Disability in Multicultural Theory

Abstract

Multicultural theorists in education tend to treat disability as part of cultural diversity and apply a minority group model to disability rights. We critically examine the fundamental presuppositions and social justice issues behind this assimilation of disability into a multicultural frame of reference. The implications of the neutralization of disability are discussed. Reasons for reconciling different views of special education and multicultural education to better achieve social justice are detailed. Policy implications of noting the differences between people with disabilities and minority groups are suggested.

Keywords

disability cultural diversity multicultural theory minority group model social justice

As a general idea regarding ethnicity, national origin, gender, and many other types of difference, multiculturalism can enrich education. It is helpful at all levels of education to have students from various ethnic groups and students whose ancestors came from various parts of the world. The promise of multicultural theory for achieving more social justice and equity is great. Nevertheless, the implications of multicultural theory for the differences we call disabilities may, unfortunately, be accepted without critical thinking (Kymlicka, 2012). Despite the fact that we share with multicultural theorists a strong commitment to social justice, for the sake of clarity and equity, we analyze critically how disability is seen in multicultural theory. We do not argue against cultural diversity or multiculturalism as a movement. Rather, we hope to show that the differences we call disabilities should not be considered merely another form of diversity.

The term multiculturalism sometimes signifies cultural diversity, including indigenous peoples, “racial” or ethnic groups, or “forced” and “voluntary” immigrants within the same community, society, or country. It describes demographic trends in many countries around the world and the fact that people from different cultural backgrounds live, are educated, and work together (Malik, 2013). As a descriptive category, multiculturalism has different meanings in countries reflecting different demographic realities and referring to indigenous peoples, national communities, ethnic minorities, African Americans, and immigrant groups. However, multiculturalism has also a broader meaning and constitutes a political philosophy, a political strategy, and an educational theory (Rattansi, 2011). We focus here on multicultural theory in relation to disability issues.

Multiculturalism and Education

According to Banks (2013), “Multicultural education is at least three things: an idea or concept, an educational reform movement, and a process” (p. 3). It is intended to foster equality and social justice, regardless of “race,” ethnicity, gender, and social class (Banks, 2013; Bennett, 2011; Gollnick & Chinn, 2013; Manning & Baruth, 2009). We put the term “race” in quotes because it is a folk concept or social category and does not indicate biological differences.

Multicultural education has gradually gravitated toward more moderate and widely accepted ideas. In the 1990s, theorists typically criticized “Eurocentric values” and criticized the neglect of African, Asian, or native American contributions to Western civilization (Banks, 1993a, 1993b). For example, Banks (1991) wrote,

People of color, women and other marginalized groups are demanding that their voices, visions, and perspectives be included in the curriculum. They ask that the debt Western civilization owes to Africa, Asia, and indigenous America be acknowledged. (p. 33)

A few scholars in education who are committed to social justice might disagree with the above statement. However, some of the specific suggestions for curriculum transformation with regard to “multicultural” science and reinterpretation of ancient history sparked heated debates (e.g., Banks, 1991, 1993a, 1993b; Bernal, 1987; cf. de Montellano, 1995, 2000; Lefkowitz, 1997). Since then, substantial changes have been made in both school curricula and the movement of multicultural education itself. Banks’s (2014) words reflect this shift:

Some readers might rightly claim that an ethnic-specific curriculum and education already exists in U.S. educational institutions and that it is Eurocentric and male dominated. I would agree to some extent with this claim. However, I believe that the days for the primacy and dominance of the mainstream curriculum are limited . . . The curriculum within U.S. schools, colleges, and universities has changed substantially within the last three decades. It is important that these changes be recognized and acknowledged. (pp. 48–49)

Multiculturalism’s contribution, along with that of cultural anthropology, has been critical to the decline of Eurocentric biases in social studies (e.g., eugenics, history of European colonization) and popular culture, and has contributed to the transformation of the curriculum, including emphasis on justice, equity, and sensitivity to cultural differences in the classroom (Banks, 2013, 2014). Nowadays, multicultural education is a specialized field of scholarship. A detailed discussion of the full set of ideas in multicultural theory and practice goes beyond the scope of this article. Our purpose here is to discuss how disability is seen through the prism of multicultural theory.

Multicultural theorists in both political philosophy (e.g., Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 1989) and education (e.g., Banks, 2013; Gollnick & Chinn, 2013; Koppelman & Goodhart, 2011) tend to consider disability another cultural difference or part of cultural diversity. Given the widespread enthusiasm in education for the emancipatory promises of multicultural education, we know that critically examining the claims of multicultural theorists about disability is a thorny task. However, phenomena as complex as cultural diversity and disability require careful thinking and logical, and critical inquiry (see Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2011; Kauffman & Badar, 2014a). Plurality of views is useful, because no view or disciplinary approach can provide a full account of complex phenomena with multiple dimensions. Exploring, explaining, and understanding human diversity presuppose the tolerance of a diversity of well-founded views and approaches, as well as the promotion of rational debate among them (Bunge, 2012). We also think it is simplistic to believe that every popular theory is right or good in every respect. Instead, the better understanding of human diversity in all of its forms is required for truly valuing and accommodating differences appropriately in our society.

Disability as Part of Cultural Diversity

Quite often, multicultural theorists tend to view disability as another cultural difference. The next step in this line of reasoning is to consider people with disabilities a cultural minority group or a culturally oppressed category. For example, in education, Banks (2006) viewed people with disabilities as a “microcultural group” (p. 78) like those of a given ethnicity, gender, social class, religion, or region. Exceptionality is sometimes considered a “multicultural subvariant” like ethnicity, gender, or social class (Banks, 2006, p. 77). Gollnick and Chinn (2013) stated,

Because of their unique social and personal needs and special interests, many exceptional people become part of a cultural group composed of individuals with similar exceptionalities. For some, this cultural identity is by ascription; they have been labeled and forced into enclaves by virtue of the residential institutions where they live. Others may live in the same communities or even neighborhood by their own choosing. (p. 174)

In addition, Koppelman and Goodhart (2011) argued that people with disabilities should be considered a minority group, using the “minority group model” in their argument. In the minority model, people with disabilities are considered oppressed (Hahn, 1985; Liggett, 1988; Silvers, 1994). A commentary by Koppelman and Goodhart (2011) accompanying a picture of wheelchair-using activists states, “Like other minority groups, people with disabilities and their advocates have had to protest and demonstrate to draw attention to the discrimination against them” (p. 294).

In political philosophy, in her famous critique of the concept of universal citizenship, Young (1989) emphasized that

In the United States today at least the following groups are oppressed in one or more of these ways: women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and physically disabled people. (p. 261)

Even Kymlicka (1995), one of the most cogent theorists of multiculturalism, noticed that according to Young’s list, 80% of the U.S. population is among “oppressed groups” and excludes only well-off, relatively young, non-disabled, heterosexual White males. Despite this arithmetic problem, it is unfortunately true that most people with disabilities have suffered from social exclusion and numerous environmental and attitudinal barriers limiting their options and opportunities. However, we see at least four major issues in conceptualizing disability as part of cultural diversity.

Disabilities as Part of Human Diversity

Disabilities are part of the rich diversity of human beings, a natural part of the humanity. Nevertheless, equating disabilities with other differences, such as ethnicity, “race,” gender, language, regional variation, and religious affiliation is misleading.

In their Glossary, Banks and McGee-Banks (2013) defined disabilities as referring primarily to “physical or mental characteristics of an individual that prevent or limit that person from performing specific tasks” (p. 353). This definition, which recognizes only impairments, does not capture the socially constructed barriers to the self-determination of people with disabilities and to appropriate services (e.g., education, medical care, counseling services) that show respect for the rights of every human. It works imperfectly or erroneously in everyday life, and thus has been the basis for many complaints of people with physical or sensory disabilities. More sophisticated approaches are needed to include socialization and other aspects of disabilities.

Some, but not all, restrictions experienced by people with disabilities can be attributed exclusively to social attitudes or barriers (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2013; Shakespeare, 2006). Recognition of the dual nature of disability—that disabilities are neither purely social nor purely a matter of impairment—is critical. For example, French (1993), having a visual impairment herself, conceded, “Some of the most profound problems experienced by people with certain impairments are difficult, if not impossible, to solve by social manipulation” (p. 17). Williams (1999) discussed the realities of chronic illness involving pain and discomfort and argued that the “endorsement of disability solely as social oppression is really an option, and an erroneous one at that, for those spared the ravages of chronic illness” (p. 812). Disabilities present special challenges, and in several cases, these challenges go beyond the existing problems of social exclusion and social oppression (see Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2011, 2012, 2013; Kauffman & Badar, 2014b; Kauffman & Landrum, 2009).

The meaning of disability lies in both biology and society, as well as in their interaction during the course of life, including critical sensitive stages of human development and epigenetics (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2013). Denying the role of biology in disability also denies daily experiences, which for some people with disabilities are very real. As Shakespeare and Watson (2002) stated,

Most activists concede that behind closed doors they talk about aches and pains and urinary tract infections, even while they deny any relevance of the body while they are out campaigning. Yet this inconsistency is surely wrong: if the rhetoric says one thing, while everyone behaves privately in a more complex way, then perhaps it is time to re-examine the rhetoric and speak more honestly. (p. 12)

Disabilities represent a particular part of human diversity that is not adequately captured by the concept of cultural diversity in its common sense. In some cases, advances in science and technology have turned disabilities into abilities falling within a normal range. As Anastasiou and Kauffman (2013) put it,

Severe myopia and even less severe nearsightedness could be a disability without corrective lenses or other medical interventions such as laser surgery. But nowadays it is not, given appropriate corrective lenses or surgery. Today we explore the limitations of the technology of cochlear implants for deaf infants in combination with speech therapy. This is another contemporary but more complex example of a socially mediated biology or “socialized biology.”

Perhaps, technology can provide new solutions to sensory and physical disabilities in the future. Regrettably, the truth is that there are still uncrossed boundaries, especially in the case of cognitive and behavioral disabilities. (p. 450)

On balance, human diversity is a broader notion than that of cultural diversity. Disabilities must be seen as socialized biological conditions (defined as social and technological mediations of biological features; Lewontin & Levins, 2007) and as cultural factors and differences as well.

Heterogeneity Across the Disability Spectrum

Multicultural theorists tend to see people with disabilities as a homogeneous group regardless of the type or severity of their disability. A corollary assumption is that a “united group” can struggle for or demand their “identity” exactly like women, African Americans, Latinos, indigenous minorities, other ethno-cultural groups, gay men, and lesbians. Arguably, disability as a unified category is useful for the provision of special services (e.g., health care, education, and employment) and interest group politics (or pressure group politics). Indeed, the general concept of disability serves not only as a basis for social policy but also as a weapon for fighting social prejudice and sensitizing and transforming public opinion.

Ironically, disability as a singular concept is also problematic for scientific purposes because it covers a huge range of disabling conditions, extremely heterogeneous in type and severity. There is great diversity in types and degrees of disability, and this diversity makes generalization inappropriate. Most people with a mild form of learning disability are not in a predicament similar to that of most people with a severe intellectual disability (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2012, 2013). Besides, for the purpose of learning and instruction, a physical disability does not represent the same challenges as a typical autism spectrum disorder. In this sense, disability as a singular concept is a kind of central tendency measure in the “activist world,” which concentrates on people with orthopedic or sensory disabilities; disabilities in plural reflect better the huge variation at the lower end of the disabilities spectrum. As Gould (1996) argued, the central tendency sometimes acts as a harmful abstraction, but “variation stands out as the only meaningful reality” (p. 45). It is only in the statistical “tails” of statistical distributions that many differences are found (Gladwell, 1997). Hence, dispersion conveys the useful message to better understanding both disabilities and the necessity for a “full house” of special education and related specialized services.

Disabilities Versus Cultural Differences

As Shakespeare (2006) argued, disabilities constitute “a complex interaction of biological, psychological, cultural and sociopolitical factors which cannot be extricated except with imprecision” (p. 38). Shakespeare’s interactional view is an important step toward careful thinking about the difference between disabilities and cultural differences. In the case of differences in ethnicity, “race,” religion, language, and region, we cannot see any interaction between bodily or neurocognitive functions on one hand and cultural factors on the other. Only nationalists, chauvinists, or racists would see important average physical, sensory, cognitive, or mental differences in ethnic, racial, religious, language, or regional groups (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2012). More analytically, we consider the case of “race.”

The term race originally and typically has referred to biological differences between racial groups, or even discrete biological divisions within Homo sapiens. However, “race” is also a folk concept that has been used in American life and other societies (e.g., Brazil, South Africa) as a source of collective identity (Ember & Ember, 2007; Nanda & Warms, 2007; Scott, 2012). In the United States, people are asked for their “race” in the census, and both “race” requirements on birth certificates and Supreme Court decisions reaffirm the social and unfortunately biological ideas of “race” (Ember & Ember, 2007; Kottak, 2011). Nevertheless, the term is a very problematic category for scientific reasons and lacks biological validation (Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Sternberg, Grigorenko, & Kidd, 2005). Its origin in scientific history probably goes back to the racial categories of Homo sapiens in the taxonomy of Carolus Linnaeus in the 1700s. Under the influence of colonialism, the notion of “race,” along with beliefs of “white supremacy,” was used to perpetuate slavery, racism, and racial discrimination and inequality (Scott, 2012). Most anthropologists no longer refer to “races,” as separate divisions within the human species, and this harmful typological thinking, on the basis of skin color, has been abandoned (e.g., Ember & Ember, 2007; Kottak, 2011; Nanda & Warms, 2007). In addition, it is accepted that there are no “pure” human groups who have existed as separate units, as the “most striking feature of global history is the incessant and widespread migration and fusion of groups from different regions” (Lewontin, 1995, p. 113). In sum, the notion of stable, pure human “races” is biological nonsense (Lewontin, 1995). Most anthropologists are also persuaded that “race” is a meaningless concept as applied to humans (Ember & Ember, 2007).

In terms of the social construction issue, the paradox is that “race” as a biological property is illusion, but racism and racial discrimination and racial inequality based on skin tone, parentage, and/or place of origin are very real phenomena in social life (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2012; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). For example, the wealth gaps between European Americans and African Americans are huge when measured by standard of living, educational and occupational opportunities, health care, and ultimately, years of life (Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Wise, 2010).

Disabilities as Social Construction

Some multicultural education textbooks emphasize that disabilities are socially constructed categories. For example, Banks (2006) argued that mental retardation is a social construction. Bennett (2011) stated, “no widely accepted definition of this exceptionality exists because disordered behavior is a socially constructed concept and there is disagreement about what it means to be mentally healthy” (p. 277). Koppelman and Goodhart (2011) avoid making blunt statements about disabilities being entirely social constructions, but argued extensively that “individual ableism” is stereotypical thinking related to the assumption about “disability as a biological problem of a particular individual” and a “medical model of disability, which views the disability as a problem and the solution is to find a cure for it” (p. 299). It is noteworthy that contrary to the aforementioned textbooks, in their multicultural textbook, Manning and Baruth (2009), as well as Gollnick and Chinn (2013), did not refer to disabilities (exceptionalities) as social constructions.

Social construction is itself a fuzzy idea. A fuzzy concept is vague, lacks precise meaning, or has multiple meanings, and its application varies considerably (Haack, 1996). Briefly, we consider the use of the “social construction” in a sample of cultural markers, such as “race,” gender, and ethnicity to determine its meaning, and whether this concept is used in a similar fashion across contexts.

In most anthropological textbooks, the term social construction of “race” refers to a widespread illusion with regard to perceived categorical biological differences (see above). In addition, it refers to how cultural identities, similar to those of ethnic identities, are constructed within a culture. Arguably, the term social construction of gender refers primarily to social or cultural roles (e.g., masculine and feminine roles), constructed within a society or culture. The gender concept is based on the distinction between the biological sex linked to anatomical and hormonal differences, and gender describing social or cultural roles and behaviors. Culture shapes gender roles, which are tasks, activities, and expectations that a culture assigns to sexes (Kottak & Kozaitis, 2012). Gender differences in a society are based on but not caused by sex differences (Lewontin, 1995). Gender also refers to gender identity, that is, how a person views himself or herself in terms of gender self-image. It is noteworthy that gender roles are changing and the notions of masculinity and femininity are more fluid than ever today. The “biological sex and gender identity are not inherently linked or absolutely binary,” and gender is a “human attribute that transcends sex and sexuality” (Kottak & Kozaitis, 2012, p. 143). Finally, the term social construction of ethnicity refers to the social organization of the perceived ethnic/culture difference. It also refers to an ongoing and interactive process of identity formation (Nanda & Warms, 2007). To conclude, the term social construction when linked to three cultural markers has at least five meanings.

In multicultural education theory, it is not clear how the term social construction is used when it is linked to disability (e.g., intellectual disabilities). Do multicultural education theorists consider that intellectual disabilities are a social illusion, a social role, a social organization process, an identity formation, a socialization process, or a combination? If so, how and why? The misuse and misunderstanding of the fuzzy term of social construction, and its association with the neutralization of disabilities, are two of the reasons that we suggest the concept of social construction hinders the search to understand disability/ies as part of human diversity. Everything and anything can be considered socially constructed, from brotherhood to serial homicide, urban statistics, nature, and the planet Mars. Hacking (1999) addressed radical social constructionism and posed the relevant question, “The social construction of what?”

Minority Model, Disability Rights, and Social Justice

We acknowledge that the minority or/and social model of disability has served people with physical and sensory disabilities to some extent both politically in supporting a social movement and psychologically in boosting self-esteem and building a positive sense of collective membership (Shakespeare, 2013). Changing the view of disability from individual impairment to social barriers has also promoted the concept of universal design as a redesign of public space (Goldsmith, 1967). However, the minority model or the universal design project cannot address all barriers erected either by cognitive or mental limitations or by economic inequalities and unequal distribution of power (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2011, 2012; Shakespeare, 2006, 2013; Williams, 1999).

Recognition of the fact that some people with disabilities have both atypical abilities and special needs can make a big difference in social policy. In his famous “capability theory,” economist Sen (1992) explicitly recognized this problem. As he put it,

Our physical and social characteristics make us immensely diverse creatures. We differ in age, sex, physical and mental health, bodily prowess, intellectual abilities, climatic circumstances, epidemiological vulnerability, social surroundings, and in many other respects. Such diversities, however, can be hard to accommodate adequately in the usual evaluative framework of inequality assessment. (p. 28)

Sen’s (1992, 1999) four theses are closely related to our discussion of disability: First, there do exist interpersonal differences in mental, physical, and psychological abilities, and in some cases (e.g., profound intellectual disability, severe autistic disorder), these differences are beyond individuals’ control (Sen, 1992, 1999, 2004). Second, disabilities can have an influence on the overall capability of a person. In many cases, a severe disability deprives one of capabilities. Thus, a person with a disability needs higher income (e.g., for additional devices or rehabilitation) to perform the same variety of functioning, when such performance is possible (Sen, 1999).

The real inequality of people that people face cannot readily be deduced from the magnitude of incomes, since what we can or cannot do, can or cannot achieve, do not depend just on our incomes but also on the variety of physical and social characteristics that affect our lives and make us what we are.

To take a simple illustration, the extent of comparative deprivation of a physically handicapped person vis-à-vis others cannot be adequately judged by looking at his or her income, since the person may be greatly disadvantaged in converting income into the achievements he or she would value. (Sen, 1992, p. 28)

Third, regarding the economic challenges for persons with (physical) disabilities, there are two types of disadvantage that tend to go with disability: the earning disadvantage and conversion disadvantage (handicap, in Sen’s terminology).

A disabled person may find it harder to get a job or to retain it, and may receive lower compensation for work . . . But that is only a part of the problem. To do the same things as an able-bodied person, a person with physical disability may need more income than the able-bodied person. To move easily or at all, a person who happens to be, say, crippled by an accident or by illness may need assistance, or prosthesis, or both. The conversion handicap [emphasis added] refers to the disadvantage that a disabled person has in converting money into good living. It is not sufficient to be concerned only with earning handicap, since disabled persons tend to suffer also from conversion handicaps. (Sen, 2004, pp. 3–4)

Finally, in the cases of age, disability, and disease, the principle of equality of opportunities—which usually is interpreted to mean equal availability of resources or equal applicability (or equal non-applicability) of a principle—must be revised (Sen, 1992, 1999). A more adequate and socially just way of considering real equality of opportunities must be equality of capabilities (Sen, 1992).

Thus, assimilating disability into cultural difference is not just another conceptual issue, but a serious social justice issue that has sociopolitical and educational implications. If disability were just another cultural difference, then the politics of recognition of difference or symbolic cultural politics might serve adequately the needs of people with disabilities. The overemphasis on this kind of politics, has, sometimes, disfavored disability benefit programs or social welfare services. A downsizing of social welfare programs and the devaluing of extra special education services can have negative consequences for people with disability. Prioritizing identity politics at the expense of the politics of redistribution can have detrimental effects on the lives of people with disabilities, especially in a sociopolitical context characterized by the withdrawal of welfare services (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2009, 2012; Erkulwater, 2006). Instead, we believe that the social inclusion of people with disabilities and social justice can be served by a balanced and comprehensive political strategy with two axes: (a) the politics of difference by struggling for the removal of barriers to achieve parity in social life, and claiming equitable social and political participation, and (b) the politics of redistribution by claiming additional resources, and expanding educational, economic, and social opportunities for people with disabilities to reverse the conversion disadvantage (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2012; Erkulwater, 2006; Fraser, 2000).

A Problematic Corollary: The Neutralization of Disability

Some multicultural theorists (e.g., Banks, 2006; Bennett, 2011; Koppelman & Goodhart, 2011; Kymlicka, 1995) seem to say that disabilities are not problems in themselves, that disabilities are neutral conditions requiring only the removal of social barriers to people who have them. Indeed, for many people with disabilities, the social discrimination, hostility, ostracism, and exclusion are worse than the physical or mental restrictions themselves. However, all these social, political, economic, and cultural disadvantages can exist independent of disabilities and surely do not define disabilities themselves (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2013). In other words, being Roma, Black, female, or gay can be disadvantageous in some social contexts, and it is only the social construction—bias, prejudice, discrimination—of them that is the disadvantage. We understand that in the absence of social barriers, inequalities and injustices such identities (e.g., Romaness, Blackness, femaleness, homosexuality) are neutral features, not characteristics we should seek to prevent or change if we can (Harris, 2000).

However, disabilities are not constructed simply by bias and ignorance, and are not neutral conditions. If they were, then it seems reasonable to assume that there would be nothing wrong with treating children in such a manner that they could no longer hear, see, walk, think, speak, read, and so on—to be blunt, to treat them such that their abilities are either thwarted or reversed (Harris, 2000, 2002). Despite the fact that disability is a natural part of human diversity, it is not just another difference and must not be seen as an unwarranted social construction alone. That is, there are important differences among differences, and disability is not a difference that, like race or ethnicity, we should on ethical or moral grounds choose to make neutral. Differences are not all equal, and social justice is not found in responding to all differences as if they are (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2011, 2012, 2013; Kauffman & Landrum, 2009).

When cognitive or mental impairments are denied or treated as socially constructed realities, disability in all its forms becomes a neutral human condition—something we do not really care about one way or the other. Then having them is just as good as not having them, and the problem is only that we see them as important when they are not. This neutralization of disabilities, disconnecting them from the body, brain, mind, and behavior of the individual, in turn allows social constructionists to give to their theoretical constructs complete autonomy, to argue as if people are social artificial operating systems empty of critical socialized biological features.

On Reconciling Different Views of Special Education and Multicultural Education

With regard to disability, most multicultural education theorists tend to point out three important, interrelated issues: (a) the interaction between disability and ethnic difference, (b) the dangers of labeling, and (c) the disproportionality issue in special education (i.e., the disproportionate representation of culturally and linguistically diverse students in special education placements; for a review, see Anastasiou, Gardner, & Michail, 2011). These are also among the most controversial issues within the field of special education field, but a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article.

The inclusion of disability in a multicultural frame of reference—in whatever way—makes us ponder major issues of human biological and cultural diversity. This opportunity for rational thinking and scientific research “on being different” in various but not always equivalent forms has emerged for both special education and multicultural education, and the gray areas of their interaction (e.g., addressing curriculum and teaching issues of English Language Learners). Plurality of views is necessary to dialogue with colleagues, “to clarify ideas, to question, to resolve doubts, and to solve problems” (Bunge, 2012, p. 183). After all, both special and multicultural education are noble causes and share common commitments to equity and social justice.

We hope to be clear in calling for social justice in responding to all kinds of difference. In our view, failing to distinguish between disabilities and cultural differences such as “race” or ethnicity impedes morally defensible, sustainable social change. Portraying disabilities as demanding the same civil rights remedy as other differences will surely stymie efforts to prevent and remediate disabilities and do justice to people with disabilities.

Policy Implications

The nature of the differences we call disabilities calls for policies quite different from those addressing other differences, even if a “culture of disability” exists (Anastasiou & Kauffman, 2012; Kauffman & Landrum, 2009). Perhaps Zigmond and Kloo (2011) have stated most eloquently why the difference between disability and other forms of human diversity must be recognized, and educational policies in particular must take into consideration the differences in differences. With reference to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), they commented,

That’s what makes IDEA different from other civil rights legislation, for minorities, for English Language Learners, for girls. We fought to have some students with disabilities treated differently, given more opportunity, more intensive instruction, more individually tailored curriculum, more carefully designed instruction. (p. 170)

Civil rights policies regarding categories of individuals other than those with disabilities are not attuned to degrees of individual difference, nor should they be. For example, policies regarding ethnicity, color, parentage, religion, and so on do not and should not depend on the degree of color, the percentage of national origin, the devoutness to a religion, and so on. However, as many have pointed out (e.g., Bateman, 2011; Yell, 2012; Yell & Crockett, 2011; Zigmond & Kloo, 2011), instructional policies related to disability are based on individual characteristics and needs, not on a group classification, and therefore, individualized planning (e.g., Individualized Education Programs [IEP]) is required. In the case of intellectual disability, physical impairment, and many other types of disability, the nature and degree of the disability are and should be taken into account for policy matters, and that is why civil rights policy regarding disability should not and cannot mimic that of civil rights regarding other minorities without risk of losing the very rights that are most important.

Education policy is perhaps most obviously at issue, but education is not the only area in which policy must recognize the difference between disability and other forms of diversity. For example, miscarriages of justice are certain when the nature and extent of disability are disregarded in matters of employment (e.g., negative outcomes are predictable when a person with severe intellectual disability is hired to perform an intellectually demanding task), although the nature and extent of differences related to other forms of human diversity (e.g., differences in color, differences in parentage) are irrelevant. Hence, a continuum of employment options, including competitive employment, entrepreneurship or self-employment, cooperatives, supported employment (usually by using job coaches who offer individualized assistance), and sheltered employment, is currently available world-wide (Mont, 2004). Despite concerns about sheltered employment, the continuum of services constitutes an integrated work policy, and when based on “person-centered planning¹,” could increase work opportunities and promote community participation for people with disabilities (Blessing, Golden, & Bruyère, 2009; Mont, 2004). However, arguably for persons from some cultural backgrounds, a supported work environment—or, even worse in the opinion of some, a sheltered work environment—could be considered unacceptable, discriminatory work policy.

Overall, public policies based on a minority group model tend to identify discrimination as the primary barrier faced by people with disabilities, emphasizing formal equality issues and promoting anti-discrimination legislation (Bruyère, 2000; Mont, 2004). In this line of reasoning, Article 27 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of People With Disabilities (CRPD; 2006),

recognize the right of persons with disabilities to work, on an equal basis with others; this includes the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities. States Parties shall safeguard and promote the realization of the right to work, including for those who acquire a disability during the course of employment, by taking appropriate steps.

Several countries provide examples of a more integrated public policy on work and employment emphasizing both equality/anti-discrimination and social (re)distribution/compensation (see description provided by Mont, 2004). Policies that integrate equality of opportunity with social justice, or an equality of capabilities perspective, would use a greater variety of tools such as disability cash benefits, intensive rehabilitation programs and vocational training, supported work, sheltered and public sector employment, hiring quotas, and tax incentives for employers and employees. Such policies go further than the mere legal recognition of the right of persons with disabilities to work on an equal basis with others in an accessible environment.

In short, formal equality or anti-discriminatory conceptualizations lead to civil rights–like and affirmative-like action policies appropriate for many minority groups, but these policies cannot serve the whole spectrum of the population with disabling conditions. Disability appears to be a unique form of difference in its implications for policy solutions. Many people with sensory disabilities such as deafness and blindness, as well as orthopedic disabilities, may be well-served by anti-discriminatory legislation and inclusive policies. However, most people with a chronic illness or fatal disease, severe mental health problems (e.g., schizophrenia and major depression), severe cognitive disabilities, and other developmental disorders (e.g., autism spectrum disorders) face extreme challenges, apart from anti-discriminatory legislation. They may need, in addition, compensatory and (re)distribution programs and policies based on social justice.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Dimitris Anastasiou, PhD, is assistant professor of special education at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. His publications are in the areas of high-incidence disabilities, philosophical approaches to disability, and international issues in disability and education.

James M. Kauffman, EdD, is professor emeritus of education at the University of Virginia. He is the author or co-author or co-editor of many publications in special education. His primary area of interest in special education is emotional and behavioral disorders.

Domna Michail, PhD, is assistant professor of social anthropology at the University of Western Macedonia, Greece. Her research interests include the anthropology of education and migration, nationalism, ethnicity, minorities and gender.

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