Twice Punished: Perceived Procedural Fairness and Legitimacy of Monetary Sanctions

Abstract

Legal financial obligations (LFOs) are routinely assessed by the courts and corrections agencies. Yet, little is known about how individuals under correctional supervision experience and perceive legal debt. Understanding perceptions of LFOs is critical as research suggests that individuals who believe that criminal justice sanctions are fair and just are more likely to perceive the system as legitimate and comply. The current study examines in-depth interview data with individuals on probation or parole to understand perspectives of LFOs and what factors may condition these views. The results suggest that participants’ views are quite varied—expressing that they deserve some level of financial punishment, particularly in restitution cases, but they question additional costs that are not directly linked to the circumstances of the case, such as supervision fees, that exacerbate a perceived experience of double jeopardy or contradict the perceived purpose of the monetary assessment. Subgroup analyses suggest that individuals with a conviction for a sexual offense have secondary financial sanctions that deepen perceptions of inequities in the system.

Keywords

legal financial obligations community corrections procedural justice sex offenses

Introduction

Legal financial obligations (LFOs) are increasingly commonplace in the criminal justice system. LFOs assigned at sentencing in the forms of fines, fees, court costs, and restitution are a nearly ubiquitous experience for system-involved individuals (Fernandes et al., 2019; Martin et al., 2018). There has also been a parallel growth in the assessment of costs associated with correctional supervision (Pleggenkuhle, 2018; Ruhland, 2019; Ruhland et al., 2017). There is emerging evidence that suggests that monetary sanctions can complicate the reintegration process for individuals under correctional supervision (Harris et al., 2010; Pleggenkuhle, 2018) and can have negative effects on postconviction success (Heaton et al., 2017; Ruhland, 2019) including higher rates of recidivism (Iratzoqui & Metcalfe, 2017; Piquero & Jennings, 2017).

Much remains to be learned about individual perceptions of, and experience with, LFOs, particularly people under community supervision. The current research explores how the assessment and collection of LFOs affect system-involved individual’s community supervision experiences and views of the criminal justice system. The procedural justice and legitimacy frameworks provide a theoretical context for understanding how individuals perceive the imposition of LFOs as part of the larger apparatus of correctional control (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tyler, 1990, 2003). This work adds to the literature in several important ways. First, although most of the current work on monetary sanctions centers on detailing their prevalence and scope, we document the lived experience of people who owe LFOs and how they perceive the legitimacy of these sanctions. Most existing work on procedural justice and legitimacy focuses on citizen contacts with the police, particularly men of color living in urban areas (Brunson & Wade, 2019; Brunson & Weitzer, 2009; Desmond et al., 2016; Tyler, 2004), with much less known about how citizens perceive community supervision including supervision costs. Second, this study draws from a rich and broad qualitative data set of individuals under correctional control, which includes an oversampling of individuals convicted of a sexual offense. Members of this offense subgroup are subject to additional legal oversight, including registration, mandated treatment, and polygraph examinations, many of which come with requisite costs (Kras et al., 2018). However, little is known about perceptions of economic sanctions among individuals convicted of different crimes. This work compares the perceptions of LFOs among individuals who have a sexual offense conviction with those with other conviction types. Finally, this work emphasizes the nuance underlying the varied collateral costs related to conviction and correctional supervision that are often combined in prior scholarship.

Background

LFOs

Economic sanctions are commonplace in the criminal legal system (Martin et al., 2018). Broadly termed LFOs, individuals with criminal convictions can be held legally responsible for financial assessments such as court costs, restitution orders, fines, supervision fees, and costs associated with postconviction supervision such as drug testing or treatment programs (Harris et al., 2010). LFOs have grown steadily over the past two decades, shifting fiscal costs from the state to the justice-involved individual (Harris et al., 2010; Page & Soss, 2017; Rosenthal & Weissman, 2007). Estimates suggest that more than 80% of probationers had been assessed financial penalties including costs associated with community supervision (Harris et al., 2010). Individuals under supervision are frequently required to pay a monthly cost, ranging from US$10 to US$100, and often lasting the duration of supervision (Harris et al., 2011). Many correctional agencies also levy specialty fees for elements of supervision including mandated treatment, electronic monitoring, and drug testing (Bannon et al., 2010; Button et al., 2009). Moreover, correctional fees are often not disclosed at the time of sentencing, and current evidence suggests there is wide variation in the use of waivers or sliding scales for individuals who cannot pay (Rosenthal & Weissman, 2007). In a nationwide study of probation, Ruhland and colleagues (2017) found that 20% of agencies prohibited waiving supervision fees in their entirety, and there was little clarity of procedures on how and when waivers were given.

An emerging body of work reveals variation in LFOs based on offense type. Persons convicted of sexual offenses are often subject to greater LFOs while under correctional supervision (Pleggenkuhle, 2018) and ordered to additional supervision conditions including residence restrictions, Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring, and polygraph tests (Kras et al., 2018; Makin et al., 2018; Omori & Turner, 2015). In many states, individuals must pay annually (or more often) for public registration and notification (Makin et al., 2018). As registration may be required for decades, the LFOs associated with sex offense convictions exist in perpetuity.

Individuals who are unable to comply with LFOs face additional consequences. Legal debt can damage credit reports, hindering employment and housing prospects, and can preclude obtaining public assistance, and educational and employment licensing (Bannon et al., 2010; Link, 2019; Pleggenkuhle, 2018). Legal debts can contribute to deeper economic marginalization of justice-involved persons and cement the identity of “offender” (Friedman & Pattillo, 2019; Harris et al., 2010). LFOs also have significant criminal justice consequences, as nonpayment can result in technical violation of supervision conditions (Ruhland, 2019), further extending periods of entanglement with the system (Diller et al., 2009; Ruhland, 2019).

Procedural Justice and Legitimacy

The legal and financial consequences of a criminal conviction are many, but less is known about how individuals perceive costs and how these may influence views of the justice system. Two related frameworks, legitimacy and procedural justice, describe how perceptions of, and experiences with, criminal justice actors and the system influence compliance. Tyler (1990), in his seminal work on procedural justice, contends that if the process by which a criminal justice actor engages with citizens is perceived as fair and just, the citizen is more likely to comply. It is the procedures that criminal justice actors use to achieve compliance, not the outcome itself, that is paramount. Procedural justice emphasizes several components: (a) voice, where the individual feels heard; (b) respect, where the individual was treated humanely and professionally; (c) neutrality, where the justice actor is perceived to be a neutral party in the interaction and free from bias; (d) understanding, where the individual comprehends what is happening at each step of the process; and (e) helpfulness, in which the individual perceives that their unique situation is taken into account during the process (Tyler, 1990). Each element of the justice actor–citizen interaction will lead to increased perceptions of fairness, and more importantly, legitimacy. Although procedural justice emphasizes fairness perceptions during an interaction, the cumulative effect of these exchanges is increased legitimacy of the authority inherent in justice systems and actors (Tyler, 1990).

Legitimacy refers to the prevailing expectation among citizens that justice system actors are “authorities entitled to make decisions and be deferred to in matters of criminal justice” (Jackson et al., 2010, p. 4). When justice actors are perceived as legitimate, then citizens will be likely to willingly obey directives and the desired by-product is a more ethical, cost-effective, and sustainable justice system (Jackson et al., 2010; see also Tyler, 2006). More recently, procedural justice has been broadened to encapsulate a more nuanced nature of legitimacy. In addition to the traditional elements of procedural justice, scholars contend that legitimacy also includes elements capturing the outcomes of decisions, particularly the equitable distribution of decisions among groups, the normative requirement of criminal justice actors to effectively address the needs most salient to a specific community, and the lawfulness of these interactions (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013). There is ample research to suggest how people perceive and judge criminal justice actors influences responses to authority (Johnson et al., 2014). Reduced legitimacy of both procedures and outcomes can weaken citizen inclination to engage with the criminal justice system (Gau & Brunson, 2010; Tyler, 2003, 2004; Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

Although most work in this area has centered on policing, scholars have applied the legitimacy framework to institutional and community corrections settings (Sparks et al., 1996). Many have argued that procedural justice is critical in achieving inmate compliance because of the restrictive nature of the prison environment (Baker et al., 2014; Franke et al., 2010; Tatar Ii et al., 2012). For example, in a study of inmate grievances in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Bierie (2013) found that violence increased when grievances were not replied to rather than in response to any negative outcomes of the grievance. Overall, this body of work identifies that understanding how incarcerated persons perceive the fairness of rules, regulations, and relationships with prison officers is key in fostering compliance and perceptions of legitimacy (Jackson et al., 2010). This research extends to people under community supervision, as citizen contact with these institutions is long lasting (Franke et al., 2010). For formerly incarcerated individuals, research supposes that there are “spillover effects” from prison to the community that influence legitimacy (Baker et al., 2014). However, during reentry, rehabilitative efforts, such as access to employment and housing opportunities through criminal justice interventions, may mitigate these effects and bolster perceptions of legitimacy (Clear, 2007).

Dynamics of the officer–client relationship are another key aspect of procedural justice in community supervision. For example, Skeem and colleagues (2007) developed a dual-role inventory that encapsulates the “firm, but fair” relational style linked with probationer compliance, finding officers who balance the therapeutic alliance with aspects of procedural justice in their approach experienced reduced client recidivism. Other studies show that probationer perceptions of community supervision outcomes are positive when they believe the officer is making decisions and using discretion in supportive ways (Blasko & Taxman, 2018; Kras, 2013; Morash et al., 2016; Skeem & Manchak, 2008).

Overall, there is ample evidence to suggest that individuals who believe that criminal justice sanctions are fair and just are more likely to perceive the system as legitimate and comply. The current work extends this body of research to consider whether and how LFOs are assessed and enforced, and condition the attitudes of those under correctional supervision, including perceptions of justice, fairness, and legitimacy. We also conduct subgroup analysis to document the unique narratives of individuals who are convicted of sexual offenses, as this group is considered to be a particular threat to public safety (Turner, 2011) and is subject to more punitive sanctions than individuals convicted of other crimes (Cochran et al., 2020).

Method and Analysis

The current study relies on in-depth interviews, as part of a larger project examining reentry experiences. The project involved oversampling of individuals with a sexual conviction to learn more about the unique needs of this population while under correctional control (see Huebner et al., 2014). The sample is comprised of 95 males under correctional supervision.¹ Interviews were conducted across seven sites in Missouri, including five probation and parole offices, one prison, and one transitional housing facility. A purposive sampling approach was used to achieve maximum variation in a correctional setting, geographic location, and overall makeup of the communities where they were located (Creswell & Poth, 2017). Participants were eligible if they were currently on probation or parole supervision, or if they had returned to prison on a technical violation within the prior 3 months.² Individuals on community supervision were approached at the probation and parole office during random report days, given a brief synopsis of the study, and asked to participate. Incarcerated individuals were initially identified by corrections personnel as eligible based on the criteria and then approached by researchers who described the study, and asked to participate. In both settings, researchers met with participants in a private office or location and obtained consent per the institutional review board (IRB)-approved consent procedure.

The research employed a semi-structured interview guide, allowing the participant to shape the course of the interview, and interviewers the ability to probe further depending on participant responses. Participants were asked about a variety of reentry dimensions, including experiences within employment searches, housing stability, and social support networks. Concerning LFOs, participants were questioned about what types of state-related financial obligations they had been assessed, the consequences of having these payments, and their general reactions to the obligation. Individuals were asked to self-report information on LFOs, and the researchers used official data to verify the responses.³ These estimates provide a baseline establishment of the differences in assessed costs across offense type. Interviews lasted approximately 1 hr on average, were digitally recorded, transcribed verbatim, and then deidentified by assigning participants a pseudonym. The final sample of males was predominantly White (65%), in midadulthood (mean age of 37.4) with a high school education (62.6%). Approximately half of the sample had been convicted of a sex offense (51.6%).

Analysis

Researchers took a phenomenological approach to the study, which is useful when the research objective requires a profound understanding of lived experiences common to a group of people (Creswell and Poth, 2017). To analyze the data, we used thematic analysis strategies, which allow for both inductive and deductive coding strategies, where the researcher relies on theoretical frameworks to anchor initial coding processes, yet remain open to emergent concepts (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Researchers began by importing interview transcripts into NVivo, then conducted a close reading, and coded for key constructs around LFOs, such as amount, response, or payment. The strength and variance of responses to LFOs about their assessment and meaning within the criminal justice system were emergent themes warranting additional investigation. LFO response codes were generally not encompassed in a specific probe during the interview; rather, they emerged unprompted when questioned about the amount or type of LFO. Researchers used an open coding strategy to interrogate these narratives, relying on sensitizing concepts informed by procedural justice literature (Bowen, 2006), such as fairness and legitimacy, to understand participant experiences.⁴ Following this iterative coding process, researchers reached saturation where no new concepts emerged and then collated themes into analytic memos. Interrater agreement was established through a consensus-building approach where researchers examine codes for agreement and reconcile discrepancies (Miller, 2005).

The unprompted and illustrative reactions of participants to questioning about LFOs suggest that these accounts are reliable and reflect a genuine lived experience. Although the goal of qualitative research is not to generalize beyond our sample here, the ubiquity of our thematic findings implies that these constructs may be transferable to other settings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The positionality of the researchers as middle class, White women may have shaped the nature of the interviews; however, participant’s consistent and uninhibited expressions related to LFOs suggest a neutral interaction affording participants the trust and rapport necessary to enhance the validity of the data. We preserve the integrity of our analysis by presenting the most illustrative evidence of our themes and retain the voices of participants verbatim where possible.

Findings

Our findings document participant perceptions of LFOs and how these financial assessments influenced their understanding of criminal justice actors and system processing. Although participant narratives are contextualized by the experience of economic disadvantage, which is common among justice-involved persons (see Link, 2019; Pettit, 2012; Pleggenkuhle, 2018), responses about the impact of LFOs extended beyond financial distress.

The findings begin by showing the variation in participant responses, demonstrating how decision-making from the supervising agent may perpetuate negative perceptions but can also be deployed to legitimize the system and assessment of the associated costs. Then, we present the unique postconviction narrative that LFOs are an added punishment, one that is distinct from the initial sentence and exacerbates perceptions of an unfair system. Finally, LFOs confuse the broadly understood purpose of criminal justice to reform, a sentiment reflecting LFOs as both lacking clear purpose and contradicting the rehabilitative function of the system. The findings conclude with a subgroup analysis of the experiences of individuals with a sexual offense conviction, who are subject to LFOs beyond those assessed for nonsexual convictions.

The Two-Sided Coin of Discretion

Sanctions that are perceived as fair will follow clear procedures and be implemented equitably between groups (Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 1990). At the same time, a key feature of procedural justice is the use of discretion in applying and enforcing sanctions that reflect empathy for individual circumstances. This tension between clear procedure and discretion emerged in the narratives. Individuals under correctional supervision in Missouri are required to pay a monthly correctional supervision fee of US$30, but state statute allows financial waivers for indigence. However, despite many meeting indigence criteria, participants often did not know of the possibility of or how to request a fee waiver. The varied enactment of modifications to LFOs was a key conduit for understanding participant perspectives of legitimacy.

Side 1: Inaccessible and inconsistent

Many participants were unsure of or had great difficulty obtaining a fee waiver. Some did not know of or understand the process and others faced procedural hassles. For example, Anthony, who spent 18 months after his release looking for full-time employment, stated, “they make it almost near impossible to try and get [supervision fees] adjusted.” Participants felt they were in an impossible position because they owed the state for supervision but were incapable of meeting this expectation, and were unable to identify a process to waive or mitigate the financial burden.

Although indigence waivers are allowed by agency policy, participants often expressed that their probation or parole officer (PO) did not consider their unique experiences and felt that they had little voice to influence change. When LFO payments, Bruce noted, “There’s no way around it.” Many participants perceived that there was little opportunity to address or adjust obligations in the face of unemployment or other financial instability, citing a lack of action from their supervisor. Joel embodied this sentiment, stating “I feel they’re unfair.” Joel described a state of indigence, having failed to obtain permanent employment in his 2 years out of prison, which his PO was aware of. He continued “They know the position we’re in, that it’s hard to find work in. How are we supposed to pay something when we’re not working?” In Joel’s experience and other cases, there was unawareness of such options as fee waivers or alternative payment plans and a lack of intervention from their supervising officer. This further delegitimized their experiences under correctional supervision, acknowledging little helpfulness from their PO in recognition of individual circumstances.

Participants also reported a wide and seemingly arbitrary variation by officers in the waiver of supervision fees. There was a recognition that LFOs could be adjusted, but in practice, the process was inconsistent. Clinton describes, “Some of the parole officers be understanding, but some of them just . . . I don’t know.” In Adam’s interview, he described that the waiver process was unclear, stating that fees were waived only “In certain circumstances. And it depends on your parole officer, cause they can get, they can waive it for anyone, but if they don’t do it, you gotta pay in.” According to participants, the LFO experience was conditioned by an officer’s willingness to use their agency, but without clarity as to when or why one might be granted a reprieve. For example, despite not securing employment in his few months out of prison, Oscar reported problems obtaining the waiver in the past but was in the process of procuring a supervision fee waiver from his current PO, saying “he’s seeming to be more inclined to assist than the [officer] I had before.” It was the inequity of application of waivers that led to frustration among participants, particularly given the opaque, inflexible, and often confusing process to request waivers. Ultimately, individuals who felt that criminal justice actors were rigid in assessment and payment expectations perceived LFOs as unjust and less legitimate, primarily due to not feeling like their voice was heard or circumstances considered (Tyler, 1990).

Side 2: Discretion as an asset

On the other side of the coin, individuals who felt that their PO was empathetic to their needs and took an active role in waiving or mitigating LFO costs had more positive perceptions. For instance, after serving more than 12 years in prison, Leonard reported being underemployed, working at a seasonal car wash, having transitioned through three jobs in less than 1 year. When asked about his supervision fees, he described, “Right now they waived because the money that I’m making, it falls under the guidelines where it could be.” Leonard appreciated his PO’s advocacy in petitioning for a waiver, which improved his outlook of supervision. POs also served as a conduit to the court and facilitated interactions with other criminal justice agencies to achieve a fair and just outcome. For example, many participants lacked the financial resources and legal knowledge to petition the court for a fee waiver, reduction in costs, or alternative methods of payment. Responsive to this challenge, some officers displayed flexibility when they were able to formulate payment plans or alternative recompense methods, such as granting an extension without added penalty. When asked about paying LFOs to community supervision and the courts, Bobby described, “they work with me.” About his court costs and restitution, Jonathan noted, “I ain’t had the money to pay for it, but the courts understand,” so he created a payment plan with his PO allowing him to comply with the court order but reduced his economic sanction to a manageable cost. Some participants with outstanding court debt were able to exchange community service for financial payment. For example, to pay off the US$2,000 toward court fines he had accumulated, Craig noted “they just want me to do the community service every month” and that “10 hours a month equals $50 a month” toward his owed court costs.

In sum, the use of discretion and helpfulness by the criminal justice system to individual circumstances allowed participants to reduce or mitigate some of the financial burdens of LFOs. Although not eager to pay LFOs, participants who felt that criminal justice agents were understanding and responsive to their circumstances were more likely to have positive assessments of criminal justice actions, which aligns with the procedural justice framework (Tyler, 2006).

Twice Punished

Participants also viewed LFOs as an added or extended sanction of a sentence already served, intensifying the effects and the label of the criminal justice system, and diminishing legitimacy. Many participants believed that time served in prison should have absolved their debt to society, making subsequent costs following imprisonment akin to double jeopardy, or being punished twice for the same offense. For instance, Randall described, “You know, cause you supposed to go to prison to pay your debt to society, but when you still get out, you still paying.” Similarly, Theodore echoed “I feel like, why should we have to pay to be on papers? I did my time.” The perceived lack of fairness or clarity in their assessment relative to the price they already paid with their liberty emerged as central to the tension between just desserts and punitiveness. Ricky summed up,

This whole system is bullshit. And like paying, I paid every day that I walked them yards. I understand I still have the time to walk down until my sentence is over. But why should I pay to be on parole?

The imposition of LFOs felt disproportionate to the costs of the offense, especially when participants had already served a detention sentence and “paid” with their liberty (Jahncke, 1991). This sense of double jeopardy leads many to feel that their time under community supervision is less legitimate.

Furthermore, the lack of transparency in assessing LFOs during criminal justice processing exacerbated the feelings of illegitimacy. Even those serving probation sentences noted that fees quickly and unexpectedly accumulated as part of a punishment invisible at the time of sentencing. Francisco was paying approximately US$130 per month for his supervision fee, court costs, and fines. He indicated he would be paying “Until I get off paper. But that’s a hidden fee and that’s not right because they don’t bring up in court when they say you want to take this plea deal, you want to take this probation?” In his experience, agreeing to terms of supervision in the community was made clear, but the economic costs were not, minimizing the understanding participants had of their LFOs.

The feeling of being subjected to double jeopardy was also apparent when discussing mandatory community-based treatment with additional costs. For example, Jim paid his monthly US$30 intervention fee but had recently been stipulated to an anger management class. He was billed an initial US$150 assessment fee and was expected to pay an additional US$25 per week. Jim had previously understood his supervision fee to cover treatment and accepted that as part of his sentence, but this was perceived as a new and financially disciplinary condition. He felt this added class and payment was “punishment for what I did.” Described in more detail later, for persons convicted of a sex offense, these added conditions and costs were especially common, and these types of experiences exemplify perceptions of being subjected to added punishment.

Jim and others illustrate the mandatory nature of LFOs, accumulating through fees, mandated treatments, and other seemingly hidden costs that compound and can be initially unclear to individuals. Collectively, the required nature of LFOs felt punitive because they seemed disproportionate to the initial punishment they received and were often assigned to them without transparency. In the case of experiencing double jeopardy, the legitimacy of corrections as having the authority to assess and collect the LFOs was diminished, primarily because the process was unclear, unfair, and unequal.

Purpose of Punishment

Compounded by a perceived lack of discretion and perceptions of added punishment of LFOs, most participants indicated a general distrust of the criminal justice system. This perception was further reinforced when individuals indicated that they did not recognize a clear purpose of LFOs, or felt they were contradictory to reintegration. Here, participants expressed how the injustice of legal debt, disproportionate financial burden, and double jeopardy culminated in the delegitimization of the criminal justice system to fairly impose sanctions and adequately promote rehabilitation.⁵

Lack of purpose and contradicting rehabilitative goals

Participants did not understand the purpose of LFOs, furthering resentment toward the justice system. Tommy succinctly states, “I don’t think that’s fair that we have to pay for our freedom. We paid our debt by doing the X amount of time we’ve done. But I don’t understand where this $30 [supervision fee] is going to.” Tommy and others ultimately felt they had paid their debt to society by giving up freedom through incarceration. Although the state is justified in making them pay this penalty, no one has made it clear why they have to continue paying, both literally and figuratively. The lack of parity and transparency in the role of LFOs in community supervision, especially after prison, undermines the perception that the criminal justice system represents a collective moral order.

Furthermore, some felt LFOs presented contradictory purposes of the criminal justice system. Many participants framed the criminal justice system as a profit-focused institution and felt this cumulative penalty was prioritized over successful rehabilitation. Thus, a narrative describing the contradictory or conflicting purpose of LFOs under correctional supervision emerged. When discussing his supervision fee helping to pay for treatment programs, Ricky asked “Why should I pay to help you guys pay for these classes so you can get more money off the classes when somebody signs their name? Each time somebody signs their name you get more money.” Ricky’s perception reflected the cynicism about transparency behind the treatment costs, especially when it appeared he was helping probation and parole profit by the number of names on the roster as opposed to gaining therapeutic benefits.

Although community supervision is often framed as an institution designed to facilitate reintegration, many participants felt it deepened the web of carceral control and made success on supervision more tenuous. Furthermore, the contradictions of prioritizing payment over therapeutic gain only reinforced the cynical views about the rehabilitative role of community supervision. Marcus pointed out, “I don’t see any productive purpose [of LFOs], other than to put more money in the state pocket.” Marcus, along with other participants, characterized the divergence of LFOs from broadly understood goals of corrections as problematic and part of a larger emphasis on control and economic marginalization. From these perspectives, a system presented as a potential resource for treatment and support was reframed as “all about the money,” by Gerald. In his case, Gerald was returned to a secure living facility because he could not pay his debts, then his wages were garnished to subsidize his residence at the facility, putting him in a double bind and making it tough to get ahead. The reintegrative angle of probation and parole supervision was ignored in favor of fee collection. Randall noted, “[POs] really don’t have any resources for employment . . . they’re more worried about getting’ their money out of you. That $30 a month.” Supervision was effectively understood as monetarily incentivized as opposed to rehabilitative, particularly considering that some participants had to pay for their treatment and were restricted from attending when unable to meet that financial expectation.

Linking LFOs to purpose: Personal responsibility and restoration

Although negative experiences were dominant, they were not universal, and some participants expressed greater acceptance of LFOs. In some cases, LFOs were described as a justified consequence of their criminal conviction, tied to themes of personal responsibility for criminal actions and the fit of LFOs in the moral order of the justice system (Tyler & Jackson, 2013). For example, Alexander stated, “well, you committed the crime, you do the time . . . and you pay the fine.” Typically, acceptance and understanding of LFOs were specific to type. For example, Edwin described,

The restitution. I understand because I hurt that man . . . So, he has, he had a doctor’s bill, if I had not hurt him he wouldn’t have had that bill. So that’s on me. But as far as . . . the supervision[fee]—I got to pay you to be free. That sucks. You know what I mean? I have to pay you $30 bucks a month so I can have my freedom.

Edwin expressed mixed feelings about LFOs. He owed a substantial amount of restitution to his victim and court costs; however, Edwin was less clear on the purpose and fairness of the monthly supervision fee. These results indicate the value of assigning meaning to their LFO, such as restitution or connecting supervision fees with treatment costs, as negative reactions were mitigated. This substantiates procedural justice propositions where understanding and neutrality promote acceptance of sanctions (Tyler, 1990).

The Added Costs of a Sex Offense

People convicted of a sexual offense typically face additional restrictions and sanctions, which often come with requisite costs (Huebner et al., 2019; Pleggenkuhle, 2018). Individuals convicted of sexual offenses felt that they paid a larger literal and figurative price for supervision. In elaborating on his feeling toward mandated and costly treatment and polygraph tests, Donald indicated, “We’re just being picked on right now. Because they can. We’re in the limelight now.” Donald’s perspective highlights the potentially biased nature of assigning additional financial responsibility because individuals convicted of a sexual offense are viewed as a high-stakes population (Turner, 2011). This amplified perspective is also uniquely related to the increased costs that a sex offense conviction carries and the limited discretion displayed by criminal justice agencies to address the associated LFOs, magnifying perceptions of double jeopardy and contradictions in the rehabilitative goals of supervision.

For example, individuals convicted of sexual offenses often landed on the inaccessibility side of the discretion coin. In the study state, individuals are typically mandated to sex offense–specific treatment, at an average monthly cost of US$140, which was not covered by the supervision fee and was ineligible for discretionary relief. For example, George spent a year under community supervision working odd jobs and attending mandated treatment. When asked about any financial assistance he might benefit from, George replied, “They waive the fees for the first few months, but that’s only for your supervision fees.” Waivers did not apply to additional sex offense–specific costs and individuals found it difficult to obtain longer term relief from fees. Jeremy described how his PO was unsympathetic to his requests for more financial assistance, noting his officer told him “Well, we gotta go by what your stipulations are.” These stipulations included commonly assigned costs such as polygraph examinations (a minimum of US$250 annually) or registration costs (US$10 initial and additional fees for updates). For Jeremy, the PO’s inflexibility in considering his request showed a lack of understanding of his economic circumstances, which reinforced his feelings of bias and unfairness.

Participants, overall, felt that they were doubly punished because they had to serve time under correctional supervision and pay a mandatory fee. However, this group was aware of their unique supervision conditions and felt that they were targeted for additional punishment when compared with others. Many participants denoted the financial and time costs of participating in the counseling programs mandated for anyone on supervision for a sexual offense. Eugene stated, “I served my time and I come out here and it’s starting all over again. This is supposed to be aftercare for me, but I have to come every week [and have to pay].” Because many had gone through 9 months of sex offense–specific programming during incarceration, the community-based treatment mandate and associated costs were perceived as not only redundant but also punitive, particularly alongside other enhanced supervision conditions. Subsequently, this population felt singled out and unfairly treated as other individuals on community supervision often had treatment costs covered as part of the monthly supervision fees. After serving 2 years in prison and 10 months in the community, Jesse completed 19 months of treatment, paying approximately US$170 per month for supervision fees and treatment costs. Jesse described this unique expectation of being solely responsible for sex offense–specific programming costs:

I believe that if the state’s going to enforce this, we have to do it. I don’t believe we should be held accountable to pay for it. I went to prison, I did nine months of this class in prison. And I come to the street and I have to do [for] the rest of my time in this class.

Perhaps most saliently, the circumstances articulated by those with a sexual offense conviction illustrated the greatest contrast between rehabilitative goals and the financial mandates of the correctional system. Although treatment was intended to be a positive aspect of reintegration, the financial burden emerged as a hindrance to therapeutic gain. When Alan was asked about ways in which treatment could be improved, he responded, “the money part.” This group felt that treatment existed for the system’s financial gain as opposed to focusing on rehabilitation and reform. Although this contradiction emerges broadly across members of the sample, this is exemplified by participants’ reports of being kept in a sex offense–specific treatment program for years—many saw this indefinite treatment was motivated by economic earnings as opposed to treatment necessity. Meaningful treatment participation was viewed as less important than program payment, a perspective that reinforced the bias and lack of voice, understanding, or helpfulness linked with perceived legitimacy (Tyler, 2010). Although compliance was achieved through strict supervision conditions, the integrity of the criminal justice system’s intervention in their lives was viewed as targeting, double jeopardy, and ultimately illegitimate.

Discussion and Conclusion

Monetary sanctions are commonly assessed by the court and correctional systems, and emerging work suggests continued growth as the costs of criminal justice are shifted to individuals who enter the system (Martin et al., 2018; Page & Soss, 2017; Ruhland et al., 2017). The current study broadens this literature by considering how individuals under correctional supervision experience LFOs, and the influence these sanctions have on their perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. Consistent with other research, LFOs were pervasive among participants who struggled to maintain compliance, even in the face of relatively small monthly fees (Link, 2019; Pleggenkuhle, 2018; Ruhland, 2019). Overall, participants perceived LFOs as unfair in their assignment, enforcement, and consequences, primarily driven by the uneven and unclear application of fees and related financial waivers. Participants felt that the system was set up to see them fail because compliance and payment were prioritized over rehabilitation. Consistent with the procedural justice and legitimacy frameworks, it was the process of assigning LFOs, and the failure to consider individual economic circumstances, and unequal distribution of outcomes, that led to perceptions of an illegitimate system.

Several key themes emerged from participants’ narratives. First, participants who felt that their PO recognized their circumstances, hearing their voice and providing help, more often reported positive perceptions of LFOs and their supervision. While understanding that some financial obligation was warranted alongside their conviction, particularly in the case of restitution, participants expressed frustration when their financial ability to pay and broader economic circumstances were ignored. Participants argued for a more frequent and flexible assessment of their financial situation, especially given the common economic challenges during the reentry period (Pettit, 2012). This contrasted those individuals who could leverage discretion in a way that neutralized their economic stress. This finding comports with work suggesting that having been heard and responded to, tends to increase compliance with sanctions (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).

The opaque nature and function of the sanctioning process also added to the frustration of participants. Costs for community supervision and treatment are not explained at the time of sentencing and participants questioned their nature and purpose, adding to perceptions of unfairness, bias, and targeting of offense history—in this case, a sex offense conviction. Participants had difficulty identifying the purpose of funds or even to whom they were paying, indicating a persistent lack of understanding (Tyler, 1990). Those with negative perceptions did not have a clear understanding of why they were being billed by the state for what they felt was a conglomerate of ill-defined “interventions” from which they saw no immediate or clear benefit. The lack of transparency in process and outcome, and even more importantly, purpose, emerged as a key condition of legitimacy perceptions.

Furthermore, the sense of being doubly punished, first by incarceration and second by LFOs, diminished perceptions of legitimacy. By extending procedural justice and legitimacy frameworks to explain the nuance of punishment-related experiences that seem loosely tied to overarching correctional goals and instead appear like an overly punitive justice system, allows corrections scholars to examine many aspects of the incarceration and community supervision that act to uphold or delegitimize it (see Jackson et al., 2010).

Finally, persons convicted of sex offenses felt unjustly targeted by LFOs and tended to view the system as unfairly treating certain populations. This contradicts procedural justice where sanctions meted by the criminal justice system tend to be perceived as fairer when they are equitably distributed. In this case, persons convicted of sex offenses were doubly stigmatized—being targeted with LFOs because they were subject to additional requirements, as well as unlikely to receive relief or the benefit of discretion due to being deemed a high-stakes population (Kras et al., 2018; Turner, 2011). This finding suggests there are important differences among justice-involved groups based on offense type or other characteristics, and future research should examine the variation occurring within and across jurisdictions in how they treat different groups.

The findings have important policy implications. As Friedman and Pattillo (2019) argue, LFOs are enacted against an idealized person without considering the unique economic and social challenges of those under correctional supervision. Although participants of this study understood and accepted incurring some LFOs, it may be relevant to consider costs on a sliding scale as opposed to blanket fees based on offense type. Because a sliding scale is conditioned on one’s ability to pay, this would emphasize other aspects of reintegration, such as stabilizing housing and employment. If the shift in focus is from paying to performing well on supervision, the goals of rehabilitation will be at the forefront and following the purported goals of the correctional system. Regardless of LFO type, participants valued PO use of discretion and help in management, not only to assist with LFOs but as a demonstration of respect and hearing the voice of individuals under their supervision. These aspects of procedural justice are vital in establishing a productive relationship with community corrections staff that engenders compliance in ways that strengthen rehabilitation while improving public safety.

Ultimately, understanding the “why” behind sanctions such as LFOs is paramount to successful compliance on supervision and reinforcing legitimacy in the criminal justice system to mete out punishment, including postconviction requirements. Furthermore, the emergent narrative viewing the criminal justice system as focused on profit over rehabilitation also leans toward legal cynicism (Wright & Gifford, 2017). In this study, the circumstances underpinning an individual situation influenced the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the sanctions—those who could pay or had their voice heard felt the costs were justified, whereas those who could not or did not receive the benefits of understanding felt further marginalized. These seemingly divergent sentiments are congruent on the premise that the process matters and is also individualized.

Although this study contributes to the growing body of work on LFOs, several limitations should be noted. First, the results here represent the lived experiences of individuals in one state’s criminal justice system, and future research should confirm these findings in varied systems, geographic spaces, and individual characteristics of the sample. For instance, the number of women in this sample is small, likely masking the gendered experience of individuals on community supervision. Similarly, we only investigate differences in perceptions based on sexual and nonsexual offense types. A more detailed examination of individual and legal traits, associated costs, and implications within and between jurisdictions may also provide greater depth and nuance. Theoretically, we can expand upon the process underlying procedural justice and perceptions of legitimacy, but we are unable to link it to the actual compliance outcomes the theory aims to explain. Future work should aim to gather outcome data to linking these perceptions with compliance data.

In conclusion, as LFOs become a ubiquitous experience for justice-involved individuals, understanding how they influence the process, experience, and outcomes of punishment will become a vital aspect of achieving compliance and reinforcing the legitimacy of the institution. This theoretical process is also critical for developing and implementing sound policies and practices that account for the realities and lived experiences of those involved in the justice system.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice under Grant 2008-DD-BX-0002. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the Department of Justice.

Notes

Author Biographies

Breanne Pleggenkuhle is an associate professor in the School of Justice and Public Safety, in Criminology and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University. Her research interests focus on prisoner reentry, with emphasis on collateral consequences and the social and structural context of postconviction experiences.

Kimberly R. Kras, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at San Diego State University. She earned her PhD in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Missouri–St. Louis in 2014, following a career with the Missouri Department of Corrections Division of Probation and Parole. Her work centers on the study of community corrections organizations and practices, reentry and desistance from offending behavior, and utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

Beth M. Huebner is a professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri–St. Louis. Her work focuses on the consequences of a criminal conviction, community and institutional corrections, and public policy.

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