role of “groupthink” in the recruitment of young Muslims to commit terrorist acts. Channeling group influence away from terrorist violence and turning it into positive oversight and restraint of terrorist activity remain a major challenge. It is likely to be especially so in immigrant communities where social relations are often based on kinship and religious ties, where there is a lack of support for universal norms and an absence of ties to outside groups (Rosenfeld, 2004).

The increase and extent of effective internal controls are related not only to the level of acceptance of the immigrants and their assimilation to a wider society but also to their own cultural backgrounds. Muslim immigrant groups are not monolithic; they differ in social and cultural characteristics (Gelfand et al., 2013) which have a bearing not only on their members’ readiness to be involved in terrorism but also on their readiness and ability to exercise oversight over terrorist violence in their community. In short, there are several variables that play a role in the development of effective internal oversight over terrorist involvement; these include, among others, the cultural background of the immigrant community, the nature of primary group relations, and the ties to wider society.

Exploration of the Two Causal Variables That Were Not Analyzed in Detail

Grabosky and Shover (2010) did not analyze in detail the potential prospects of two other causal variables namely—the pool of tempted/predisposed individuals and organizations and the supply of criminal opportunities—in reducing the odds for the recurrence of economic meltdowns. However, they did state that effective policies aimed at reducing the supply of lure, increasing the perceived credibility of external oversight, and increasing the effectiveness of internal oversight would reduce the pool of predisposed and tempted individuals/organizations and the supply of criminal opportunities. Although this statement seems logical, it might be useful to explore some aspects of the remaining two “causal variables” in the context of reduction of terrorism.

The Size of the Pool of Tempted/Predisposed Individuals and Organizations for Terrorism

Considering the current wave of radical Islamist terrorism, it seems that a large pool of tempted and predisposed individuals is available not only in Muslim majority countries but also in western European countries (see the major terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Berlin), to a lesser degree in the United States (see the homegrown terrorist attacks in Boston, San Bernardino, and Orlando), and in Canada and Australia.

Recruitment propaganda aimed at Western Muslim communities by terrorist organizations, especially by ISIS, is focusing on the pool of mainly second generation young Muslims, many of whom are not well absorbed into mainstream societies and may feel alienated, feel disenfranchised, and/or unstable. Many of them grew up in ethnic enclaves in a cultural milieu that is foreign and often hostile to Western culture, values, and norms. Many of these youth are frustrated with their life in Western societies (Leiken, 2016), some of them have criminal records and spent time in prisons like a number of those who were involved in attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany. Until being radicalized, many of them were secular not showing much religious fervor and were involved in drinking, gambling, and other activities that are forbidden by Sharia. Large numbers of Westerners who traveled to join ISIS and those who committed terrorist attacks in the name of ISIS may fit these patterns. This situation may be more complex and challenging as recent research indicates that in the United States, jihadists tend to be older (in average 29-years old), one third of them are married, some of them are well-educated and as mentally stable as typical citizens (Bergen, 2016).

Considering the fact that the Muslim population in Western countries is increasing, especially in the younger age groups due to the wave of immigration and the higher than average birth rates, it is likely that the size of the pool of tempted and predisposed individuals for terrorist involvement may grow. Hence, the suggested reduction in lure and the increasing effectiveness of external and internal oversights mentioned before will hardly be able to reduce the supply of the pool of potential recruits for terrorist groups. The significant reduction of this pool, beyond unrealistic expectations of rapid social and cultural assimilation of immigrants and major restrictions on immigration, including the rejection of refugees and asylum seekers, does not look feasible in the foreseeable future.

Supply of Terrorist Opportunities

Shover and Grabosky (2010) tied the supply of criminal opportunities to the credibility of oversight by suggesting that the supply of opportunities becomes a lure in the absence of effective oversight. They maintained that when there is a “widely held perception that credible oversight is lacking transforms the supply of lure into a tide of criminal opportunities” (p. 432). In the case of radical Islamist terrorism, these opportunities are situations in which mass terrorist attacks can be carried out successfully.

The opportunity perspective in criminology focuses on the place and the situation, on when and where a crime occurs rather than on offenders’ personality, background, and motivation (Lynch, 2011). Benson and Simpson (2009) with a focus on studying white-collar crime from an opportunity perspective state, “The opportunity perspective alerts us to the possibility that sometimes we can prevent or at least reduce particular forms of crime without necessarily doing anything directly to the offender” (pp. ix-x). In other words, this perspective is concerned with the crime rather than with the criminality of perpetrators, which according to Clarke (2016) until recently was prevalent in criminological theory and research. The opportunity perspective is often embraced by applied criminologists and policy makers because it lends itself to practical methods and measures of crime prevention. The most familiar formulations of this perspective are the routine activity and the SCP perspectives (Clarke, 1980; Cohen & Felson, 1979). These approaches are representative of the rational choice theoretical perspective which suggests that “crime can be reduced or eliminated by convincing rational criminals that the opportunity to commit crime can be reduced” (Cordella & Siegel, 1996, p. 18).

Lynch (2011) claimed that although SCP was successful in reducing crime, it is not clear yet how the opportunity theoretical approach can be applied to the reduction of terrorist acts. He maintained that the “rare-event” nature of terrorism relative to street crime makes it difficult to conduct empirical investigations on prevention efforts (p. 152). However, the recent increase in mass-causality attacks such as those that occurred in Paris, Brussels, Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, Nice, Berlin in Western countries and in Istanbul, Dhaka, Kabul, Bagdad, Mosul in Muslim majority countries and the increase in “lone wolf” attacks may provide better opportunities for empirical evaluation of preventive policies and measures.

In modern Western democratic societies, opportunities for large-scale mass terrorist attacks are abundant. Most soft targets such as churches, shopping malls, concert halls, night clubs, sporting events, transportation hubs, airports, public festivities, university campuses, and others can hardly be fully protected not only because of their scale and numbers but also because of limits in fiscal and human resources needed for a long term state of emergency (Stewart, 2016). Similarly, there are abundant opportunities for such attacks in Muslim majority countries because of less-than-efficient external and internal controls.

An important aspect of opportunity is the actual or perceived vulnerability of targets. As Morris (2015) pointed out, SCP assumes that terrorists make choices based on their assessment of “the attractiveness and vulnerability of the target” (p. 419). Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) distinguished among primary victimization that affects personalized victims, secondary victimization that involves impersonal victims (such as public buildings, churches, public transportation, recreation centers, schools), and tertiary victimization which is diffused and extends to the entire community. It is characteristic of the wave of Islamic terrorism that besides killing and maiming as many people as possible, it also focuses on secondary and tertiary victimization in the selection of vulnerable targets for mass destruction (Shichor, 2007). The perceived vulnerability of targets becomes a lure for terrorists as a successful attack against a not well protected target (lack of effective oversight) may further their aim of destruction, may increase publicity and spread fear in the public.

To reduce terrorist opportunities, there is a need not only in SCP measures, but as David Omand (2016) the former Security and Intelligence Coordinator of the United Kingdom emphasizes, also in vastly improved international intelligence sharing between security agencies. Intelligence gathering should be based on digital methods, on electronic surveillance under legal safeguards, and also on “old fashioned” human based methods. Dahl (2011) stated in this regard that “The most important step forward preventing future attacks is to focus on local and domestic intelligence, and to figure out how to gather the necessary intelligence while still maintaining the proper balance between civil liberties and national security” (p. 635).

Conclusion

The theoretical approach taken in this article is a modest contribution to the growing criminological literature of the study of terrorism in line with the recent interest of widening criminological approaches to this subject (Freilich & LaFree, 2015). It is an exploratory attempt to apply an additional theoretical framework to the study of Islamic terrorism. The above framework was adopted from the analysis of white-collar crime related to the recent economic crisis and endeavored to propose potential ways for reducing the odds for its recurrence. A modified version of causal variables that emerged from the analysis of the essays published in a special issue of Criminology & Public Policy (Grabosky & Shover, 2010; Shover & Grabosky, 2010) was used to explore its potential for the reduction of Islamic terrorist activities. The causal variables analyzed were related to the size of the pool of tempted individuals and organizations, to the supply of lure, to the prevailing estimates of external oversight, to the system of internal oversight, and to the supply of terrorist opportunities. After exploring the reduction potential of the above mentioned variables, it seems that reducing the supply of lure and increasing the prevailing estimates of the credibility of external oversight have some promising possibilities for reducing terrorist activities and recruitment. The reduction of the size of the pool of tempted and predisposed individuals and organizations does not look feasible in the foreseeable future. In fact, this pool is likely to increase with the high birth rate and mass migration of Muslims to Western countries while their absorption and assimilation to the surrounding societies are slow. Thus, it may take a considerable time until an effective internal oversight mainly through positive community control of terrorism will emerge in that population. As far as the reduction of the supply of terrorist opportunities is concerned, improvement of surveillance methods, technological advances, development of traditional on-the-ground intelligence gathering, and improved international information sharing and cooperation may have positive reduction effects in spite of the multitude of opportunities for terrorist attacks available in modern democratic as well as in nondemocratic societies.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biography

David Shichor (BA, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Sociology and History; PhD, University of Southern California, Sociology) is professor emeritus of Criminal Justice California State University SanBernardino. He authored and co-authored ten books and over one hundred professional articles on juvenile delinquency, corrections, private prisons, victimology and white-collar crime.

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